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Introduction
"Gettin' no rest till de judgement day"
In October, 1922, the New Orleans Item invited Martin 
Behrman, the former mayor and the leader of the Regular 
Democratic Organization (RDO), to commit his personal and 
public history to writing. For years the Item had been a 
relentless and often merciless critic of Behrman and his so- 
called political machine. In 1920, with the help of an 
assortment of anti-Regular reformers, including Governor 
John Milliken Parker, and disaffected professional politi­
cians, led by John Patrick Sullivan, the Item drove Martin 
Behrman and his Regular Democrats from power, ending twenty 
years of "ring rule" and electing a reform municipal admin­
istration under Mayor Andrew McShane. Now weary of the end­
less and pointless bickering and inept administration of the 
municipal government under McShane and the commission coun­
cil, the Item discovered a grudging appreciation for Mayor 
Behrman and his "reform" Regular Democrats.x
Over the course of his discursive, though informative, 
writings, Martin Behrman wondered why so many of the readers 
and friends of the New Orleans Item opposed him and his
xNew Orleans "Behrman Tells," Item, October 23, 1922. 
Paul Capdevielle was the first Regular Democrat elected as 
mayor. Behrman succeeded him in 1904, serving four consecu­
tive terms as mayor.
1
administration. Behrman believed, with considerable justi­
fication, that his administration benefitted the interests 
of civic and commercial leadership of the city, providing it 
with effective public services and honest, progressive muni­
cipal government. He could only surmise that the social and 
civic leaders of New Orleans disliked him and his kind of 
professional politician and could not abide the idea of 
their social inferiors governing New Orleans.2
The dislike of the social and civic elite for profes­
sional politicians and the people they represented was 
both personal and political, Behrman suggested. The social 
civic elites of New Orleans, Behrman asserted, considered 
professional politicians uncouth, corrupt, and unfit to 
govern. In their view, he wrote, "professional politicians 
should not have political power and...public places that 
have power should go to gentlemen of literary learning, 
students of history, and prominent citizens of large estab­
lishments, such as banks, railroads and so forth." It was 
their belief that "plain men from less fortunate families 
living on the side streets in small houses, men who spent 
their whole lives actively in politics, should never be 
promoted to positions of power in government." Rather, 
Behrman argued, the "silk-stocking" and commercial elites 
wanted public office and political power to remain exclu­
2John R. Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman of New Orleans 
Memoirs of a City Boss. (Baton Rouge, 1977), 107-08.
sively in their possession, rotating power and position only 
among men of their own class, education, and moral and 
political persuasion.3
Martin Behrman's description of municipal politics in 
New Orleans during the Progressive Era is not without sub­
stance or merit. The leading anti-Regular reformers of New 
Orleans, men like John M. Parker, Charles Allen Favrot, 
Esmond Phelps, James M. Thomson, and Donelson Caffery formed 
a self-conscious social and civic elite, bitterly resentful 
of its declining political power and the ascendancy of pro­
fessional politicians like Martin Behrman. And, despite its 
reformist rhetoric and pretensions, it objected to many of 
the municipal reforms and policies of the Behrman adminis­
tration, in particular the intrusion of the municipal 
government in the private and public affairs of business and 
industry. This self-styled elite rarely won a municipal 
election, but it exerted a profound, though, at times, 
detrimental, influence on city politics and the municipal 
reform movement. For dispite its complaints, the social and 
civic elite retained position and power in the municipal and 
parochial governments of New Orleans and it used its posi­
tion and power to satisfy its own personal wants and politi­
cal interests.*
3Ibid.
■•Matthew J. Schott, "Progressives Against Democracy: 
Electoral Reforms in Louisiana, 1894-1921," Louisiana 
History, XX (Summer 1979), 247-60.
Admittedly, the principal leadership of the anti- 
Regular municipal reform movement came from the "upper 
crust" of Mew Orleans society and its beliefs had a signi­
ficant influence on the disposition of anti-Regular reform. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume— and a close read­
ing of the historical record does not suggest— that social 
prejudice, class distinctions, moral considerations, and 
anti-democratic sentiment formed the basis of progressive 
municipal reform in New Orleans. Though the Regular Demo­
cratic Organization had supporters among the lower working 
classes of New Orleans, a recent study has concluded that 
there was no clear social, ethnic, or occupational distinc­
tions between the leadership of the RDO and the members of 
the anti-Regular reform movement, suggesting, perhaps, that 
ethno-cultural issues did not determine the content of muni­
cipal politics in the Progressive Era.® The Regular Demo­
cratic Organization contained men (and women) of all social 
classes, economic classifications, educational achievement.
®Edward P. Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern Citv 
New Orleans in the Progressive Erar (Ruston, 1988), passim. 
Professor Matthew J. Schott suggested in two published 
studies and in his doctoral thesis that "social prejudice 
and moral considerations" formed the basis of antimachine 
progressive reform. But Professor Schott's definition of 
progressive reform is too narrow and conventional in light 
of the immense historical literature on the Progressive Era. 
See Schott, "John M. Parker of Louisiana and the Varieties 
of American Progressivism," (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt 
University, 1969), passim; "The New Orleans Machine and Pro­
gressivism," Louisiana History. XIV (Spring 1983), 141-53; 
"Huey Long: Progressive Backlash?," Louisiana History. XXVII 
(Spring 1986), 134-35, see footnote 3.
and political persuasion. The Regular Democrats were, in 
many ways, more representative of the progressive municipal 
reform movement than the civic and commerical elite of New 
Orleans. The RDO did not, as has been suggested, "co-optn 
progressive reform out of political necessity. Rather, the 
Regulars adopted municipal reform out of personal and poli­
tical conviction, a devotion to the progressive reform prin­
ciples of the Democratic party, and recognition that munici­
pal reform was good politics." But it would be a mistake, as 
well, to believe that city politics in New Orleans during 
the Progressive Era focused principally on the social dif­
ferences between working-class politicians, consumed with 
local, pedestrian interests and dedicated to democratic 
principles, and a civic-commercial elite, dispairing of 
democracy and dedicated to efficiency, centralized author­
ity, and cosmopolitian issues. The issues and politics of 
municipal reform transcended social distinctions, centering 
instead on fundamental questions of represenation, the 
source and character of political and municipal authority, 
and power and ethics.7
"Schott, "The New Orleans Machine," 141-44; Haas, 
Political Leadership in a Southern City, 99.
7Richard L. McCormick, "Ethno-Cultural Interpretations 
of Nineteenth-Century Voting Behavior," Political Science 
Quarterly. 89 (June 1974), 351-77; McCormick, "The Discovery 
That Business Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the Ori­
gins of Progressivism," The American Historical Review. 86 
(April 1981), 247-74.
The Regular Democrats and the civic-commercial reform­
ers were concerned with the issues of expanding and central­
ized municipal authority, regulation of private and public 
corporations, completion and expansion of public services, 
"living wages" and decent working conditions for organized 
labor, equitable taxation and assessment rates for property 
holders, and city planning. Though there were (and are) 
innumerable social implications in all those issues, social 
distinctions in the form of ethnic and religious differences 
did not determine why the Regulars and the reformers divided 
on those issues."
The answer lies, I believe, in the philosophical, ideo­
logical differences between the Regular Democratic Organiza­
tion and the reformers. The Regulars and the civic reformers 
of New Orleans divided on one of the principal concerns of 
the Progressive Era, the demand for a more effective, effi­
cient, centralized public authority and the preservation and 
expansion of democratic self-government. The division was 
never a clear one. As a rule, the RDO did not fear or oppose 
centralized municipal authority and, broadly speaking, its
"The conventional view of municipal politics is stated 
in several sources. For example, see, Allen P. Sindler,
Huev Long's Louisiana State Politics. 1920-1952. (Baton 
Rouge, 1956), passim; George Reynolds, Machine Politics in 
New Orleans, 1897-1926, (New York, 1936), passim; T. Harry 
Williams, Huey Long, (New York, 1969), passim; Alan 
Brinkley, Voices of Protest Huev Long. Father Coughlin, and 
the Great Depression. (New York, 1982), 15-16. Professor 
Brinkley argued that Louisiana politics subsisted on "airy 
platitudes, patriotic homilies, barbecues, and country 
music".
7efforts to centralize municipal government championed home 
rule and preserved democratic institutions. At times, 
though, the commitment of the RDO to democratic institu­
tions stymied efforts to establish a centralized municipal 
government, particularly in its attempts to regulate and 
rehabilitate the public utilities industry in New Orleans. 
The civic reformers, on the other hand, believed that the 
centralization of public power in their hands would promote 
efficient municipal government, diminish the influence of 
"unwarranted" political considerations, and bring about a 
fundamental and just realignment of public and political au­
thority. The civic and commercial elites of New Orleans 
were never nonpartisans. They, too, sought public power and 
political advantage. They advocated centralized municipal 
government only when they could control it, characterizing 
centralized government under the Regulars as "politicized" 
and inefficient.
Personalities, organizations, and specific issues, of 
course, also shaped municipal politics in New Orleans in the 
Progressive Era. Most students of politics in New Orleans 
considered the Regular Democratic Organization the southern 
version of the corrupt, urban political machines of the 
northeast and midwest. These students portrayed the RDO as a 
political organization comprised exclusively of working- 
class, parochial politicians, relentless in its pursuit of 
patronage and political advantage. These same students de-
pict the Regular Democrats as corrupt and conservative, 
allied with the interests of the "vicious class" and the 
interests of alien corporations like New Orleans Railway 
and Light Company.9
There were, to be sure, members of the RDO who came 
from or represented the working class of New Orleans and who 
were concerned with "pedestrian" issues. A few owned bar­
rooms, drank and smoked heavily, missed Mass on occasion, 
and at least two of them had financial (and romantic) in­
terests in the infamous red-light district, Storyville. Some 
Regulars were, for the most part, unschooled, like Martin 
Behrman, others were unprincipled, like John Sullivan, and 
more than a few were consumed with political patronage, like 
Sullivan, Robert Ewing, and Ulic Burke..But these men and 
conditions were the exceptions rather than the rules. Within 
the ranks of the RDO, there were many college-educated, 
middle- and upper-class business and professional men. Men 
like attorneys Joseph Generally, Chandler C. Luzenberg, and 
I. D. Moore, businessmen Arthur J. O'Keefe, Edward Lafaye, 
William Bess Thompson, and Martin Manion. These men were not 
pliable, "shirt front" businessmen lending respectability, 
and nothing else, to a corrupt and irresponsible political 
machine. Rather, they were leaders of the RDO and executive
"Williams, Huev Long, passim; Brinkely, Voices of Pro­
test, 15; Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison and the 
Image of Reform New Orleans Politics. 1946-1961. (Baton 
Rouge 1974), 8.
members of the municipal government under Martin Behrman, 
contributing directly to the political success of the Regu­
lars and determining public policy for New Orleans.
Nor were these men and others like them opposed to 
municipal reform. Martin Manion, for example, endorsed and 
worked for the municipal regulation of the public utilities 
industry in New Orleans and advocated woman suffrage. As 
Commissioner of Public Property, Edward Lafaye developed a 
comprehensive paving plan for New Orleans and forced the New 
Orleans Railway and Light Company to reduce its electric 
rates and to install "modern" street lighting for the city. 
On the whole, the Regular Democrats supported municipal re­
form, including the primary election system, the commission 
form of government, the regulation of the public utilities 
industry (the Behrman administration did not endorse munici­
pal ownership, principally because the city could not afford 
to purchase NORLC and because municipalization did not guar­
antee lower rates and better service), and the centraliza­
tion of municipal authority under the commission council.
The RDO was also dedicated to municipal public ser­
vices. During Behrman's tenure as mayor, his administration 
completed and expanded the sewerage, drainage, and water 
system, began and completed a public belt railroad serving 
the port of New Orleans, compelled the Board of Liquidation 
City Debt, an indepedent commission controlled by the major 
bankers of New Orleans, to place city revenues in interest-
10
bearing accounts (something not prescribed by law), initi­
ated a comprehensive paving plan, and attempted, though did 
not accomplish, the regulation and rehabilitation o£ the New 
Orleans Railway and Light Company. The failure to regulate 
and rehabilitate the public service industry did not result, 
however, from an "unholy alliance" between the Regular Demo­
cratic Organization and New Orleans Railway and Light Com­
pany. Rather, that failure stemmed from the partisan objec­
tions of the civic-commercial elite to municipal regulation 
under the RDO and from the reluctance of the Behrman admin­
istration to dictate a settlement.
The rehabilitation issue was not the only "failure" of 
the Behrman administration. The city administration en­
dorsed, though did not profit from, legal vice, fighting 
efforts by local citizens and the federal government to 
close Storyville, giving substance to accusations that the 
RDO was a thoroughly venial and corrupt political machine. 
The Regulars were also unable to resolve the city's anti­
quated financial and assessment systems, leaving the city 
administration without adequate revenues and opening it to 
allegations of "politicized" assessment practices and 
charges of maladministration of the public money.
In essence, then, despite its many accomplishments, the 
Behrman administration could not convince the civic and 
commercial leadership of New Orleans that it could govern 
effectively and honestly. As a rule, civic reformers be-
11
lieved that the Regular Democrats lacked "popular" support 
and governed, as one accomplished scholar noted, "through 
a combination of philanthropy and corruption". The civic- 
conunercial reformers accused the RDO of manipulating the 
political process, adding thousands of unqualified, even 
nonexistent, voters to the rolls, intimidating voters 
through its abuse of tax and assessment practices, and "buy­
ing" votes with political patronage and favoritism. Above 
all else, the civic reformers of New Orleans complained that 
the Regular Democrats "politicalized" private and public af­
fairs, subjecting private economic interests to public con­
trol and regulation and excluding the "better class" of 
citizens from public affairs.10
Unwilling to accept their declining political influ­
ence, the civic reformers demanded the restructuring of the 
municipal government and the realigning of political power 
in New Orleans. They demonstrated for the commission council 
form of municipal government, preference primary elections, 
the appointment of most executive public offices, and re­
sisted attempts to eliminate their own positions and powers 
on the independent municipal boards and commissions. They 
achieved only modest success, but they managed to influence 
the structure and content of municipal affairs. Though un^ 
able to sustain themselves in elected public office, the
xoBrinkley, Voices of Protest. 15; Schott, "John H. Par­
ker," passim, "Progressives Against Democracy," passim.
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civic elite retained their near complete hold on the in­
dependent municipal and parochial boards. And, contrary to 
the conventional understanding, the civic reformers did not 
desert politics after every electoral defeat. Rather, they 
organized and politicked through the civic and commercial 
organizations they controlled, compelling the Behrman admin­
istration to temporize its attempts to centralize authority 
and to further "politicize" municipal affairs.xx
Despite those accusations and complaints, the Regular 
Democrats were genuinely popular, attracting support from 
most every segment of the community and generally providing 
effective municipal government. Though the Regulars never 
willfully or systemactically manipulated the voting rolls 
(as the civic reformers attempted), they did contribute to 
the "politicalization" of municipal affairs in New Orleans. 
They, too, urged the restructuring the municipal government 
and the realignment of political power in New Orleans. The 
Regular Democratic Organization and the Behrman administra­
tion sought greater public authority over the independent 
municipal boards, the regulation of private economic af­
fairs, and the recognition of diverse political interests in 
governing New Orleans. Little wonder, then, that the RDO and 
the Behrman administration had few friends among the civic 
and commercial elite of New Orleans.
xxSchott, "John M. Parker," passim.
Chapter One
"Where the Elite Meet to Eat"
For Walter Denegre and his friends and associates in 
the Good Government League (GGL), the past twelve years in 
the political life of New Orleans were bitterly disappoint­
ing and terribly confusing.3* In the years since 1900, when 
the Regular Democratic Organization (RDO), the so-called 
machine, reestablished authority over municipal affairs, 
Denegre and other men of similar social and business back­
grounds complained openly about their loss of political in­
fluence in New Orleans. Though several of them still held 
positions of importance in the municipal and parochial 
governments, in particular on several independent boards and 
commissions, they were, they believed, unable to determine 
the content of public policy to their satisfaction.2 Men 
like Denegre, John M. Parker, the leader of the GGL, Esmond 
Phelps, the Attorney for the New Orleans Daily Picayune, 
James Mcllhaney Thomson, the publisher of the New Orleans
1Denegre to John M. Parker, January 28, 1912, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, here­
after cited as Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. January 
5, 23, March 3, 1912.
2New Orleans Item. June 21, 22, 1911; Matthew James 
Schott, "John M. Parker of Louisiana and the Varities of 
American Progressivism," (Ph. D. dissertation, Vanderbilt 
University, 1969), 111-16; Schott, "Progressives Against 
Democracy: Electoral Reform in Louisiana," Louisiana 
History. XX (Summer 1979), 247-60.
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Item, and Charles Janvier objected to what they called the 
"politicalization" of public policy and private affairs. In 
public matters, the reformers complained that the "people" 
had lost the ability to affect the selection of public offi­
cials and to control the government and determine its poli­
cies. In the private realm,they wanted to protect private
concerns and initiatives from"inimical" political consider­
ations.3 In essence they ob-jected to a system of politics
and a structure of municipal government that, as Samuel P. 
Hays wrote, "enabled local and particularistic interests to 
dominate" municipal affairs.1* These local and pedestrian 
interests, the reformers believed, dominated municipal af­
fairs because of the decentralized character of municipal 
politics and government The ward system, they argued, 
favored parochial interests by giving those interests an 
artifical and disproportional advantage on the city council. 
The aldermen, too, were men of local and limited vision, 
unable and unwilling to speak and work for interests beyond
3Walter Denegre to Parker, March 28, 1903; Charles 
Janvier to Parker, October 20, 1903. Paker Papers, UNC.
'•Samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal 
Government in the Progressive Era," Pacific Northwest Quar­
terly, LV (October 1964), 157-69. Professor Hays correctly
identified the source of the discontent of upper-class re­
formers like Parker and Denegre, and I have based my assess­
ment of their actions on Hays's seminal essay on the sub­
ject. However, Hays's claim that the upper-class complaints 
formed the basis of municipal reform is incorrect. As J. 
Joseph Huthmacher, John D. Buenker, Richard L. McCormick, 
David P. Thelen, and others have shown, municipal reform in 
the progressive era incorporated more than an upper-class 
response to industrialism.
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those of their own neighborhood or district.9 There was no 
advantage, either, in politicking to replace one set of 
councilmen with another. By definition, ward representation 
meant serving local and pedestrian interests. To remedy 
their disadvantage, the upper-class reformers sought to re­
move the basis of local representation. "Toward this end," 
wrote Samuel Hays, the upper-class reformers "sought innova­
tions in the formal machinery of government which would con­
centrate political power by sharply centralizing the pro­
cesses of decision-making rather than distribute it through 
more popular participation in public affairs."®
In New Orleans, the charter of 1896, conceived and car­
ried out in the name of municipal reform, succeeded in re­
ducing the number of councilmen, but did not diminish the 
importance of local interest in municipal affairs.7 The new 
charter continued the standard practice of ward representa­
tion, allotting one councilman for each of the seventeen 
wards (a later revision increased the number to twenty-one).
9Hays, "The Politics of Reform," 161-62.
®Ibid.. 162-63.
7Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age: Politics 
and Urban Reform (Baton Rouge,1969), 312-27; Raymond 0. 
Nussbaum, Jr., "Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 
1896-1900," (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1974), 
87-89; Edward P. Haas, "John Fitzpatrick and Political 
Continuity in New Orleans, 1896-1899," Louisiana History.
XXII (Winter 1981), 7-29; Administrative Survey of the 
Government of the City of New Orleans (New Orleans, 1922), 
46-48.
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The charter removed much o£ the council's command over pat­
ronage, placing common city officials under civil service, 
and creating a civil service commission to administer the 
new system. The charter also placed the police and fire de­
partments under a separate civil service system and distinct 
and independent boards. The reformers managed to enhance the 
power and prerogatives of the mayor (an office traditionally 
held by men of supposed greater ability and higher social 
standing than councilmen8), granting him more authority over 
the administration of municipal affairs. The charter author­
ized the mayor to appoint the commissioners of several exe­
cutive departments, creating to some degree a coordinated 
and potentially powerful executive branch of city govern­
ment . *
The new, more "representative" council, however, re­
tained its traditional powers over franchises, budgeting, 
finances, and approval over appointments to specific boards, 
permitting local political interests to determine the con­
tent of some of the more important aspects of municipal 
policy. The mayor, too, no matter how independent or power­
ful, depended on the council and those it served for the
“Jon C. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph Citv Government 
in America,. 1870-1900 (Baltimore and London, 1984), 42-54.
*Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age. 312-27; Nuss- 
baum, "Progressive Politics," 87-89; Henry C. Dethloff, 
"Populism and Reform in Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Uni­
versity of Missouri, 1964), 300-01.
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practical and political authority to execute his office.
Even in a system that centralized power into fewer hands, 
there was always the danger that truly essential services 
and obligations could be "politicalized" beyond the reach 
of the upper-class reformers.
Beginning in the 1880s, then, the city's reform estab­
lishment convinced the state legislature to create boards 
and commissions, independent of the municipal government and 
removed from public, political considerations, to govern the 
development, distribution, and funding of such essential 
services as debt liquidation, water, drainage, health, levee 
protection, and the management of the Port of New Orleans. 
These boards had funding independent of the city council and 
administration. And, as Jon C. Teaford has shown, "the com­
missioners who expended these funds could act almost en­
tirely without regard for public opinion, since they served 
for life [or a term beyond that of any elected official] and 
owed their appointment to their colleagues on the commission 
and not to any elected offical."xo And, as Teaford has also 
shown for New Orleans and other American cities, the civic- 
commerical elite dominated these boards, allowing only the 
mayor or some other executive officer to serve as ex officio 
members. "Free from the pressures of the public or 
politics," Teaford wrote, these independent boards and
x°Jon C. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph, 66-82, quota­
tion on 70-71.
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commissions attempted to conduct the public business "in 
accord with their own perceptions of the public interest."X1
Despite these apparent advantages, the upper-class re­
formers were unable to determine public policy free of "po­
litical" considerations. There were several reasons why. 
First, the charter reforms and the special legislation 
creating the independent boards and commissions did not cen­
tralize municipal administration. To the contrary, the muni­
cipal reforms of the 1880s and 1890s recognized what Jon C. 
Teaford called a "complex framework of redistributed author­
ity and balanced power." This new arrangement permitted for 
"greater centralization and continuing neighborhood power, 
for coordination as well as fragmentation."12 Under this 
framework, the council remained the principal forum for lo­
cal concerns, distributing services and favors to those at 
the so-called local level. No longer in a ceremonial posi­
tion, the mayor became a true executive, possessing author­
ity and power to determine policy and compel compliance with 
that policy. The urban elite retained immense influence over 
vital services and concerns, often free of political consid­
erations. Yet, the municipal framework satisfied no one be­
cause it accomodated everyone. And it began to fall apart
“ Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph, 68-77, quotation on
76.
“ Ibid. . 81.
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when services were no longer local and power no longer 
centralized within separate spheres of interests.13
Second, though the reformers were able to reshape the 
structure of government, they were never truly able to read­
just the complex structures of urban politics. Throughout 
the 1890s and into the twentieth century, electoral reforms 
designed to reduce and hamper the voters managed to further 
"democratize1* urban politics and government, much to the 
dismay of the upper-class urban progressives who advocated 
them.1* In particular, the direct (and in the South, white 
and partisan) primary helped restore faith in the political 
party system. The direct primary, coming in the first decade 
of the twentieth century, complemented earlier electoral re­
form measures, dispelling the image of the party as the ad­
vocate of vested interests. Indeed, supporters of the direct 
primary saw it as a "remedy" for the corrupt political in­
fluence of special interests, a way of "re-enfranchising" 
the people.13 The political parties, particularly at the 
local level, became everything to everybody, defining par­
tisanship on the basis of shared interests.1®
13Ibid.. 9, 80-82.
1*Matthew J. Schott, "Progressives Against Democracy," 
247-GO.
lsRichard L. McCormick, "The Discovery that Business 
Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the Origins of Progres- 
sivism," 267, 269.
lsMcCormick, "The Discovery that Business Corrupts Poli­
tics," 250-51, 269-70.
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Third, by definition, reformers like Denegre and Parker 
shared few interests with the common voter or politician, 
especially their notions of politics and, in particular, 
government. In the years after 1900, Americans redefined 
their concept of government and the role it played in their 
lives. According to Robert H. Wiebe, after 1900, Americans 
wanted a government "broadly and continuously involved in 
society's operations."XT The new politics assumed a govern­
ment vested with broad, flexible powers, capable of respond­
ing to the demands of modern urban life. Good government, 
Wiebe wrote, meant efficient government "not a handful of 
honest men on low salaries; a rational electorate presup­
posed the eventual inclusion of all citizens, instead of its 
restriction to one class; civil service promised increasing 
government service...rather than its further withdrawal; di­
rect democracy no longer replaced government...but strength­
ened it; and the harmonious society, now usually composed of 
interacting groups instead of isolated individuals, depended 
upon government's presence not its absence."XB
Finally, municipal reform was not limited to the con­
cerns of Parker and the other "political" reformers in the 
Good Government League. Several reformers within the GGL 
urged the League to endorse reforms concerning corporate re-
17Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New 
York, 1967), 160; McCormick, "The Discovery that Business 
Corrupts Politics," 251.
“ Wiebe, The Search for Order. 161.
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gulation, woman suffrage, income tax, and workmen's compen­
sation.3-9 But even moire important, municipal reform was not 
restricted to New Orleans's upper-class establishment. Many 
Regular Democrats, including those in the city government, 
advocated the restructuring of municipal affairs, expanding 
of popular participation in government, curbing the excesses 
of corporate influence in city politics. In a different 
sense, these men, too, were distressed and confused about 
political circumstances in New Orleans. The structural revi­
sions of the 1890s and 1900s divided and diluted the power 
of the municipal government. By 1910, eighteen distinct 
boards and commissions formed part of the municipal govern­
ment of New Orleans. According to one survey of the munici­
pal government, the board system encouraged "inefficiency" 
and delay in public service and allowed those who controlled 
it to escape "accountability" and "criticism and blame".20 
Martin Behrman, the incumbent mayor and the leader of the 
RDO, believed that several boards, in particular the Board 
of Liquidation City Debt, the Board of Commissioners of the 
Port of New Orleans, and the Public Belt Railroad Commis­
sion, represented more the private concerns of their members 
than the public interest. Behrman did not want to dismantle 
the board system. Rather, the mayor sought to bring it under 
greater municipal control. To that end, Behrman proposed
X9Schott, "John M. Parker," 112-15.
2°Administrative Survey of the Government of the Citv of 
New Orleans. 59.
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consolidating the boards under the mayor's office and en­
acting a home rule charter for New Orleans, permitting the 
city to determine its own development and reform itself.21 
Faced with opposition from various interests (public and 
private), Behrman failed to achieve either reform.
The same political reforms that furthered the democra­
tizing of the political processes in New Orleans also fur­
thered the decline of the existing party system, as citizens 
and special interests found ways other than voting to influ­
ence the government. "Interests organizations took over much 
of parties' old job of articulating popular demands and 
pressing them on the government," writes Richard L. McCor­
mick. "More exclusive and single-minded than parties, the 
new organizations became regular elements of the polity." 
"The result," McCormick concludes, "was a fairly drastic 
transformation of the rules of political participation: who 
could compete, the kinds of resources required, and the re­
wards of participation all changed." The formulation of pub­
lic policy also changed, requiring the government to "take 
explicit account of clashing interests and to assume the re­
sponsibility for mitigating their conflicts through regula­
tion, administration, and planning.” The government of the 
City of New Orleans was, as things stood in 1911, unable to
21Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman. 169-73; Teaford, The Un­
heralded Triumph. 105-22; Bradley Robert Rice, Progressive 
Cities The Commission Government Movement in America. 1901- 
1920 (Austin and London, 1977) xii.
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accomodate these changes and new requirements. But both the 
reformers of the GGL and the reformers of the RDO seemed 
poised for reform— even if they had to use the words and 
tactics of the old politics.22
Late in May, 1911, as the cooler and dryer days of 
spring gave way to the repressive heat and humidity of sum­
mer, the leading contenders (and pretenders) for governor 
gathered in New Orleans seeking support or encouragement 
from the GGL and RDO. Neither faction could settle on a 
suitable candidate. The most appealing candidate was Con­
gressman Joseph Eugene Ransdell, but Ransdell parried every 
attempt or device to make him a candidate for governor. He 
wanted nothing to do with Louisiana's intramural and vola­
tile politics.23
If Ransdell did not want to be governor, there were 
many other Democrats who did. Among them was the long-time 
Regular Democrat and the incumbent Secretary of State, John 
T. Michel. Michel was the leader of the Thirteenth Ward in
22McCormick, "The Discovery that Business Corrupts Poli­
tics," 250-51, 269-70; "The Party Period and Public Policy:
An Exploratory Hypothesis," Journal of American History, 66, 
(September 1979), 279-98.
23George Q. Flynn, "A Louisiana Senator and the Underwood 
Tariff," Louisiana History. X (Winter 1969), 5-6; Schott,
"John M. Parker," 122-64. Ransdell declined the nomination 
so he could run for the United States Senate. Ransdell de­
feated the aging incumbent senator, Murphy James Foster. 
Ransdell held his Senate seat until 1930 when Huey Pierce 
Long defeated him. See T. Harry Williams, Huev Long (New 
York, 1969), 460-80.
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New Orleans, a minor political subdivison situated in the 
lowest part of the city. Michel's tenure as Secretary of 
State was hardly noteworthy. He was, as one scholar noted, 
the epitome of the second-class politician, possessing all 
of the vices of political popularity and none of the virtues 
of concerned public service. He was unaccustomed to serious 
campaigning and virtually inarticulate on public issues. He 
too was, from all indications, uncomfortable with the senti­
ments and intentions of "progressive reform" in Louisiana, 
oblivious to the social and political changes within the 
state since the 1890s. Apparently, Michel believed that he 
could become governor by securing as many "public" endorse­
ments as possible, convincing voters of his fitness and com­
pelling other candidates to withdraw from the race. Michel 
simply misunderstood the temper of politics in Louisiana. As 
we have already noted, the political and electoral reforms 
of the 1890s and 1900s had furthered the democratizing of 
state and local politics. No longer did the convention 
bosses— urban or rural— dictate the calibre of candidates or 
determine the choice of issues. Those days in Louisiana and 
New Orleans had given way to a more pluralistic and democra­
tic form and style of politics.2-*
2-*Dethloff, "Populism and Reform," 121-54, 320-63; 
Schott, "John M. Parker," 39-121, 242-76, 317-46, 466-95; 
Joseph G. Tregle, "Another Look at Shugg's Louisiana," 
Louisiana History. XVII (Summer 1976), 245-81.
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Despite these misgivings and misconceptions, Michel 
persited in his attempts to win support from the organized 
political powers in the state. In June, 1911, anxious for a 
visible sign of support, Michel demanded a meeting with the 
leaders of the RDO and Governor Jared Young Sanders. They 
met at the Grunewald Hotel in downtown New Orleans. Michel 
insisted on a formal endorsement, but several Regulars, in­
cluding Mayor Behrman and Robert Ewing, the owner of the New 
Orleans Daily States and the Shreveport Times, considered 
Michel's chances of victory remote. Ewing suggested that 
Michel, like other potential candidates, test his popularity 
in rural north Louisiana, where the balance of power resided 
in state politics, before asking the RDO to commit itself 
to his candidacy. Michel insisted, however, that he be given 
some assurances of organized support, particularly in New 
Orleans, before undertaking a statewide campaign. After sev­
eral more hours of discussion and disagreement. Mayor Behr­
man agreed to campaign for Michel, but only within the city. 
Ewing refused to endorse Michel, seeing no discernible ad­
vantage in supporting a nondescript "ward boss" from New Or­
leans for governor.23
Though Robert Ewing saw no political advantage in sup­
porting Michel, Martin Behrman clearly did. As a resident of
29New Orleans Item. June 18, 23, September 2, October 
11, November 9, 10, 11, 1911, January 29, 1912. Ewing 
endorsed Superintendent of Education James B. Aswell, who 
finished last in the governor's campaign of 1911-1912. Jared 
Young Sanders remained silent during the campaign.
New Orleans, Michel was familiar to the voters and politi­
cians of the city. Despite his obvious liabilities as a can­
didate outside New Orleans (a Roman Catholic from New Or­
leans had not been governor since 1880), Michel could at­
tract a sizeable vote within New Orleans, aiding the other 
Regular candidates for state offices and displaying the vot­
ing strength of the city and the popularity of the RDO. With 
Michel as their candidate, the Regulars could fashion his 
platform and conduct his campaign to suit the concerns and 
interests of the city administration, emphasizing its com­
mitment to progress and municipal— not partisan— reform. 
Mayor Behrman saw the state elections as a referendum on his 
administration and its brand of municipal reform. Behrman 
and the Regulars did not want to surrender those initiatives 
to John M. Parker and the Good Government League. Michel's 
candidacy gave Behrman and the Regulars the opportunity to 
display their appeal to the citizens of New Orleans and to 
establish their claim to the mantle of municipal reform.26
John Parker and other members of the GGL also saw the 
state elections as a prelude to the municipal campaign. The 
old-line reformers believed that the "machine" dominated the 
political life of New Orleans by controlling state and muni­
26I have based this assessment of Behrman's actions and 
reasoning on a study of Michel's platform and the Regulars' 
campaign in New Orleans from September 1911 to January 1912. 
See also Robert Webb Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and 
Political Boss of New Orleans, 1904-1926" (M.A. thesis, 
Tulane University, 1952), 34-35.
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cipal patronage, violating state registration and voting 
laws, and falsely identifying itself with the principles of 
direct democracy and the Democratic party.27 Since state law 
and state officials underwrote these advantages, it was es­
sential to the League's understanding of municipal reform to 
control state government.2® A friendly reform governor could 
withdraw patronge from the machine and order the purging of 
the "animated voting rolls". With the help of the governor 
and a willing state legislature, the GGL could realign city 
politics by restructuring the municipal government along 
prescribed lines and by eliminating the partisan primary. 
With all these reforms in place, the GGL's candidates for 
municipal office could easily defeat any "ring" ticket, as­
suring efficient and honest government for the city and 
eliminating all undue political considerations from the con­
duct of municipal and private affairs.
Finding acceptable candidates for governor and the 
state legislature and eliminating the political advantages 
of the ring were not simple tasks. No one in the leadership
27Parker to James B. Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker 
Papers, UNC; Schott, "John M. Parker," 111-16; "Progressives 
Against Democracy," 247-60; "The New Orleans Machine and 
Progressivism," Louisiana History. XXIV (Spring 1983), 141- 
53.
2aSince the Unification Movement of the 1870s, New Or­
leans reformers considered winning state elections an indis­
pensable to reform in New Orleans. T. Harry Williams, "The 
Louisiana Unification Movement of 1873," Journal of Southern 
History. XI (August 1945), 349-69. For a more recent and 
considered interpretation, see Michael Perman, The Road to 
Redemption Southern Politics. 1869-1879 (Chapel Hill, 1984), 
154-55, 158.
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of the GGL, including John Parker, had any true practical 
experience in the electoral politics of the state, and no 
one in the ranks seemed inclined to seek public office.29 
The League leadership, by necessity, had to look outside its 
membership to find suitable reform candidates for governor 
and, in several cases, for the state legislature, an expe­
diency not lost on the RDO and the voters of New Orleans. In 
May, 1911, John Parker and others of the GGL leadership met 
with Luther E. Hall, an associate justice of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, a promising candidate for governor from north 
Louisiana. After several days of discussion and delibera­
tion, the executive committee of the GGL (Parker and certain 
select members) tendered its endorsement to Hall. Hall, who 
had also met with Governor Sanders and "representatives" of 
the RDO, accepted the support of the GGL without hesitation, 
but, at the same time, he asserted his own independence and 
self-sufficiency. He would, he said, accept the portions of 
the League platform as his own, but he would not exclude or 
purge other Democrats from his administration or assault
29Jean Gordon to Parker, January 28, 1911, Parker Papers, 
UNC. Gordon and her sister Kate were the leaders of several 
"progressive” reform movements, including woman suffrage, 
child labor, and prohibition. According to Matthew Schott, 
the Gordons and other upper-class reformers within the so­
cial justice movement turned to Parker and the GGL because 
the RDO would not respond to their pleas for moral reforms 
and because these reformers harbored social and religious 
biases against the Regulars and those they served. Schott, 
"John M. Parker," 118-19.
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"home rule" in New Orleans.30 Intelligent and well-spoken. 
Hall was a seasoned and adroit campaigner and, above all 
else, a skilled politician. In accepting the nomination of 
the GGL and endorsing its platform, Hall stood for progres­
sive reform in state and local governments. In welcoming the 
support of every variety of Democrat, including the New Or­
leans Regulars, Hall broadened the notion of municipal 
reform beyond the stilted, partisan constraints placed on it 
by reformers like John M. Parker.3X
Though the two major candidates differed vastly in 
background, temperament, and ability, their platforms were, 
to some degree, remarkably similar. The GGL and the RDO both 
advocated a professional, "businesslike" approach to the 
administration of state and local governments; a general 
reduction in the size of expenditures; elimination of "use­
less, unnecessary jobs" and dual office holding; the separa­
tion of politics from education; extending the right of suf­
frage to women on matters of taxation, education, and social 
welfare issues; constructing a modern system of roads and 
highways; and permitting local option on the use of alcoho­
lic beverages. The League and the Regulars recognized the
3°New Orleans Item. June 1, July 27 and 29, 1911; Schott, 
"John H. Parker," 112. In his political memoirs, Martin 
Behrman claimed that Hall and Parker were too different in 
their politics and temperaments for their political alliance 
to last. See Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman. 259-65.
3XNew Orleans Item. June 21, 22, July 4, 1911; Walter 
E. Burke and others, Luther E. Hall," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly. VI (January 1923), 46-55.
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need for a wholesale revision of state laws regulating the 
incorporation and behavior of public utility and private in­
dustry corporations. To that end, both factions recommended 
stricter lobbying laws, hoping to remove or at least temper 
the influence of corporations on politics and government.
Finally, the two sides agreed on the need to reform state
laws and practices regarding taxation and assessment.32
Despite the apparent agreement on the ends of reform,
the Regualrs and the GGL disagreed on the means and sub­
stance of reform. For Parker and the League, businesslike 
government meant more than installing "sound" accounting 
procedures or remodeling the city government to resemble the 
modern, bureaucratic corporation. As we have seen, it meant 
a fundamental restructuring of political power in Mew Or­
leans and redefining the ends of government to meet their 
concept of the public welfare. In its platform, the GGL 
called for a constitutional amendment subjecting all elec­
ted public officials to the direct recall of the voters. As 
the Item explained to its readers, the recall was fundamen­
tal to establishing "genuine democracy" in Louisiana and in 
New Orleans. The recall, its proponents claimed, allowed the 
people (in this case thirty percent of the registered 
voters) to rid themselves of corrupt and incompetent public 
officials, irrespective of the artifical restraints of
32New Orleans Item, 18, 28, June 1, 13, 21, 22, July 8, 
September 2, 3, 15, October 12 and 18, November 12, Decem­
ber 22, 1911; January 3, 4, 10, 13, 17, 1912.
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partisanship. The recall, like the initiative and the refer­
endum, would, the reformers contended, "re-enfranchise" the 
people, giving the public direct control over the conduct of 
public officials and the government.33
The League also wanted to end the sordid relationship 
between politics and business, believing that politics cor­
rupted business. The GGL platform called, then, for enacting 
a corrupt practices act, prohibiting candidates from promis­
ing jobs for votes and compelling candidates to disclose the 
size and source of all campaign contributions. The League 
assured the public that a corrupt practices act would break 
the "unholy alliance" between the the RDO and "alien" cor­
porations like New Orleans Railway and Light Company and the 
Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Company.
As a final consideration, the GGL urged the adoption of 
a commission council charter for New Orleans. The commission 
system, the Leaguers argued, would guarantee greater effi­
ciency in government and more direct accountability from pu­
blic officials. Charter revision alone, however, would not 
restore integrity to public affairs. Political reform must
3Progressive reformers did not agree on the worth of 
direct legislation. Some reformers claimed that direct demo­
cracy legislation permitted too few people to harass or re­
move officials for partisan or trivial reasons. Others 
believed direct democracy laws meaningless, too cumbersome 
to be effective. See Rice, Progressive Cities. 73-76; Lloyd 
Sponholtz, "The Intiative and Referendum: Direct Democracy 
in Perspective, 1898-1920," American Studies. 14 (Fall 
1973), 43-64.
3“,New Orleans Item, June 2, December 1, 1911, January 10, 
12-14, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 111-16.
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accompany the restructuring of the municipal government. The 
commission system, then, must accomodate and promote politi­
cal reform by concentrating political power in the proper 
hands and removing many unwarranted public considerations 
from the conduct of municipal administration. The reformers 
found that accomodation in the nonpartisan primary, a device 
designed to excise the advantages of party identification.39
The Regulars, too, wanted a more efficient, central­
ized municipal government, one that also anticipated a re­
formulation of political authority and public power. Their 
platform called for the consolidation of the special boards 
and commissions under the city government and for a home 
rule charter for the city. For Behrman and the Regulars 
(Michel had little to say about the platform or campaign in 
New Orleans), these issues were the essence of municipal 
reform. Unless the city could free— or at least loosen— the 
grip of private concerns on public matters, it could never 
plan and manage its own development. In this regard, the 
issue of dual office holding takes on greater clarity and 
significance. Several Regulars held elective state position 
and also served in some capacity in the municipal govern­
ment. For example, attorney George Terriberry was a member 
of the Louisiana State House of Representatives from New 
Orleans and served as the general counsel for the Board
39New Orleans Item, September 17, 1911; Schott, "Progres­
sives Against Democracy," 254-57; Rice, Progressive Cities. 
76-77.
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of Assessors (a board composed of the seven elected asses­
sors of Orleans Parish). Representative James O'Connor was 
the chief clerk for the Commissioner of Police and Public 
Buildings. The Item and the GGL contended that the Regulars 
wanted to end the practice of "double dipping" in order to 
attract more men into their ranks.
Martin Behrman did not deny that the RDO would benefit 
from prohibiting dual office holding, but he also asserted 
that dual office holding created an inherent conflict of in­
terest, especially for members of the independent boards and 
commissions, pointing out that "dual office holding" cut 
across partisan, occupational, and class lines. Bernard Me- 
Closkey, the chief counsel for New Orleans Railway and 
Light, was the general counsel for the Board of Commission­
ers of the Port of New Orleans (the Dock Board) where his 
brother, Hugh McCloskey, the president of the utility, was 
the chairman of the board. Robert M. Walmsley, a bitter op­
ponent of the city administration and president of the Loui­
siana National Bank, was the chairman of the Board of Liqui­
dation City Debt. Through these and other public positions, 
Behrman argued, private men dominated important aspects of 
public policy, often without any effective measure of public
36It was not unusual for state legislators to hold two 
public jobs. The legislature met only once every two years 
and state government, like municipal administration, was 
only then becoming a professional occupation. See Jon C. 
Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph. 98-102.
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control.3-7
The city administration also favored greater regulation 
of business, especially banking and utilities, but the Regu­
lars wanted the authority to emanate from the city charter 
and not state law. Too often in the past, the Regulars com­
plained, special, private interests manipulated the state 
legislature into circumventing municipal authority. The en­
actment of a home rule charter, the Regulars said, would en­
able the city government to regulate its own interests free 
of undue state and private interference.30 The enactment of 
nonpartisan primary, however, would allow special, private 
interests to continue their domination over the city polity.
No other single issue more clearly separated and dis­
tinguished the two rival factions than the issue of nonpar­
tisan elections. Electoral politics in Louisiana, as else­
where in the South, operated under the direct party primary 
system. John Parker and the GGL saw the partisan primary as 
the epitome of machine politics. In their view, it favored 
the local professional politicians, catering to the parochi­
al interests they served and permitting the intemperate and 
unlettered voters to govern the course of public considera­
tions. nIf the people of New Orleans don't want nonpartisan 
election(s)," Parker remarked in 1912, then, "we've lost
37New Orleans Item. June 2, 1911.
3BNew Orleans Item. June 21, 22, 1911, January 13,
1912. For an account of the often misunderstood relationship 
between the state legislature and the city government in 
this period, see Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph. 83-131.
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everything we've been fighting for."3®
By contrast, the Regulars favored the direct partisan 
primary for obvious political reasons. The primary system 
placed a premium on organization, particularly at the neigh­
borhood level where the Regulars were especially strong and 
and local interests best defined. The direct primary system, 
its proponents contended, favored popular politics, making 
the candidates, the parties, and the government more respon­
sive to the "will of the people". There was as well, advo­
cates said, a residual benefit to the direct primary system. 
They saw the primary as a means of curbing private influence 
and power over public affairs. And, in the Deep South, the 
party of Jefferson and Jackson, Bryan and Wilson stood as 
the party against private privilege and interests. Any 
attempt to dismantle the primary system, then, suggested the
39Parker to James B. Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker 
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. June 22, 1911, January 10,
11, and 12, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 111-16 (quota­
tion from 111); "Progressives Against Democracy," 254-57; 
"The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism," 141-53.
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return of municipal government by distant, private inter­
ests .
Both platforms expressed the essential demands (and limi­
tations) of political reform in the progressive era. Both 
factions sought to concentrate power in administrative hands 
and to expand the power and scope of the municipal govern­
ment beyond the considerations of conventional politics.
Both sought to end the decentralized character of municipal 
government and to end the factionalism that characterized 
city politics. The GGL believed it could achieve both de­
mands by eliminating local and partisan considerations from 
public affairs. The Regulars thought they could attain 
their version of municipal reform by removing the influence 
of "private" interests from public considerations. But the 
demands of the modern urban environment— sanitation, health, 
police and fire protection, gas, electricity, mass transit, 
and a host of other services— blurred the distinctions 
between local and municipal issues, partisan and nonpartisan 
considerations, and public and private good. The considera-
*°For an insightful interpretation of the "political" 
significance of the direct primary in the context of the 
progressive era, see McCormick, "The Discovery that Business 
Corrupts Politics," 265-67. For an account of the Democratic 
party under Bryan and Wilson, see John Milton Cooper, Jr., 
The Warrior and the Priest Woodrow Wilson and Theodore 
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1983),120-
29. According to Professor Cooper, the Democratic party 
under Wilson ascribed to a two-part political philosophy.
The first tenet called for the Democratic party to enlist in 
the cause of "modern service" to the public. The second 
principle acknowledged the party's traditional faith in the 
people's ability to govern.
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tion of these issues, however, waited on the conventional 
consideration of politics as usual.
In New Orleans, the League's first appeal to conven­
tional politics was to the district attorney of Orleans 
Parish, J. St. Clair Adams. In February, 1911, nearly a year 
before the state elections, John Parker wrote to Adams 
urging him to empanel a special grand jury to investigate 
registration and election fraud in New Orleans. "Election 
fraud," wrote Parker, "strikes at the very foundation of de­
cent government, and your hearty support in the vigorous 
prosecution of clear cases of violating the sanctity of the 
ballot will be productive of the great good to the City [New 
Orleans] and the State." Adams replied that indictments and 
prosecutions required specific evidence of violations of ex­
isting laws. Parker assured Adams that such evidence existed 
and that the GGL would furnish him with the particulars.43- 
The existing registration law, passed in 1908 under the ad­
ministration of Governor Jared Young Sanders, permitted 
political parties or recognized "political organizations" to 
canvass the registration rolls and, if warranted, to compel 
the Registrar of Voters to erase the name of citizens who
“ Parker to Adams March 15, 28, 1911, John Milliken 
Parker Papers, Department of Archives, Dupre Library, Uni­
versity of Southwestern Louisiana, hereafter cited as 
Parker Papers, USL. Parker to Adams, February 14 and April
21, 1911, Adams to Parker, February 15, 1911, Parker Papers, 
UNC.
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had forfeited the right to vote or who had been "fraudulent­
ly and illegally registered". Armed with this law, which ap­
plied exclusively to Orleans Parish, the GGL set out to 
prove the Regulars guilty of fraud.
In April, 1911, Parker and H. Dickson Bruns, the Lea­
gue's resident expert on matters of registration and voting 
laws, hired Joseph F. Markey, an "irregular" politician from 
the Third Ward, to scour the voting rolls for fraudulent and 
improper registrations. After nearly two months of daily in­
vestigations at the Registrar's office, Markey furnished 
Parker with his "preliminary findings". Markey reported that 
he and his staff had inspected nearly 50,000 registration 
cards and applications and had "unearthed" over 3,000 in­
stances of improper and illegal registrations. Markey admit­
ted, however, that he could find no pattern to the obvious 
"fraud" he had detected. Many of the violations centered on 
voters who had moved within the precinct, ward, or parish 
and had failed to inform the Registrar's office of their 
change of address. What Markey found, however, was a bewil­
dering degree of duplication in the parish's records, a pat­
tern of performance not uncommon in most bureaucracies. Des­
pite of the clutter and duplications, the public record 
showed that the Regulars were routinely honest regarding re-
■*2Act 98 of 1908, Acts Passed by the General Assembly of 
the State of Louisianaf 1908.
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gistration. In other words, there was no "cemetary" or "red- 
light district" vote as Parker had believed— or hoped.*3
More to the point, there was a relaxed attitude at the 
Registrar's office toward the literacy and property require­
ments that were the substance of Louisiana's registration 
laws. Whether this attitude constituted willful, premedita­
ted fraud is problematic, but Parker and the GGL assumed 
that it did. Parker wrote to Registrar of Voters William P. 
Ball, accusing him and his staff of violating the 1908 reg­
istration act. "Your records show," Parker wrote, "very many 
of [the] application blanks filled out by the clerks in your 
office or by others and signed in [an] entirely different 
[hand]writing, and evidently by some other person." Clearly, 
Parker asserted, these transgressions were grounds for eras­
ing the names of those registrants from the rolls. If the 
Registrar's office did not correct this disgraceful situa­
tion, he said, the League would "exact and take our full 
rights according to the law." The usually temperamental and 
fiesty Ball, a former police reporter, remained indifferent 
to the League's taunts until Parker and Markey released 
their findings to the press. Ball then accused the GGL of 
fabricating "fraudulent" records in an attempt to smear the 
Regulars and their candidates. Ball told reporters that 
Markey and his staff of "vigilantes" interfered with the 
registration of many citizens and demoralized the public
*3Markey to Parker, June 26, 1911 Parker Papers, UNC.
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with "loose talk" in the press about rampant fraud and 
imminent erasures. If the League had any evidence of 
systematic fraud. Ball asked, why did it not present its 
evidence before the District Attorney for Orleans Parish.44
The same doubts about the propriety and legality of the 
League's canvass circulated among some of other leaders of 
the GGL. Esmond Phelps, Charles Payne Fenner, Edwin T. Mer­
rick, and Joseph W. Carroll asked the Attorney General of 
Louisiana, Walter Guion, to explain, in laymen's terms, what 
constituted fraud under the registration law; what was the 
proper and legal method of removing names from the voting 
rolls; and what safeguards existed to prevent the manipula­
tion of the Registrar's records for partisan reasons.43 
Guion replied with a trite recital of the various provisions 
of the 1908 act, neither answering the Leaguers' questions 
nor providing them with proper counsel. From William Ball's 
perspective, though, there was no question of the inequities 
built into the act. According to Ball, the act permitted 
political mercenaries like Markey and Bruns to "attest" to 
suppossed irregularities and improprieties on the part of
44Parker to Ball, May 21, 1911, Parker Papers, USL; New 
Orleans Item. August 11, 12, 14, 1911; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. December 8, 1911. The League's leadership did not 
limit its actions to removal of voters. According to the 
newspaper accounts, the GGL urged Lily-White Republicans to 
switch parties for the state and municipal elections. Parker 
also called on Registrar Ball to give "galvanized" Democrats 
preference over new Democratic registrants. New Orleans 
Item, July 11, 12, 1911, January 2, 7, 1912; Parker to 
Jared Young Sanders, April 6, 1911, Parker Papers, USL.
4SNew Orleans Item, August 14, 1911.
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registrants and the Registrar's office without furnishing 
any evidence of fraud or nonfeasance. With the help of a 
compliant, partisan Registrar, any political group could re­
move voters from the rolls without the guarantee of judicial 
review. The law placed the burden of proof on the voter, and 
not on the canvasser. It required any voter whose name was 
marked for removal to provide the Registrar with affidavits 
from two bona fide voters testifying to the canvasser's er­
ror. If the canvasser challenged the affidavits, the voter 
could seek a ruling from the Civil District Court, where the 
voter paid the costs regardless of the court's decision. The 
expense and inconvenience involved in these proceedings.
Ball said, needlessly taxed the resources of the parish and 
tested the patience of the voters.*6
The good government partisans, of course, saw matters 
differently. In their view, the Regulars used lax registra­
tion procedures, escape clauses, and assistance provisions 
to swell their majorities at the polls. The assistance pro­
vision of the primary election law, the GGL argued, was a 
graphic example of the RDO's abuse of the electoral system 
for its own partisan advantages. The Regulars contended that 
any voter, even one registered under the education clause, 
could seek and receive assistance in marking his ballot. The
46New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 8, 1911, January
6, 7, 1912; New Orleans Item. November 28, December 11,
12, 20, 1911. Markey and Bruns claimed that the GGL would
remove between 10,000 and 15,000 names from the rolls. The
GGL succeeded in removing only 200 names.
League, naturally, disputed this claim and asked the Attor­
ney General for an opinion on the matter. Guion responded 
with an opinion that sustained the Regulars. Any voter re­
gistered under the education clause, he said, could seek and 
receive assistance in filling out his ballot. The question, 
the Attorney General wrote, was not whether a voter could 
read or write, but whether he was making a truthful state­
ment when he claimed he needed assistance. District Attorney 
Adams disagreed with Guion*s opinion, arguing that only a 
physically impaired voter could ask for assistance at the 
polls, and that he intended to prosecute anyone who violated 
the assistance clause or any other provision of the primary 
election law.4-7
Though John Parker and the GGL welcomed Adams's assis­
tance, Parker and the anti-machine reformers preferred a 
more direct and an immediate remedy to the "illicit" advan­
tages enjoyed by the Regulars. According to Parker, the RDO 
enjoyed an unfair advantage at the polls. Michel and the 
other "ring" candidates for state office had over four hun­
dred clerks and commissioners serving them at the polls, the 
protection of the city administration, and the clout of the 
Regular Democratic Organization at their disposal. With 
these and other favorable considerations, Parker said, the 
Regulars could distort the returns, depriving the League of
*7New Orleans Item. December 12, 1911, January 24, 25, 
February 2, 3, 9, 1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. January
18, 20, 22, 1912.
victory in the state and municipal elections. Since party 
practices and policy assured the Regulars' advantages, the 
GGL would have to seek protection on the streets and at the 
polling places themselves.40
Two days before the state elections, the GGL published 
an advertisement in the newspapers, with Parker's name at­
tached to it, calling for armed volunteers to stand ready to 
guarantee a fair count and a League victory. Though he had 
neither written nor signed the message, Parker later agreed 
to its wording and sentiment. Speaking to the press, Parker 
told Mayor Behrman that no civil or constitutional authority 
could deny any American the "right" to carry his rifle or 
shotgun in full public view. The GGL, he said, stood ready—  
in the extreme— to ensure and assure an honest vote, a fair 
count, and the proper expression of the people's will.4*
Mayor Martin Behrman found the entire episode (indeed, 
the GGL's entire campaign) misguided and pernicious. Con­
cerns about voting fraud were unjustified and an indication, 
he said, of the emptiness of the GGL's campaign in New 
Orleans. Rather than discussing its platform or debating its 
differences with the RDO, the GGL resorted to vilification. 
There was no reason, Behrman remarked, to anticipate any 
irregularities or violence at the polls, and he expected
■•"Polling booths were literally on the sidewalks— ban­
quettes in New Orleans parlance.
49New Orleans Item. January 9, 10, 18, 23, 1912; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. January 10, 24, 1912.
nothing less than an honest election and a fair count. How­
ever, as mayor, he would not permit armed vigilantes to roam 
the streets of New Orleans under the pretense of guarding 
the sanctity of the ballot. The GGL, the mayor said, de­
signed its campaign "to stir up bitterness and strife" in 
the city, masking the shallowness of its version of munici­
pal reform and concealing its inner desperation. The mayor 
assured the voters of New Orleans that the city administra­
tion was capable of protecting its citizens and conducting 
a peaceful and honest election without resorting to armed 
irregulars roving the streets. Unlike the GGL, Behrman 
asserted, the RDO did not revel in personal attacks, appeal 
to class prejudice, or ignore the contents of its own plat­
form. Instead, he said, the RDO spoke to the issues of muni­
cipal reform and administrative experience and competence.90
The Regulars did conduct a credible, though limited, 
campaign, hardly bothering to mention their candidate or 
pertinent state issues. By design the Regulars focused on 
local, state, and party elections, campaigning almost exclu­
sively among the numerous precinct and ward organizations, 
neighborhood improvement associations, union halls, and 
business and professional societies that characterized city 
life and politics in the second decade of the twentieth cen­
tury. The Regulars perforce concentrated on municipal
"Ibid.
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issues. They campaigned on twelve years of tangible accom­
plishments, stressing their role in the development of the 
sewerage, water, and drainage system, public ownership and 
regulation of essential city services, the return of "fis­
cal integrity" in the city government, better fire and 
police protection, improvements in health and santitation, a 
greater degree of home rule for the city, and the restora­
tion of the port. By contrast, they depicted the GGL as in­
experienced in municipal affairs and as "partisan" re­
formers, concerned foremost with preserving and extending 
their own advantages and only coincidentially concerned with 
municipal reform.91
The League dubbed the RDO's campaign as provincial and, 
of course, partisan. As the results in New Orleans bore out, 
however, the Regulars' campaign reached more people and ad­
dressed more concerns than the League's quixotic campaign 
against registration fraud and assistance clause violations. 
In Orleans Parish, Michel (the lost man in the campaign) 
benefitted from the RDO's intelligent campaigning and exten­
sive organization. Outside the city, though, where voter in­
terest was equally high and superbly motivated, Michel suf­
fered from the RDO's reputation as a big-city machine. In 
the city, eighty percent of the registered voters went to 
the polls without incident or provocation. Michel received
slNew Orleans Item, June 22, July 1, September 24, 1911; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 6, 11, 12, 15, 1912; 
Schott, "The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism," 144.
23,694 votes in New Orleans, an impressive sixty percent of 
the vote. Michel had a majority in 111 of the 144 precincts 
in New Orleans, winning every ward except the Tenth Ward.
Not surprisingly, Michel's principal support came from the 
downtown and "back-a-town" wards, the First through the 
Ninth and the Fifteenth Ward, the home of Martin Behrman.
In the Uptown wards, the Eleventh through the Fourteenth, 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth (the so-called center of anti- 
Regular, upper-class reform) Michel outpolled Luther Hall by 
more than 1,800 votes. Hall, too, benefitted from the high 
voter turnout. Hall collected 13,896 votes, for a respect­
able thirty-five percent of the vote. Hall won only nineteen 
precincts, six in the Uptown wards and thirteen in the wards 
below First Street.32
In rural Louisiana, Michel barely matched his vote in 
New Orleans, raising his total to a disappointing 46,201. 
Hall, on the other hand, amassed another 40,000 votes in 
rural northern and southern Louisiana. Though Hall led 
Michel by only 7,200 votes, Michel's prospects for over­
coming that deficit in a second primary were nonexistent. 
Michel was a one-parish candidate. His vote in New Orleans 
amounted to fifty-one percent of his total, but the city's
32Report of the Secretary of State to his Excellency The 
Governor of Louisiana. 1910-1912 (Baton Rouge, 1912), np;
New Orleans Item. January 26-28, 1912; New Orleans Daily 
States. January 26-29, 1912. Aswell was not a factor in New 
Orleans, garnering fewer than 2,000 votes, over half coming 
from the Irish Channel area of the Tenth Ward.
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vote in the gubernatorial election was only thirty-two per­
cent of the state vote. The Regulars could do no more for 
Michel. It was evident to all, including Michel, that the 
rural parishes wanted Luther E. Hall. Four days after the 
primary, Michel conceded.33
The results of the election in New Orleans confused 
many League supporters and troubled some others.9* The GGL 
was instrumental in electing a reform-minded governor, but 
Hall owed his election more to the League's country follow­
ing than to the city reformers. Hall's vote in the city was 
barely more than a quarter of his total vote. He had few 
friends in the city and even fewer friends in the city's 
legislative delegation. In the city, the League elected only 
four members to the General Assembly, hardly enough to bene­
fit Hall or carry through the GGL's reform agenda. The RDO 
won a tremendous popular victory, giving Michel an impres­
sive, honest majority, electing nearly its entire legisla­
tive ticket, exposing the narrow popular base of the GGL 
in New Orleans, and giving the Behrman administration a re­
sounding vote of confidence. For some League members, es­
pecially James Mcllhaney Thomson, the publisher of the Item. 
the issue was clear. For municipal reform to succeed in New 
Orleans, the old tactics, the old issues, and the old mem-
93New Orleans Item, January 25-28, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. January 25, 29, 1912; New Orleans Daily 
States, January 25-28, 1912.
9*Denegre to Parker, January 28, 1912, Parker Papers, 
UNC; New Orleans Item. January 23, March 3, 1912.
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bership, perhaps the old leadership, too, had to be aban­
doned.
Soon after the governor's election, the New Orleans 
Item called on the leaders of the GGL to "reconstitute" the 
League's city branch along more "democratic lines". Given 
the results of recent state elections in New Orleans and the 
past performance of similar reform groups, the Item urged 
the leadership of the GGL to open its ranks to the "common 
citizen" and to concern itself with issues that addressed 
the daily, practical needs and experiences of the people of 
New Orleans. "Democracy," the Item wrote, "requires that 
they share in the future councils of the independent and un­
bossed Democracy which they themselves constitute." To do 
less would open the League to charges of being another an­
other machine, or worse, of being indifferent to the cares 
of the ordinary citizen. The present arm of the GGL in the 
city, the City Campaign Committee (CCC) was, the Item wrote, 
poorly organized, cumbersome, and undemocratic, and could 
not conduct a successful municipal campaign in the fall of 
1912. Rechartering the League or defining the role of the 
CCC, as some reformers suggested, would not broaden the re­
form movement's appeal, but only further narrow its focus 
and only jeopardize any hope of defeating Behrman in the mu­
nicipal primary. What was needed, the Item suggested, was a 
"grass roots" political organization modeled broadly along
ssNew Orleans Item, January 5, March 3, 1912.
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the same contours as the RDO, but incorporating the ideals 
and programs of municipal reform.96
At the "grass roots" level, the Item proposed abandon­
ing the CCC's practice of imposing leaders on the ward and 
precinct organizations. In its place, the Item suggested 
that the partisans of each precinct and ward choose their 
own leaders. The proposal, the Item commented, had several 
advantages. It would open the League to a greater number and 
variety of people and interests, broadening the GGL's appeal 
beyond the stale interests and concerns that led to its de­
feat in the state primary in New Orleans. It would assure 
voters of the democratic— if not Democratic— character of 
municipal reform movement. It would introduce men of experi­
ence (professional politicians) into the leadership of the 
GGL, eliminating one of its more serious disabilities. It 
would galvanize GGL partisans and workers, creating an at­
mosphere of trust and confidence in the campaign organiza­
tion. In the state campaign, the Item wrote, the CCC kept 
its city workers "in the dark" concerning campaign strategy, 
tactics, and issues. In the state election, the Item specu­
lated, it may not have been necessary for each precinct and 
block captain to know or comprehend campaign issues and tac­
tics, but in the municipal campaign, ignorance and compla-
96New Orleans Item. March 3, 6, 1912. The executive 
committee of the CCC was Parker, Charles Dechamp, Fred S. 
Weis, C. R. Westfeldt, Jr., S.S. Labouisse, Edward F. Hen- 
rigues, D.W. Pipes, Esmond Phelps, Thomas D. Flynn, and 
Henry Dickson Bruns.
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cency could prove "fatal" to municipal reform in New 
Orleans.37
The Item conceded that its proposal could give the 
municipal reform movement a parochial tilt, perhaps compro­
mising the League's dedication to reform and, no doubt, mak­
ing it susceptible to the selfish influences of special 
interests and professional politicians. As a counterweight 
to the imbalances in its plan, the Item recommended that the 
current leadership of the GGL appoint a twenty-five man com­
mittee, chosen from among the city's professional and com- 
merical "men of standing," to oversee the selection of can­
didates and drafting of policy for the GGL. These men would 
give the new arrangement a dispassionate and wider vision of 
politics and would keep the League in harmony with the 
tenets of municipal reform in New Orleans and the nation.
The twenty-five man committee and the seventeen man "grass 
roots" caucus would form a new city campaign committee. In 
turn, the new CCC would select another committee from its 
own ranks to direct the municipal campaign. This entire ar­
rangement, the Item asserted, would give the GGL the broad, 
democratic appeal and the organizational cement needed to 
win popular support and maintain the reform discipline and 
consistancy for the long and exacting campaigns that lay 
ahead.
S7New Orleans Item. March 5, 1912.
*BNew Orleans Item, March 3, 4, 5, 6, 1912.
The few "profesional" politicians within the GGL saw 
merit (and, no doubt, advantage) in the Item's plan. John 
Caruso, Ulic J. Burke, and Raoul Sere endorsed the proposal, 
which, they hoped, would give them a measure of influence in 
the League (Burke and Caruso, as "ward leaders" for the GGL 
won but four precincts between them in the governor's elec­
tion, and Sere defeated the Regulars' candidate for the 
state House of Representatives by only twenty-one votes**). 
Other leaders of the GGL believed the Item's plan served no 
constructive purpose. George Flynn cautioned against chang­
ing the character of the organization "in the middle of 
the stream,” and John J. O'Neill described the plan as 
"unwieldy" and impractical, and he condemned the Item for 
conducting the League's business in public. William J. 
Hennessy believed the plan had some merit but only if the 
"professional and business interests" dominated the organi­
zation at each political and executive level. Samuel J. 
Kohlman though the plan "worthless” and he urged the League 
to grant John Parker "plenary power" over the campaign com­
mittee and the municipal campaign.®0
John Parker, too, acknowledged the need to reconsti­
tute the City Campaign Committee and to widen and strengthen 
the League's political support. Parker refused, however, to 
admit professional politicians into the ranks of the GGL
*"Ibid.
®°New Orleans Item. March 5, 6, 1912.
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leadership or to permit the people of the precincts and 
wards to choose their own leaders. Parker understood, as 
perhaps the Item did not, that to include these people and 
interests in the GGL would demean and dilute the social and 
political content of the municipal reform movement. The GGL 
wanted to eliminate local concerns from the considerations 
of municipal politics, not incorporate them into the reform 
coalition. When Parker spoke of "broadening and strenghten- 
ing" the appeal of the GGL, he meant inviting more men from 
the city's social and corporate elite to join the GGL.
Parker responded to the demand for a more appealing and 
diverse reform organization by proposing that the existing 
ward organizations and their leaders— the CCC— select seven­
teen men from their organization to represent the wards on 
the "new" CCC. In addition, Parker suggested that he alone 
select a twenty-five man committee that, with the advice of 
the new CCC, would set campaign strategy and policy for the 
League. The selection process would, Parker confessed, take 
time and study. In the interim, Parker would select sixteen 
men to assist him in formulating the strategy and tactics 
for the municipal campaign that would "redeem" New Orleans 
from ring rule.BX
BXParker to Luther E. Hall, March 21, 1912, Parker 
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. March 26, 27, April 5, May 5 
and 12, 1912. The members of committee of sixteen were from 
among the civic and commerical establishment of New Orleans. 
Among them were J. Zach Spearing, Frank B. Hayne, Joseph W. 
Carroll, C. DeB. Claiborne, Philip Werlein, and Dr. Walter 
S. Oser.
While John Parker pondered his selections for the per­
manent committee of twenty-five, the ad hoc committee met to 
chart the course of the League's municipal campaign. The 
League's performance in the state elections impressed the ad 
hoc CCC with the importance of taking the campaign directly 
to the people of the city. The campaign the CCC planned to 
take to the people, though, varied little from the one the 
League conducted in the gubernatorial contest. The CCC's 
campaign centered on the issue of ring rule, calling for the 
removal of Martin Behrman and the Regulars from every aspect 
of municipal government and politics. The CCC's strategy for 
removing the Regulars and establishing good government was 
twofold and required the cooperation of the state legisla­
ture and of Governor Hall. First, the CCC called for immedi­
ate adoption of a commission council charter that consoli­
dated municipal and parochial governments into one and in­
corporated the nonpartisan primary and the short ballot into 
the political structure of the city. Second, to offset its 
"disadvantages" at the polls, the CCC demanded the removal 
of William P. Ball, the Registrar of Voters, and the contin­
uous "purification" of the voting rolls in Orleans Parish 
and the vigorous prosecution of those who violated the 
voting laws of Louisiana.62
®2Parker to Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker to Hall, 
March 1, 21, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. 
September 17, 1911, March 1, 2, 26, 1912.
These were not issues, frankly, that would necessarily 
rally the citizens of New Orleans to the cause of the GGL 
or, for that matter, assure the reformers of defeating the 
Regulars in the fall elections. The enactment of a new char­
ter required the consent of the state legislature and, in an 
appeal to direct democracy, the approval of the citizens of 
New Orleans. It seemed unlikely that the Regular Democrats 
who controlled the New Orleans delegation to the legislature 
would accept a charter that promised to legislate the re­
formers into office and to "depoliticalize" public affairs. 
Among the citizens of the city there was no discernible pop­
ular demand for charter reform, with most people seeing it 
primarily as a partisan issue. In the past in New Orleans, 
partisans used charter revisions to either legislate them­
selves into office or to prevent another sect of partisans 
from becoming the dominant faction in city politics.83 And, 
it seemed unlikely that the majority of the voters, who 
favored the Regulars, would side with the GGL on a partisan 
issue like charter reform. Though many New Orleanians wanted 
a more coordinated administration, the state elections 
showed that they did not want to exchange democratic prac­
tices and principles for promises of greater administrative 
efficiency and nonpartisan politics.
83Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 45-47, 66, 316.
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In the first decade of the twentieth century, most 
major American cities operated under the mayor-council form 
of government. Critics of that system charged that the coun- 
cilmanic system served too many masters. It catered to local 
interests and biases at the expense of the larger needs of 
the city. It gave local ward politicians and sectarian in­
terest groups power and influence far exceeding their con­
tributions to the community, and it forced those without po­
litical standing to rely on informal, often "corrupt," means 
of influencing the government. In addition, critics alleged 
that the council system snarled the formal lines of authori­
ty, shielded public officials from proper scrutiny and ac­
countability, compromised business and political leaders, 
and lent itself too readily to political pressure and com­
promise. The result of these innumerable political and 
social pressures was a public policy frozen in accomodation 
and compromise. Managing the affairs of a city was, these 
critics said, "a plain matter of business, securing the 
best, cheapest, and most efficient service in the public 
business." Politics should have little bearing on the admin­
istration of the city.**
In the place of the ward-council system of government,
the advocates of the commission-council plan proposed a
®*Rice, Progressive Cities. 3-51; James Weinstein, "Or­
ganized Business and the City Commission and Management
Movement," Journal of Southern History. XXVIII (May 1962), 
168-70, 178; New Orleans Item. February 6, April 5 (quota­
tion), 1912.
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system of government based on virtual, at-large representa­
tion and nonpartisan politics. The proponents of this plan 
saw at-large, nonpartisan representation as a means of end­
ing the political division and social disharmony that, in 
their view, plagued modern city life. The commission system 
concentrated executive and legislative power and responsi­
bility in the hands of a single board chosen without ref­
erence to the arbitrary and artifical lines of political and 
class distinctions. Acting as a legislative body, the coun- 
cilinen determined municipal policy, the granting of fran­
chises, and the of constructing budgets. Working as indepen­
dent executives, the commissioners managed specific depart­
ments within the city government, carrying out the policies 
they, as the council, had set. Proponents claimed the system 
prevented waste and encouraged efficiency by allowing the 
commissioners to ignore unwarranted political considerations 
and by providing greater coordination and concentration of 
authority and responsibility in the administration of public 
affairs.83
Commission partisans argued that the removal of the ar­
bitrary, partisan lines of representation on the city coun­
cil would convince men of notable standing in the community 
to seek office in city government. Because of their social 
and commercial importance, these men would not be dependent
ssRice, Progressive Cities, xi, 3-51, 64, 77-78; 
Weinstein, "Organized Business and the City Commission and 
and Manager Movement," 169-70, 178-79.
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on local, factional interests or behind-the-scenes power 
brokers for support or direction. Free from the constraints 
of partisan politics and the temptations of the spoils sys­
tem, the commission councilmen would of necessity seek the 
common good. Commission advocates claimed that given the 
proper guarantees and safeguards, the commission form would 
restore order, economy, and integrity to public affairs, 
would initiate expert, professional management in city 
government, and would eliminate parochial politics as a 
consideration in governing the city.**®
Despite the claims of its supporters, there were sev­
eral important structural and political weaknesses in the 
commission system. The unification of executive and legis­
lative powers did not necessarily provide for a more centra­
lized, coordinated administration. In theory, each council­
man represented all citizens and made municipal policy in 
conjunction with the other members of the council, assuming 
responsibility for the management of the entire city govern­
ment and for each department. In practice, however, each 
commissioner concentrated on his own department, placing him 
in direct competition with the other commissioners for the
soRice, Progressive Cities. 30, 65-66, 72-83; New Orleans 
Item. June 20, 24, 29, 30, 1911, April 12, 1912. Despite its 
pretensions as a democratic reform, the commission system 
lacked any significant measure of popular control. Mindful 
of this deficiency, proponents grafted so-called direct 
democracy devices on to the commission plan. The best known 
of these devices was the so-called "trinity of democracy," 
initiative, referendum, and recall.
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city's meager resources and, as a consequence, preventing 
the council from coordinating the city's policy needs.87
The removal of the "artifical" lines of representation 
did not necessarily end local considerations in determining 
public policy and did not result in attracting men of "char­
acter" to public service. Indeed, opposition to the commis­
sion system was not limited to those who criticized it as 
undemocratic; many anti-machine reformers were skeptical of 
the commission system, fearing that it might concentrate 
power in the hands of the bosses and other local interests 
they opposed. In 1909, when the New Orleans Item called for 
adopting the commission form as a means of defeating the 
RDO, John Parker opposed the plan. As Parker explained, at- 
large elections were merely extensions of the partisan pri­
mary system and, as such, would not end political considera­
tions in the selection of public officials. Through their 
mastery of primary the system and their extensive organiza­
tion, Parker said, the Regulars also controlled the paro­
chial government, providing them with countless elective 
offices and appointive jobs. The commission plan, as inaugu­
rated in Galveston and embellished in DesMoines, was 
strictly a municipal reform, affecting relatively few public 
officials. For the GGL, any charter revisions, then, had to 
include the nonpartisan primary and a reduction in the num-
87Rice, Progressive Cities. 90-94.
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ber of elective officials in New Orleans and Orleans 
Parish.BO
What attracted Parker and the leaders of the GGL to the 
commission plan was how readily they could adapt it to the 
principles of the nonpartisan primary and the short ballot. 
By definition, the nonpartisan primary served to eliminate 
political considerations and partisan voters from the elec­
toral process. Without the party emblem and the other totems 
of partisan politics to guide them, nonpartisan theorists 
asserted illiterate and complaisant voters would soon aban­
don politics, leaving the party organizations without pop­
ular support. By reducing the number of elected positions in 
the municipal and parochial governments, the short ballot 
reform hoped to eliminate the influence of professional 
politicians on government. The short ballot reform, in con­
junction with the nonpartisan primary, would obviate the 
need for ticket making and ticket makers, allowing the so- 
called better class of citizens to seek public office and, 
so, restore government to the more "substantial and moral" 
class of people. The commission plan, as Parker and the GGL 
envisioned it, would serve primarily as a means of defeating
68Parker to James B. Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker 
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. June 20, 24, 29, 30, July 1,
2, 20, 1911, February 3, 1912.
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the Regulars and removing them and the interests they repre­
sented from the political process.
In September, 1911, fully eight months before the leg­
islative session of 1912, the City Campaign Committee called 
on the state General Assembly to enact a commission council 
charter for New Orleans. The CCC did not disclose any speci­
fic features of its proposal, but in instructing the legis­
lature in the procedure needed for implementing the commis­
sion system, the CCC revealed some of the complexities and 
shortcomings of its municipal reform plan. The CCC counseled 
the legislators to enact a "detailed and comprehensive" com­
mission charter that affected every phase of the municipal 
government of New Orleans. The CCC's plan also urged placing 
the entire parochial government under the direct authority 
of the commission government. The CCC's charter was not a 
simple municipal charter revision at all, but a wholesale 
restructuring of both the municipal and parish governments 
and a reorientation of city politics.70
Flush with the spirit of reform, the Item endorsed the 
CCC's plan sight unseen. The Item called the proposal "un- 
contestably true" and "fundamentally just". Such a plan, the 
newspaper wrote, held within it the promise of a truly
6SE. J. Hamley to Parker, March 30, 1912, W.J. Redding 
to Parker, June 4, 1912, Parker Papers USL; New Orleans 
Item. June 29, 30, 1911, April 12, 1912; Rice, Progres­
sive Cities. 82-88; John D. Buenker, Urban Liberalism and 
Progressive Reform (New York, 1978), 118-20.
7°New Orleans Item. September 17, 1911.
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"radical" and democratic departure from the unimaginative 
and corrupt administrations of Martin Behrman and the Regu­
lar Democrats. For the Item, as well as for the Parkerites, 
there was no question of the true intent and purpose of the 
commission plan. Its aim was to overthrow the RDO "directly, 
swiftly, and unmistakenly". There were, though, some League 
members, like real estate executive Sidney St.John Eshleman, 
who expressed reservations about blindly endorsing the CCC's 
charter reform measure. Eshleman and others wanted public 
discussions concerning the commission system and urged the 
CCC to include provisions calling for home rule, utility 
regulation, initiative, referendum, and recall. Above all 
else, they cautioned against portraying charter reform as a 
partisan weapon designed to restrict the suffrage or under­
mine the Democratic party.7X
Parker and the CCC had no intention of conducting pub­
lic discussions concerning its commission council proposal. 
Immediately following Hall's election as governor in Janu­
ary, 1912, the city affairs committee of the Progressive 
Union, a businessmen's association more or less evenly di­
vided between supporters of the League and the Regulars, be­
gan a series of discussions on the commission council 
system. The League's leaders "boycotted" the open forum,
"^Parker to James B. Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker 
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item September 17, 1911, January
10, June 22, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 111-16. For
criticism of the CCC's plan from other League members, see
Gordon S. Orne to Parker, May 20, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC.
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accusing the committee's chairman, Philip Werlein, a member 
of the GGL's inner circle, of using the hearing to further 
his own political aspirations. Werlein's committee made no 
recommendations concerning the commission system and dis­
continued the hearings soon after initiating them.'72
Late in March, 1912, the CCC, feeling pressure from 
the reform press to hold discussions and needing public ap­
proval for its plan, announced the formation of a special 
Committee of Forty to study the commission council proposal. 
The Item hailed the movement toward public hearings as a 
"progressive step," and called on all citizens to attend the 
hearings the committee planned. According to the Item, the 
Committee of Forty planned to meet in public with experts in 
the fields of law, finance, engineering, public administra­
tion, and government to determine the best plan for the 
city. In reality, the committee did not intend to conduct 
open hearings or to meet with experts in municipal govern­
ment. It planned instead to "educate" the public on the com­
mission system through a series of newspaper articles and 
editorials and to induce public support through a care­
fully staged, old-time political rally.7:3
On the night of April 4, the League sponsored a "mass 
rally" in support of the commission movement. The rally's 
principal speaker was Chicagoan John Z. White, a profes­
72New Orleans Item. January 30, 31, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily States. January 31, 1912.
73New Orleans Item. March 27, 28, April 2, 1912.
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sional lecturer and a friend of many of the League's top of­
ficials. The Item discribed the crowd, which it placed at 
3,000, as wildly "enthusiastic, discriminating," and yet 
representative of every class, occupation, institution, and 
faction in New Orleans. White's speech was more a campaign 
oration than a dispassionate, informative lecture. He merely 
recited a litany of the commission plan's familiar virtues. 
It was left to John Parker to completely and accurately des­
cribe the League's commission plan. For Parker, the commis­
sion plan was the only form of government that was truly 
"nonpartisan and nonsectarian" and the only form capable of 
assuring the defeat of the RDO in the fall elections.
At the end of the rally, John Parker, Donelson Caffery, 
and Samuel A. Montgomery, whom the Item described as "impar­
tial" proponents of good government, offered a resolution to 
the audience calling on the Committee of Forty to draft a 
commission council charter for New Orleans and to press for 
its passage in the next session of the General Assembly. The 
audience passed the resolution without dissent or hesita­
tion. But the Item wondered aloud who would actually write 
the charter bill. The newspaper called on Parker and the 
Committee of Forty to select a drafting committee composed 
of citizens whose experience combined "a practical knowledge 
of local politics and local conditions generally with a
7*New Orleans Item, April 2, 3, 5, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. April 5, 1912; Parker to Luther E. Hall, 
March 21, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC.
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sound, scientific knowledge of the fundamental principles 
of civil government." In other words, the drafting committee 
should include members of the RDO and the GGL.79
To some extent Parker agreed with the Item. In a letter 
to Governor-elect Hall, Parker acknowledged that the charter 
revision issue was of such importance to progressive reform 
in the city and state that "every branch of business in the 
city should be invited to participate." Parker even went so 
far as to propose that the "strongest and best supporters 
of the opposition" be asked to take "an active interest in 
the preparation of the charter". After almost a month of 
study and discussion, however, no one besides Parker and the 
Committee of Forty had seen the commission charter bill. As 
the legislative term approached, James Mcllhaney Thomson, 
the publisher of the Item and his dour editor, Z. Marshall 
Ballard, lost patience with Parker and the committee. The 
Item recognized the difficulty facing the committee in 
drafting a simple, comprehensive charter bill. But the news­
paper reminded the committee that the public expected and 
demanded an adequate allotment of time to digested and re­
vising the League's charter bill. It was one thing for "par­
lor reformers," academics, and political dilettantes to 
agree on an ideal reform measure, the Item remarked, but it 
was quite another thing when precinct captains, ward 
leaders, neighborhood associations, and the RDO caucus
79New Orleans Item, April 5, 1912.
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showed an interest in a particular reform measure. No re­
form, the Item editoralized, no matter how wise or com­
pelling could become law without the skilled efforts of pro­
fessional politicians and the enthusiastic support of the 
voters.76
As a rule, the RDO, like other political organizations 
elsewhere in the United States, opposed structural or admin­
istration reforms like the commission council that tended to 
restrict popular participation in municipal politics and 
government. There was nothing inherent in the commission 
system, apart from the nonpartisan primary, that threatened 
the Regulars' organization or jeopardized its standing or 
control over city politics and government. In fact, in Mayor 
Martin Behrman's view, given the proper guarantees for popu­
lar control, the commission form could give the city a more 
efficient and coordinated government that could move the 
city closer to home rule. For the time being, though, Mayor 
Behrman and the Regulars would reserve their judgment until 
they knew the specific contents of the League's charter 
reform bill.77
Despite the advanced warnings, the committee's charter 
bill shocked most people. The charter bill covered 196 type-
76Parker to Hall, March 21, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; New 
Orleans Item. May 1, 1912.
77New Orleans Item. April 7, 1912, January 3, 12, and 16, 
1916; Buenker, Urban Liberalism. 122-23, 134-35, 161-62,
209, 215; Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Re­
form," 231-41; Rice, Progressive Cities. 90.
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written pages, encompassed 104 distinct provisions, and 
required thirteen constitutional amendments. John Parker, 
who unveiled the plan in mid-May, announced that the GGL 
charter bill was a composite of the modern commission 
charters of Des Moines and Junction City, Kansas. The plan 
provided for a five-man commission that, of course, posses­
sed both executive and legislative powers. The Commissioner 
of Public Affairs would serve as mayor and have a vote on 
the council and general oversight of all municipal depart­
ments, boards, and commissions. The four other commis­
sioners, Finance, Property, Safety, and Utility, would ad­
minister their separate departments within the municipal 
government, and, acting with the mayor-commissioner, serve 
as the common council for the city government. The commis­
sion council would perform the duties then assigned to the 
city council, mayor, fire and police commissioners, comp­
troller, treasurer, commissioners of public works and build­
ings, and the city engineer. In addition to these duties and 
functions, the League's charter bill granted the commission 
council "plenary" power over all parochial departments, 
boards, and commissions. The Parker plan authorized the com­
missioners to appoint the District Attorney, Coroner, all 
city court judges, the clerks of the Civil and Criminal Dis­
trict Courts (the judges to those courts would be elected), 
the Civil and Criminal Sheriffs, Recorder of Mortgages, Re­
corder of Conveyances, and two city assessors. The bill sub-
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jected all other municipal and parochial employees (exclud­
ing common laborers, the majority of whom were black) to a 
civil service and merit system. The plan also reduced the 
mayor's salary from $10,000 to $7,500 and scaled down the 
commissioners’ salaries from $9,000 to $6,000.78
There was no assurance, however, as the League knew, 
that these provisions would themselves end ring rule in New 
Orleans. If anything, the bill tended to focus greater power 
in fewer hands— perhaps from the League's view, the wrong 
hands. In essence, the reformers had to assure their own 
election to the commission council. The Parker plan guaran­
teed, at least to Parker's satisfaction, such an assurance. 
The Parker charter provided that the voters of New Orleans 
elect the mayor and the other commissioners in separate, at- 
large, nonpartisan preferential primaries. In effect, elec­
tions in New Orleans (what few would remain under the new 
charter) would no longer be subject to the state primary 
law, which, as we have seen, Parker and his followers in the 
GGL saw as the quintessence of machine politics and corrupt 
government.79
78New Orleans Item. May 18 1912; Rice, Progressive 
Cities. 30. The charter bill reduced the number of assessors 
from seven to two and made their tenure dependent on the 
council and not the electorate. That state legislature 
raised the mayor's salary to $10,000 in 1910. The issue 
rankled the anti-Regular press and became part of the GGL's 
reform program. Kemp, ed., Martin Behrmanr 255-59.
79New Orleans Item. June 4, 1912; Schott, "Progressives 
Against Democracy," 255.
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The bill attracted little critical attention. Some mem­
bers of the legislature, meting before the summer session, 
wondered if the League charter guaranteed the peopled of New 
Orleans a democratic, republican form of government or 
if the charter proposal permitted the voters an opportunity 
to vote on its adoption.00
The charter bill was, broadly speaking, republican and, 
in its strictest sense, progressive, but it was patently un­
democratic. At the center of the commission movement in New 
Orleans, as elsewhere in the United States, was the issue of 
representation and the power to set and carry out public 
policy. Despite its pretense of greater representation, the 
Parker charter sought to narrow, not broaden, representation 
in the city and parish governments. The intent and design of 
the-commission system and the short ballot was to remove the 
"artifical” considerations of local representation in the 
formulation and conduct of municipal affairs and to concen­
trate power and authority in the fewest offices possible.
The charter also diminished the role and significance of the 
voter and citizen in the conduct of municipal policy, remov­
ing government and its policies beyond his influence and 
needs. Under the Parker charter, the voters of New Orleans 
had but two duties, the election of the commission council 
(and a few judges) and the ratification of the charter.
°°New Orleans Item, May 24, June 4, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily States. June 4, 1912.
Parker was anxious to have the citizens of New Orleans
vote on the charter, as long as they did so before the mini-
cipal elections in the fall of 1912. Apparently, Parker be­
lieved that the passage of the charter bill was but a matter
of fact. He convinced himself that his plan had the support
of Governor Hall and the state legislature. Parker was mis­
taken. During the course of the recent state campaign, Hall 
had remained steadfastly independent and uncommitted to any 
particular charter reform measure. He made a point of stay­
ing clear of most of the city's intramural political 
issues— and with good reason. As governor, Hall needed all 
the support he could muster in the legislature and in the 
local governments. He concluded that his success as governor 
depended on friendly relations with the legislature, espe­
cially with its largest and most cohesive bloc, the Orleans 
Parish delegation.01
Contrary to what Parker believed, the GGL did not con­
trol the state legislature and it had even fewer friends 
among the Orleans delegation. In the Senate, eight of the 
nine senators from New Orleans were Regulars. The sole 
member of the League, William H. Byrnes, Jr., believed the 
bill was hopelessly flawed and probably beyond repair. The
01New Orleans Item, December 16, 1911, March 3, 26, 27, 
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 28, June 15, 1912; 
Parker to Hall, March 21, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; W. C. 
Hardee to Parker, June 4, 1912, Parker Papers, USL; Schott, 
"John M. Parker," 119-20, 183-84; Williams, "Martin 
Behrman," 35.
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League had a few more supporters in the House of Representa­
tives, but, as in the Senate, the Regulars dominated the im­
portant Committee on City Affairs (CCA) that managed all 
legislation concerning the City of New Orleans. Sixteen of 
the seventeen members of the committee were Regulars, in­
cluding its chairman, the hot-tempered Creole, Joseph E. 
Generally. In short, the Parker charter bill had no execu­
tive or legislative support and, most telling of all, its 
true intent and purpose— the removal of the Regulars and 
eliminating "political considerations" in municipal 
affairs— ran contrary to the beliefs and wishes of a major­
ity of the citizens of New Orleans, Regulars and reformers 
alike.82
On June 8, 1912, Representative Raoul Sere, a Good Gov­
ernment Leaguer from the fashionable Garden District of New 
Orleans, introducted the Parker charter bill into the House 
of Representatives. As expected, the Committee on City Af­
fairs took charge of the bill and began hearings on June 12. 
Parker, accompanied by Esmond Phelps, Charles Payne Penner, 
and Frederick Weis, testifed on behalf of the Sere bill. 
Mayor Behrman, John Fitzpatrick, the former mayor of New
azThe most notable of the League's supporters to oppose 
the Parker charter were, in addition to Senator Byrnes,
Edgar H. Farrar, "father" of the Sewerage and Water Board 
and head of one of the city's most prestigous law firms, and 
Norman Walker, editor of the Daily Picayune. The Daily 
Picayune was an early critic of the commission system, call­
ing it an artifact of Reconstruction and a threat to munici­
pal democracy. See Daily Picayune. June 14, 15, 1912.
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Orleans, Victor Mauberret, an assessor and reputed "king" of 
the tenderloin district, and City Attorney Isaiah D. Hoore 
appeared against the League's charter bill. The Leaguers 
were confident and candid, but poorly prepared, and soon 
grew reckless and defensive under the intense questioning 
and rebuttals of chairman Generally and Mayor Behrman 
(Behrman, who sat behind Generally during the hearing, acted 
more like a member of the committee than as one of its 
witnesses).
In his opening statement, John Parker told the commit­
tee that the city, in effect, suffered from too much demo­
cracy. There were, in his opinion, too many elected posi­
tions in city government filled by too many professional 
politicians. These officials, he said, made a burlesque of 
the democratic process in New Orleans. They corrupted the 
municipal elections, intimidated private citizens and busi­
nessmen, made a "farce" of municipal administration, pre­
vented needed progressive reforms, were profligate with the 
public money, and, as a consequence, divided and demoralized 
the people of New Orleans. The only way to end the influence 
of these corrupt officials and to restore integrity and con­
fidence in city government, Parker said, was to reduce the 
number of elected officials and to eliminate the influence 
of politics on municipal affairs. The GGL, Parker confessed
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to the CCA, designed the Sere bill to accomplish those 
ends . ° 3
Generally pressed Parker for evidence that would sub­
stantiate his allegations. Parker admitted that the League's 
canvassers and poll commissioners had been unable to uncover 
evidence of fraud in the recent elections, and he could not 
cite a particular instance of corruption or malfeasance in 
the Behrman administration. Confused and overwrought by 
Generally's questioning, Parker tried to change the subject. 
Regardless of the Regulars' perfidy, he said, the citizens 
of New Orleans demanded the enactment of a commission coun­
cil charter that promised to rid the city of the curse of 
ring rule. Generally, however, protested that he and the 
other members of the CCA saw no indication that the people 
of New Orleans wanted a charter that encompassed the reforms 
demanded by the League. Generally reminded Parker that the 
New Orleans reformers made the commission council plan an 
issue in the recent state elections in New Orleans and that 
the voters rejected the League by nearly 10,000 votes. The 
chairman of the CCA dismissed Parker's testimony as parti­
san, and he confessed he saw no benefit or merit in a system 
of government that denied its citizens the power of the bal­
lot and a fair degree of direct representation.a-€
a3New Orleans Item, June 8, 12, 13, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. June 13, 1912.
•’■•New Orleans Item, June 12, 13, 1912; New Orleans Times- 
Democrat. June 13, 1912.
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Frederick Weis challenged Generally's interpretation of 
the charter bill and of the League's intentions. The short 
ballot and the nonpartisan primary, Weis told the CCA, were 
essential to the success of the commission plan. These two 
provisions afforded the voter greater freedom of choice in 
selecting public officials and would, if incorporated in the 
commission council the party primary, break down the arti- 
fical character and considerations of the ward system of 
politics and government. By simplifying the lines of author­
ity and focusing responsibility in the hands of a few 
elected officials, Weis reiterated to the committee, the 
commission system invited greater participation in govern­
ment by the ordinary citizen. "Our intention," Weis said to 
"is to make the government of New Orleans a single, concen­
trated government of five men. We want good government."83
Mayor Behrman did not question that the commission form 
of government would create a more coordinated municipal gov­
ernment, allowing the city administration to formulate and 
carry out a more comprehensive municipal policy. The Parker 
charter, however, created an oligarchy of three men, no 
doubt, he said, chosen from the "better class" of citizens, 
who would debate, write, execute, and adjudicate the ordi­
nances of New Orleans. They would decide, free from so- 
called "political considerations," which people, interests, 
and issues required their attention. Regardless of its
83New Orleans Item. June 13, 1912.
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merits, Behrman said, the plan was unquestionably undemo­
cratic and constitutionally impractical.08
The next day. Generally entertained a motion from 
Representative Thomas Anderson, a Fourth Ward Regular (also 
reputed to be the "King of the Tenderloin") calling for an 
unfavorable report for the Sere bill. Sere pleaded with 
Generally to delay consideration until June 17 when he would 
offer several amendments removing the provisions concerning 
the appointment of the parochial officials and the nonparti­
san primary. Martin H. Manion, an intensely independent Reg­
ular from the Twelfth Ward, supported Sere's attempts at 
postponing a vote on Anderson's motion. He told Generally 
that he believed the issue of charter reform too important 
to dismiss without a "fair assessment". At this point. Gen­
erally had had enough. He scolded Sere and Manion for their 
discourtesies to the committee, then turned his anger on the 
League,. At no time in the past several months since the GGL 
began preparing this bill, Generally taunted, did the League 
bother to consult with the people's elected representatives 
in the state and municipal governments or hold public dis­
cussions on its charter reform proposal. Instead, he con­
tinued, the League concocted an ill-conceived, poorly draft­
ed bill, fully expecting the Comiittee on City Affairs, the 
General Assembly, and the voters of New Orleans to pass this 
bill without comment or criticism. During the entire pro-
B6Ibid.
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cess, Generally said, the GGL showed no consideration for 
the people of New Orleans, its elected officers, or, for 
that matter, the democratic process and deserved no special 
consideration from the committee. Generally called for a 
vote. Only Sere and Manion voted against Anderson's 
motion.8-7
Proponents of the Sere bill chastized the Generally 
committee for its "purblindness," and predicted that the de­
feat of the League's charter reform bill would eventually 
work against the Regulars. "The idea that a great national 
movement for progressive local government can be delib­
erately checked with one arrogant resolution by a represen­
tative from the Red Light section of New Orleans," the Item 
wrote, "is contrary to all human experience." The Daily 
Picayune saw the issue differently. The CCA's vote to give 
the Sere bill an unfavorable report was well-considered and 
appropriate. The bill tried to do too much. It was too in­
volved and poorly written, of doubtful practicality, and 
of questionable constitutionality. The committee's vote did 
not expose the Regulars as reactionaries, but showed them to 
be deliberate and realistic lawmakers and politicians. Their 
aim, the Picayune wrote, was not to arrest the commission 
movement (as early as February, 1912, the Item reported a 
ground swell among the Regulars and their supporters for a
8,7 Ibid.
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commission council), but to defeat a terribly flawed and im­
practical commission council bill.®8
Events proved the Daily Picayune correct. The day after 
Generally*s outburst, he met with Raoul Sere, William H. 
Byrnes, and Robert Roberts, Hall's legislative floor leader 
in the House of Representative, to work out a compromise, 
assuring passage of a commission council charter for New 
Orleans. Generally would allow Sere to withdraw his bill 
from consideration without formal comment from the CCA. In 
exchange for this courtesy, Sere and Byrnes, the League's 
leader in the Senate, agreed to a joint conference commit­
tee on the commission council plan. Sere and Byrnes acknowl­
edged that the League's bill was impractical and in need of 
wholesale revision, and they welcomed the help of the 
Regulars to salvage the commission plan. The Regulars 
readied themselves for the conference, but the League's 
leadership in New Orleans disavowed the commitments of 
Sere and Byrnes. The League announced it was unwilling to 
discuss the commission bill with the Regulars. Instead, it 
planned to introduce into the Senate its own "revision" of 
the original Sere bill.88
The League's revision made only one major concession to 
the Regulars. It deleted all provisions pertaining to the
®aNew Orleans Item, February 2, June 14, 1912; New Or­
leans Daily Picayune. June 14, 15, 1912.
°®New Orleans Item. June 14, 15, 17, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. June 15, 17, 1912.
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appointment of parochial officials, but it retained the sec­
tion subjecting the commissioners to nonpartisan elections. 
Senator Byrnes was irate over the League's "revised" bill.
If the League's leadership in New Orleans was serious about 
obtaining a practical commission charter and not a campaign 
issue, Byrnes told reporters, then they would have to remove 
provisions concerning nonpartisan elections, the reduction 
of the mayor's and commissioners' salaries, and all other 
provisions requiring constitutional amendments. Byrnes 
agreed to introduce the bill into the Senate but promised 
to work against the bill in committee hearings and on the 
floor of the Senate."0
When the Senate CCA began hearings on June 18, the 
League leadership, as promised, was in greater numbers, but 
it was hardly better prepared. The CCA's chairman, the acer­
bic Henry L. Favrot, told the League's witnesses that their 
bill was an insult to the General Assembly, the legislative 
process, and an affront to the people of New Orleans. Is the 
Senate of Louisiana, Favrot asked, expected to pass a bill 
into law merely on the word and at the pleasure of forty men 
from the city's self-proclaimed "better element"? The League 
ignored the objections of the House of Representatives and, 
adding insult to injury, ridiculed the efforts of its own 
leadership in the House to salvage the charter reform bill.
®°New Orleans Item, June 17, 19, 21, 22, 1912; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune June 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 1912.
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The GGL's charter bill, he said, scoffed at their principles 
of democratic rule and sought not a better form of govern­
ment but rank political advantage.91
H. Dickson Bruns, appearing for the League, answered 
that 3,000 citizens of New Orleans who attended the April 4 
rally at the Winter Garden Hall testified to the popular 
support of the Sere-Byrnes bill. Favrot disputed Bruns's 
claim. The three thousand citizens who attended the rally 
constituted but six percent of the registered voters of New 
Orleans, and, if the newspaper accounts were correct, few of 
the three thousand knew in advance the undemocratic nature 
of the League's commission charter.92 Claiming that the 
Byrnes bill was inherently more democratic than the "ward- 
boss" system, John Parker argued that the nonpartisan ballot 
did not disfranchise the voter, but only the professional 
politician. Favrot labeled Parker's reasoning as pure soph­
istry, and promptly shut off debate. Parker, incensed at 
Favrot's rude treatment of the League's witnesses, told the 
committee that if the General Assembly defeated the Byrnes 
bill, he would take the issue to the streets of New Orleans, 
"crushing" all opposition in the next municipal election. 
Then, in 1914, with the help of a friendly mayor and a duti­
ful legislature, he would enact the Sere-Byrnes bill into 
law. Favrot and the CCA ignored Parker's blustering remarks
91New Orleans Item, June 19, 21, 22, 1912; New Or­
leans Daily States, June 19, 21, 22, 1912.
92Ibid.
79
(Parker often spoke and acted before he thought) and voted 
to delay action on the Byrnes bill, pending the introduction 
of another charter reform measure by the Behrman administra­
tion.*3
A week later. Senator Favrot introduced another commis­
sion charter bill into the Senate. The new charter bill, 
written by City Attorney I. D. Moore and attorneys Joseph 
Gleason and Hugh Cage, comformed to the basic principles of 
the commission council system. The bill provided for a five- 
member council, elected on an at-large basis and vested with 
the full executive and legislative authority of the City of 
New Orleans. The new charter enhanced the power of the com­
mission council over the general administration of the city, 
the civil service commission, the police and fire boards, 
and the city health board. It deleted all references to non­
partisan elections, restored the mayor's (not the commis­
sioners') salary to its earlier and higher figure, and sub­
jected the city's direct democracy provisions to state 
law.**
The new charter plan departed from the Sere-Byrnes pro­
posals on several important features. By design, the admin­
istration charter did not grant the council "plenary power" 
over the numerous boards and commissions that formed a sepa­
rate, independent branch of city government. The granting of
*3New Orleans Item, June 21, 22, 24, 25, 1912.
**New Orleans Item. 28, July 4, 6, 8, 1912; New Or­
leans Daily Picayune. June 26 and 27, July 2, 5, 6, 9, 1912.
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plenary power over these boards would have required several 
complicated and cumbersome constitutional amendments and 
separate referenda on each proposal. Rather, as we shall 
see, the Behrman administration sought to gain "plenary" 
power over the boards and commissions on its own initiative, 
following the logic of "centralization" so apparent in the 
commission system. The commission system, as we have seen, 
by definition and practice, divided executive power and 
responsibility among the commissioners. In theory, each 
of them and all of them would execute the collective will 
of the council, permitting for the development of a more 
coordinated municipal administration. In practice, however, 
no one held true executive authority. As early as 1910, if 
not before, critics and even advocates recognized the fail­
ure of the commission system to provide effective executive 
leadership. It seems likely, though there is no extant 
documentation to that effect, that Behrman, Moore, and the 
other authors of the new charter were aware of the systems 
problems. The 1912 charter vested all executive power for­
merly held by the mayor and other executives in the commis­
sion. But the new charter also created a very powerful and 
intrusive chief executive in the mayor.
The administration charter, like the Sere bill, granted 
the mayor overall "oversight" of all city departments and 
boards. In addition, the administration charter made the 
mayor president of the Sewerage and Water Board (SWB), the
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Public Belt Railroad Commission (PBRRC), and a voting member 
of the Board of Liquidation City Debt (BLCD), and the New 
Orleans Board of Health. Though the mayor had fulfilled 
these duties under the old charters, the commission charter 
proposed by the city administration enhanced the power and 
influence of the mayor, expanding his place and role in city 
and parish governments; in effect, making him "the co-ordi­
nating agent" for the various departments and commissions in 
municipal government, speaking to each and for all of their 
related problems.93
Finally, the two charter proposals differed in their 
approach to the regulation of public utilities, in particu­
lar, the regulation of New Orleans Railway and Light Com­
pany (NORLC). The G6L was never comfortable with the idea of 
public regulation of "private concerns," and its initial 
charter proposal reflected the League's discomfort. The 
original Sere bill, in fact, did not provide for the direct 
regulation of NORLC by the city administration. To the con­
trary, in granting the city the power of expropriation, the 
Sere bill in effect removed the power of regulation from the 
city administration, placing regulation under the jurisdic­
tion of the courts. Most utility experts at the time con­
sidered expropriation a costly and elaborate legal
"Rice, Progressive Cities. 90-91; Administrative Survey 
of the Government of the Citv of New Orleans. 12-13; Act No. 
159 Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana 
at the Regular Session. 1912.
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procedure, an uncertain and regressive manner of utility 
regulation. Under pressure from the Regulars and from 
reformers within the League, the leadership of the 6GL, 
abandoned the expropriation provision, leaving the matter of 
utility regulation to the legislature and the experts.*®
Though Regulars were more certain of their stance on 
public regulation, favoring a vigorous regulation of NORLC 
by the city administration, they were uncomfortable with the 
idea of defining and confining the city's regulatory powers 
within the charter. The Favrot charter did not "enhance" the 
council's powers of regulation, retaining the language of 
earlier charters. The city administration decided to acquire 
direct regulatory power over NORLC through legislative 
statute and municipal ordinance. In brief, the Behrman ad­
ministration would regulate NORLC by following the precepts 
of home rule and the logic of the commission council system.
Apart from these distinctions, the Favrot bill hardly 
differed from the Sere-Byrnes bills, and it raced through 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. For the 
most part, opposition to the Favrot act among the voters of 
New Orleans was unorganized and outmanned. The Socialist 
party in New Orleans decried any "structural" device that 
wittled away minority particiapation in politics and repre­
sentation in government. At-large elections, argued Social-
*"New Orleans Item, June 17, 19, 21, and 22, 1912; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. June 13, 18, 19, 21, and 22, 1912; 
Schott, "John M. Parker," 184.
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ist leader T.E. Brenan, favored the well-heeled and the 
well-known, and virtual representation was a fallacy, a ru­
bric for expressing the domination of the social and commer- 
ical elites over the working classes. Among the working 
classes, only one other group expressed opposition to the 
commission plan. The Central Trades and Labor Council, a 
craft association, agreed with the socialists about the in­
tent and effect of the commission council system. The Coun­
cil, however, made no known attempt to join with the social­
ists in opposing the act.3,7
Criticism of the commission act was not confined to the 
working class alone. Among the propertied classes, a name­
less "taxpayers’ association" joined the socialists and the 
Council in opposing the Favrot act. The association's com­
plaint was not political or sociological in nature, but 
legal. According to the association's "brief" filed in the 
local press, the state constitution required the election of 
any municipal official whose duties called for the exercise 
of the "police powers" of the city.*" The association 
alleged that the new charter violated this provision of the 
state constitution, authorizing the council to appoint of­
*7New Orleans Item June 28, July 2, 6, 8, August 28, 30, 
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. June 6, 27, July 2, 5, 6,
9, 13, 26, August 29, 1912; Rice, Progressive Cities. 29,
43, 90-91.
*"Police powers, of course, refer to the powers inherent 
in government to exercise reasonble control over persons and 
property within its jurisdiction in matters concerning their 
general health, safety, morals, and welfare.
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ficials whose duties required the exercise of the inherent 
powers of the city government. These assertions were, of 
course, without substance since the charter vested the 
commission council with all powers inherent in the City of 
New Orleans. The appointment of several officials, like the 
treasurer or City Engineer, did not violate the state con­
stitution. 39 The association did not press the issue in the 
courts and its objection went unnoticed by the public.
The new charter had its more ’’traditional1’ detractors, 
however. The Item, perhaps sensing a campaign issue, lam­
basted the Favrot act as a cynical and calculated betrayal 
of the municipal reform movement. The Regulars, the Item, 
charged, bastardized the commission council movement by 
deliberatly removing the nonpartisan primary provision and 
by refusing to modernize the municipality's cumbersome and 
ineffective administrative system. The newspaper claimed 
that the Favrot charter was not a true commission charter 
but a clever facsimilie which the Regulars ’superimposed'' 
over the old and corrupt ward system of politics. The result 
of this makeshift reform, the Item concluded, would be the 
continuation of factional, divisive politics and inept 
municipal rule.100
"New Orleans Item. July 4, 6, and 8, August 28 and 30, 
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. August 29, 1912.
xooNew Orleans Item, August 30, 31, December 2, 4, 14,
1912; Ethel Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience Under Commis­
sion Government," National Municipal Review, 6 (January 
1917), 74.
Other critics of the Regular Democrats and the Behrman 
administration argued that the momentum of the municipal re­
form movement compelled the Behrman administration to adopt 
a commission council charter. They argued that the Favrot 
charter imposed a commission council system on New Orleans. 
The charter obviously united the executive and legislative 
branches of the municipal government, provided for the at- 
large election for the council, reduced the number of 
elected city officials, and promised, at least on paper, to 
untangle the lines of municipal authority and to fix the 
burden of responsibility on the five councilmen. Despite 
some "painfully weak" provisions, particularly in the area 
of utility regulation, these "friendly critics" believed 
that the system would work more or less as promised. In 
their view, the charter would force the Regulars to select 
candidates of "new vision," dedicated to the ideals of "pub­
lic service" and civic advancement. These men, these cri­
tics believed, would introduce business ethics and proce­
dures to city government, fostering among the other elected 
and appointed government officials a sense of common pur-
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pose that placed civic advancement above political consid­
erations.101
Still other commentators were less sanguine about the 
virtues of the commission system. These critics agreed that 
the commission system would alter the political arrangements 
in New Orleans, but they feared that those changes would not 
be for the better. The logic of politics and the commission 
system, they contended, would compel the Regulars to select 
businessmen as candidates for the council, eliminatating 
popular ward leaders from positions of importance and influ­
ence in city government and in the RDO. Without popular con­
trol at the governmental and political levels, the council 
and the mayor— and those they represented— would define the 
public interests to suit their own needs, ignoring the con­
cerns of local interests. These opponents were also concern­
ed that a commission council of businessmen would turn the 
city government over to a battery of "experts" hired to man­
age the city's affairs, reducing politics and government to 
concerns of accountants and lawyers.102
Contrary to both contemporary and historical accounts, 
the Behrman administration did not design the Favrot charter
101New Orleans Item, August 30, 1912; Hutson, "New Or­
leans* Experience Under Commission Government," 74-79. In 
1920, City Attorney Ivy G. Kittredge, an anti-Regular re­
former, praised the Favrot charter as a precise and thought­
ful piece of legislation. See Ivy G. Kittredge to (Commis­
sioner of Public Utility) Paul H. Maloney, December 20,
1920, vol.14, City Attorneys Opinion. City Archives, New 
Orleans Public Library; hereafter cited as CAP. CA, NOPL.
102New Orleans Item, August 30, 1912.
to compromise the municipal reform movement or to disguise 
its own intentions. From the beginning of the commission 
issue, the Behrman administration and the Regular Democrats 
showed a keen and intelligent interest in the commission 
system of government. They understood its potential for 
greater coordination and efficiency in municipal administra­
tion. They favored the basic contours of the commission sys­
tem, the unification of the executive and legislative powers 
of the city government, the displacing of the old-style city 
council and the strenghtening of the executive. They also 
grasped many of the limitations and potential dangers in the 
commission system, especially the plan proposed by John 
Parker and the G6L. From the start, the RDO and the Behrman 
administration opposed nonpartisan elections and the 
appointment of all but a few public officials. At the regu­
lar session of the General Assembly, the Regulars did not 
hide or disguise their opposition to the "partisan" sections 
of the Sere-Byrnes bills.
They also seemed to understand (or were at least will­
ing to admit) that no commission charter bill could assure 
the establishment of a fully competent and efficient muni­
cipal government or guarantee that any municipal administra­
tion would be free from the political and sociological con­
siderations of the modern American city. In a speech before 
the City Federation of [Woman's] Clubs in 1916 Mayor Behrman 
spoke to that issue. He acknowledged the many improvements
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and the advancements in municipal administration under the 
commission council charter, and he spoke enthusiastically 
about the promise for further improvements under the 1912 
charter. It was, he said, the practical intelligence and 
democratic character of the commissioners and the RDO that 
made the commission system a flexible and responsive part 
of popular government.xo3
The Favrot charter did accentuate the role of profes­
sional businessmen played in the city administration, but it 
did not compel the leaders of the RDO to recruit them for 
office. There were no social or occupational barriers for 
"membership1 in the Regular Democratic Organization. Several 
notable businessmen like William Bess Thompson, Arthur J. 
O'Keefe, Martin H. Manion, and Harold H. Newman belonged to 
the RDO, serving the city administration at times in posi­
tions of authority and importance. As a rule, even before 
the enactment of the Favrot charter, the Regulars selected 
businessmen and other professionals for executive positions 
within city government. By definition and design, the com­
mission system was essentially executive government; with 
its adoption by the city, the RDO merely continued with its
x°3New Orleans Item. November 28, 1916.
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established practice of choosing professionals and business 
executives for executive positions in city government.3-0'* 
Though the commission reduced the visibility of the 
professional politicians in city government, it did not di­
minish their importance or weaken the standing of the RDO in 
city affairs. Professional politicans like Criminal Sheriff 
Matthew Long, Michael James McKay, a clerk in the criminal 
court system. City Attorney I. D. Moore, and Arthur O'Keefe, 
the deputy Commissioner of Public Finance, served the city 
under the commission charter as "minor" officials. They held 
positions of authority and importance in the municipal gov­
ernment, contributing to the formulation and conduct of pub­
lic policy and lending their own significant measure of pro­
fessionalism to the municipal government. The commission 
system did not change Martin Behrman's approach to city gov­
ernment and administration, either. Though he insisted on a 
public display of solidarity by his colleagues and subor­
dinates, in private Behrman welcomed independent thought and 
initiative by the members of his administration. Under the 
commission council, as with past administrations, Behrman 
relied heavily on each member of the administration in de-
xo^Teaford, Unheralded Triumph. 42-66; Haas, "John Fitz­
patrick and Political Continuity in New Orleans, 1896-1899," 
7-29; Brian Gary Ettinger, "John Fitzpatrick and the Limits 
of Working-Class Politics in New Orleans, 1892-1896," Loui­
siana History. XXVI (Fall 1985), 341-67. Despite the conten­
tions of Haas and Ettinger, the RDO appealed to classes 
other than the working class, and many of its leaders, in­
cluding Fitzpatrick and Behrman, were "businessmen".
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terming public policy. In the purely political realm, he 
continually sought the sense of the RDO caucus, and, though 
Behrman was its dominant personality, the caucus remained 
the governing body of the RDO.103
As Behrman*s statement makes clear and as the evidence 
at hand suggests, the commission structure made only a 
modest difference in formulating public policy, and in no 
way impaired the influence of "politics" on the municipal 
government. The official correspondence of the Behrman ad­
ministration and other contemporary accounts, before and 
after 1912, indicate that "public considerations," not the 
form of city government, shaped municipal policy on such 
issues as sanitation, paving, zoning, public transportation, 
gas and electric service, and public finance. The Behrman 
administration gave public expression to the concerns of the 
city, but its voice was not the voice of a single class or 
of a business elite, but rather a chorus of interests, pre­
judices, and ideals. The commission system, however, as part 
of a general movement toward a more accomplished and invol-
xosThese statements are based on my reading of the vari­
ous letters, reports, and legal opinions written during the 
Behrman administrations, 1904-1920; 1925-1926. See Mayors1 
Correspondence. Mayors* Letters. City Archives, New Orleans 
Public Library, hereafter cited as MCML.
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ved municipal government, made the city administration a 
discrete and decisive member of that chorus.xo°
The change in the form of government, then, did not af­
fect substantially how the Behrman administration arrived at 
or carried out municipal policy, or affect the general com­
position of city government, or alter the influence of poli­
tics on the municipal government. The question becomes, 
then, why the Regulars adopted the Favrot commission charter 
bill. The standard explanation to this question is that the 
Regulars, anxious to retain their dominance over city gov­
ernment, adopted a charter that resembled the commission 
form that allowed them to pacify a majority of the commer­
cial and social elite that demanded a more honest and re­
sponsive city government and yet permitted the RDO to con­
tinue politics as usual.10-7 This account is only plausible 
if we accept the notions that progressive reforms like the 
commission council served only the interests of the so- 
called professional and commerical elite and that the 
Regular Democratic Organization was a wholly reactionary 
faction immune to the spirit and necessity of "good govern­
ment" .
xoaHutson, "New Orleams* Experience,” 79; Schott, "John M. 
Parker," 106-07; Schott, "The New Orleans Machine," 141-53; 
Williams, "Martin Behrman," 63-64. Again, I have based my 
assessment on the official correspondence of the city gov­
ernment and on its response to several important issues 
from 1900 to 1926.
xo-7Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience," 73-79; Rice, Pro­
gressive Cities. 98; Reynolds, Machine Politics. 104-06,
255.
The Regulars did not respond to the commission issue 
out of fear of losing City Hall to Parker and the G6L or 
from a fawning desire to please the commercial establishment 
of the city. The Regulars had the support of a substantial 
majority of the voters of New Orleans, and, as we have seen, 
the nonpartisan components of the commission system did not 
jeopardize the political integrity of the RDO. And, although 
the initial impetus for the adoption of the commission coun­
cil plan came from the reform press and allied elites, the 
demand for effective city government was not confined to 
them, but, as a rule, shared by the entire community. De­
spite their opposition to the Sere and Byrnes bills, the 
Regulars displayed a genuine interest in the commission 
form. The commission idea won the qualified endorsement of 
two New Orleans newspapers, the Daily Picayune and the 
Daily States, the Board of Trade, the Progressive Union, 
several ward and precinct leaders, and a number of neighbor­
hood improvement associations. For these interests and 
groups, the Favrot charter offered a workerable plan that 
promised them a more accessible, professional, decisive, and 
capable municipal government than the slow-moving and
amateurish aldermanic system.10" The party professionals, 
like Behrman and Robert Ewing (at first), favored the com­
mission idea precisely because it attracted the attention 
and support of diverse municipal interests and because, as 
John Parker feared initially, it promised to enhance the 
power and standing of the city administration. With the 
support of the city administration and the endorsement of 
several important components of city politics, the voters of 
New Orleans adopted the Favrot charter. The new charter took 
effect in December, after both the parochial and municipal 
elections of 1912.
loaNew Orleans Daily Picayune. August 31, December 2, 
1912; New Orleans Daily States. August 20, 1912; New 
Orleans, February 2, May 1, 1912; Daniel T. Rodgers, "In 
Search of Progressivism," Reviews in American History,. 10 
(December 1982), 113-42; Buenker, Urban Liberalism, passim; 
Buenker, "The Progressive Era: A Search for a Synthesis," 
Mid-America, 51 (July 1969), 175-93; Jon C. Teaford, "Finis 
for Tweed and Steffens: Rewriting the History of Urban 
Rule," Reviews in American History. 10, (December 1982), 
133-49.
Chapter Two
In the Land of Dreams
With the defeat of the Sere and Byrnes bills in the 
House and Senate, the 66L abandoned the legislative session, 
turning its full attention to the parochial and municipal 
elections. The parochial elections, scheduled for September, 
preceded the municipal elections (the first conducted under 
the commission council charter) by less than a month, and 
both the 6GL and the RDO viewed the parochial elections as 
the second phase of the municipal elections. Before the 
parochial campaign began, however, the divisions and con­
cerns of national politics intruded on the municipal elec­
tions. Late in June, after the defeat of the GGL charter 
proposals, John Parker announced his intention of conducting 
a "June to October" campaign against the "bosses" of New 
Orleans. But, when questioned about his commitment to the 
third party movement of Theodore Roosevelt, Parker grew very 
defensive. He assured his colleagues in the GGL that his re­
lationship with Roosevelt and the Progressive Party would 
not affect his standing with the GGL or lessen his resolve 
to bring progressive reform and good government to the city. 
Two weeks later, however, in July, Parker signed a resolu­
tion calling for a Progressive party convention that would 
nominate Theodore Roosevelt as its candidate for president.
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Parker again assured his followers that his pledge to elect 
Roosevelt as president did not jeopardize or alter his com­
mitment to municipal reform or to the Democratic party in 
Louisiana. "I am a Democrat," he said, "in state and city 
politics." There were, though, many other Democrats inside 
and outside the GGL who thought otherwise.1
The New Orleans Item could not find a "logical reason" 
why Parker's decision to support Roosevelt and the Progres­
sive party should bar him from leading the city's indepen­
dent political reform movement. There was, however, the Item 
wrote, a very important and compelling "practical" reason 
why Parker should not remain as the leader of the Good Gov­
ernment League. The Democratic party, the Item reminded its 
readers, was the dominant political institution in the state 
and the city; no reform movement, no matter how compelling 
its message or well-organized its supporters, could succeed 
outside its ranks. By endorsing Roosevelt, Parker chose to 
ignore a cardinal precept of Louisiana's otherwise volatile 
politics. Parker would better serve the cause of municipal 
reform, the Item wrote, by "subordinating his convictions 
and his personal loyality in this respect to the demands of 
his position at the head of the city's protest against Gov­
ernment by Boss."3
xNew Orleans Daily Picayune,. June 25, July 7, 12, 1912; 
New Orelans Item. July 8, 12, August 13, 1912; New Orleans, 
Times-Deroocrat. July 9, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker,"
184-89.
3New Orleans Item. July 12, 1912.
Most members of the GGL agreed with the Item1s 
assessment and they urged Parker to withdraw his endorsement 
of Roosevelt.3 Leland Moss, a long-time Parker supporter 
from Lake Charles, pleaded with Parker to remain with the 
Democratic party. Within the ranks of the RDO, Moss wrote, 
"your name signed to the Roosevelt call was received with 
derisive shouts of joy, as furnishing positive proof of all 
the charges made against you and against the Democratic Good 
[Government] League in the last fight, as being made up 
largely of republicans [sic] instead of democrats [sic]. I 
am sure that your action will materially affect the success 
of any progressive movement in the city of New Orleans, and 
I know that the success of any such movement is very dear to 
your heart." Moss went on to tell Parker that if he des- 
serted the Democratic party and the GGL, he forfeited any 
chance of reforming the party along lines favorable to the 
interests of the GGL, and, with it, lost any hope of ending 
ring rule in New Orleans.4
Parker resigned as the chairman of the City Campaign 
Committee, but remained a member of the GGL. He told the
3Frank T. Guilbeau to Parker, February 6, 1912, J. 
Austin Fontenot to Parker, July 11, 1912, Parker Papers,
USL; W.E. Allen to Parker, July 12, 1912, Parker Papers,
UNC.
4Moss to Parker, July 9, 1912, Parker Papers, USL. Some 
members of the League, of course, found no fault with 
Parker's decision. But only a few League members followed 
Parker into the Progressive party. See Sidney Story to 
Parker, July 18, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. August 6, 13, 1912.
League's executive committee that he was still interested in 
the reform movement in the city and would continue active in 
it irrespective of his party affiliation. He insisted that 
his principles were those of the true Democrat: white 
supremacy, federally funded flood control of the lower 
Mississippi River Valley, and antiring rule. Parker insisted 
that the Regulars, not he, had deserted the tenets of the 
Democratic party in Louisiana, and he accused Behrman and 
the RDO of being "revenue Democrats," concerned solely with 
patronage and political advantage. God save Louisiana, he 
wrote, "when [the] Office Holding, Ballot Box Stuffing, Law 
Deriding Ring of New Orleans sits as the Supreme Court to 
pass on the qualifications of Independent American Manhood." 
"In my humble judgment," he wrote to Governor Hall, "every 
ringster and every man who supported the ring should be made 
to walk the [political] plank as promptly as possible. The 
ring would crush you and your policies without a second's 
hesitation; they have no regard, no loyalty, no principle, 
and no fealty to party. They are Democrats for office and 
office only. They have never hesitated to sacrifice the 
State of Louisiana for their personal aims; they would not 
hesitate for an instant to ruin the City of New Orleans if 
it meant their perpetuation in power.""
"Parker to J. Austin Fontenot, July 11, 1912, Parker 
Papers, USL; Parker to Executive Committee, Parker to Hall, 
August 12, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; Schott, "John M. Par­
ker," 186-87.
Such shrill language and rash behavior charcterized 
much of John Parker's political correspondence and public 
life, and it is tempting to dismiss his endorsement of 
Roosevelt and his resignation from the G6L as the actions 
and words of an ill-tempered and frustrated man. And, to a 
certain degree, there is some truth to that judgment. But 
Parker's actions and remarks reveal something more profound 
than his affection for Roosevelt or his contempt for the 
Regular Democratic Organization. There were other reasons 
for Parker's departure from the Democratic party and the 
G6L. Parker was dissatisfied with the tincture and direction 
of the modern Democratic party. He distrusted and disliked 
William Jennings Bryan, Woodrow Wilson (at least the candi­
date Wilson), and what he considered the "populist" wing of 
the Democratic party. Bryan and Wilson pushed the Democratic 
party to the "left," catering to labor, assailing the priv­
ileges of business and finance, and threatening to end the 
Democratic party's dependence on the conservative white 
South and the financially important (to the New South Demo­
crats like Parker) northeast.® Parker was uncomfortable in 
this new, "populistic" Democratic party, and his leaving was 
an indication of his dissatisfaction with the party. The
®Moss to Parker, July 9, 1912, Parker Papers, USL; 
Schott, "John M. Parker," 39-90; Schott, "Huey Long: Pro­
gressive Backlash?," Louisiana History. XXVII (Spring 1986), 
133-45; Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest. 120-25, 127-30; 
LeRoy Ashby, William Jennings Brvan Champion of Democracy 
(Boston, 1987), 41-125.
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Democratic party, at home and in the nation, had moved be­
yond Parker and his variety of New South progressivism.
So too had the state and municipal reform movements. 
Parker seemed obtuse to the political and social issues and 
demands that concerned the citizens of Louisiana and New Or­
leans. Parker stressed only the "political and procedural 
objectives" of the reform movement, ignoring other, more sa­
lient issues. While Parker and the "conservative" reformers 
preached about the menace of ring rule and advocated ballot 
reform, other League members and Regular Democrats called 
for greater regulation of banking, corporations, and utility 
companies; woman's suffrage; workmen's compensation laws; a 
corporate and personal income tax amendment; and a revision 
of the state and parish tax and assessment policies. These 
issues and demands indicate the extent to which the munici­
pal and state reform movements had moved beyond Parker's 
narrow and confining definitions of reform.7
It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that Parker 
and the more "conservative" reformers were without influence 
in municipal politics or the reform movement. John Parker
7Schott, "John M. Parker," 112-13, 164-70, 182-88; 
Schott, "Huey Long: Progressive Backlash?," 138-40. Profes­
sor Schott does not "make much of" the interpretations of 
progressivism that have become "fashionable" in the 1970s 
and 1980s. His definition of the movement identifies pro­
gressivism with "elitist, entrepreneurial, or professional 
interests groups...who favored varying degrees of support 
for increased governmental responsibility in dealing with 
social problems, and advocated increased bureaucratic con­
trols with centralization or concentration of governmental 
structures to achieve efficient administration."
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may have "forfeited" a personal opportunity to direct the 
course of reform politics in New Orleans, but the "conser­
vatives" still controlled the reform organization and man­
aged to define the new reform issues, like woman suffrage, 
tax reform, and utility regulation, in terms of ring rule. 
Municipal politics and reform issues may have moved beyond 
Parker and the "conservative" reformers, but politics and 
reform in New Orleans could not move without them.
The parochial campaign began in earnest in late July, 
(news of Parker's resignation and the unsettling affect it 
had on the League delayed the selection of candidates and 
distracted, at least for the moment, the public's interests 
in the parish races), and, as expected, the League concen­
trated its campaign on the issue of "ring rule" and pinned 
its hopes of victory on selecting the "best qualified" can­
didates and on effectively reducing the voting rolls. 
Confident of victory, the Regulars hardly campaigned at all. 
Their only concern was finding the best candidate for Dis­
trict Attorney of Orleans Parish, the highest ranking paro­
chial official in metropolitan New Orleans.
The RDO caucus favored retaining incumbent District 
Attorney J. St.Clair Adams, a fiercely independent and ex­
ceedingly competent man with both social and political con­
nections. Adams wished to return to private practice, how­
ever, and so declined the invitation to seek reelection.
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The Regulars considered several other candidates but finally 
settled on Chandler C. Luzenberg, a former DA of Orleans 
Parish as their candidate.8 Luzenberg was a quality candi­
date and a superior criminal attorney. The Item described 
him as a "latent" reformer; tough, exacting, honest, and 
politically impartial. He was, in the Item's words, a man 
with an exceptional pedigree, "considerable ability, an 
honorable name in [his] profession, and a pleasing person­
ality". As the ring's candidate, however, Luzenberg was 
unacceptable to the Item and to unbossed, "independent 
manhood" of New Orleans.8
The GGL nominated its new executive chairman, forty- 
two year old Donleson Caffery for District Attorney of Or­
leans Parish. Born in St. Martin Parish in 1870, Caffery 
attended Roanoke College and the United States Naval 
Academy. He received a law degree from Tulane Law School, 
and later served as District Attorney for St.Martin and 
Terrebonne parishes. In 1900, in a period of Republican 
resurgence in Louisiana's sugar bowl parishes, Caffery 
stood as the Republican candidate for governor, though, 
like Parker, he claimed to be a "Democrat in faith," if 
not in name. Later, with the help of Parker, Thomas S. 
Wilkinson, and T. Marshall Miller, Caffery founded the 
Democratic Good Government League in 1908. Dispite Parker's
"New Orleans Item, 17, 18, 19, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. July 19, 1912.
"New Orleans Item. August 10, 22, September 15, 1912.
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disaffection from the League, Caffery promised to continue 
the reform program "mapped out by Mr. Parker",xo
Angered at being bypassed by the Regulars, Joseph Gen­
erally qualified as a candidate for District Attorney— no 
mean feat without organized support— and stood for election 
as an independent Democrat. At thirty-nine, Generally looked 
older than his years. Scholarly in appearance. Generally was 
a hardened campaigner with a solid and impressive constitu­
ency (the Item called him the "darling of the Creole" com­
munity). Generally attended the College of the Immaculate 
Conception ( the forerunner of Jesuit High School), known 
for its rigorous and classical Jesuit education and as the 
classroom for future civic and political leaders of New Or­
leans. As a young man. Generally "read the law," and was ad­
mitted to the Louisiana bar. He married Alice Sarpy, the 
daughter of an old and well-placed Creole family. Generally 
strenghtened his familial and professional credentials when 
his sister married Lionel Adams (no relation to St.Clair 
Adams), a prominent attorney who later became Generally's 
law partner. Generally, then, like Luzenberg and so many 
other members of the Regular coalition, did not fit the
XQNew Orleans Item. July, 12, August 4, 1912; Schott, 
"John M. Parker," 186-87. Why Caffery did not challenge 
Martin Behrman in the municipal elections is a matter of 
some question. Perhaps, like Parker, Caffery believed that 
the commission system would force Behrman and the other pro­
fessional politicians to retire. The choice of a mayoral 
candidate was not nearly as important a choice, then, as the 
selection of five compatible and progressive businessmen to 
serve as commissioners.
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reformers' description of the crass and unlettered 
"ringster". Yet, the League's leadership and the reform 
press discounted Joseph Generally and saw no significance in 
his candidacy, dismissing him as a spoiler or "dummy" candi­
date. This appraisal was a harsh and inapproriate judgment, 
indeed, particularly since the GGL had at one time con­
sidered Generally its prime candidate for District Attor­
ney.11
In addition to the candidates for District Attorney, 
each faction fielded a complete slate of candidates for a 
battery of parish offices, all proportioned neatly among the 
various wards and precincts of the city. The most intriguing 
race, apart from the DA's contest, was the race for Criminal 
Sheriff of Orleans Parish. The campaign matched three Re­
gulars (all from the Third Ward, as custom and politics de­
manded) and the League's M. T. Breslin, himself a former Re­
gular. The pre-campaign maneuvering among the Regulars, in­
cumbent Matthew Long and challengers Michael J. McKay and 
Edward M. Comiskey, testified to the competitive structure 
of the RDO. Unlike the GGL, whose leadership from necessity 
handpicked its candidates, the Regulars encouraged (and in 
some cases, could not discourage) competition, and selected 
their candidates on their appeal to the ward leaders and the 
voters. The system favored incumbent office holders, and, at
xxNew Orleans Item. July 18-23, August 1, 11, 1912; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune, July 17-22, August 10, 13, 1912.
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times, resulted in "bolts" from the RDO. For the successful 
"bolter," however, there was always room at the RDO's caucus 
table.
The Regulars nominated Matt Long as their candidate, 
but there was serious and organized opposition to him with­
in the caucus. Long was a hot-tempered and impulsive man, 
known for his quick fists and strong-armed tactics around 
the polling booths. The press intimated some sort of scandal 
in his office, and not a few Regulars, Mayor Behrman among 
them, wanted to "dump" Long. Long was a successful cam­
paigner, though, and protege of former mayor John Fitz­
patrick, the aging leader of the Third Ward. Challenging 
Long and Fitzpatrick for control of the ward were two other 
Irish politicians whose names were synonymous with politics 
in the Third Ward, the polished and popular McKay and the 
pugnacious Edward Comiskey.
At fifty-four, McKay was the "quiet man" of Third Ward 
politics. He was a meticulous and immaculate dresser and he 
served the criminal district court with equal precision and 
care for detail. Many Regulars considered McKay the most 
capable and appealing of the candidates, though many other 
Regulars believed he was too much a gentleman to be a poli­
tician and the Criminal Sheriff. McKay persisted, though, 
challenging the Regulars and Long without organized support 
or much money. After weeks of campaigning, however, McKay
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withdrew from the race in the name of Democratic party 
unity.3-2
Edward Comiskey, however, showed a different mettle. 
Comiskey, too, like Long, was a favorite of "Old Fitz," and 
with his help won a seat in the state General Assembly in 
1908 and again in 1912. When the Regulars settled on Long, 
Comiskey left the RDO and allied with the League, which, un­
fortunately for Comiskey, had already endorsed M. T. Breslin 
as its candidate. The GGL and the reform press were over­
joyed with Comiskey's departure from the RDO. Men like Ed­
ward Comiskey and his brother James were welcomed additions 
to the League's faltering ranks. The Comiskeys were hard- 
nosed and capable politicians and reportedly controlled a 
sizeable portion of the Third Ward's massive vote. But, 
instead of celebrating the acquisition of the Comiskeys, the 
GGL should have taken careful note of Michael McKay's quiet 
return to the RDO.3-3
The League's leadership, though, seemed bent on dis­
tracting itself in another witless assault on the voting 
rolls and the voters of New Orleans. In May, the new Regis­
trar of Voters, Samuel A. Montgomery, a League stalwart, 
ordered his staff to conduct a thorough and "systematic re-
X2New Orleans Item. July, 18-23, 1912; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. July 17-22, August 10, 13, 1912. I would like 
to thank Mr. James F. McKay, Sr. and Mr. John Donellan Fitz- 
morris, Jr. for their help in defining the character of 
Michael McKay.
“ Ibid.
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view" of all registration documents, erasing the names of 
all voters not properly or legally registered. He instruc­
ted the canvassers to consider any flaw or discrepancy on 
an application as an indication of willful fraud. A GGL 
spokesman justified Montgomery's actions as legal and pro­
per, assuring the voters of New Orleans an honest and fair 
election.
The Regulars acknowledged that duplications and cleri­
cal errors existed, but they disputed the notion that such 
errors constituted willful fraud. The Regulars filed several 
suits in Civil District Court blocking Montgomery's orders. 
In the most important suit, attorneys for Anthony Herrle ad­
mitted that Registrar Montgomery could strike names from the 
voting lists, but only in strict compliance with the regis­
tration act of 1908. The act permitted the Registrar to 
erase the names of those voters who had died, been convicted 
of a felony, or been judged mentally incompetent. Judge 
Porter Parker, John Parker's brother, agreed with Herrle's 
demurer and issued a permanent writ preventing Montogmery 
from removing Herrle's name from the rolls.13
The League's response to Judge Parker's ruling was 
swift and harsh in its condemnation. The Item damned the 
decision as "judicial hocuus pocus". "There is no equity and 
no right," the Item editoralized, "in a judicial order that
x*New Orleans Item, May 9, July 27, 29, August 21,
1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 119-20.
lsNew Orleans Item, August 8, 10, 15, 17, 18, 1912.
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prevents by technicality the carrying out of the real intent 
of the law of the state." Judge Parker's decision, the Item 
concluded, had stepped beyond the bounds of judicial impar­
tiality and propriety into the realm of partisan politics.
As a means of combating "politicalized" judges, the Item 
called for a constitutional amendment subjecting all state 
and municipal judges to the direct recall of the voters. 
Donelson Caffery, however, urged a more direct and immediate 
approach. Caffery suggested that Montgomery ignore the 
court's ruling and continue removing the names of voters 
registered illegally. "The time has arrived," he said, "to 
serve notice that an injunction by a court cannot rob the 
people of their rights."1®
Montgomery ignored Caffery's advice and, as expected, 
appealed Parker's writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court. With 
the final court ruling not expected until after the parochi­
al elections, the Regulars and several less strident but in­
fluential League members met to set the ground rules for the 
elections. The two factions argeed, at least for this elec­
tion, that only those voters with valid registration papers 
and poll tax receipts would be allowed to vote. They also 
agreed that an illiterate voter registered in error under 
the education provision could seek assistance in marking his 
ballot. The agreement changed nothing about the eligibility
ieNew Orleans Item, August 14, 17-22, 1912. Montgomery 
removed only 338 of the 50,000 voters registered in New Or­
leans .
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of the voters, and its political effect clearly favored the 
Regulars. The agreement acknowledged that the duplication of 
records and clerical error were not grounds for removing a 
voter from the rolls and that illiteracy should not bar some 
one from voting. The agreement also meant that a visible and 
important segment of the League was disgusted with the tac­
tics and rhetoric of the Parkerites, in effect, questioning 
the old-line leadership of the GGL.17
Publicly, Caffery accepted the terms of the agreement, 
but he was dissatisfied with it. He told a rally of League 
supporters and interested observers that if on election 
day the Regulars violated the primary election law, he and 
the GGL stood ready to act as judge, jury, and, if need be, 
coroner. The League did not condone violence, he said, but 
it would not back away from it when faced with a threat of 
fraud and intimidation at the polls. The League would take 
every precaution, Caffery blustered, to ensure the safety of 
its workers and the sanctity of each ballot.18
In trying to reassert his command of the GGL and rally 
its supporters, Caffery lost some valuable support. The New 
Orleans Daily Picayune, which had endorsed Caffery, now cen­
sured him as a reckless "fire-eater8 and a man unworthy of 
public office. Since there was no substance to Caffery's
17New Orleans Item, September 1, 1912; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. September 2, 1912.
18New Orleans Item. 21, 30, 1912; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. August 16, 21, 1912.
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charge, the Picayune concluded that he designed his remarks 
to discourage ordinary citizens from voting, enhancing, as 
he saw things, his own chances of election. The Regulars 
agreed with the Picayune. The League's leadership, the 
Regulars contended, had no useful proposals or timely issues 
to present to the people of New Orleans. The League's entire 
campaign centered on the tiresome and meaningless issue of 
ring rule, homespun cliches (Caffery's campaign slogan was 
"home, family, and the City of New Orleans"), and the fading 
recollections of nineteenth-century politics. The GGL de­
liberately engaged in idle talk and veiled threats to excite 
the public, discourage voters, and provide itself with a 
convenient excuse for losing the parochial elections.x"
The League's campaign tactics and rhetoric had no visi­
ble effect on the "ordinary" voters of New Orleans, but they 
aroused considerable concern and agitation among the city's 
commmerical leaders. Even before Caffery made his revealing 
remarks, a number of prominent businessmen and civic leaders 
on both sides of the contest expressed their concerns to 
Mayor Behrman about the direction and demeanor of the paro­
chial campaign. On August 5, they addressed a letter to 
Behrman detailing their worries and suggesting to the mayor 
that he appoint a special police force to keep the peace and 
enforce the voting laws on election day. Soon after deliver-
x,New Orleans Daily Picayune. August 16, 21, 27, 30, 31, 
1912; New Orleans Item. August 30, 1912.
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ing their letter to Behrman, the group's chief spokesmen, 
Hugh McCloskey, the president of New Orleans Railway and 
Light Company, and Edwin T. Merrick, called on the mayor at 
City Hall. Behrman told them that before committing himself 
to their suggestion he wanted to consult with City Attorney 
I. D. Moore about the legal aspects of their plan. The mayor 
suspected that legal and financial complications would pre­
vent the formation of a "special" police force. But, more 
importantly, he feared that a special police force appointed 
by an incumbent mayor might be seen as a partisan "goon 
squad," giving credence to Caffery's charges and tarnishing 
the city's reputation.20
City Attorney Moore rendered his opinion a week later. 
According to Moore, unless there was a "clear and present 
danger" of violence or a total collapse of the civil author­
ity, the mayor had no power to create an extralegal police 
force. Until such occurences, the city administration and 
the businessmen had to depend on the New Orleans Police De­
partment and the common sense and integrity of the people to 
keep peace and order on election day.23L Moore's opinion de­
lighted the mayor, but McCloskey and Merrick believed 
Moore's findings overly legalistic and unmindful of the 
city's serious political troubles. The businessmen appealed
2°New Orleans Daily Picayune. 27, 30, 31, 1912; New 
Orleans Item. August 30, 1912.
zlMoore to Behrman, August 11, 1912, vol. 5, CAP, CA,
NOPL.
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to Behrman again, but the mayor, armed with Moore's persua­
sive opinion, declined to reconsider their request. Undeter­
red, McCloskey and Merrick went to Governor Hall for assis­
tance. Hall pressed Behrman for an accounting of the situa­
tion. The mayor, irked by McCloskey and Merrick's pleas to 
the governor, told Hall that the businessmen were overre­
acting to Caffery's idle remarks and, as a consequence, were 
misinforming him about the political situation in New Or­
leans. There was, Behrman told Hall, no real threat of vio­
lence and no likelihood of fraud occuring at the polls. The 
city administration was capable of protecting its citizens 
and preserving the public order without the assistance (or 
interference) of the state government or a special, politi­
calized police force. The Democratic party in New Orleans, 
Behrman said, was capable of conducting its own elections, 
rendering a fair and accurate count, and was willing to 
abide by the results of those elections.22
On election day, September 3, the reform press reported 
"unusually" heavy voting throughout the city, a sure sign, 
it boasted of the League's impending victory. The Item was 
surprised and pleased to report that the Regulars were 
"manifesting an unusual disposition to play it fair". Obvi­
ously, the Item wrote, the presence of Governor Hall in New 
Orleans and the "visible" determination of the League to
22New Orleans Item, September 1-3, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. September 1-3, 1912.
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assure a fair election cowed the Regulars and lessened the 
chances for violence and fraud at the polls. There was but 
one serious incident and that, acccording to the Item, ap­
peared to be more a matter of race than politics. There was, 
however, nothing unusual or pleasing for the League about 
the results of the elections. The RDO swept the parochial 
elections. Chandler Luzenberg, ignored in the press, became 
the new District Attorney, winning thirteen of the seventeen 
wards and holding a 5,000 vote lead over Caffery and a 1,500 
vote majority over the field of candidates. Caffery won the 
uptown wards, the Twelfth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seven­
teenth, nearly matching Hall's performance in the guberna­
torial primary. Generally fared well in the downtown wards, 
and, though his candidacy did not materially influence the 
outcome of the election, by eating into the Regulars' 
"normal" majorities, he gave false confidence to the 
League's campaign for the commission council.23
The Regulars' unspectacular but complete victory should 
have given the League second thoughts about challenging 
Martin Behrman in the October municipal elections. Instead, 
the GGL and the Item interpreted the results of the paro­
chial elections as an indication of the League's ultimate 
victory. The Item even went as far as developing a fanciful
23New Orleans Item, September 1-5, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. September 3-5, 1912; New Orleans Daily 
States. September 9, 1912. Luzenberg received 18,719,
Caffery 13,689, and Generally 3,575. The Regulars predicted 
a 1,200 vote majority for Luzenberg.
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thesis explaining the reasons for the ring's final defeat, 
confidently announcing that "the old gods are dead". Over 
the past four years, the Item wrote, the Regulars' margin of 
victory in important primary contests had declined drama­
tically. In 1908, the Regulars gave Jared Young Sanders a 
10,000 vote majority in New Orleans, but the reforms and 
pressures for reform instigated by the League since then had 
worked to reduce the RDO's majorities for Michael and Luzen­
berg. It was apparent to all, said the Item, that the people 
were increasingly dissatisfied and disgusted with ring rule; 
only the influence of professional politicians and the con­
nivance of the ring's "animated payroll" kept the RDO in 
power.
All that would end in October. The League maintained a 
solid and experienced organization and added to its strength 
and numbers every day. Men like R.G."Buddy" Gregory, Robert 
O'Rourke, and the Comiskeys swelled the ranks of the League 
and brought new confidence, experience, and, most of all, a 
large number of active workers and voters to the League's 
cause. Since May, when Samuel Montgomery became Registrar of 
Voters, the League had removed hundreds of illegally regis­
tered voters from the rolls. For the first time since dis­
franchisement, the Item reported, the rolls reflected the 
true composition of the voting population. The Item antici­
pated, as well, a dramatic rise in the number of men voting
= ,,New Orleans Item. September 5, 1912.
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in October, nearly all committed to the purposes o£ anti­
machine reform. In the January primary, nearly 40,000 men 
voted for one of the three gubernatorial candidates, but in 
the parochial elections only 33,000 men voted. According to 
the Item, most all of the 7,000 who failed to vote in Sep­
tember were supporters of the League (they had failed to* 
vote because they were out of town on summer vacation), and 
could be expected to vote Martin Behrman out of office on 
October 1. The Item based its conclusion on a survey con­
ducted by the League that showed that 500 men in the Garden 
District precincts of the Twelfth Ward had failed to vote in 
the recent elections. If other precincts and wards resembled 
the Twelfth Ward, and the Item was confident they did, then 
the GGL had not yet tapped its full complement of voters.
The Regulars, on the other hand, as the results of the paro­
chial elections showed, had spent themselves completely.23
The GGL's canvass, of course, proved only that a few 
hundred residents of Garden District had not taken interest 
in the parish elections (not an uncommon occurence in Uptown 
New Orleans, given John Parker's voting record), and said 
nothing pertinent about how the rest of the city might vote 
in municipal election. The Item's inventive analysis was as 
inaccurate as it was misleading. Of the 40,000 men who voted 
in the governor's race, only 3,500, not 7,000 chose not to 
vote in the parochial elections. And, Chandler Luzenberg,
2SIbid.
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not Donelson Caffery, suffered more from the voters' loss of 
interest. Luzenberg's total was twenty percent less than 
than Michel's vote, while Caffery's vote was but two percent 
less than Governor Hall's percentage. Joseph Generally, not 
Caffery, contributed to Luzenberg's relatively poor showing. 
Generally won ten percent of the vote, most of it coming 
from the RDO's strongholds. In short, the Regulars had not 
exhausted themselves, and any talk of their death was great­
ly exaggerated.26
Realistically, there was no exaggerating the League's 
growing sense of desperation. The campaign that began more 
than a year before with much confidence and hope was by 
early September, 1912 at the point of complete exhaustion. 
The League approached the municipal elections without an 
appreciable measure of popular support, without an issue 
that might swing popular opinion in its favor, without 
creditable leadership, and without, at least for the moment, 
anyone willing to challenge Martin Behrman in the municipal 
campaign. The Regulars were, to be sure, confident of suc­
cess in the city elections. They had beaten the League in 
New Orleans in convincing fashion in two major contests, 
had weathered partisan charges of fraud and venality, had 
thwarted efforts to legislate them out of office, had suf­
fered only minor and temporary defections, and, most impor­
tant of all, they had a successful and popular candidate to
2 6 I b i d .
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lead their commission ticket, the incumbent mayor of New Or­
leans, Martin Behrman.
The League began its public search for a mayoral candi­
date as early as November, 1911. It considered a great many 
possible candidates, but few men of the so-called "better 
element" of New Orleans displayed much interest in seeking 
elective public office, and fewer still relished the task of 
trying to unseat Martin Behrman. Some League members, par­
ticularly Samuel Montgomery, Marshall Ballard, and James 
Thomson, hoped to draft John Parker as the League's nominee 
for mayor, but Parker declined consideration, citing a long­
standing reservation against seeking public office. Parker 
believed that his candidacy would introduce undue partisan­
ship into the campaign, diverting attention away from the 
principal issue of ring rule and municipal reform. Parker 
also believed that reforms like the nonpartisan primary, the 
short ballot, and the commission council would discourage 
professional politicians from seeking office and encourage 
men of merit and intelligence to pursue public service.27 
The choice of a mayoral nominee, then, was not nearly as im­
portant as the selection of five compatible and progressive 
businessmen to serve as commissioners.
27New Orleans Item, November 5, 19, 1911, January 5, 
February 25, 27, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 98-99, 
see fn. 17; "The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism," 
146, see fn. 11.
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Less sanguine than the Parkerites about the ability of 
businessmen alone to govern the city, the Item urged the 
League to select "first class intelligent men" who were 
either themselves experts in law, public finance, municipal 
administration, or engineering or who were willing to employ 
experts in governing the city. The League, the newspaper 
wrote, must select nominees solely on their "moral, social, 
and political" contribution to New Orleans, "regardless of 
[the] advantages or disadvantages of birth, education, or 
wealth". Above all else, the Item advised, the GGL's nom­
inees must be above party and faction and must be able to 
serve without regard to the "social, family, or personal 
connections which would influence them away from the line of 
duty...". Not surprisingly, though, the men most frequently 
mentioned as possible mayoral candidates were among the 
social and coromerical elites of the city.ZB
For nearly two weeks after Caffery's defeat, the execu­
tive selection committee interviewed and evaluated potential 
candidates. The committee spokesman, J. Frank Coleman, ad­
mitted that perhaps the League had delayed too long in 
naming its ticket, but the selection committee had encoun­
tered some unexpected, though not entirely unwelcomed, dif­
ficulties. According to Coleman, the League had so many fine
2"New Orleans Item, July 17, August 30, September 5, 
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 23, 1912. Those men 
mentioned most often were Leon C. Simon, Frank B. Hayne, 
Crawford H. Ellis, and Leigh Carroll.
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candidates from whom to chose that selecting the five "best 
men" was extremely painstaking and difficult. In addition, 
the League sought a well-balanced ticket, one that was rep- 
resentive of the League's true composition and that appeal­
ed to all classes of voters in New Orleans. This later as­
pect had proven more perplexing than the selection committee 
had anticipated, but, though the commission election was 
only two weeks away, the League was confident of fielding a 
complete ticket and just as confident, at least in public, 
of complete victory.29
Privately, however, influential League members were not 
so confident or anxious to "contest" the Regulars in the 
municipal elections. In mid-September, Edgar H. Farrar, the 
prominent attorney and reformer, proposed that the GGL aban­
don its intention of fielding its own municipal ticket. 
Instead, Farrar suggested that the League offer to form a 
bipartisan municipal government with the Regulars. The plan 
sounded plausible and attracted some consideration from the 
executive leadership of the GGL. It allowed the League to 
avoid another humiliating defeat and accorded the reformers 
representation on the commission council. It also forced the 
Regulars into recognizing the League as a potential equal,
29New Orleans Item. September 10, 11, 13, 14, 1912;
New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 6-8, 10-15, 1912. 
Later, Coleman confessed that the committee had a very dif­
ficult time persuading any of the "best citizens" to run on 
the League's ticket.
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condoning its words and actions over the past year and 
legitimating the League's agenda for municipal reform.
The executive committee, however, had a number of seri­
ous reservations about Farrar's suggestion. In proposing it, 
the League appeared unwilling to accept the decision of the 
voters of New Orleans and seemed more concerned with politi­
cal position than with reform. Even if the Regulars consent­
ed to the plan, the professional politicians would continue 
to dominate the municipal government, nullifying whatever 
influence the reformers had with the municipal government.
As a minority on the commission council, the GGL would not 
be able to set and direct public policy, but, as part of the 
administration, the League would be accountable to the 
public for the general tone and calibre of the city 
government.
The executive committee was willing to "submit” to a 
bipartisan government, but it was not willing to share power 
with Martin Behrman. The League advised Behrman (not direct­
ly, but through the reform press) that it would accept a bi­
partisan municipal administration of three Regulars and two 
League members, provided, however, that Behrman step down as 
mayor. The Item termed the League's offer "serious and gen­
erous," but Berhman rejected it, calling the proposal "friv­
olous and insulting”. The League's plan, the mayor said, was 
nothing more than a desperate attempt by the League to fore­
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stall a final humiliation at the polls and to finagle itself 
into office.30
On September 17, three days after the Regulars rejected 
its "serious and generous" offer for a bipartisan city gov­
ernment, the League announced its ticket. Four of the five 
nominees were businessmen, but none of the four was from the 
commerical elite of the city. The fifth nominee, Charles F. 
Claiborne, was a lawyer, the lone "professional" on the tic­
ket. With the exception of Claiborne, the League's nominee 
for mayor, none of these men was well-born or particularly 
well-educated. Though the reform press lionized them as 
"sound, substantial, [and] eminently qualified" to serve on 
the council, none of them was an expert in public law, fi­
nance, management, or municipal government. Though four of 
them served in prior reform administrations, their experi­
ence in government was limited. These men did not come from 
the commerical, managerial, or social elite (again excepting 
Claiborne), but from the ill-defined and volatile social and 
commerical middle class. And the League chose them, it would 
seem, not because the dynamics of progressive reform dicta­
ted their selection, but because political necessity forced 
the hand of the GGL. These men alone agreed to run on the 
League's ticket. They had previous, though limited, campaign 
experience, and had served in city government before (again
3°New Orleans Item, September 14, 17, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. September 14, 17, 20, 1912.
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in limited and minor capacities), and they could, or so the 
League hoped, appeal to every category of voter in New 
Orleans.
Charles F. Claiborne was not the League's first (or 
even second) choice for mayor, though from the beginning of 
the metropolitan campaigns, he remained among the League's 
prime candidates. Imperious in appearance and manner (he 
looked and acted like a Creole grandee), Claiborne's quali­
fications for mayor did not extend beyond his uncommon 
family heritage (his grandfather was William C. C. Clai­
borne) and his commonplace association with the antimachine 
reformers as an "implacable foe of corrupt bosses and dis­
honest politics". Despite his social pedigree and courtly 
Southern mannerisms, the reform press portrayed him as a man 
removed from the shallowness of "club life," who moved free­
ly among all classes and character of citizens and who 
shared the concerns and understood the needs of the common 
man.32
Claiborne's public career and private concerns give 
little indication that he shared the concerns of the ordin­
ary citizens of New Orleans. As councilman from the Seventh 
Ward (1888-1892, 1896-1900), Claiborne served as the chair-
31New Orleans Item, September 18, 19, 22, 23, 1912;
Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 38.
32New Orleans Item, September 18, 19, 22, 23, 1912. 
The League's selection committee wanted Leon C. Simon, a 
securities magnate, as its candidate, but Simon refused to 
leave his brokerage firm, Kohn, Weil, and Simon.
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man of the budget committee, a committee that did not formu­
late the budget, but merely sanctioned its priorities and 
expenditures. Later, as a member of the City Park Commis­
sion, he and the other commissioners (all from the social 
and commerical establishment) were responsible for making 
the park more accessible and appealing to the public. These 
achievements were the extent of Claiborne's public career, 
a career confined to minor pursuits and interrupted by 
twelve years of inactivity. Claiborne did nothing to dispell 
these facts. He was a distant and ineffective campaigner, 
content with repeating the League's antimachine slogans and 
appealing to "the intelligent and thinking voters of New 
Orleans". He was, in effect, no match for Martin Behrman.33
The other four League candidates, Louis Pfister, George 
M. Leahy, Oscar Schumert, and Andrew J. McShane, were all 
self-made businessmen and amateur politicians. Louis Pfister 
was a second generation German immigrant, born in New Or­
leans and educated in the Catholic school system. He served 
as a member of the Orleans Parish Levee Board, the city 
council, and the Public Belt Railroad Commission, under both 
reform and Regular administrations. As a member of the coun­
cil and the railroad commission, he urged the active and 
strict regulation of all public utility monopolies, a common 
concern of every administration since 1896. George Leahy too 
was a native of New Orleans, and, like Pfister, served on
3 3 I b i d .
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the city council from 1896-1900. Leahy was the president of 
the Contractors and Dealers Exchange (the only "exchange" 
member on the League's ticket) and president of the Security 
Building and Loan Association. The Item called Leahy a man 
of "well-balanced, sane, conservative, progressive, and sym­
pathetic qualities," but made no mention of any public con­
viction apart from his opposition to ring rule. Oscar Schu- 
mert, like Leahy, was the president of a savings and loan 
association. Unlike the other candidates, though, Schumert 
had no previous political exposure and experience. Andrew J. 
McShane, a future mayor, was the best known and qualified of 
the League's candidates. Hot-tempered and fearless (some ob­
servers said senseless), McShane began and ended his politi­
cal career as steadfast antimachine reformer. A serious and 
sober campaigner, McShane was mindful of the League's dis- 
ablities and limited appeal.
Ideally, these men were not the sort of ticket the GGL 
selection committee had envisioned or that the League's 
supporters had expected. With the exception of McShane, none 
of these men, especially Claiborne, was particularly well- 
known or, for that matter, recognized by the League member­
ship as a leader in the antimachine movement. Their records 
of public service and civic accomplishment were stale and 
unexceptional, and they seemed content to rely on the tired
3,*New Orleans Item. September 18, 20, 22, 23, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. September 19, 20, 1912.
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adages and remedies of the antimachine consensus for their 
political guidance and support. They were, after all, little 
more than afterthoughts; campaigning not so much to win the 
election as to keep the reform movement from falling 
apart.33
The RDO caucus met the week of September 11 to select 
its commission council ticket. Amisdt rumors of dissent and 
hard feelings, the caucus promptly renominated Mayor Behrroan 
once again— and for obvious and compelling reasons. In addi­
tion to being the recognized leader of the RDO, Behrman was 
a man of immense personal and political popularity, a hard­
working and progressivs mayor, and a proven campaigners.
Over the course of the week, the Regulars named the other 
four remaining nominees. As expected, all four were busi­
nessmen of substantial social and commerical reputations. 
Although they were fairly active in municipal politics (one 
of them had been a Citizen Leaguer and another a one-time 
candidate for mayor), they were not tied formally to the 
RDO. Only one of the four had held elective office before, 
and, like the men on Claiborne's ticket, none of them had 
direct or appreciable experience in modern city government. 
Why, then, did the RDO caucus select these men for the com­
mission council? Their selection suggests that the Regulars, 
like the reformers, were committed to reform in municipal
33New Orleans Item, September 18-23, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune,. September 19-20, 1912.
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government. The modern municipal government demanded execu­
tive experience and expert knowledge in the certain special­
ized fields. But municipal politics required an appeal to 
the demands of special interests and local considerations. 
The business executive came closest to fulfilling those de­
mands and requirements. In addition, in selecting business­
men and other executives for office, the Regulars were 
merely following precedent. Executive office required men 
with executive ability and experience.2,6
William Bess Thompson, like Martin Behrman, was born 
outside New Orleans, and he too was a large and generally 
unattractive man. But apart from these similarities and 
his love for the city, William Bess Thompson was everything 
Martin Behrman was not. Thompson's father was a wealthy cot­
ton factor who provided William with all the advantages and 
trappings of wealth. Thompson attended New Orleans's ex­
clusive private academies and later graduated from the Uni­
versity of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee. Thompson studied 
history and political economy under Herbert Baxter Adams and 
Richard T. Ely at Johns Hopkins University, later receiving 
a law degree from Columbia Law School. His academic years 
behind him, Thompson returned to New Orleans to manage his 
father's cotton firm, adding considerably to the family's 
already substantial wealth. The New Orleans Cotton Exchange
3SNew Orleans Item. September 11-13, 15-17, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune,. September 11, 12, 15-17, 19, 1912; 
Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 39-41.
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(NOCE) elected Thompson its president first in 1907, then 
again in 1909. In 1911, after resigning as president of the 
NOCE, Thompson became president pro tempore of the Public 
Belt Railroad Commission, a commission he and Behrman plan­
ned to bring under the authority and control of the commis­
sion council. Thompson's social standing as a member of the 
Boston, Pickwick, and Southern Yacht clubs did not preclude 
him or many men like him from endorsing Martin Behrman and 
the RDO with their votes, money, and service.37
Harold W. Newman, too, was a wealthy and educated busi­
nessman and an ambitious politician. He was the son of 
Morris W. Newman, a banker and broker in utility securities, 
whose large and commerically active family had at one time 
controlled a large portion of the city public utility sys­
tem. Harold Newman attended Tulane University, where he re­
ceived a law degree in 1904. As a young man, Newman became 
president of the New Orleans Stock Exchange. Despite his 
family's existing and former ties with the public utility 
monopoly, Newman called for a more formal and exacting 
municipal regulation of New Orleans Railway and Light 
Company.
In addition to his business activities, rather because 
of them, Newman became interested in city politics and go-
37New Orleans Item, September 17, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. September 17, 20, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily States, September 22, 1919; Hutson, "New Orleans' Ex­
perience Under Commission Government,” 78-79.
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vernment. In 1908 Newman left the Democratic party, joining 
the "Customhouse" wing of the Republican party (provoking 
the Item to refer to Newman as a "political pharisee"). 
Newman's sojourn with the Customhouse Republicans lasted but 
a few days. Later in 1908, Newman rejoined the Democrats, 
announcing his availability for mayor of New Orleans. Four 
years later he reestablished his party regularity by endor­
sing John Michel for governor and supporting the Regulars in 
the parochial elections. Despite his movement toward poli­
tical orthodoxy, Newman kept his distance from the Regular 
professionals. He would accept the RDO's nomination, he 
said, only if the Regulars assured his complete independence 
in office.30
Adolph G. Ricks was eighty years old in 1912, by far 
the oldest candidate, and, besides Behrman, the only other 
Regular with previous experience in municipal government. 
Ricks came to America from Germany at the age of ten, set­
tling in Paris, Texas, a cotton community on the Red River. 
Ricks later moved to St. Helena Parish, then to New Orleans. 
After the Civil War (Ricks was a Confederate veteran), Ricks 
joined John Franks in the hides and leather business. From 
his association with Franks, Ricks branched into brewing and 
banking. He was the president of the New Orleans Brewing As­
sociation, the Mutual Bond and Homestead Association, Title 
Mortgage and Guaranty Corporation, and the Metropolitan Bank
3 8 I b i d .
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and Trust Company. His only other foray into city politics 
came in 1896 as a member of the Citizens League and the city 
council.3*
Edward E. Lafaye (pronounced laa fi), the Regulars 
final choice for the commission council, came from an old 
and respected Creole family. The Lafayes belonged to the 
most exclusive social organizations and held offices in 
several prestigious commerical and banking insitutions in 
New Orleans. Lafaye, known throughout the city as E. E., was 
a wholesale grocer and real estate developer, and, at 
thirty-two, the youngest and least experienced candidate in 
the campaign. The Item considered Lafaye a fairly competent 
and progressive candidate, but far too young and inexperi­
enced for such an important and exacting position in city 
government. The Regulars' ticket, the Item wrote,, possessed 
outstanding individuals with impressive credentials and 
solid characters— they were, after all, from the business 
and social elites of New Orleans. As a ticket, paired with 
Martin Behrman and the RDO, however, they were but a "shirt 
front," an admission of the failure of the ward-boss system 
in general and the Behrman administration in particular to
39New Orleans Item, July 9, 1911, September 17, 1912; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. September 19, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily States, September 22, 1912; Hutson, "New Orleans' Ex­
perience Under Commision Government," 78.
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provide the type of leadership needed to make New Orleans a 
modern/ progressive city.*0
The municipal campaign was mercifully short. After al­
most two years of continuous campaigning, there was little 
left to say. What was said and debated took place in the 
newspapers and a few campaign rallies. The reformers took up 
their familiar chant of ring rule, and the Regulars recited 
their litany of accomplishments.
Martin Behrman, as the leader of the RDO and as the 
chief executive of "government by boss," epitomized the 
failures and inequities of the old politics. The ward-boss 
system, the Item wrote, allowed likeable but shallow men, 
like Martin Behrman, to rise above their station and talent, 
corrupting politics and government by encouraging mediocrity 
and rewarding incompetence. Behrman, the newspaper said, 
"never was anything but a small-bore politician and chronic 
office holder, (who] has demonstrated nothing but tempera­
mental unfitness and utter incompetence in every large af­
fair in which he was personally engaged..." His accomplish­
ments in office were due to the foresight, initiative, and 
skill of the "better elements" of New Orleans. Behrman and 
the Regulars were not "evil men," the Item graciously ad­
mitted, but were simply unlettered and unremarkable men.
*°New Orleans Item, December 15, 1911, February 22, Sep­
tember 16, 17, 1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 
18, 19, 1912; Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience Under Com­
mission Government," 73-79.
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"offensively swollen with the assumed right to control bet­
ter men holding commission direct from the people" and fun­
damentally incapable of administering a "great business like 
the affairs of a city".*1
At issue was not just the selection of the five best 
individuals or even the better ticket, the Item contended, 
but the better system of politics and government. The ward- 
boss system, the Item intoned, encouraged inefficiency and 
corruption in government, retarding economic progress and 
depriving the citizens of New Orleans of the benefits of 
modern city life. It closed government to the people, dis­
couraged participation in politics, and, as a consequence, 
made a mockery of the democratic process. In the public 
sphere, ring rule meant a "politicalized" assessment and 
taxation system, unpaved and dimly lighted streets, uncol­
lected garbage, high utility rates and fares, and poor pub­
lic service. In the "private sector," political favoritism 
shown to certain businesses and interests discouraged in­
vestment and growth, kept prices arbitrarily high and wages 
unnecessarily low, and placed the honest businessman under 
the influence of corrupt public officials.*2
The very purpose of the League's metropolitan campaign, 
the Item concluded, was the elimination of these wrongful
*1New Orleans Item, August 14, 1912; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. August 15, 1912; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor 
and Political Boss," 35-36.
*2New Orleans Item. September 21-22, 24-26, 1912; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. September 26, 1912.
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political considerations and the establishment of a politi­
cal system committed to public service and democractic prin­
ciples and ideals. As long as "political" considerations 
continued to warp the legitimate concerns of the people, New 
Orleans would never reclaim its position as the "cultural 
center" of the South or take its natural place among the 
nation's premier cities.**
Martin Behrman responded to the Item's and the League's 
criticisms and slurs with a simple recitation of the major 
accomplishments of his administration. In his only major ad­
dress of the campaign, Behrman took credit (with sufficient 
justification) for the financial and physical improvements 
in the city over the past eight years. Over the course of 
his two terms, Behrman said, his administration gave the 
city an improved financial and economic standing, extended 
the water, drainage, and sanitation system, initiated major 
improvements to the port, made the belt railroad a reality, 
paved and lighted many streets, and made city government 
more accessible, efficient, and expert. There was, in short, 
the mayor said, no substance to the League's allegations of 
mismanagement or political favoritism. The issue in this 
campaign, Behrman concluded, was the difference between the 
administration's proven ability and record of achievement
«3Ibid.
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and the League's meaningless sloganeering and its visible 
inexperience. '■'•
Rain marred the final week of the campaign and threat­
ened again the morning of the election. But by mid-morning, 
the threat had passed, the clouds and rain moving rapidly to 
the south and east. The rest of the day remained cool and 
dry, and uneventful. The election was, despite predictions 
to the contrary, never in doubt. Mayor Behrman and the Regu­
lars won in impressive fashion, outpolling the League ticket 
by nearly forty-two thousand votes and sweeping all five 
commission positions. The mayor won all but two wards, 
losing the Twelfth Ward by three votes and the Fourteenth by 
only 210 votes. The other Regular candidates also won with 
comparative ease. Harold Newman, who among the Regulars re­
ceived the fewest votes, outpolled Andrew McShane, the 
League's best performer, by more than five thousand votes. 
Claiborne's performance was an embarrassment. Though he re­
ceived thirty-seven percent of the vote, roughly the average
‘•‘•New Orleans Item, September 26, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. September 20, 21, 24, 26, 1912;
Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 45, 
70-81; Schott, "The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism," 
144.
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for the League in New Orleans, two of his running mates, 
Schumert and McShane, garnered more votes than he did.*9 
As the mayor and the new commission council prepared 
for a new administration, the Item consoled the League and 
its supporters. The League's defeat in the municipal pri­
mary, wrote the Item in a customary postmortem, did not 
signal the end of the municipal reform movement in New 
Orleans. Granted, the Item wrote, the League had a number of 
organizational problems and some serious character flaws, 
most notably its closed view of municipal reform and its 
narrow "class" appeal. Its "natural" leader abandoned the 
movement in mid-course, compelling secondary figures to 
assume command. The League "compromised" its reputation and 
credibility by conducting its campaigns on a single and 
suspect issue, personal slurs, and false accusations.*6
There were, however, encouraging signs of the perman- 
ance and vitality of the municipal reform movement, the Item 
wrote. Already, there were plans for the creation of a more
*9New Orleans Item. September 30, October 1-3, 1912; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. October 1-3, 1912; Williams, "Martin 
Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 46-47.
Regulars League
Behrman: 23,371 Claiborne: 13,917
Thompson:23,039 McShane: 16,216
Lafaye: 22,267 Schumert: 13,962
Ricks: 22,035 Pfister: 13,493
Newman: 21,492 Leahy: 12,686
112,204 70,274
*sNew Orleans Item. September 30, October 2, 1912; New 
Orleans Daily Picavuner October 3, 1912; Williams, "Martin 
Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 46-47.
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permanent and democratic reform organization. The new, yet 
unnamed, organization would be a citizens' lobby and a per­
manent political organization. As a citizens' lobby, the new 
organization would promote the social and commerical inter­
ests of the people of New Orleans. And, as a political or­
ganization, it would contest the Regulars for control of the 
municipal government. *'T
Despite its numerous difficulties and obstacles, the 
Item remarked, the municipal reform movement achieved most 
of its objectives. It elected an antimachine reformer as 
governor, forced the enactment of a commission council char­
ter, and compelled the RDO to nominate and elect businessmen 
to the commission council. True, the League failed to remove 
Martin Behrman and the RDO from power. But the League suc­
ceeded in defining the issues and influencing the course of 
municipal politics and government. It learned the limits of 
"antimachine" reform, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Regulars, and something of the true composition of politics 
in New Orleans. The League may not have "smashed" the ring, 
the Item wrote, but it surely propelled the RDO in the di­
rection of good government, and, in the process, weakened
‘,7£bid. The new organization did not last. Its "charter" 
members, Donelson Caffery, J. Frank Coleman, H. Dickson 
Bruns, Andrew McShane, J. Zach Spearing, and Charles F. 
Claiborne could not sustain interest in the organization. 
After a brief effort to rekindle interest failed, the or­
ganization collapsed. See New Orleans Item. March 7-9, 1913.
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the foundation of ring rule and partisan politics in New Or­
leans . ‘•a
The Item's assessment of municipal politics and reform 
needs qualification. After all, it was the Regulars, not the 
League, that won all three primary contests in the city, ex­
posing the limited popular appeal of the anti-machine munic­
ipal reform movement. The new structure of city government, 
crafted by the Regulars, promoted the demands for greater 
public accountability and governmental efficiency without 
threatening the principles and values of representative 
municipal government. The election of Martin Behrman and the 
new council assured the continuing influence of the RDO on 
the content and course of public policy and municipal reform 
in New Orleans. But, even more importantly, the election of 
Martin Behrman and the Regular Democratic Organization 
assured the continuing influence of every sort of political 
interest, including that of the antimachine reformers, on 
the content and course of city politics and municipal reform 
in New Orleans.
'•"New Orleans Item, October 2, 1912; New Orleans, Daily 
Picayune. October 3, 1912; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor 
and Political Boss," 35; Schott, "John M. Parker," 120-12; 
186-88, 204, 243-44; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Or­
leans . 206-07.
Chapter Three
The Plying Horses
For Martin Behrman and the Regular Democratic Organiza­
tion, the mandate of 1912 was clear and unmistakable. The 
Regulars had won three convincing and important primary vic­
tories in New Orleans and had restructured the city govern­
ment to satisfy the demands of popular politics and the re­
quirements for a more effective municipal government. But 
for Martin Behrman and the RDO the events of 1912 were more 
than a popular affirmation of the policies and achievements 
of past administrations. They were, as Behrman and the com­
mission council envisioned them, a mandate for a popular re­
distribution of political power among a greater array of 
individuals and interests. The mandate of 1912 also demanded 
the extension and consolidation of public authority in the 
hands of the municipal government, allowing for a greater 
public ordering of "private" concerns, particularly in the 
areas of essential municipal services like gas, electricity, 
and transit.
The redistribution of political power and the consoli­
dation of public authority, however, were elusive reforms. 
The mandate built by Martin Behrman and the RDO was so broad 
that it lacked a clear and precise definition. As a conse­
quence, the Behrman administration was all things to all
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people, incorporating every concern and every interest 
under the broadest definition of the public interest. The 
same political and social arrangements that permitted the 
RDO to construct its coalition and enunciate its mandate 
also allowed private individuals, independent public author­
ities, and corporations to challenge or redefine in their 
own interest the "public" mandate. As a result, an associa­
tion of interests, both private and public, defined and 
determined the course of municipal policy in New Orleans.
The formulation of public policy in New Orleans in the pro­
gressive period was, then, hardly the workings of a calcula­
ting, relentless, and indifferent machine. Indeed, the oppo­
site appears to be true. Public policy in New Orleans may 
not have been efficient, but it was democratic.
Meeting the demands of public policy and sustaining the 
mandate for municipal reform, of course, fell to the new 
commission council. When the council met for the first time 
in December, 1912, it had to reshape the city administration 
to suit the sense and provisions of the new charter. Though 
the charter specified the various departments and divisions 
in city government and defined some of the powers and re­
sponsibilities of the government, it left the task of 
creating the administration to the council. As the charter 
required, the council assigned four commissioners (under 
the charter, the mayor was the Commissioner of Public
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Affairs) to a particular position.x The council assigned A. 
G. Ricks to Finance, William Bess Thompson to Utilities, 
Harold W. Newman to Safety, and E. E. Lafaye to Property. 
Then, with the assignments made, the council adopted its 
first ordinance, installing the four commissioners, creating 
all necessary departmental divisions, and prescribing the 
powers and duties of all city officials and employees. With­
in a matter of days, the council had "recast" the entire 
city administration. The recasting of the city administra­
tion, however, went beyond the installation of the commis­
sioners or renaming the departments to suit the sense of the 
commission system.2
In 1900, after several years of intense and often 
bitter political debate, the city government under the RDO 
created the Public Belt Railroad of the City of New Orleans 
(PBRR) to further the flow of commerce from the port and to
xAct 159, Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the 
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1912. There 
were five departments: Public Affairs (mayor). Finance (vice 
president of the council and acting mayor). Safety, Proper­
ty, and Utilities. Early in the development of the commis­
sion system, most charters did not require candidates to run 
for a specific commission position. Rice, Progressive 
Cities. 30.
2Most of the department and division heads were hold­
overs from the previous administration. For example, Arthur 
J. O'Keefe remained a fixture in the department of finance 
as Deputy Commissioner of Finance, former councilman Alex 
Pujol became Deputy Commissioner of Public Property for pub­
lic buildings, and W. J. Hardy remained as City Engineer. 
Ordinance Number 1, Commission Council Series, hereafter 
cited as CCS: New Orleans Item. December 2, 18, 1912.
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prevent the major railroad lines from dominating the princi­
pal industry in the city. The ordinances creating the Public 
Belt Railroad also established a special governing body for 
the belt railroad, the Public Belt Railroad Commission 
(PBRRC). Upon the recommendation of several of the most im­
portant commerical exchanges and business associations, the 
mayor, with the consent of the council, was to appoint ele­
ven of the sixteen members of the PBRRC (the mayor appointed 
the other five, but those members represented the city and 
its principal subdivisions). Operating through the PBRRC, 
the city would construct, maintain, and operate the belt 
railroad.3
In 1908, after several more years of debate and litiga­
tion, the state legislature extended the protection of state 
law and the state constitution to the belt railroad and the 
PBRRC. The law, which later became part of the state consti­
tution, authorized the Public Belt Railroad to issue con­
struction bonds secured by revenue generated by the PBRR and 
underwritten by a special city tax should those revenues
30rdinances 147 (1900) and 2683 (1904) New Council 
Series hereafter cited as NCS. Bloomfield v .Thompson,. 64 
Southern Reporter. 855; Behrman v. Louisiana Railway and 
Navigation Company. 127 Louisiana. 775; Schott, "John M. 
Parker," 58; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Boss," 
64-67. Three members of the PBRRC came from the Board of 
Trade, two each from the Cotton Exchange, the Sugar Ex­
change, the Progrssive Union, and the Merchants, Dealers, 
and Lumberman Exchange. Three of the at-large representa­
tives came from above Canal Street and the two remaining 
commissioners were to represent the areas below Canal 
Street.
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prove insufficient. The PBRR act of 1908, at the insistence 
of the bondholders, vested "exclusive" control over the belt 
railroad in the PBRRC and its executive officer, the presi­
dent pro tempore. (Under city ordinance, the PBRRC selected 
its executive officer from among those "appointed upon the 
recommendation of the business exchanges". The president pro 
tempore, in other words, could not be a direct appointee of 
the mayor and council.) In effect, as several members of the 
PBRRC argued, the act of 1908 wrested control of the PBRR 
from the city administration, making the PBRRC an indepen­
dent public commission similar to the Dock Board or the 
Board of Liquidation.*
The Behrman administration, with its own proprietary 
claim to the PBRR, disagreed with that interpretation of the 
intent and effect of the 1908 law. The city administration 
contended that the 1908 act gave the city the vested right 
to operate the PBRR "through and by means of" the PBRRC as 
organized and established by city ordinances. Those ordi­
nances permitted the city to reorganize or reconstitute the 
PBRRC as it saw fit. In effect, the Behrman administration
■•Act 179, Acts Passed bv the General Assembly of the 
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1908; Bloomfield 
v. Thompson, 64 SR 854-56; Ordinances 147 and 2683 NCS.
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argued, the PBRR was not a public corporation, but a depart­
ment of the municipal government.3
The Favrot charter of 1912 furnished the Behrman admin­
istration with the opportunity of "reconstituting" the PBRRC 
and asserting its authority over the PBRR and perhaps other 
municipal utilities. The charter placed the PBRR under the 
general supervision of the Commissioner of Public Property, 
but the commission council, using its "discretionary 
powers," authorized the Commissioner of Public Utilities 
(CPU) to take "full and active charge, management, di­
rection, operation, and control" of the PBRR. In short, the 
CPU, by virtue of his office, would be the president pro 
tempore of the PBRRC. The current president pro tempore was 
William Bess Thompson, the Commissioner of Public 
Utilities.6
The response of the commercial exchanges to the re­
structuring of the PBRRC was swift and critical. In a letter 
addressed to the entire council, the executive officers of
3John F. C. Waldo, assistant City Attorney to W. F.
Clarke, Secretary, Editorial Department, Atlanta Constitu­
tion. December 27, 1910, vol. S, CAP. CA, NOPL. Though the 
Exchanges could recommend appointees to the mayor and the 
council, neither they nor the PBRRC had any authority 
over appointments to the board. The laws and ordinances 
governing the PBRR, wrote City Attorney Ivy G. Kittredge, 
did not invest the Exchanges or the PBRCC with a "vote or 
right to determine either the qualifications of or who shall 
be the members of that Board." See Kittredge to Mayor Andrew 
McShane, March 11, 1922, vol. 9, CAO, CA, NOPL.
"Act 159, Acts Passed bv the General Assembly of the 
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1912; Ordinance 
Number 1, CCS: New Orleans Item. December 19, 1912; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. December 20, 1912.
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the Board of Trade, the Progressive Union, and the exchanges 
called on the council to repeal all provisions of the recent 
ordinance concerning the PBRRC. Those provisions, the com- 
merical executives contended, violated state and local laws 
and ran counter to the original understanding of those who 
furnished the funds for the PBRR. The true intent of the 
original laws, they wrote, was to prevent any one person or 
group from determining the policy of the PBRR and to remove 
the decisions of the PBRRC from the common course of poli­
tics .
The new ordinance jeopardized those considerations. It 
concentrated power over the PBRR in the office of the CPU, 
reducing the PBRRC to the level of an advisory board whose 
advice was not sought and whose consent was not needed. As a 
member of the commission council, the CPU served at the con­
venience of the other four councilmen and at the pleasure of 
a host of political considerations. The ordinance, then, did 
not safeguard the PBRR; it could not clothe any person or 
body with the necessary wisdom or political independence to 
operate so vital a public utility.
The Item was more succinct. In its opinion, the com­
mission council was without legal and "ethical" right to 
operate the PBRR. The Behrman administration, the Item 
stated, was not interested in public efficiency or in the
7New Orleans Item. December 19, 27, 30, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. December 31, 1912.
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"rightful centralization" of public power. The administra­
tion merely wanted the political advantage that went with 
controlling the PBRR. The logic of the commission council 
system and the demands of the age, the Item intoned, re­
quired greater efficiency and concentration of power in the 
hands of the municipal administration, particularly in the 
area of public utilities. But under the present circum­
stances, as long as the Regulars controlled city politics, 
to extend or concentrate authority and power in the munici­
pal government would be a mistake. The best policy for the 
administration would be to repeal all pertinent provisions 
of the ordinance and to return control of the belt railroad 
to the PBRRC.®
The city administration consented to hear the objec­
tions and recommendations of the commercial exchanges. The 
executives urged the commission council to repeal those por­
tions of the ordinance dealing with the PBRR. Despite the 
often clumsy and insulting remarks from the advocates of 
repeal, the council agreed to set aside the ordinance. The 
council insisted, however, on replacing the old ordinance 
with one that satisfied the demands of the city government 
and that addressed the concerns of the commercial exchanges.
°New Orleans Item. December 19, 22-24, 1912; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. December 20, 21, 31, 1912.
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Both sides agreed to meet soon after the new year to com­
plete discussions on a "compromise" ordinance."
The conference collapsed soon after it began. The city 
administration offered a new ordinance, which, it main­
tained, accorded the city a more direct role in the opera­
tions of the belt railroad but respected the authority of 
the PBRRC over the general policy of the PBRR. The repre­
sentatives for the commercial exchanges rejected the pro­
posal, insisting that the sole purpose of the conference was 
to ease the way toward repeal. Mayor Behrman was incensed.
The city administration sought a reasonable compromise with 
the PBRRC, but the commission and the commercial exchanges 
it represented, he said, acted in bad faith. The mayor an­
nounced that the council would repeal the old ordinance 
(thus keeping faith with the commercial exchanges and the 
belt railroad commission), but would tie repeal to the en­
actment of the "compromise" ordinance.xo
The new PBRR ordinance passed without opposition. The 
ordinance made the Commissioner of Public Utilities an ex 
officio member of the PBRRC, abolished the office of presi­
dent pro temporer and created the position of "acting presi-
"New Orleans Item. December 30, 31, 1912, January 8, 
1913; New Orleans Daily Picayunef December 31, 1912, January 
9, 1913. The council selected Mayor Behrman, Thompson, and 
Commissioner of Public Safety Harold Newman as its represen­
tatives; the exchanges chose S. Locke Breaux of the Board of 
Trade, William B. Bloomfield of the Sugar Exchange, and J.
W. Porche of the Progressive Union.
xoNew Orleans Item. January 8, 10, 11, 1913; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. January 9, 10, 1913.
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dent". The CPU would, by virtue of his office and position 
with the PBRRC, serve as acting president. The ordinance 
gave the acting president the "active charge, management and 
control of the detailed operation" of the PBRR. Under the 
new ordinance, the PBRRC would continue to set general 
policy, but the CPU-acting president would be the sole 
executive charged with carrying out the "general directory 
powers" of the PBRRC.xx
In explaining its reasons for enacting the so-called 
Thompson ordinance, the city government was both candid and 
disingenuous. The city administration maintained that the 
ordinance merely followed the logic and objectives of the 
commission council system. It placed the administration of 
PBRR under a single municipal executive, vested with powers 
sufficient to make the belt railroad more efficient and pro­
fitable. In another sense, the council agreed that the 
Thompson ordinance hardly changed the relationship between 
the city administration and the PBRRC. The CPU-acting 
president held the same powers and the same responsiblities 
as the president pro tempore of the PBRRC. As acting presi­
dent, the CPU was accountable only to the railroad commis-
xxOrdinance Number 74, CCS; Bloomfield v. Thompson. 64 
SR 856; I. D. Moore to Martin Behrman and the Commission 
Council of the City of New Orleans, undated (probably 
February 10, 1915), vol.7, CAP. CA NOPL; New Orleans Item. 
January 14, 1913; New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 11, 
22, 1913.
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sion and was charged with carrying out the policies estab­
lished by the PBRRC, not the city council.12
The ordinance clearly advanced the interests of the 
Behrman administration. It brought the PBRR under the exe­
cutive authority of the CPU and the control of the commis­
sion council. The city administration would direct all as­
pects of the belt railroad, regulating its development, man­
aging its business affairs, and determining its labor poli­
cies. The ordinance also relegated the PBRRC to an advisory 
role, denying it the opportunity of selecting its own execu­
tive officer and giving it only "directory powers". In its 
application and effect, the ordinance made the PBRR— and by 
implication, all other public utilities— subject to the 
authority and power of the city administration, removing it 
from the control of "private" concerns.
CPU Thompson admitted as much in explaining the coun­
cil's rationale for passing his ordinance. The purpose of 
the ordinance, he said, was to preserve the public ownership 
of the PBRR. The belt railroad belonged to the city, not to 
the PBRRC or to the bondholders. If the project failed, the 
city, not the PBRRC, was responsible for the mortgage. But, 
Thompson revealed, the PBRRC looked on the PBRR as its pri­
vate reserve and concern. It ignored the inquiries of coun­
cil and the mayor for information on the conduct of the belt
12New Orleans Item. December 19, 1912, January 14, 1913; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 20. 1912.
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railroad, refused to acknowledge the role of the municipal 
government in the operation and development of the PBRR, and 
defied the efforts of the city government to reassert its 
authority over the PBRR. The position of the protesting ex­
changes and the PBRRC, Thompson said accusingly, "is not 
only a menace to the successful operation of the commission 
system, but it is [also] antagonistic to the fundamental 
principles of any just system of government".3-3
With the passage of the Thompson ordinance, the protest 
of the exchanges and the PBRRC took another form. William B. 
Bloomfield, a member of the PBRRC and the New Orleans Sugar 
Exchange, filed suit in Civil District Court in New Orleans. 
Bloomfield's attorney, Charles I. Rosen, a former Regular 
and now bitter opponent of Martin Behrman, argued that with 
the passage of the 1908 PBRR act, the city council was 
"absolutely impotent and powerless" to reorganize the PBRRC. 
The Thompson ordinance, he contended, was illegal because 
it divested the PBRRC of the "control, administration, man­
agement and supervision of the maintenance, operation, and 
development" of the PBRR, thus violating state and city law 
and jeopardizing the "pecuniary interests" of the bond­
holders .
X3New Orleans Item, January 14, 1913.
X4New Orleans Item. January 13, 14, 23, February 24, 
1913; New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 14, 23, Febru­
ary 25, 1913; I. D. Moore to Behrman and Council undated 
(probably February 10, 1915) vol.7, CAP. CA, NOPL; Bloom­
field v. Thompson. 64 SR. 856.
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City Attorney Moore, arguing for the council, disputed 
Rosen's line of argument. The council authorized and under­
wrote the construction and operation of the PBRR, he argued, 
and, in two separate ordinances, created the PBRRC to carry 
out the policies and operations of the PBRR. State law con­
firmed the council's perogative to "reorganize" the PBRRC. 
The council's recent actions did not "divest" the PBRRC of 
control over the PBRR but merely exercised the council's 
authority to reorganize the composition of the PBRRC and 
to prescribe its duties and obligations in light of change 
in the form and character of the municipal government.13
Early in April, after considering the case for more 
than a month, Judge George H. Theard ruled for the city.
The city council, Theard wrote, possessed the authority and 
power to reorganize the PBRRC and to define its powers and 
duties. The commission council altered the composition of 
the PBRRC, eliminating the position of the president pro 
tempore, creating the position of acting president, and 
making the the CPU the acting president. Though the council 
could reconstitute the PBRRC and redefine its powers and 
duties, exclusive control over the operation of the belt 
railroad, Judge Theard said, must remain with the PBRRC.
The ordinance in question recognized that subtle relation­
ship, "jealously" guarding the commission's authority over
13New Orleans Item, February 24, 1913; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. February 25, 26, 1913.
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the general policies of the PBRR. The acting president pos­
sessed powers that were only technical and operational, that 
no commission, by its nature, could perform. The PBRRC, how­
ever, retained ultimate power because it held the powers of
review and approval over the actions of the acting presi­
dent .X6
Meeting at the insistence of Mayor Behrman and CPU 
Thompson and anticipating an appeal of the case to the 
Louisiana State Supreme Court, the PBRRC refused to recog­
nize the validity of the ordinance and the court's judgment. 
The state Supreme Court initially declined to hear the case, 
citing its lack of jurisdiction. But when the New Orleans 
Board of Trade joined Bloomfield in his suit, the high court 
agreed to hear the case on its merits.3-’7
As in the earlier hearing in the New Orleans Civil
District Court, the city argued that the ordinance did not 
wrest control of the PBRR from the PBRRC, but only made a 
distinction between the "detailed and technical" operations 
assigned to the Commissioner of Public Utilties and the
16New Orleans Item, April 2, 1913; New Orleans Daily Pic­
ayune. April 3, 1913.
^When Bloomfield appealed to the Supreme Court, the City 
Attorney filed a petition claiming the court did not have 
jurisdiction in cases involving less than $2,000. Bloomfield 
claimed that te value of his bonds exceeded $2,000 because 
the city ordinance would substantially lessen the market 
value of his bonds and increase his tax burden. The court 
found no validity in Bloomfield's argument. Bloomfield v. 
Thompson 64 SR 659-60, 634-65; Moore to Behrman and Council, 
undated, vol 7, CAO, CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item. May 26,
1913.
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broad, directory powers of the PBRRC. Bloomfield argued, 
as he had in Civil District Court, that state law precluded 
the commission council from reconstituting the PBRRC under 
any circumstances. In a divided decision, the Supreme Court, 
speaking through Justice Oliver O. Provosty, ruled for Mr. 
Bloomfield and the Board of Trade. According to the high 
court, state law and city ordinance required the PBRRC to 
select its executive officer from among those commission 
members recommended by the commercial exchanges and 
appointed by the mayor. Nor could the council make a dis­
tinction between the "detailed and technical" operations and 
the "directory" powers of the PBRRC.xa
The burden of the court's opinion, however, focused on 
the "political" intentions and effects of the Thompson or­
dinance. The council, Provosty wrote, sought to wrest exclu­
sive control of the PBRR from the commission, making the 
PBRR a mere department within city government. Clearly, he 
intimated, such action violated the original intention of 
the earlier arrangements and compromised the understanding 
between the city and the principal bondholders that a 
special, independent commission would operate the belt 
railroad. Finally, in what was unquestionably a gratuitous 
remark. Justice Provosty found it "noteworthy" that the sole 
beneficiary of the ordinance would be CPU William Bess 
Thompson. As president pro tempore of the PBRRC, Thompson
18Bloomfield v. Thompson. 64 SR. 854-58.
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served at the pleasure of the commission; under the Thompson 
ordinance, as CPU-acting president, Thompson would be com­
pletely independent of the PBRRC. Justice Provosty con­
cluded, then, that the sole purpose of the ordinance was to 
"emancipate" Thompson from the control of the commission.x® 
In declaring the Thompson ordinance unconstitutional, 
though, the court did not state that the commission council 
lacked the requisite authority to reorganize the PBRRC, but 
only that there were severe limitations to the council's 
powers of reorganization. Those limitations, however, im­
plied that the council retained a measure of control over 
the PBRRC, its detailed and technical operations and its 
general directory powers. At the request of City Attorney 
Moore and "in the public interest," the court sought to 
clarify its decree annulling the Thompson ordinance. The 
court declared that its decision annulled the Thompson or­
dinance "only in part" and only "insofar as" the ordinance 
undertook to make the Commissioner of Public Utilities the 
"forced agent" of the PBRRC and only "insofar as" the ordin­
ance divested the PBRRC of exclusive control and vested ex­
clusive control in the Commissioner of Public Utilities.20
x"Bloomfield v. Thompson. 64 SR 857-63. Thompson main­
tained that certain exchange members attempted to sabotage 
his administration as president pro tempore by blocking 
needed reforms in finance and management with "vexatious" 
delays. Bloomfield claimed that Thompson wanted to and did 
raid the PBRRC's treasury, burdening operations with a 
sizeable deficit. New Orleans Item, January 4, 5, 1913.
2°Moore to Behrman and Council, undated, vol.7, CAP, CA,
NOPL.
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The court had not spoken definitively on the city's au­
thority to reorganize the PBRRC, but City Attorney Moore was 
convinced that "at least inferentially,...the power to reor­
ganize existed.” Apparently, William Bloomfield drew the 
same conclusion. He sought a rehearing on the court's clari­
fying declaration. The Supreme Court denied him a rehearing, 
but Bloomfield found remedy in appealing Judge Theard's 
original ruling to the Orleans Parish Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals nullified the Thompson ordinance, but it 
based its ruling on the same grounds as the Supreme Court. 
”It may well be stated at this time," the court wrote,
"that had a majority of the [Supreme] Court been of [the] 
opinion that Act 179 of 1908 vested absolute and sole con­
trol of the Belt Railroad in the Board of Commisioners, ex­
clusive of any further authority over [it] in the City 
i t s e l f . t h e  Court would in that event have rested its 
opinion on those grounds, as logically it should have done 
had such been its view."21
"I am firmly of the opinion,” wrote City Attorney Moore 
to the council, "from the several judgments rendered in this 
case by the Supreme Court of the State and the Court of 
Appeals, that the right of the council to reorganize the 
Public Belt Railroad Commission undoubtedly and inquestion- 
ably exists, and that these decrees point unerringly to this
21Moore to Behrman and Council, undated, vol.7, CAP. CA, 
NOPL; New Orleans Times-Picayune. April 15, 17, June 16, 17,
1914.
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conclusion." But there were, as the courts reiterated often, 
limitations to the council's powers over the PBRRC. "The 
power to reorganize the Commission," wrote the Supreme Court 
in its final declaration in the case, "does not vest any 
jurisdiction in the Council to appoint the members thereof, 
or to administer the Belt Railroad Commission otherwise than 
through a Commission appointed by the mayor with the consent 
of the Council." If the council decided to reorganize the 
PBRRC, Moore cautioned, then it must avoid the objections of 
the courts. The council could not create an ex officio posi­
tion on the PBRCC; all members of the PBRRC (with the excep­
tion of the mayor) had to be named specifically by the mayor 
and confirmed by the council. The council also had the 
authority to "prescribe" the powers, duties, and functions 
of the PBRRC, but only the commission could carry them out. 
The reorganization of the PBRRC, then, was a matter of 
public policy— not legislative prerogative. As the courts 
ruled (and as Bloomfield suggested in his suit), the only 
proper way for the city administration to influence the 
development of the PBRR was through appointment and other 
political considerations— the very action the PBRRC and its 
allies in the municipal reform movement wanted to eliminate 
from public affairs.32
22Moore to Behrman and Council, undated, vol.7, CAO, CA, 
NOPL; New Orleans Times-Picayune. October 25, 1914, February
10, 1915; New Orleans Item, February 11, 18, 1915.
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Mayor Berhman and the council obviously favored legis­
lative reform, as more than two years of litigation by the
administration showed, and they were not averse to using
political influence to gain control of the PBRRC. They also 
understood the dangers inherent in a forced reorganization 
of the PBRRC. Such action could prompt wholesale litigation 
(could the mayor, for instance, remove a member of the
PBRRC, particularly one nominated by the commercial
exchanges?), exhausting the city's resources and diverting 
its attention from other pressing matters. Forcing the 
resignations of uncooperative commissioners could open the 
administration to charges of tampering with a vita public 
utility for partisan reasons, an accusation to which the 
Behrman administration was extremely sensitive.
Despite these misgivings, Mayor Behrman announced his 
intention of reorganizing the PBRRC by forcing the resigna­
tions of recalcitrant commissioners and by forcing the PBRRC 
to recognize William Thompson as the commission's executive 
officer.23 Charles Rosen, the counsel for the PBRRC, argued 
that the mayor and council were without the legal power or 
the ethical authority to reorganize the PBRRC, and he warned 
the commission and the public of the administration's desire
23Late in 1913, after the Supreme Court rendered its 
initial decree in the Bloomfield case, the PBRRC removed 
Thompson as president pro tempore. New Orleans Item. 
December 19, 23, 1913, February 11, 18, 1915; New Orleans 
Times Picayune. February 11, 1915.
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to "politicalize" the PBRR and its commission. Without 
friends on the PBRRC and sensitive to accusations of poli­
tical tampering, the Behrman administration could not force 
the reorganization of the PBRRC. William Thompson, deprived 
of his position of executive authority on the PBRRC, 
resigned from the PBRRC, his place taken by an associate 
from the Cotton Exchange.2*
The commercial exchanges were determined to prevent the 
"politicalization" of the PBRR and the commission. For them 
the PBRR was a "private" conveyance, one that they and the 
city established and promoted for their convenience and 
profit. State law and the state courts protected them, 
insulating their interests from public considerations. They 
had, in short, ample private and public power and authority 
to resist the city government. Their interest was also 
sufficiently narrow and "partisan" as to not arouse public 
suspicion or passion. For a majority of the public, it 
seems, the belt railroad dispute involved two established 
elites— the private commercial exchanges and the city gov­
ernment— jockeying for political and legal advantage. The 
public service was not at stake. Sanitation, clean water, 
streets, and public transit were essential services; large- 
scale, commercial railroad service was not.
The controversy over the control and direction of the
2*New Orleans Item, February 19, 20, 23, 24, 1915; New 
Orleans Times Picayune. February 19, 20, 23, 24, 1915.
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belt railroad and the Public Belt Railroad Commission was 
not, however, an isolated issue. Rather, the dispute 
between the Behrman administration and the PBRRC fit into 
the larger public controversy over the character, control, 
and direction of essential public services. Beginning in 
the 1890s, the commercial classes of New Orleans attempted 
to define the character and to control the distribution of 
those services considered genuinely public matters: water, 
drainage, levee protection, the belt railroad. With the 
advent of the twentieth century, as inequities in service 
and costs became more appartent, the citizens of New Orleans 
demanded that the city government take a more active and 
direct part in the distribution of public services.
For the city administration to take a more concerted 
part in the distribution of basic city services, it had to 
consolidate its political power and extend its governmental 
authority over those independent boards and commissions that 
lay beyond its reach. That is, the Behrman administration 
had to "politicalize" public services. The Behrman adminis­
tration believed, apparently, that the commission chater and 
the selection of businessmen to the commission council would 
allow it to consolidate authority and overcome the objec­
tions of the commercial establishment to the "politicaliza­
tion" of municipal policy and service. Such was the case 
with the Public Belt Railroad Commission.
The PBRRC issue, however, did not compel the city ad-
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ministration to abandon its re£orm efforts. Rather, the 
Behrman government continued its efforts to bring other, in 
some cases, less well-entrenched, public services under the 
control of the city government. The success of the adminis­
tration in this area depended on its ability to command 
legal and political authority over public services, gain the 
cooperation of the business and profressional classess, and 
meet the demands of a disparate community. It was in and 
under the streets (literally) that command and reform were 
most elusive.
If the city administration could construct and operate 
an immense public utility like the Public Belt Railroad, 
could it also operate other public services carried along 
the city streets? It was a lesson not lost on the Behrman 
administration or on a variety of "private" interests. 
Whoever could define the character and direct the course of 
the public services that traversed the city streets, could 
determine the course of public policy in New Orleans.
The city government already possessed the "inherent"
and constitutional authority to determine the use of the
streets. The basis of that authority, the so-called police
or inherent powere, wrote City Attorney Moore:
is predicated [on] the repeatedly affirmed proposition 
that organized government has the inherent right to 
protect the health, life and limb, individual liberty 
of action, private property and legitimate use thereof, 
and provide generally for the safety and welfare of its 
people; not only does this right exist, but [also] this 
obligation is imposed upon those clothed with the 
sovereign power. It is a duty sacred and cannot be
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evaded, shifted, or bartered away without violating 
a public trust.
The City of New Orleans, by virtue of the authority dele­
gated to it in the state constitution, specific legislative 
acts, and the city charter, also possessed the power to 
"enact and enforce all laws for the maintenance, advance­
ment, and protection of life, safety, morals, comfort, 
quiet, welfare, and prosperity of the people". The regula­
tion of the city streets clearly fell under the council's 
"inherent" power, Moore argued. "The use of the streets or 
public highways is a right inherent in the people," wrote 
Moore, but, "the manner and mode of using them may, however, 
be the subject of proper regulation" by the city council.
The rights of private citizens and corporations to use and 
profit from the use of the streets, the City Attorney's 
office argued, were always subordinate to the rights of the 
city to control and regulate the use of the streets.23
The right of regulation, however, was as Moore con­
ceded, circumscribed the provisions of the state and fed­
eral constitutions and the authority of the courts— and, 
he could have added, subordinated to the interests of pri­
vate citizens. "The power to regulate invests the [council] 
with a large discretion to determine what measures are 
necessary to preserve the public interest and protect pri­
23Gilmore to City Engineer W. J. Hardee, March 11, 1909,
vol.5, Moore to Thompson, March 26, 1915, vol.7, CAP. CA,
NOPL.
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vate rights," Moore remarked. But, he added, "to justify 
the [council] in interposing its authority on behalf of the 
public, it must appear that the interest of the public 
generally, as distinguished from a particular class, re­
quires, such interference, and that the means are reasonable 
and necessary for the accomplishment of the designed pur­
poses and not unduly oppressive on the individual. Thus, 
the [council] cannot, under the guise of protecting the 
public interest, impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions 
upon individual liberty, lawful occupation, or its use of 
property, or the overthrow of vested rights."26
The city council, Moore explained, could choose the 
occasion (the exigency he called it) for exercising the 
police power of the city. But "under our constitutional 
system, the judiciary determines the subjects and objects 
upon which the power is to be exercised, and the reason­
ableness of that exercise". But the courts were incapable 
of defining the police power of the state with any clarity 
or precision, preferring to test each case on its merits 
rather than constructing an abstract, and unenforceable 
definition of the police power. "Hence," concluded Moore, 
"the difficulty when we come to discuss the proposition of 
novel... regulations... and of knowing just what might or 
might not be considered by the courts to be within the
26Moore to Thompson, March 26, 1915, ibid.
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'police powers' [of the city], and as to the reasonableness 
of [its] regulations. nz7
For much of the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, then, the city government of New Orleans could not 
formulate a comprehensive and coherent policy concerning the 
commerce and services carried over the city streets. The 
methodical consolidation and eventual monopolization of the 
public utilities industry in New Orleans from 1905 to 1916 
compelled the Behrman administration to reexamine and, to 
some degree, reconstructure its public utilties policy. 
Beginning in 1912, the city administration sought a more ex­
tensive regulation of the public service industry. Con­
fronted by the concerted opposition of both private citizens 
and public authorities, the Behrman administration achieved 
only a few modest successes.2"
27Moore to Thompson, March 26, 1915, ibid. 
zaGilmore to Hardee, January 25, 1906, vol.4, March 11, 
1909, Moore to Hardee, November 12, 1909, Waldo to Moore,
May 14, June 16, 1910, Moore to Commissioners of Streets and 
Landings, December 8, 1910, vol.5, Moore to Behrman, October 
19, 1913, vol.6, CAP. CA, NOPL.
Chapter Four
September Storms
Late in September, 1912, as the municipal campaign came 
to an end, William Bess Thompson, the future Commissioner of 
Public Utilities in the Behrman administration, spoke before 
a modest crowd of supporters and newspaper correspondents 
about the difficulties of public utilities regulation. If 
the City of New Orleans was to become a modern, progressive 
city, he stressed in his talk, then the next administration 
(the first under the commission council charter) must demand 
a more efficient and enlightened management of the public 
utilities industry. The progressive management of companies 
like New Orleans Railway and Light Company (NORLC) and New 
Orleans Gas Light Company (NOGLC) required the city adminis­
tration to fashion a reasonable and comprehensive policy of 
municipal regulation that assured service at reasonable cost 
and protected legitimate investment.x
The commission council under Mayor Behrman, Thompson 
assured his audience, had no illusions about the difficul­
ties of formulating and implementing a comprehensive and co­
herent utilities policy. The mayor, the council, and the 
RDO, Thompson said (he was, after all, confident of winning 
the municipal election), were aware of the desperate need
xNew Orleans Daily States. September 26, 1912.
161
162
for essential public services throughout the city. But 
some areas of town, most notably the business and retail 
sections clustered around Canal Street and the residential 
areas in the uptown portion of New Orleans, were overdevel­
oped, while many other less populated neighborhoods lacked 
sufficient services. The city administration had to resolve 
two serious problems before it could extend services to 
those "undeveloped" sections of the city. First, the council 
had to "persuade" NORLC and NOGLC to extend service to the
underpopulated areas of the city, foregoing an immediate and
discernible return on their investments in those areas. 
Second, should NORLC and NOGLC require additional revenues 
to fund expansion, the council had to convince the residents 
living in the more populated sections of the city that any 
increase in fares and rates that funded the expansion of
services benefitted them as well. In short, the Behrman
administration had to build a consensus that expansion of 
these services was essential to the development and well­
being of the utility companies and to a skeptical city.2
There were, Thompson suggested, even more immediate 
considerations that had to be addressed before the Behrman 
administration could devise a comprehensive utility policy. 
The Behrman administration recognized that neither NORLC nor 
NOGLC would submit willingly to regulation; indeed, the two 
utilities had for years ignored the wishes and demands of
aIbid.
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the city government for better service, displaying their 
contempt for regulation of any variety or capacity. Mayor 
Behrman and the council did not condone the utilities' open 
disregard for their obligations, Thompson said, but the city 
government did not possess the "regulatory" authority to 
force compliance. New Orleans, like other cities, attempted 
to regulate the public utilities industry through three sep­
arate methods: competition, taxation, and the contract fran­
chise. None of these methods were at all effective, for they 
did not guarantee service or compel compliance of the terms 
of the franchise. (Writing to the council in 1905, following 
the final consolidation of the public services. Mayor Behr­
man summarized the city's predicament. It was his experi­
ence, he said, that the street railways company would appeal 
to the sanctity of contract when it suited its interests and 
would seek exemption from the obligations of contract when 
those obligations threatened its interests. The only re­
course open to the city government to compel service was, 
he suggested, to sue for forfeiture of the franchise, surely 
an empty and counterfeit public policy.)3
The consolidation and monopolization of the public 
utilities industry in the first decade of the century accel­
erated the reexamination of the "regulatory" policy and 
practices of the city government. The public was increas­
3Ibid.; Martin Behrman to City Council, August 12, 1905, 
Mayor's Correspondence. Letters Mayor's Office, hereafter 
cited as MCLCO, vol., 90, CA, NOPL.
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ingly dissatisfied with the quality and cost of service, 
and with the inability of the city administration to compel 
better service and to regulate costs. Though the public de­
manded reform, Thompson said, it was confused and disturbed 
by the welter of reforms urged by students of the public 
utilities industry. The public's confusion was justified, 
for there was serious and legitimate disagreement among ex­
perts over the most efficient and expedient form of regula­
tion. Students of the public service industry proposed three 
basic forms of regulation: state government regulation, mu­
nicipal government regulation, and a combination of state 
and municipal regulation that served as a transition between 
regulation and municipal ownership. Each of these reforms 
promised the effective regulation of the public service in­
dustry, compelling the utility companies to furnish essen­
tial services at reasonable costs and at a legitimate profit 
and, as students asserted, ending the abusive practices long 
associated with utility investment and management.4
These reforms also had a residual effect. Each of them 
promised that it would "depoliticalize" the public utilities 
industry, reducing, if not eliminating, the corrupt influ­
ence of the utility companies on the municipal government 
and city politics. Advocates of these reforms claimed that a
4New Orleans Daily Picayuner September 26, 1912; David 
Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts," 219-36; Delos F. 
Wilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Franchises," 
National Municipal Review, hereafter cited as NMR. 3 (Jan­
uary 1914), 13-27.
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select, independent board of regulators could determine the 
quality and cost of service and set the standards of finan­
cial conduct for the utilities companies without reference 
to politics as usual. What distinguished one form from an­
other was the extent and degree of influence "politics as 
usual" would have on the regulation of public service util­
ities. Advocates of state regulation (most of whom were 
critics of the Behrman administration or managers of NORLC 
and NOGLC) contended that municipal regulation under the 
Behrman administration would not remove politics from the 
regulation of the utility companies but only further "polit­
icalize" and corrupt the public service industry. The Behr­
man administration, as Thompson explained, viewed municipal 
regulation as a more forceful and expedient form of regula­
tion, permitting the city government to exert a more direct 
and immediate influence on rates, fares, and service (Thomp­
son made no reference to labor-management issues) than state 
regulation. And it dismissed as partisan suggestions that 
municipal regulation meant the "politicalization" of public 
service and the public service companies. As Thompson and 
the Behrman administration understood, the intention of mu­
nicipal regulation was to bring the public utility companies 
under the direct and expedient review and control of those
1 6 6
people most affected by them.B
The Behrman administration, however, could not dismiss 
with easy assurance allegations suggesting that it favored 
municipal "regulation" for its own interests. Critics of the 
Behrman administration accused it of entering into an "un­
holy alliance" with NORLC and NOGLC against the interests 
and needs of the citizens of New Orleans. These critics 
charged that the Behrman city government stood by idly as 
the two giant, "alien" corporations (NORLC was an holding 
company owned by "Yankee" banks and investment houses and 
NOGLC had its beginnings in the 1870s under the Radical Re­
publicans during Reconstruction) absorbed the smaller, more 
competetive, locally-owned streetcar and electric companies. 
The Regulars, opponents alledged, permitted NORLC and NOGLC 
to ignore or abuse their franchise obligations, tolerated 
their financial excesses, favored them with scandalously low 
tax assessments, and allowed the two companies to siphon 
millions of dollars in bloated revenues from the citizens of 
New Orleans in return for deficient and, at times, dangerous 
service. In exchange for these favors, NORLC and NOGLC fun­
nelled thousands of dollars into the political campaign 
chest of the Regular Democrats, giving them yet another un-
BNew Orleans Daily Picayune, September 26, 1912. Though 
from time to time the Behrman administration considered the 
benefits of municipal ownership of the transit, electric, 
and gas services, it dismissed municipal ownership as infea­
sible given the city's brittle financial conditions.
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fair and unscrupulous advantage over the forces of reform.* 
When the residue of this corrupt alliance became appar­
ent in the form of high rates and inferior service, critics 
asserted, the RDO and the Behrman administration, anxious to 
turn the utility reform movement to their own advantage, be­
came the advocates of utility regulation. The Regulars and 
the city administration, of course, opponents contended, 
were never serious proponents of utility regulation. In the 
debate over the commission council charter, the Regulars, at 
the direction of Martin Behrman and City Attorney Moore, de­
liberately scuttled the original municipal regulation pro­
vision that allowed for the expropriation of NORLC and 
NOGLC, substituting instead a provision that gave the coun­
cil only the power to revoke existing privileges. The 
authors of the original provision claimed that expropriation 
was the most prudent means of acquiring municipal ownership, 
and that without the right of ownership the city could never 
regulate public services. Municipal regulation under the 
Favrot charter and the Behrman administration, they said, 
meant the continuation of the abuses of the past and, prob­
ably, the "politicalization" of the employees of NORLC and
"New Orleans Item, October 30, November 2, 4, 1911, Feb­
ruary 22, 1912; Schott, "John Parker," 107-08; Reyonlds, 
"Machine Politics," 48-9; T. Harry Williams, Huev Long. (New 
York, 1969), 284-5, 200-303; Adam Fairclough, "Public Ser­
vice," 45-51.
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NOGLC.
These allegations were themselves partisan and without 
foundation, portraying the Behrman administration as both 
the corrupt master and the slavish agent of NORLC and NOGLC. 
Nevertheless, several knowledgeable and sympathetic histori­
ans of the Behrman administration have accepted these accu­
sations with only a few modest revisions. These historians 
contend that the Behrman administration was not completely 
subservient to the two utility companies, but that it enjoy­
ed a "most cordial," indeed almost "too cordial" relation­
ship with them. The rationale for this cordial relationship, 
they argue, was neither corrupt nor political, but ideolog­
ical. According to these scholars. Mayor Behrman and his 
associates in the RDO possessed "an almost naive faith" in 
the practical and civic virtue of businessmen and the city 
administration and the Regulars considered their alliance 
with NORLC and NOGLC as "both natural and in the best inter­
ests of the community as a whole”. As a consequence, the 
commission council under the Behrman administration acceded 
to the wishes of the utility companies in opposing state 
regulation, ignoring the legitimate concerns of consumers
''New Orleans Item. September 25-27, 1912; Ethel Hutson, 
"New Orleans’ Experience Under Commission Government," NMR.
6 (January 1917), 74; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and 
Boss," 81-4, 154. The charge leveled at the RDO concerning 
the expropriation provision was groundless since expropria­
tion was an unsound and ineffective means of achieving mu­
nicipal ownership. In an expropriation suit, the court, not 
the council, would set the ultimate price for the utility 
companies.
I
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and just demands of labor, and defeating efforts to "munici­
palize" transit, gas, and electric service. 8
These contentions too are without foundation, and are 
based, apparently, on a cursory review of the documentary 
evidence and political circumstances concerning the regula­
tion of the public utilities industry in New Orleans. The 
Behrman administration, as we will see, did not form any 
alliance, unholy or otherwise, with NORLC and NOGLC, and its 
relationship with the two utility companies, though never 
antagonistic, was never amiable or "too cordial". Though the 
Behrman administration relied on the expertise and advise of 
businessmen in civic and political affairs (businessmen com­
prised a majority of the new commission council and sat on 
the major independent boards and commissions of the munici­
pal council), the mayor and the RDO did not profess a naive 
faith in the ability of businessmen as a class of citizens 
nor did the administration believe that the business commu­
nity possessed dispassionate commitment to the general wel­
fare of the community. The events of the past twenty years, 
in particular the consolidation and, in 1905, the monopoli­
zation of public utility service, the steady erosion in the 
quality of service and the increase in rates, the growing 
dissatisfaction of consumers and riders, and the constant 
antagonism between labor and management dispelled any
"Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Boss," 81-4, 154; 
Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 49-50.
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notion on the part o£ city o££icials that the businessmen 
who managed the public service utilities sought the "best 
interests of the community as a whole".9 These events— and 
not the corruption of an indifferent political machine or 
the naive and feckless belief in the civic virtue of the 
management of NORLC and NOGLC— determined the response of 
the Behrman administration to the difficult circumstances 
and problems of public utility regulation.
In the early 1890s, prior to the introduction and de­
velopment of the electrified streetcar in New Orleans, 
eight, independent, and relatively competitive street rail­
way companies controlled the mass transit system of New Or­
leans. By 1901, after the electrification of the streetcar 
system, there were but two utilities companies, and between 
them they controlled the electric power companies and the 
lone gaslight company. By the end of that year, in 1902, 
there was but one utility company (the gaslight company re­
mained an "independent" subsidiary until the 1920s), and 
ownership had passed from local businessmen to regional and 
national holding companies controlled by New York and Phila­
delphia investment houses. Technology, in the form of the 
electric streetcar, and innovations in the realm of business
"Behrman to the City Council, August 12, 1905, vol. 90, 
MCLMO. CA, NOPL; Raymond Oscar Nussbaum, "Progressive Poli­
tics in New Orleans," 96-124; David Paul Bennetts, "Black 
and White Workers: New Orleans 1880-1900," (Ph.D. disserta­
tion, University of Illinois, 1972), 393-448.
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organization, management, and finance, in the form of the 
modern corporation, and huge and steady profits from a 
fortuitous combination of an expanding urban population, de­
clining prices, and a guaranteed fare generated the movement 
toward consolidation and monopoly in the street railway, 
gas, and electric industries.3-0
Initially, electrification sharpened the sense of com­
petition among the eight companies as large and small com­
panies alike borrowed heavily from "local capitalists" in a 
hectic, almost frenzied, effort to electrify their opera­
tions and to generate higher revenues and greater dividends. 
Eventually, however, electrification accelerated the move­
ment toward consolidation and monopolization of the public 
utilities business, for the cost and maintenance of the 
electrification of the streetcar lines far exceeded the rev­
enue and credit of any individual company or the "local cap­
italists" of New Orleans.xx
The consolidation of the utilities industry began, at
10New Orleans Public Service Incorporated, Reclassifica­
tion of Electric Plant. Statements "A" to "I" Inclusive.
(New Orleans, n.d.), 15-17, 28-31; Fairclough, "Public Util­
ities," 45-48; New Orleans Item. April 6, 1919; Alfred D. 
Chandler, Jr., "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American 
Business," Business History Review. 33 (Spring 1959), 1-31; 
Charles Hoffman, "The Depression of the Nineties," The Jour­
nal of Economic History. XVI (June 1956), 145. The eight 
street railway companies were: New Orleans and Lake, Cres­
cent City, Canal and Claiborne, New Orleans and Carrollton, 
Jefferson and Lake Pontchartrain, St. Charles Street Rail­
road, Orleans and Jefferson, and Orleans Railroad.
ia-New Orleans Item, April 6, 1919; Fairclough, "Public 
Utilities," 45-47.
1 7 2
least at first, at home and under the direction of two 
groups of local investors. Late in 1892, on the eve of elec­
trification, C. D. Wyman and several associates formed the 
New Orleans Traction Company (NOTC), a quasi-operating and 
holding company, capitalized at nine million dollars.12 With 
this initial issue of stock, NOTC bought the controlling in­
terest in two street railway companies, the New Orleans City 
and Lake Railroad and the Crescent City Railroad. NOTC "pur­
chased" control of the two "traction" companies by manipula­
ting the purchase of their stock. The stockholders of the 
two "underlying companies" would not agree to unification 
unless NOTC gave their stock a "preferred basis of securi­
ty," turning common and preferred stock into bonds and pay­
ing dividends to stockholders in the form of rentals on pro­
perty leased from the two underlying companies.13
The common practice of turning stocks into bonds with 
guaranteed rates of return added more debt— and little real 
investment— to NOTC. With the purchase of the two underlying 
companies, NOTC had no money to electrify the 115 miles of 
track now under its control. To carry out the electrifica-
12NOTC issued capital stock of $7.5 million ($5 million
in common stock and $2.5 million in preferred stock) and a 
bonded debt of $1.5 million bearing six percent interest. 
NOTC offered the bonds and the preferred stock at "liberal 
discounts," issuing common stock as a bonus to those who 
purchased bonds and preferred stock. Many local financiers 
took advantage of the opportunity to "earn" dividends on 
the inflated stock value, an opportunity they soon came 
to regret.
“ I b i d .
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tion of the streetcar system, NOTC borrowed nearly $10 mil­
lion from New York trust companies. The weight of NOTC's do­
mestic and "foreign" debt proved too heavy for it to bear.
In 1898 NOTC defaulted on its local debt, failing to pay its 
"rental dividends" to the underlying companies. To stave off 
bankruptcy , NOTC bondholders levied a $1 million assessment 
against themselves to meet the rental and interests payments 
to the stockholders of the underlying companies. The assess­
ment prevented the collapse of NOTC, but it did not end the 
financial crisis facing the company. In February, 1899, in­
vestors in the NOTC, under the guidance of Robert M. Walms- 
ley, the president of the Louisiana National Bank and the 
vice-president of NOTC, reorganized NOTC as the New Orleans 
City Railroad Company (NOCRC). The NOCRC absorbed the debt 
and obligations of the NOTC by turning stocks into bonds and 
offering common stock in NOCRC as a bonus for the purchase 
of preferred stock and secured bonds in NOCRC. The New Or­
leans Item estimated that Walmsley's NOCRC pumped an addi­
tional $4.2 million of watered stock into NOCRC.Despite 
its financial difficulties, NOCRC controlled and electrified 
a major portion of the street railway system of New Orleans, 
owned and operated its own "power house" (the New Orleans 
Power House Company, Limited), and promoted the consolida-
x*New Orleans Item. April 6, 1919; Fairclough, "Public 
Utilities,"48-49. Between 1893 and 1899, NOTC-NOCRC pur­
chased the St.Charles, the Orleans, the Orleans and Jeffer­
son railway companies.
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tion of the electric street railway industry in New Orleans.
The NOTC-NOCRC also served as a model for a second 
group of local investors eager to consolidate the ownership 
and operation of the remaining independent companies under a 
single ownership and management. In the early 1890s this 
second group of investors, led by the powerful brokerage 
firm of Isadore Newman and Sons, owners of the New Orleans 
and Carrollton Railroad Company, began the electrification 
of the lines of the New Orleans and Carrollton (the oldest 
line in the city), the Canal and Claiborne, and the Jeffer­
son and Lake Pontchartrain. By 1899, Newman and the other 
investors had absorbed the Canal and Claiborne line (the 
Jefferson and Lake remained a subsidiary) and had made plans 
to buy two "electric light" companies. In 1901, the consor­
tium of investors formed the New Orleans and Carrollton 
Railroad, Light and Power Company (NOCRLPC), purchasing the 
New Orleans and Carrollton, the Merchants Electric Company, 
Limited, and the Edison Electric Company. The Newmans and 
their partners capitalized the NOCRLPC at $7.5 million and 
were careful not to issue securities that exceeded the 
earning power of the underlying companies.3-9
19NOPSI, Reclassification. 15-17; New Orleans Item. April
6, 1919; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 46-47. In November,
1900, the Merchants Electric Light Company reorganized as
the Merchants Electric Company. The Edison Electric Company 
was the result of the consolidation of the Edison Electric
Illumination Company and the Louisiana Electric Light Com­
pany. The merger and absorption of these two companies into 
the NOSCRLSPC was so successful that preferred stock sold at 
par and common stock at eighty percent of its face value.
In general, however, consolidation of the utilities in­
dustry increased capitalization by geometric proportions. In 
1888 capitalization for all New Orleans utility companies 
did not exceed $5 million. But, by 1897, at the height of 
the electrification movement, capitalization stood at $22 
million, and in 1901, on the eve of monopolization, capita­
lization for both of the major utility companies probably 
exceeded $36 million, a sum critics charged exceeded the 
"actual" value of the investment in the operating companies. 
The businessmen who fabricated the consolidation of the 
utility industry in New Orleans defended consolidation as 
a practical business consideration and as a civic virtue. 
Consolidation, they claimed, promised greater business effi­
ciency and progressive economies, permitting the utility 
companies to plan the extension of services, improve the 
quality and reduce the cost of service, and generate higher 
profits for the company and dividends for stockholders. (A 
large proportion of the profits would, presumably, be 
returned to the community in the form of improvements in 
service or a decrease in rates. The increase in profits 
would also be returned to the community in the form of addi­
tional investments.) Consolidation would perforce promote 
the expansion and development of New Orleans, virtually as­
suring the city of greater tax revenues to fund necessary 
social services like schools, libraries, roads, street
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lighting, and sewerage and drainage systems.a-**
The consolidation of the street railway companies, con­
trary to the public expressions of the new utility managers, 
did not improve service, lower costs, initiate greater effi­
ciency, practice "progressive economies," or promote the 
civic and social advancement of New Orleans. The sole design 
and purpose of merger and consolidation was to gain control 
of the market; to expand the investment opportunity of local 
and "foreign" (northeast) capitalists. After the consolida­
tion of the streetcar lines, service remained incidential to 
revenue and profit. The financial obligations of the new 
corporations compelled them to ignore the obligations of 
their franchises (consolidation and merger did not relieve 
the new companies of the franchise obligations of the under­
lying companies), curtailing service without the consent of 
the city council, refusing to honor the "transfer" system, 
and avoiding their paving obligations. Least of all, consol­
idation failed to advance the physical and social betterment 
of New Orleans, consolidation did not win the good will of 
the people or government of the city. Throughout the 1890s 
and well into the next century, the utility compamies and 
the public bickered over the quality and cost of services. 
The companies resisted efforts to improve or maintain the 
level of services, willfully ignoring the terms and
xaThomas Ewing Dabney, "Public Services of New Orleans" 
(typescript in the possession of New Orleans Public Service, 
Incorporated, n.p. n.d.).
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restrictions of their franchises. The city government, oper­
ating within the limitations set by law and precedent (and 
working under both "machine" and reform administrations), 
achieved only grudging compliance from the streetcar and 
utility companies, often resorting to expediency and compro­
mise in dealing with public service.17 The attitude and be­
havior of the utility companies (and the success of the 
municipal ownership movement under the Sewerage and Water 
Board) convinced some influential members of the municipal 
government that the city should own and operate transit, 
gas, and electric services.x*
The consolidation of the public service utilities did 
not result, however, in the municipalization of the street 
railway and utility companies, but in the loss of local own­
ership and management, the erosion of public control over 
the essential services of the city, and the monopolization 
of those services by a single corporation, itself operated
X7Nussbaum, "Progressive Politics," 114-24; Gavin Wright, 
"Regulation in American History:The Human Touch," Reviews in 
American History. 14 (June 1986), 166-67. The two notable 
exceptions were the city government's response to the two 
bitter and costly street railway strikes of 1892, which pre­
ceded a general strike, and 1902. In both instances, the 
city administrations of John Fitzpatrick (1892-96) and Paul 
Capdevielle, both Regular Democrats, compelled the companies 
to settle the strikes in favor of the union. (In 1892, the 
companies and the reactionary press dismantled Fitzpatick's 
settlement by appealing to the governor to break the 
strike.)
x"Walter C. Flower to Leonard Darbyshiere, October 6, 
1897, vol., 72, HCLMO. CA, NOPL; Flower to James Higgins,
April 25, 1900; Paul Capdevielle to James C. Henriques,
June 25, 1900, vol., 79, ibid.
for the benefit and profit of "alien" stockholders and com­
mercial bankers. Late in the fall of 1901, the New York Se­
curity and Trust Company sought the consolidation and con­
trol of NOCRC, NOCRLPC, New Orleans Gas Light Company, and 
the four other independent street railway companies. By 
early 1902, the trust company had acquired a majority of 
the capital stocks in the streetcar companies to justify 
the creation of company to manage its holdings and operate 
the underlying service companies. In January, 1902, the New 
York Security and Trust obtained a charter from the State of 
New Jersey, incorporating the New Orleans Railways Company 
(NORC) at a mere $5 million. NORC offered the security 
holders of NOCRC, NOCRLPC, and the other companies the 
option of selling their stocks and bonds at a price fixed 
at five dollars above their local selling price (at the 
time New Orleans had its own stock exchange) or of exchang­
ing one stock for another. Since NORC preferred exchanging 
one stock for another, it proposed converting preferred 
stocks into bonds, discounting its preferred stock, and 
issuing common stock as a bonus on all exchanges.3-"
By early Hay, with the consolidation plan near comple­
tion, the New York investors recapitalized NORC at more than 
$72 million. (Estimates concerning the precise recapitaliza-
X3Reclassification, 28; New Orleans Item. April 6, 1919; 
Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 46-47. Most security holders 
exchanged their securities for those of NORC. The notable 
exception was the Newman family, who demanded and received 
cash (rumored to be in gold) for its holdings.
tion are muddled and confusing, ranging from a low of $72 
million to a high of $98 million.)20 Under the terms of the 
recapitalization plan, each of the "constituent" or under­
lying companies— the streetcar and electric companies and 
NOGLC— retained its own corporate identity and maintained 
legal ownership of the franchises and the physical proper­
ties. In practice, however, NORC owned and controlled each 
of the operating companies, holding nearly all the mortgage 
bonds and the preferred and common stock and operating the 
underlying companies through interlocking management and 
boards of directors.23-
The underlying companies, however, could not generate 
enough revenue to operate the system and satisfy the demands 
of NORC's bloated bonded debt. Within two years of the com­
pletion of the consolidation and monopolization plans, the 
New York Security and Trust Company, renamed the New York
2°The recapitalization estimates compiled by successor 
companies show that NORC issued $40 million in bonds to 
purchase the securities of NOCRC and NOCRL&PC, make improve­
ments, and buy the securities of the underlying operating 
companies and NOGLC. Company "records" show that NORC issued 
$10 million in preferred and another $30 million in common 
stock for a total of $80 million for recapitalization. The 
Item reported that NORC spent $58 million for the purchase 
of the securities of the underlying and holding companies 
and floated $40 million to capitalize NORC. New Orleans 
Item, April 6, 1919; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 47.
21By 1903, NORC owned ninety-two percent of the stocks
and bonds of all underlying companies. By 1916, NORLC, the 
successor company to NORC, owned all but 222,000 shares in 
all subsidiaries. Reclassification, 31; Simon Borg and 
Company v. New Orleans Citv Railroad Company, et. alia..
244 Federal Reporter 617, hereafter cited as Borg v. NOCRC: 
New Orleans Item, March 17, 1916; New Orleans Daily States. 
April 5, 1916; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 46-47.
Trust Company, petitioned a federal court in New Jersey to 
place an embattled NORC into the hands of a receiver. The 
court obliged the trust company, appointing Elwin C. Foster, 
the president of NORC, as the receiver. Several days later, 
the federal district court in New Orleans joined the pro­
ceedings, appointing New Orleans businessman Pearl Wight as 
receiver and relegating Foster to the role of "ancillary*1 
receiver.22
Soon after NORC went into receivership, the new State 
Attorney General, Walter Guion, brought suit against NORC, 
contending that NORC violated the incorporation law of the 
state. The receivers and Guion settled the suit out of 
court, agreeing to incorporate any successor corporation 
under Louisiana law and to reduce capitalization to $60 
million— a $12 million (or $38 million) reduction in capi­
talization. The reorganization and refinancing plan, under 
the supervision of the New York Trust Company, called for 
the incorporation of a successor company, the New Orleans
22In September, 1902, union workers for NORC struck the 
company for more money and an open shop contract. The union 
immoblized the streetcar system, blocking lines and cutting 
power lines. Despite these tactics, the union had the sup­
port of the public and the city administration. Unable to 
run its cars or to break the strike, NORC agreed to the de­
mands of the union. Dismayed by the strike and by the pyra­
miding of stocks by the company, Attorney General Omer 
Villere brought suit against NORC. He later dropped the suit 
when NORC agreed to settle the strike and to refrain from 
issuing more stock. Reclassification. 31; New Orleans Item, 
April 4, 1916; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 50-51;
Charles G. Carpenter, "The New Orleans Street Railway Strike 
of 1929-30," (M.A. thesis Tulane University, 1970), passim.
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Railway and Light Company, that would assume the financial 
and contractual obligations of the old corporation. The plan 
allowed NORLC to issue $30 million in bonds to secure the 
bonds of NORC and its underlying companies and to make a 
series of physical improvements. The new company also issued 
$30 million in stock ($10 million in preferred, $20 million 
in common) to buy the remaining securities of NORC and to 
meet the expenses of promotion in the "formation and organi­
zation of this corporation and in acquiring and bringing 
about the purchase of the property rights and franchises" of 
NORC and its constituent companies.23
NORLC, like its predecessor, was both a holding company 
and an operating company. NORLC did not own a single street­
car, a foot of track, utility poll, power house, or repair 
shop. NORLC owned nearly every piece of common and preferred 
stock in each of the underlying, operating companies, con­
trolling those companies through a single board of directors 
and management staff. NORLC operated the lines and services 
of the underlying companies by leasing the streetcar lines
a3Reclassification, 31-36; New Orleans Item. April 2, 15, 
1915, April 6, 13, 1919; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 47. 
Despite the sizeable "reduction" in capitalization of NORLC, 
several critics, in particular, Dr. Valentine K. Irion, the 
founder of the Municipal Improvement League, argued that the 
latest settlement retained $24 to $25 million in "watered 
stock". An audit conducted by Charles E. Wermuth in 1919 
was unable to determine the precise valuation of NORC and 
its constituent companies. But, as Adam Fairclough points 
out, with a funded debt of $159,000 for every mile of track 
and $9.00 in "investment" for every dollar earned, there is 
little doubt that a sizeable portion of the stock of NORLC 
was water.
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and other facilities owned by those companies and paying 
rent in the form of dividends on the preferred and common 
stock. For example, NORLC owned 98.94% of the preferred and 
97.23% of the common stock of the New Orleans City Railroad 
Company, controlling the voting interests of that company. 
New Orleans City Railroad owned and operated fourteen separ­
ate street railway franchises which it leased to NORLC. In 
lieu of rent, NORLC paid yearly dividends of $62,500 on the 
preferred stock and $50,000 on the common stock. Those divi­
dends, of course, went to the company that owned the common 
and preferred stock— NORLC.**
At first, Elwin Foster, the president of NORLC and the 
receiver for NORC, convinced new the board of directors for 
NORLC and the public that the latest reorganization had in­
deed worked a financial miracle, making NORLC into a profit­
able and efficient venture. In fact, from the start, NORLC 
was on the verge of collapse. The underlying companies could 
not produce enough revenues for NORLC to meet its "rentals" 
and other operating expenses. Between 1905 and 1907, NORLC 
paid its "fixed charges" and unearned dividends with money 
secured from the sale of bonds. When the recession of 1907 
closed off bond sales, the management of NORLC faced yet
24Simon Bora v .NOCRC 617; New Orleans Item, March 17,
May 22, 23, November 26, 1916; New Orleans Daily States. 
April 4, May 22, 23, July 24, 1916. The NOCRC operated the
Tchoupitoulas; Annunciation; Colisium; Dryades; Peters; Mag­
azine; Camp and Prytania; Rampart; Dauphine; Levee and Bar­
racks; Canal; Bayou St.John; Esplande; and the Lake and Vil-
lere.
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another financial crisis. Only the acquisition of an emer­
gency loan from the Interstate Bank and Trust Company and 
the tireless work of Hugh McCloskey, the chairman of the 
board of directors for NORLC staved off bankruptcy. The loan 
permitted NORLC to meet its immediate financial obligations 
and McCloskey's dedication and tight-fisted management 
allowed NORLC to borrow additional, larger sums from New 
York and Philadelphia banking and investment houses for the 
rehabilitation of NORLC and its underlying companies.29
Despite the efforts of local bankers and businessmen, 
like Hugh McCloskey, the rehabilitation of NORLC and its 
underlying companies never really took place. In effect, the 
so-called rehabilitation allowed investment bankers to con­
solidate their hold on the utility industry in New Orleans 
and the South. In 1908 the Philadelphia firm of Bertron, 
Griscom and Company (reportedly with the aid of loans from 
the Standard Oil Company) began acquiring the capital stock 
of NORLC. (Bertron, Grison also purchased a sizeable portion 
of the Consumer's Electric Company, the only remaining inde­
29New Orleans Item, September 26, 1911, February 16, 29, 
1912, February 21, 1918, April 13, 1919; New Orleans Daily 
States. November 11, 1913.
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pendent utility in New Orleans.)2® By 1911, Bertron, Griscom 
(now Bertron, Griscom and Jenks), through its holding com­
pany, American Cities Company (ACC) had acquired through 
purchase eighty-eight percent of the preferred and ninety- 
seven percent of the common stock of NORLC. With its 
holdings in NORLC, ACC mortgaged the underlying companies 
and NOGLC, draining them of their earnings and compelling 
NORLC to borrow additional funds to meet its "fixed" obliga­
tions to its stockholders, namely, the American Cities Com­
pany. With the dividends it received from NORLC, ACC pur­
chased control of utility companies in Birmingham, Houston, 
Knoxville, Little Rock, and Memphis.27
The success of ACC in consolidating its holdings and 
managing its properties naturally attracted the attention 
and interest of larger, more resourceful companies. Near the 
end of 1912, two large holding companies. International
2®Reclassificationr 37; New Orleans Item, February 14, 
16, 1912, November 16, 1913, February 19, 1918, April 13, 
1919; New Orleans Daily States. February 19, 1918. In 1903 
several New Orleans businessmen, among them Maurice J. Hart, 
a former councilman with interests in several streetcar com­
panies, and former mayor, John Fitzpatrick, formed the Con­
sumer's Electric Company. The company faltered under the 
competitive advantages of NORLC, and in 1908 filled for 
bankruptcy. The courts appointed Samuel Insull as the re­
ceiver for Consumer's. Insull attracted investment for out­
side the city and reorganized the company under the name 
Consumer's Electric Light and Power Company. The CEL&PC be­
came part of NOPSI in 1926.
37American Cities hoped to exchange its stock for the 
stock of NORLC, but the offer was complex and unsatisfactory 
to the owners of NORLC. New Orleans Item. December 12, 13, 
1911, February 29, 1912, February 19, 1918, April 13, 1919; 
New Orleans Daily States. February 19, 1918.
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Water Power Company of London (IWPCL) and United Gas and 
Electric Corporation (UGEC) began efforts to control ACC and 
all its underlying companies, including NORLC. The IWPCL, as 
its name implies, sought to develop and promote the use of 
hydroelectric power in the United States, particularly in 
the southern states with their great supply of water and 
their even greater need for electric power. Though IWPCL 
hoped to generate thousands of hours of hydroelectric power, 
it had no large and reliable network of buyers for its 
power. The purchase of ACC would, of course, resolve that 
problem.28
United Gas and Electric already controlled several 
utility companies in the northeastern United States and 
wanted to control more. In the summer of 1912, Bertron, 
Griscom and Jenks, in need of more capital for its utility 
ventures, agreed to a merger of its Susquehana Railway,
Light and Power Company, a holding company that held the se­
curities of Consumer's Electric Light Company, and United 
Gas and Electric Company. The merger would allow Bertron, 
Griscom and Jenks to "rehabilitate" its holdings and for the 
new company. United Gas and Electric Corporation, to absorb 
ACC. The interests of IWPCL complicated the rehabilitation 
and absorption of ACC. IWPCL purchased one-third of the com­
mon stock of ACC and held an option on the remaining stock.
2BNew Orleans Item, November 15, 19, 1912, August 12, 16, 
20, 31, 1913; New Orleans Daily Picayune. November 19, 1912.
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IHPCL declined to exercise its option, and was content with 
its position as a "limited partner". UGEC eventually absorb­
ed American Cities, gaining control of an immense network of 
public utilities, including those operated by NORLC.2"
The public and fulsome promises of monopolization, like 
the promises of consolidation, were never fulfilled. Monopo­
lization did not further the financial and physical rehabil­
itation of NORLC and its constituent companies or improve 
services and lower costs or restore public confidence in the 
public utility industry.30 To the contrary, monopolization 
accomplished none of those ends. The financial excesses and 
corporate arrangements of monopolization saddled NORLC with 
an exorbitant debt (reported to be $72,000,000), a debilita­
ting set of obligations, and a "foreign" ownership that de­
prived the New Orleans public service companies of the reve­
nues needed to underwrite the costs of improving service.
2"Reclassification. 38; New Orleans Daily Picayune.
August 9, 1913; New Orleans Itemr August 23, 1912, August 
11, 20, November 16, 1913. The franchise of the Consumer's 
Electric Company prevented its sale or transfer to any com­
petitive company. Since ACC owned and operated NORLC, it 
could not purchase Consumer's Electric. Bertron, Griscom and 
Jenks had Susquehana Railway, Light and Power purchase Con­
sumer's Electric, bringing all utility companies in New Or­
leans under the control and eventual management of a single 
corporation.
3°In 1916, ACC and UGEC consented to the consolidation of 
NORLC with its underlying companies. In essence, the plan 
allowed NORLC to assume actual ownership of the operating 
companies. Officials for NORLC and ACC explained that the 
new arrangement merely allowed NORLC to better manage its 
properties, replacing an informal business arrangement with 
a formal and structured arrangement. Boro v. NOCRC 244 FR 
617-21; New Orleans Item. March 17, April 22, May 22, 23,
July 19, November 26, 1916.
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Under the monopoly enjoyed by NORLC, the quality of public 
service deteriorated and the cost of service increased, an­
tagonizing an already skeptical public and galvanizing it 
and the municipal government to the threat monopoly posed 
to public service and to local self-government.31
In September of 1911, the Consumer's Electric Light and 
Power Company, without the knowledge or consent of the city 
council or any other civil authority, raised its rates for 
electric lighting and power by an average of seventy-five 
percent. When local merchants and manufacturers complained 
about the unexpected and, in their view, unwarranted in­
creases, Consumer's Electric, confident of its position, 
threatened to discontinue service until customers agreed to 
the new rates. Several merchants and manufacturers contacted 
NORLC about electric light and power service, but NORLC, os­
tensibly the principal competitor of Consumer's Electric, 
denied service to the businessmen, compelling them to sub-
3XTestimony of Jacob K. Newman, Proceedings of the Feder­
al Electric Railway Commission. vol.l, 566; New Orleans 
Item. November 11, 1913, June 14, 25, 1914; Fairclough,
"Public Utilities," 46, 53. The Behrman and McShane adminis­
trations consistently disputed claims by NORLC that its 
valuation exceeded $72 million. City officials placed the 
actual investment and value of NORLC at $45 million. For a 
more detailed account of the valuation issue, see Chapters 
Five, Six, and Ten. For the decline in service, see the 
numerous letters written to the Commissioner of Public Util­
ities in Petitions and Coorespondence, Department of Public
Utilities, vols. 1 and 2, CA, NOPL. See also John F. C.
Waldo to Moore June 30, 1910, vol.5 CAP. CA, NOPL and Moore
to Thompson, January 6, 1913, vol.6 ibid.
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mit to the rate increases imposed on them by Consumer's 
Electric. Angered by the actions and tactics of the two 
power companies, individual merchants and the Merchants and 
Manufacturers Exchange complained about the quality and cost 
of electric service to the Progressive Union, an association 
of businessmen, professionals, and civic leaders.32
Appearing before the Board of Directors for the Pro­
gressive Union, the protesters accused the utility companies 
of conspiring to drive up their prices in willful violation 
of the terms of their franchises and in total disregard for 
the best interests of their customers and the welfare of the 
city. There was, they argued, no justification for raising 
the electric rates; the costs of production had remained 
steady for some time, NORLC and Consumer's Electric already 
enjoyed "virtual monopolies" in New Orleans, and rates in 
New Orleans were already higher than in other cities of com­
parable size and population. The terms of the franchises 
prohibited them from increasing rates without the consent of 
the city government, and that consent surely required the 
good will of the people of New Orleans. Finally, the pro-
32New Orleans Item, September 8, 13, 15, October 30, 
November 3, 1911, February 16, 1912. The Progressive Union 
was, like so many other business and professional associa­
tions, quite active in the civic and "political" affairs of 
the city, though the Progressive Union was careful to avoid 
partisan politics. In 1913 the Progressive Union reorganized 
as the Association of Commerce, and, though its membership 
and leadership remained unchanged, it became an opponent of 
the Behrman administration. See New Orleans Item, December 
14, 1911 and May 4, June 26, 1913.
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gress and well-being of the city depended upon the public 
services provided by the utility companies. High rates for 
basic services did not promote the expansion of services or 
the improvement of existing ones. The first priority of the 
public service companies, then, was service, and only by 
meeting the demands for quality service would the utility 
companies prosper. (Neither the board nor the merchants 
seemed anxious to offer a specific reason why Consumer's 
Electric and NORLC were compelled to raise their rates.33 
And no one questioned the "authority" of the Progressive 
Union to behave like the city government in investigating 
accusations against the utility companies.)
The utility companies denied allegations that they had 
conspired to raise rates and they asserted that there was 
precedent— and justification— for raising rates without the 
consent of customers and the local civil authority. Hugh 
McCloskey, the president of NORLC and chairman of its board 
of directors, insisted that NORLC and Consumer's Electric 
were competitors, intent on providing service to their cus­
tomers and producing a profit for their stockholders. But 
neither NORLC nor Consumer's Electric could continue provid­
ing service or producing profit without an increase in the
33It was apparent to most observers and critics of the 
utilities industry in New Orleans that the financial obli­
gations incurred during the reorganization and consolidation 
of Consumer's Electric and NORLC forced the increase in 
rates for electricity and gas. New Orleans Item, February 
11-14 1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 14, 1912.
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rates charged for electricity. In many ways, McCloskey told 
the members of the Progressive Union, unrestained competi­
tion and politics were responsible for the present condi­
tions in the utilities industry in New Orleans. When Con- 
summer's Electric began operations, it set its rates below 
the cost of production, hoping to entice customers to use 
its services rather than those of NORLC. Its tactic failed, 
and Consumer's Electric petitioned the federal courts for 
relief. The federal district court in New Orleans granted a 
rate increase to Consumer's Electric which placed its rates 
still below those of NORLC. Political pressure from the 
Board of Trade and the commerical exchanges for a system of 
"uniform" rates and fees, forced NORLC to reduce its rates 
for electric service. Because of the loss of revenue, 
brought on by unwitting competition and unremitting public 
pressure, McCloskey said, NORLC was forced to postpone im­
provements and expansion to meet current needs. With the de­
mand for more and better service increasing, McCloskey con­
tended, neither the city nor the utility companies could 
survive with rates that impaired service and undermined in­
vestment. Service, McCloskey remarked, was secondary to in­
vestment; there could be no service without the unqualified
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protection of investment and profit.3*
Neither the merchants nor the utility companies offered 
any specific evidence about electric rates and service, and 
the Progressive Union declined to express an opinion or to 
pass judgment on the matter. The Progressive Union was con­
cerned, however, with the quality and cost of electric ser­
vice in New Orleans and it instructed its Municipal Affairs 
Committee (MAC), chaired by music store impresario Philip 
Werlein, to make a careful study of service in New Orleans 
and to compare it with service and costs in other major 
cities in the region and the nation. Werlein promised to 
conduct a thorough and judicious investigation, affording 
every one a fair and considered hearing and providing the 
MAC with the time and evidence to complete its study and to 
make sound recommendations.39
The Werlein committee, however, was thorough and judi­
cious to a fault. The committee met infreguently and always
"New Orleans Item. November 3, 8, 9, 12, 1911. 
McCloskey's rendition is at variance with the public record. 
Consumer's Electric petitioned the federal court to initi­
ate a rate increase for electric service. When the court 
approved the increase for Consumer's Electric, NORLC raised 
its rates without petitioning the courts or the council. In­
stead, NORLC sought the "approval" of the Board of Trade. 
Despite its objection to the increases for service, the city 
administration was unable prevent the increases. Later, 
though, the Behrman adminsitration learned that Consumer's 
Electric had overcharged customers and the mayor and council 
ordered a refund. Consumer's Electric eventually reduced its 
rates.See New Orleans Item. November 1, 1910, April 26,
1912, April 15, 1913, November 16, 1914.
"New Orleans Item. October 30, November 3, 1911.
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behind closed doors. The pace and conduct of the investiga­
tion aggravated the merchants and manufacturers. Early in 
November they formed the New Orleans Electric Rate Associ­
ation (NOERA) and began their own study. The NOERA did not 
conduct an exhaustive study of the utility industry in New 
Orleans, but its observations were perceptive and its recom­
mendations sound. The NOERA acknowledged that service and 
investment were related, and it conceded that Consumer's 
Electric and NORLC were entitled to a reasonable rate in­
crease, ranging between ten and twenty percent. The utility 
companies, however, demanded increases of between sixty and 
one hundred percent. The explanation for these outrageous 
demands, the NOERA explained, was simple. Electric and gas 
rates were not based on the cost of service, but on the cost 
and demands of investment. The excessive cost of service 
was, as the NOERA claimed, imposed "from above" by the com­
panies that held the securities of NORLC. The regulation of 
the quality, extent, and cost of service, then, depended on 
the regulation of the internal workings of the public ser­
vice utilities. Clearly, the NOERA declared, no ad hoc 
association of businessmen possessed the authority or the 
mandate to regulate the public utilities industry. That 
responsibility, the association believed, fell to either the 
state or municipal governments, and it recommended the 
creation of a public service commission to regulate the
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public actions of the utility companies and to assure the 
well-being of the people of New Orleans.38
The NOERA did not suggest, however, that the Progres­
sive Union or the MAC abandon their efforts while waiting 
for the state legislature or the city administration to form 
a public service commission. The merchants and manufacturers 
recommended that the Progressive Union and the NOERA conduct 
a joint investigation of the electric rates in New Orleans, 
hoping to wrest some immediate concessions and relief from 
NORLC and Consumer's Electric. The NOERA also suggested that 
the two associations commission a professional survey of the 
entire utility business in New Orleans as evidence of the 
need for a public service commission in New Orleans.37
The businessmen who formed the Progressive Union were, 
on the whole, skeptical about the municipal regulation of 
the utility industry in New Orleans. In general businessmen 
were anxious to impose stability and order on the corporate 
and financial practices of NORLC and its competitors, but 
they were reluctant to invest such power in a "politicized" 
public authority like the Behrman administration. They 
recognized that high utility rates and marginal service
3BNew Orleans Item. November 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 1911, Feb­
ruary 22, 1912. Werlein defended his methodical approach to
the regulation of rates, claiming that it was his belief, 
impressed upon him by the officers of NORLC, that a reduc­
tion in the rates for commerical users would result in a 
rate increase for domestic customers.
37New Orleans Item, November 11, 12, December 14, 15, 
1911, February 22, 1912.
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placed the city at a "competitive disadvantage" in attract­
ing new businesses and jobs to New Orleans, jeopardizing the 
"growth and development" o£ the city and diminishing the 
quality of life of its citizens. Convinced that the manage­
ment of NORLC and Consumer's Electric shared their appreci­
ation of the "public good," the leaders of the Progressive 
Union suggested that NORLC and Consumer's Electric reduce 
their rates to the levels before the "recent adjustment".3"
The Progressive Union, however, expressed no desire to 
question the financial policies or the business practices of 
NORLC and its parent companies, or to acknowledge the rela­
tionship between service and investment, or to recommend the 
creation of a public service commission for New Orleans. The 
majority of the men who formed and led the Progressive Union 
possessed many of the same beliefs, interests, and dislikes 
as the men who managed NORLC and Consumer's Electric. Un­
doubtedly, many of these men considered regulation an evil 
necessity that confirmed the rights of private property and 
assured property a dominant voice in the public discourse. 
When Hugh McCloskey announced that the rights of the stock­
holders were his principal concern and that service to the 
city was secondary to that concern, no one in the Progres­
sive Union challenged him or his statement. When, in early 
1912, NORLC "adjusted" its rates for commercial and indus-
3®New Orleans Item, November 11, December 14-16, 1911, 
February 22, April 10, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 112- 
15, especially footnote 46, 114-15.
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trial customers without the knowledge or "consent" of the 
Progressive Union, few members protested and only one member 
called for public regulation of NORLC.39
There was, as well, a financial and personal relation­
ship between the Progressive Union and the other utility 
companies. NORLC was a consistent and generous contributor 
to the Progressive Union and its successor, the Association 
of Commerce, and several leading banks, with vast holdings 
in utility securities, also contributed to the Progressive 
Union. Several members of the Progressive Union's board of 
directors had interests in the utilities industry. Hugh Mc­
Closkey, the president of NORLC and chairman of its board, 
along with several other members of the board, were also 
members and officers of the Progressive Union.90 The pres­
ence of these men in the Progressive Union impeded the 
effort of the Werlein committee to investigate the public 
service industry in New Orleans and jaundiced the attempts 
to bring the utilities industry under public regulation. 
Finally, despite their cordiality, the Progressive Union and 
the Behrman administration were for some time suspicious of
39New Orleans Item. February 13, 16, 29, 1912; New Or­
leans Daily Picayune. February 15, 29, 1912. When NORLC 
raised its rates, several members wanted the Werlein commit­
tee to broaden its study, and they requested to see the 
"books" of NORLC. To their shock, NORLC refused to disclose 
its financial records, and the investigation ended.
9°New Orleans Item December 14, 15, 1911, February 22, 
1912, May 4, June 26, 1913. New Orleans Progressive Union 
Roll-Call of Members. Directors, and Committees, film 1861, 
Division of Microfilms and Newspapers, Troy H. Middleton 
Library, Louisiana State University.
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(at times hostile toward) each other. And even among those 
in the Union who favored the public regulation of NORLC and 
the other utility companies, there was an open and abiding 
distrust of the Behrman administration and the Regular Demo­
cratic Organization that frustrated the effort of the Pro­
gressive Union and other civic associations to influence the 
policies and practices of NORLC and other utility companies.
The Behrman administration felt frustrated by its rela­
tive inability to affect the quality of service or influence 
the conduct of the public utility corporations that served 
New Orleans. The administration understood, perhaps better 
than its critics realized or admitted, the complexity and 
perplexity of the public utility question. The mayor and the 
council, as we have seen, recognized the city's desperate 
need for quality utility service at rates and fares that 
were reasonable and beneficial to the public and the inves­
tors. Efficient and effective public service, the adminis­
tration reasoned, contributed immeasurably to the growth and 
development of the city, extending and improving the quality 
of life in New Orleans. The Behrman administration argued 
consistently for rates and fares based on the cost of ser­
vice, but it argued with equal fervor for a reasonable re­
turn on "actual" investment. "Reasonable" rates would bene­
fit every one in the city. Reasonable rates made for a more 
competitive New Orleans, sustained commerce, attracted busi­
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ness and industry, advanced the expansion and quality of 
service, and assured a consistent profit for the company.
The Behrman administration understood, then, the con­
nection between service and investment and it recognized the 
necessity of promoting service and protecting investment 
through the public, municipal regulation of both. The city 
administration under Martin Behrman did not, however, as its 
critics charged, advocate municipal regulation to either ad­
vance its own partisan interests or those of NORLC or to 
circumvent the demands for municipal ownership. As we shall 
see, the Behrman commission council advocated public, muni­
cipal regulation as the most direct, effective, and democra­
tic means of curbing the excesses of the utility corpora­
tions. And, though it seriously considered municipal owner­
ship for gas, electric, and transit service, the Behrman ad­
ministration discarded the idea as impractical for New Or­
leans. The Behrman administration considered municipal own­
ership too expensive; the city could not afford the costs of 
purchasing or reproducing the gas, electric, and transit 
systems. (From time to time the council discussed buying or 
reproducing the gas and electric systems, leaving transit in 
private hands.) There was no guarantee, either, that munici­
pal ownership would immediately and immeasurably reduce 
rates or expand and improve service.
Consolidation and monopoly promised the same benefits 
as municipal ownership— quality service, cheap, competitive
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rates, consistent, reliable revenues that could fund the ex­
pansion and development of services— without the financial 
expense or political liability. But, as the needs of the 
city went unmet and as costs rose, the administration became 
skeptical of the so-called benefits of consolidation and 
and monopoly. Consolidation and monopolization did not fur­
nish greater and more efficient service or promote the phys­
ical and social development of the city. It promoted stock 
manipulation and contributed to declining services, rising 
prices, and the increasing disregard for the obligations of 
franchise and the values of good citizenship.
Despite its skepticism, the Behrman administration had 
relatively little influence over the course and development 
of consolidation and monopolization. They simply lay beyond 
the authority of city government. The Behrman administration 
had no authority over the formation or conduct of investment 
banks and holding companies that held their charters from 
outside Louisiana (or, for that matter, inside Louisiana). 
The Behrman administration had no legal authority over stock 
issues and it had no authority to prevent or sanction the 
purchase of the New Orleans utility system to local or out­
side investors. It had no recognized authority to set rates 
and fares except through its limited authority to set the 
terms and conditions of utility franchises, levy taxes, and
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contract for services.'*3-
Before consolidation and monopolization, regulation of 
the public utilities industry in New Orleans, as elsewhere 
in the urban United States, consisted of the enforcement of 
the obligations of franchise, taxation, and contracts. All 
were designed to promote the development of public services 
and protect private investment without compromising the pub­
lic interest. Even before consolidation, however, though 
surely not obsolete, conventional methods proved inadequate 
responses to the question of utility regulation. Though 
franchises contained specific terms and obligations,— fares, 
schedules, number of cars at rush hour, paving and lighting 
requirements, bans on overcrowding— they were often diffi­
cult to enforce. The only remedy for chronic or willful dis­
regard for the terms of the franchise was to sue for the 
forfeiture of the franchise. The utility companies also ar­
gued for a literal interpretaion of the terms of the fran­
chise (when it suited their interests), asserting that they
■^George T. Bartley, Assistant city Attorney to Moore 
October 14, 1910, vol.6, Moore to Behrman July 24, 1911
vol. 6, Moore to Thompson, undated (probably between Febru­
ary 13 and 19, 1916, vol.7, Moore to Commissioner of Public 
Utilities E. J. Glenny, February 28, 1917, vol.8, CAP. CA,
NOPL; Unsigned and undated letters to Board of Directors, 
Progressive Union, Street Railway Union Collection, box 1, 
Special Collection Division, Howard-Tilton Library, Tulane 
University, hereafter cited as SRUC. SCDTU; New Orleans 
Item, February 7, 13, 1912, November 5, 1913, July 27, 1915. 
In 1900, the city council passed an ordinance regulating the 
rates of the telephone companies. The issue lingered into 
the 1920s, when the courts determined that the state had au­
thority over telephone service. See Nussbaum, "Progressive 
Politics," 111-113; Williams, Huev Long. 153-5, 162-73.
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were under no other obligations except those expressly con­
tained in the franchise or contract.*2
At times the Behrman administration also argued for a 
literal interpretation of utility franchises and contracts, 
especially on issues of scheduling, routing, lighting, and 
paving. The city administration, however, did not believe 
that the bonds of contract and franchise were the only suf­
ficient and reasonble methods of protecting the public in­
terests. The Behrman government acknowledged that the public 
service corporations held exclusive franchises that invested 
them with many "special legal privileges" but with few ex­
pressed obligations. But, the administration argued, the ex­
clusive franchises and the actual monopoly enjoyed by the 
utility companies contained "corresponding obligations in 
favor of the taxpayers, who are the principals from whom 
these [exclusive] rights...originate." The public service 
corporations, then, "in good faith and [in] enforceable 
equity...is bound to furnish them with the desired utility 
and public commodity." Assistant City Attorney John F. C.
*2Moore to Behrman July 24, August 14, 1911, vol.6, CAP. 
CA, NOPL. NORLC and its underlying companies openly and con­
sistently ignored their paving obligations. The city con­
stantly pressed for compliance, arguing that NORLC's rights 
to use the streets were limited and inferior to the city, 
and that the franchises required NORLC and the other compan­
ies to keep the streets "in good order and condition" and to 
pay for all costs in paving. Between 1909 and 1916, there 
were sixty separate opinions from the City Attorney on the 
paving obligations of NORLC. See in particular, Samuel Gil­
more to W. J. Hardee March 11, 1909, vol.5, Moore to Hardee 
November 12 1909, Waldo to Moore May 14, 1910, CAP. CA, 
NOPL.
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Waldo, writing to City Attorney Moore, believed that the 
legal privileges enjoyed by the utility companies imposed a 
special social and political obligation on the companies and 
on the city government. "The exercise of franchise rights by 
the public utility corporations is after all, when resolved 
to its final...analysis," Waldo wrote, "nothing else than a 
great trusteeship held for the account of the people from 
whom these rights were originally and conditionally ac­
quired...." The utility companies, he said, were legally 
committed to hold and administer property and to provide 
service for the benefit of others (though as trustee NORLC 
was entitled to a "reasonable, safe" return on its invest­
ment), and the city government, by virtue of its political 
mandate and social trusteeship, was obliged to formulate a 
public utility policy that served the public good.*3
The legal opinions of the City Attorney and his assis­
tants, however, no matter how compelling or resourceful in 
their arguments, were not the equivalent of law. The Behrman 
administration, in the wake of monopoly, declining service, 
rising rates, and at the suggestion of the Item, NOERA, and 
the city attorney, advocated revising the utility franchise 
law and establishing a municipal public service commission
*3Bartley to Moore, October 14, 1910, (first quotation); 
Waldo to Moore, April 17, 1911, vol.6, CAP, CA, NOPL.
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to regulate the utilities industry in New Orleans.■•■• Mayor 
Behrman and the council wanted the city government to have 
the authority to set the standards of service and to regu­
late the the cost of service without reference to the pro­
visions of specific franchises. The council urged the legis­
lature to place that authority into the hands of either the 
commission council itself, the Commissioner of Public Util­
ities, or an elected independent commission. Before the 
Behrman administration could articulate these concerns into 
law, however, it had to win the support of its traditional 
adversaries in the press and the civic reform groups and 
overcome the concerted opposition of NORLC and its influen­
tial supporters. The Behrman administration had to convince 
the reformers that it was not in league with NORLC, that it 
was sincere about regulation, and that municipal regulation 
would not further the partisan interests of the administra­
tion or the financial interests of NORLC— a formidable task 
for even the most masterful of politicians and the most re­
sourceful of organizations.
The New Orleans city government, like most others in 
the United States, utilized taxation as one of its principal 
methods of regulating the public utility industry. Critics 
of the administration charged, though, that the mayor, the
‘•'•Moore to Thompson, undated (probably between February
13 and 19, 1916, vol.7, CAP. CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item.
November 11, 12, December 14, 15, 1911,February 22, 1912,
April 8, 17, 18, June 14, 17, 1914; New Orleans Times-Pica­
yune, April 18, 1914.
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council, and Board of assessors allowed NORLC and its sub­
sidiaries to avoid their just share of taxes. Low taxes for 
the utility companies, critics said, would be understandable 
if NORLC reinvested its revenues in improving service, re­
habilitating and expanding the system, and lowering rates. 
NORLC did not use its revenues to improve the quality of 
service, but to satisfy the endless demands for dividends by 
the New York and Philadelphia bankers. For its role in this 
unethical arranagement, critics asserted, the Behrman admin­
istration and the RDO received steady and sizeable contribu­
tions to their campaign chests.49
There was, to be sure, no such arrangement. From 1913 
to 1916, the Behrman administration raised NORLC's assessed 
value from slightly over $17 million to nearly $22 million 
and it increased the company's tax burden from $400,000 a 
year to $780,000, an increase of almost two hundred percent. 
The city administration and the giant utility monopoly quar­
reled continually and publicly over assessment and taxation 
practices, NORLC complaining that it did not receive the 
same favorable treatment accorded other "public utilities" 
and demanding a more favorable, less costly assessment 
policy based on net earnings. The Behrman administration in­
sisted that its assessment and taxation practices were equi­
table and impartial and, though on occasion it adjusted the
49New Orleans Item, April 15, 1915; Nussbaum, "Progres­
sive Politics," 119-20; Williams, "Martin Behrman," passim; 
Reynolds, Machine Politicsr passim.
204
assessed value and the taxes of NORLC, it refused to alter 
its policies and practices to suit the interests of NORLC.
In the spring of 1913, the Board of Assessors for the 
Parish of Orleans set the assessed value of NORLC at nearly 
$23,600,000, an increase of $6,426,000 over 1912. The tax 
resulting from the new assessment was in excess of $400,000. 
The board gave no specific reason for the increase, but the 
increase may have represented NORLC's greater "mortgaging 
power"— a result of its purchase by ACC and UGEC. In any 
event, NORLC protested to the Assessment Revision Committee 
(ARC) of the city council what it considered an exorbitant 
and pernicious tax. A battery of company officials and sev­
eral leading local bankers appeared before the ARC complain­
ing about the size of the increase (wisely, none of these 
men questioned the justice of increasing the tax burden of 
NORLC). The principal spokesmen for this assemblage was 
banker Sol Wexler, the president of the Whitney Central 
Bank. Wexler told the ARC that he and the other bankers 
feared that the increase contemplated by the city would dis­
courage investment in NORLC at a time when it required more 
investment to fund the rehabilitation of the underlying com­
panies. Mayor Behrman, who was not a member of the ARC,
“■"New Orleans Item, April 10-17, 1913, March 16, 23, 25, 
April 1, 7, 8, 9, June 25, July 23, 1914, March 25, 26, 
1915, March 19, 1916; New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 11,
12, 16, 17, 1913, March 17, 24, 26, 1914; New Orleans Times- 
Picavune. April 8, 9, June 23, 27, July 23, 1914; New
Orleans Daily States. March 19, 1916.
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agreed with Wexler, and urged the committee to reduce the 
assessment to a level where NORLC's tax would not exceed 
$400,000.
Despite the apparent influence of the witnesses, the 
ARC, with William Thompson, Harold Newman, and A.G. Ricks as 
its members, remained skeptical and divided. Commissioner of 
Public Finance Ricks and Commissioner of Public Safety New­
man doubted the arguments of Wexler and Mayor Behrman, 
though Commissioner of Public Utilities Thompson found them 
convincing. Ricks and Newman contended that the changing 
character and increasing value of the utilities industry 
justified a substantial increase in the assessment of NORLC. 
The two commissioners argued that NORLC held an actual mo­
nopoly in transit and gas services and a virtual monopoly in 
electricity (the commissioners were aware of the connection 
between Consumer's Electric, NORLC, ACC, and U6EC), and that 
a low assessment was no longer justified in the absence of 
competition. Equity, they argued, played a role in the Board 
of Assessor's decision. Since the consolidation of public 
services, NORLC has sent millions of dollars in revenues to 
stockholders, ignoring the needs of the public for more and 
better service. The increase in taxes, then, represented the 
attempt by the city to recoup some of those revenues, using 
them to extend and improve city services. There was, they
■*7New Orleans Item, April 10, 1913; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. April 11, 12, 17, 1913.
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said, no basis to NORLC's argument that the city had treated 
it unfavorably or that the city's action would dissuade in­
vestors. Commissioner Ricks observed that taxes were usually 
absorbed by customers and never passed on to stockholders. 
What interested stockholders was earning power, and NORLC 
earned between six and eight percent on its investment, a 
percentage that would surely attract investors. Finally, as 
Commissioner Newman pointed out, in the past few years NORLC 
had increased its valuation to $66 million, though its true 
worth was about $46 million. If the Board of Assessors ap­
plied the proper assessment ratio to the true value of 
NORLC, its assessed value would be $27 million instead of 
$23 million.
Unconvinced by the arguments of Ricks and Newman, Com­
missioner Thompson recommended the reassessment of NORLC and 
a corresponding decrease in its taxes. Thompson urged the 
commission council, which had the authority to reduce any 
assessment, to place the assessed value of NORLC at $21 mil­
lion, a decrease from the recoomendation of the Board of As­
sessors, but an increase over 1912 of three and one-half 
million dollars. Mayor Behrman and commissioners Thompson 
and Lafaye convinced Ricks to agree to the Thompson compro­
mise. Though he remained unconvinced, Harold Newman consent­
ed to the will of the majority of the council, stating that
■•■New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 12, 1913; New Orleans 
Item. April 16, 191*3.
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the public and the press favored the compromise and that he 
would not object to it.*"
The next spring, the Board of Assessors again increased 
the assessed value of NORLC to $22 million, requiring the 
company to pay $473,000 in property tax. Again, the manage­
ment of NORLC alledged that the Board of Assessors had 
treated the company unfairly. S. Reading Bertron, a senior 
member of Bertron, Griscom and Jenks, complained that the 
assessors increased the assessment of NORLC by twenty per­
cent, seven times the average increase in assessment. Ber­
tron also asserted that such an increase would impair the 
ability of NORLC to borrow at competitive rates and, of 
course, this failure would impede the development and exten­
sion of public services in New Orleans. Other officers of 
NORLC questioned the legality and method employed by the 
board in determining its rate of assessment. C. K. Beekman 
of NORLC asserted that the Board of Assessors probably did 
not have the legal authority to assess NORLC. That authority 
belonged, he said, to the State Railroad Commission. Bernard 
McCloskey, the general counsel for NORLC and the brother of 
Hugh McCloskey, did not question the authority of the muni­
cipal government to assess the public utilities that served 
the city. He did, though, question the formulas used by the
■"New Orleans Item. April 13, 15-17, 1913; New Orleans 
Daily States. April 16-17, 1913. Newman and the council won 
the universial approval for the compromise from several 
civic associations and from the newspapers.
Board of Assessors. McCloskey remarked that it was the con­
sidered opinion of his firm (McCloskey and Benedict) and 
other attorneys familiar with utility regulation that as­
sessed value should be based on net earnings. NORLC earned 
$887,000 in 1913, and at a six percent rate of return, its 
assessed value should be $14 million. Despite the justice of 
this proposal, McCloskey said, NORLC would not press its 
case in Civil District Court if the council would roll back 
the company's assessed value to the level of 1912 or $17 
million. Unless the council could guarantee a fair and im­
partial assessment, NORLC would pursue its rights in the 
courts.*0
The commission council dismissed the assertions of the 
managers of NORLC as wholly self-serving, designed to intim­
idate the council into reducing the company's tax burden, to 
alter the basis of regulation, and to discredit the Behrman 
administration and the principle of municipal regulation.
The commission council contended that the increase in the 
assessed value of NORLC was fair and completely justified by 
the phenomenal increase in the earnings and bonded debt of 
NORLC over the past year. The Commissioner of Public Safety, 
Harold W. Newman, reported that the net, "undisguised" earn­
ings of NORLC exceeded $1,670,000 (almost twice the amount 
claimed by NORLC), and, with that type of profit, NORLC in-
*°New Orleans Item, March 16, 23, 25, April 1, 7-9, 1914 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. March 17, 24, 26, April 1, 1914; 
New Orleans Times-Picavune, April 8-9, 1914.
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creased its bonded indebtedness another $4,000,000, acquir­
ing still more financial obligations (owed to itself in the 
form of consolidation bonds) and enabling it to misrepresent 
"profit" as fixed charges. With that sort of earning and 
mortgaging power, Newman suggested, NORLC would have no 
difficulty meeting its financial and contractual obligations 
to the city and still return a "substantial” profit to its 
stockholders. There was, then, Newman announced, no truth to 
the warnings that the increase in taxation would result in 
the loss of services or impede the expansion of services.
The warnings had one immediate purpose: to intimidate the 
council into reducing the taxes of NORLC, freeing it to 
transfer earnings from services to dividends.81
The Behrman administration, however, was not easily in­
timidated. It rejected the appeal of NORLC for a reduction 
in its taxes, stating that it would not tolerate the loss or 
curtailing of service or a raise in the cost of service. The 
councilmen understood as well the implications that lay be­
hind the arguments of NORLC. The company's demands for re­
ducing its tax obligations went beyond its immediate concern 
for profit and extended to the issue of public regulation. 
The proposal of Bernard McCloskey sought to tie service to 
the financial conditions of the company, in effect, exempt­
ing NORLC from the obligations of its franchises. If service
81New Orleans Item, April 7-9, 1914; New Orleans Times - 
Picayune. April 8, 9, 1914.
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depended on the earnings of the company, so easily masked 
as financial obligations, then NORLC, not the city govern­
ment, would determine the quality and cost of service. The 
regulation of public services by municipal franchise, then, 
would have no substantive authority or meaning.
The city council, too, wanted to move the idea of muni­
cipal regulation beyond the rigid formulas of franchise and 
tax obligations to include the authority to regulate stock 
issues and to set rates exclusively on the cost of service. 
The concept frightened the management of NORLC (and the 
press), and it sought to discredit the idea of municipal 
regulation by questioning its feasiblity and by impeaching 
the competency of the Behrman administration. The management 
of NORLC wanted to avoid regulation, but it would accept the 
distant and casual regulation of the State Railroad Commis­
sion rather than face the immediate and exacting regulation 
of the commission council. In its opposition to municipal 
regulation, NORLC found willing, though uneasy, allies in 
the newspapers and the business and civic associations of 
New Orleans. Once again, the principal challenge to the 
public authority of the municipal government came from those 
who wanted to prevent the "politicalization" of public pol­
icy and private affairs. Those interests, at times divided 
among themselves, challenged the municipal government over 
the regulation of essential services first in the streets
and then in the legislature and the courts.9a
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In the fall of 1913, the commission council of New 
Orleans, disturbed by the endless complaints from residents 
and merchants over the high cost of public service and em­
barrassed by its inability to manage the public service in­
dustry, instructed Commissioner of Public Property Edward E. 
Lafaye to study the question of the municipal ownership of 
public services.93 After several months of investigation and
92Ibid. NORLC did not appeal the council's decision to 
the Civil District Court. In 1915, the Board of Assessors 
again increased the assessed value of NORLC. The next year, 
though the assessors reduced its assessed value, NORLC paid 
$780,000 in taxes. See New Orleans Item. March 25, 26, 1915, 
March 19, 1916; New Orleans Daily States. March 19, 1916.
93The debate over municipal ownership predated the con­
troversy over NORLC. Beginning in the 1890s, after years of 
neglectful private ownership, the administrations of John 
Fitzpatrick, Walter C. Flower, and Paul Capdevielle munici­
palized the essential services of water, sewerage, and 
drainage. The issue won the support of both the civic elite 
and the broad middle class and united reformers and Regulars 
alike. Despite its virtues and successes, the movement 
toward municipal ownership of public services proved highly 
devisive and only marginally successful. First, there was no 
agreement on what constituted an "essential public service". 
Water and drainage were by definition essential, but not so 
gas and electricity. Mayors Flower and Capdevielle thought 
that gas, electricity, and transit were essential and should 
be owned and managed by the city. They could not construct a 
consensus, however, principally because there was no agree­
ment on how to manage those services. The civic elite wanted 
essential services managed by "nonpolitical" boards staffed 
by members of the commerical establishment. The Regulars 
wanted an elected board staffed by professional, full-time 
commissioners, arguing that an appointed, self-perpetuating 
part-time board was undemocratic and ineffective regulation. 
See Flower to Leonard Darbyshire, October 6, 1897, vol.72; 
LaVillebeuvre to Charles F. Thayer, March 4, 1901, vol.79, 
LaVillebeuvre to Carter Harrison, June 12, 1901, vol.80, 
MCLMO.
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study, Lafaye issued only a preliminary report. The report 
confirmed the earlier findings of the NOERA and the Progres­
sive Union that electric rates were "exceedingly high" and 
needed to be "substantially reduced" if New Orleans was to 
remain competitive with other regional and national cities 
of its size and class and if New Orleans was to improve the 
quality of life for its citizens. The first priority of the 
commission council, he maintained, must be the reduction of 
rates and the extension of service, and he recommended that 
the commission council pursue those ends without direct ref­
erence to its legislative efforts to revise public utility 
laws and practices.94
Lafaye reiterated, however, the urgent need for reform, 
labeling the current laws and practices as inadequate and 
harmful and recommending that the council consider two ave­
nues of reform. Lafaye acknowledged that the municipal 
ownership of electric service was desirable, but he did not 
believe that it was financially and politically feasible.
The cost of purchasing the electrical system was, in his 
estimation, prohibitive, though, he confessed, he had no 
solid estimates of the cost of purchasing the system from 
NORLC. Neither would the city gain anything from reproducing 
the system. The cost of reproduction, though cheaper than 
the cost of purchasing the system from the utility company,
94New Orleans Item, November 4, 1913, April 8, 17, 18,
June 14, 17, 1914; New Orleans Times-Picavune. April 18,
1914.
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was an expensive proposition. It would, as Lafaye correctly 
surmised, take years to fully install the system and reve­
nues may not be sufficient to maintain or expand the 
system. In either instance, Lafaye asserted, there was no 
guarantee that a municipally-owned electric light and power 
system would reduce cost and improve service. The financial 
obligations and risks were too high and the political and 
social benefits too remote to justify an experiment in muni­
cipal ownership. The council, Lafaye concluded, should con­
sider municipalization only as a last resort.aa
The regulation of the utilities industry by an indepen­
dent public commission or by the city council. Commissioner 
Lafaye suggested, had few financial obligations and the po­
litical and social benefits were more immediate. The modern, 
public regulation of the utilities industry would grant the 
public an unprecedented degree of authority and control over 
rates and fares, the quality and extent of service, and the 
public and private concerns of NORLC. The result would be a 
perceptible reduction in costs and a visible improvement in 
services. There were, to be sure, some important reserva­
tions about the character and effectiveness of public regu­
lation; that it would legitimate the fraudulent capitaliza­
tion of the utility companies, permitting the companies to 
determine the content of public utility policy, and that it 
would "politicalize" essential city services, holding those
BSIbid.
services hostage to the interests o£ politicians and other 
special interests. Lafaye did not discount these hazards, 
for they were real political concerns for many people and 
were, in part, responsible for the failure of the adminis­
tration's municipal regulation bill in 1912. He did believe, 
apparently, that those dangers could be avoided or modified 
by selecting the type or form of public regulation that con­
formed to the political needs of the city. He was not able 
to make that recommendation, however, explaining that even 
experts were divided on the issue and that it required addi­
tional study and deliberation by the council. In the mean­
time, he would seek a reduction tion in the rates charged 
for electric service, predicating the renewal of NORLC's 
lighting contract with the city on an agreeable and sub­
stantial reduction in rates for all domestic and commerical 
users.90
There were, of course, both risks and benefits attached 
to Lafaye's report and analysis. The young and able Commis­
sioner of Public Property dismissed the municipal ownership 
of electric service (and by implication gas and transit) 
without adequate study or deliberation. Apparently, he did 
not regard the successes of municipal ownership in Detroit 
and Cleveland as sufficient evidence that it was a practical 
and reasonable alternative to private ownership of the 
utilities industry. For some unexplained reason, Lafaye ig-
SBIbid.
215
nored the varied and notable achievements of the Sewerage 
and Water Board and the Public Belt Railroad, both owned and 
operated by the City of New Orleans and two of the principal 
accomplishments of the Behrman administration. The Sewerage 
and Water Board (S&WB) cost $20,000,000 to complete, oper­
ated on a budget comparable to NORLC, employed hundreds of 
men (NORLC employed close to 4,000 people), and managed to 
maintain and expand the system on rates that Martin Behrman 
and the council reduced several times. Operating under dif­
ferent circumstances and on a much smaller scale, the Public 
Belt Railroad, too, was an example of the benefits of muni­
cipal ownership and of the competency of the Behrman admin- 
isration. It too cost several millions of dollars to com­
plete, and it also provided cheap, efficient service to the 
port and to the railroad lines serving the city.
The Behrman administration was aware, then, of the 
practical and social benefits of municipalization, but it 
was more concerned with the political risks and dangers as­
sociated with the municipalization. Despite all its virtues 
and successes, the movement toward the municipal ownership 
and management of public services proved highly divisive.
The city administration fought openly and constantly with 
the so-called custodians of the municipally owned utilities, 
the Board of Liquidation City Debt and the Public Belt Rail­
road Commission. Though ostensibly committed to the public 
ownership and management of public utilities, these boards
successfully resisted the administration's efforts to bring 
the S&WB and the PBRR under more direct public control. Sev­
eral of the bankers who served on the BLCD also served on 
the board of directors for NORLC, and were opposed to any 
effort to municipalize the public utilities industry in New 
Orleans.97 These men and their compatriots in the business 
exchanges (who controlled the PBRRC) and in the newspapers 
accused the city administration of attempting to "politi­
cize" the utility companies and organized efforts to dis­
parage the ability of the Behrman administration to manage 
gas, electric and transit service. These forces were also 
extremely influential with the state legislature and the 
governor, and they would work tirelessly and endlessly to 
prevent the municipalization of NORLC. The proponents of 
municipalization, on the other hand, were not as influential 
and they too were, for the most part, uncomfortable with the 
prospect of the Behrman administration managing and operat­
ing the public services of New Orleans.
The Behrman administration believed, apparently, that 
municipalization of the public service industry in New Or­
leans was not politically feasible, and instead it advocated
97New Orleans Daily Picayune February 9, 1912; New Or­
leans Times-Picavune. December 13, 1914; New Orleans Itemr 
December 13, 1914. The bankers who sat on both boards were 
John Gannon of the Hibernia National Bank and Trust Company, 
Robert M. Walmsley of the Canal and Louisiana Bank and Trust 
Company, Lynn H. Dinkins of the Interstate Trust and Bank 
Company, and Charles Godchaux of the Whitney Central Bank 
and Trust Company.
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the municipal regulation of the public utility companies in 
New Orleans. There was, however, some uncertainty about the 
the character and effectiveness of municipal regulation. 
There was no guarantee that municipal regulation would in­
vest the commission council or an independent public service 
commission with the requisite authority to compel the pub­
lic utility companies to provide quality service at reason­
able prices. There was the fear that the utility companies 
would dominate, if not "capture," the regulatory process, 
turning regulation to their own advantage. There was, as 
well, considerable apprehension among the opponents and the 
friends (in their case, misapprehension) of municipalization 
about the character and tenor of municipal regulation under 
the Behrman administration. Their common concern was that 
municipal regulation would grant the city administration 
plenary power over the financial arrangements and internal 
management of NORLC, politicizing both vital public services 
and the workers of NORLC.
The Behrman administration was aware of the concerns 
and misapprehensions concerning municipal regulation, and it 
was intent on using the electric rate controversy to dispel 
those concerns and misapprehensions. The rate controversy 
went well beyond the issue of adjusting the rates to suit 
the interests of local merchants and manufacturers and ex­
tended to the issue of public regulation. The controversy 
showed the need for reforming the laws and practices of
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utility "regulation," and it gave the Behrman administration 
the opportunity and latitude to display its competency and 
to create a coalition in support of municipal regulation. 
Regretably, it took nearly two years for the city adminis­
tration to resolve the rate dispute, and it was never able 
to convince critics of the benefits of municipal regulation 
or of its own competency and sincerity.
Four months after his initial and preliminary report on 
electric rates in New Orleans, CPP Lafaye issued another 
tentative "report," recounting the administration's initial 
findings and explaining its position on municipal ownership 
and municipal regulation. The administration dismissed muni­
cipal ownership as impractical and it remained committed to 
the idea of municipal regulation, dispite its failure to 
convince the State General Assembly to enact a municipal 
regulation bill at the recent regular session of the legis- 
ture. Commissioner Lafaye emphasized that the council's 
primary interest remained the reduction of electric rates 
for the commerical and domestic consumer. Apparently, Lafaye 
remarked, NORLC had no intention of discussing a rate reduc­
tion with the city administration. The city administration, 
then, would force the matter by issuing an "ultimatum" (the 
summer of 1914 was rife with ultimatums) to NORLC, demanding 
that the company reduce its rates in compliance with a sche­
dule devised by the city administration. At present, Lafaye 
wrote in his ultimatum, NORLC charged domestic customers
219
fourteen cents per kilowat hour (kwh) during the "primary" 
or initial hour of use, then seven cents per kwh after the 
first hour of use. Commissioner Lafaye directed NORLC to re­
duce its rates over the next three years. Beginning with the 
first of September, 1914, NORLC would charge domestic users 
twelve cents per kwh during the primary hour and six cents 
during additional hours. In September, 1915, the rates would 
become eleven cents and six cents; in 1916, ten cents and 
five cents.*"
Lafaye's report did not attain universal acceptance.
The New Orleans Item complained that the scope of the in­
vestigation was too narrow, confining the city's interests 
only to domestic users and ignoring the blatant discrimina­
tion in rates between commerical and domestic use. The Item 
was also dissatisfied with the rates proposed by Lafaye. The 
revised rates were generous to a fault, allowing NORLC to 
extract immense profits from the city without requiring the 
company to improve and extend services. The Item, however, 
appreciated the complexity of the problem that the Behrman 
administration faced. The city did not have the authority to 
force compliance of the obligations of franchise and it did 
not have the financial resources or legal authority to pur­
chase the company. It would take at least two years for the 
city to acquire the resources and the power to buy NORLC
*"New Orleans Item. July 23, 1914; New Orleans Times-
Picayne. July 24, 1914.
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(the legislature would have to grant the city the authority 
to purchase and operate the public utilities and it met once 
every two years) and it would require several more years to 
make the municipally owned utilities a "going concern". (The 
Itern did not favor purchasing NORLC if it meant placing pub­
lic services under the Behrman administration and it was ad­
amant in its opposition to municipal regulation under the 
incumbent administration.) The city could not afford to com­
pete with NORLC, either. The public utility industry, the 
Item declared, was no longer a competitive industry, but had 
become a "natural monopoly,” immune to the laws of the mar­
ketplace. The city administration, the Item suggested, did 
not have the means, the resources, or the support to compel1 
the utility industry to reduce rates, encourage use, or ex­
tend and improve services."
Two citizens associations, however, believed that the 
city administration possessed the means, the resources, and 
the public support to provide the city with efficient and 
and inexpensive public service and they were not dissuaded 
by fears of politicized public services. The Municipal Im­
provement League (MIL) recommended that the commission coun­
cil sever all relations with NORLC and that the council move 
toward the municipalization of public services in New Or-
"New Orleans Item. July 24, 26, November 10, 18, Decem­
ber 2, 3, 7, 11, 1914. The Item was an inveterate opponent 
of the Behrman administration, and wanted to portray the ad­
ministration as inept and disreputable.
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leans. Until municipalization became a "going concern," the 
MIL suggested that the council construct a municipal power 
plant to furnish cheap electric light and power to the for­
mer customers of NORLC. The New Orleans Public Ownership 
League (NOPOL) was more specific and realistic in its recom­
mendations to the city government. The NOPOL recommended 
that the council model its plan for the municipalization of 
gas, electric, and transit services on the S&WB. The council 
could fund municipal ownership by issuing special municipal­
ization bonds underwritten by gas, electric, and transit 
revenues and by a special dedication from the city’s ali­
mony. A special, independent board, much like the S&WB, 
would manage and operate public services in the city. The 
NOPOL recognized that its plan would take several years to 
complete and that the council would have to develop another 
means of lighting the public streets and buildings. The 
NOPOL recommended that the council offer a short-term con­
tract to any legitimate interest to light public property 
until municipalization was complete.eo
The management of NORLC agreed to consider the rates 
and schedule proposed by Commissioner Lafaye, but it could 
not, it replied, consent to his demands within the deadline 
set by his ultimatum. In truth, NORLC had no intention of 
complying with the councilman's demands. In its estimation,
°°New Orleans Item, July 25, 1914; New Orleans Times-
Picavune. July 24, 25, 1914.
neither the Commissioner of Public Property nor the commis­
sion council itself possessed the authority to determine the 
cost and quality of electric service for private domestic 
(or commerical) use, and it rejected the council's demands 
and refused to discuss the issue with the council.sx The 
commission council, however, had no intention of allowing 
the company to dictate the terms and conditions of service. 
The council authorized Commissioner Lafaye to broaden and 
intensify his investigation and to reconsider the feasibil­
ity and practicality of municipalization. Commissioner 
Lafaye, Mayor Behrman, and a select committee of local civic 
and business leaders met for nearly one year, interviewing 
utility experts (among them Samuel Insull), private citi­
zens, and local civic associations and deliberating on the 
volumes of testimony and recommendations. The committee even 
heard the recommendations from NORLC, which twice offered to 
"lower" rates to levels approximating those offered by Com­
missioner Lafaye earlier in the year. The committee reviewed 
the offers suggested by NORLC, but remained skeptical about 
the sincereity and effect of those offers. The committee 
remarked that it would be more impressed by evidence docu­
menting the claims of NORLC than by criticisms that lower 
rates were unfair to investment and would not promote the 
expansion and improvement of services."2
B1New Orleans Item, July 25, August 4, 1914.
6SNew Orleans Item. August 4, November 22-25, 1914.
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The select committee ended its investigation and delib­
erations early in June, 1915, but waited until July to make 
its findings and recommendations public. The committee per­
mitted NORLC to preview its findings and recommendations, 
offering the company the opportunity to accept the findings 
of the committee or to submit "facts and figures" that might 
persuade the committee to revise its recommendations. NORLC 
countered not with "facts and figures" but with offers to 
lower its rates. The committee rejected the counteroffers as 
"absurd," revealing that NORLC*s proposed rates would result 
in an increase in the monthly bills of most customers. Sat­
isfied that it had afforded NORLC every consideration, the 
Lafaye committee released its findings and issued another, 
though more considered, ultimatum.®3
In some ways the report was incomplete and disappoint­
ing, making virtually no reference to the dilapidated physi­
cal and financial conditions of NORLC. (Apparently, the 
council believed that such a study was beyond the competence 
of the committee, for the council commissioned utility ex­
pert Frederick W. Ballard to conduct such a survey early in 
1915.) The electric and gas plants were antiquated and obso­
lete, designed to service a limited number of customers and 
incapable of meeting the increasing demands more efficient 
and effective electric and gas service. The limited capacity
“ New Orleans Item, July 13, 14, 27, 1915; New Orleans, 
Times-Picayune. July 14, 28, 1915.
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of the electric and gas plants and the insatiable demand for 
dividends allowed the owners and mangement of NORLC to ex­
ploit the needs of its relatively few customers, effectively 
denying service to residents of moderate and low incomes and 
retarding the further development of New Orleans. The com­
pany lacked the resolve and the resources to modernize its 
phyiscal plant; the expanding demand for service and new 
technologies that made wider service possible were unwel­
comed developments that threatened the profit of NORLC.66
In another sense, however, the Lafaye report was a 
blistering indictment of the practices of NORLC. The commit­
tee concluded (to the surprise of no one) that electric 
light and power rates were "too high" and the quality of 
service was inadequate. The commission council, the commit­
tee reported, could no longer allow rates to be tied to the 
demands of investment; instead, rates must depend on the 
cost or "value" of service. Rates based on the cost of ser­
vice would permit for the expansion of services and the im­
provement in the quality of life in New Orleans.69 The coun­
cil could not, however, assure the expansion of services 
without the cooperation of NORLC. The company, despite the 
enormous benefits and profits it had extracted from the 
city, showed virtually no consideration for the citizens of
" N e w  Orleans Item. July 14, 15, 25, 27, August 20, Sep­
tember 12, 13, 1915; New Orleans Times-Picavune. July 14, 
1915.
"N e w  Orleans Item. July 13, 14, 27, 28, 30, August 20,
1915; New Orleans Times-Picavune. July 14, 31, 1915.
225
New Orleans. It flaunted its disregard for the people of New 
Orleans and ignored the legitimate authority of the commis­
sion council. Despite the discourtesies NORLC showed to the 
council and the committee, the select committee accorded the 
company every opportunity to influence its recommendations. 
Instead, NORLC responded with accusations disparaging the 
intentions and character of the committee and its investiga­
tion. The findings and recommendations of the committee, the 
report stated, though not without provocation, were offered 
without malice or prejudice.®®
Those recommendations may have been made without malice 
or bias, but they were more damaging to NORLC than the 
recommendations made by Lafaye in July of 1914. The Lafaye 
committee recommended, of course, that the council not re­
new the city's lighting contract with NORLC unless the com­
pany agreed to reduce the rates it charged the city for 
lighting public streets and buildings and unless the company 
reduced the rates for domestic service. The committee also 
recommended that the council extend the same conditions to 
commerical customers of NORLC and Consumers' Electric Com­
pany, though it did not recommend that the council end the 
discrimination between commercial and domestic rates. The 
select commmittee recommended that the council set domestic 
rates at twelve cents per kwh for primary use and six cent
®®New Orleans Item, July 13, 14, 1915; New Orleans Times- 
Picayuner July 14, 1915.
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per kwh for secondary use for 1915-1916, gradually reducing 
rates to seven cents and four cents by 1917-1918. The com­
mittee urged the council to end all discussions with NORLC, 
giving the company only two weeks to comply with its recom­
mendations. If NORLC failed to comply with every provision 
of the report, the committee recommended that the council 
arrange for alternate sources of electric power, either by 
constructing its own plant or by granting a short-term fran­
chise, and that it begin preparations for the municipaliza­
tion of NORLC. The council adopted the report without dis­
sension .'7
Criticism of the Lafaye report, however, was more ex­
tensive. The Item praised the committee for its efforts, but 
ridiculed its proposals for rates and service as regressive. 
The present system of primary and secondary service, the 
Item remarked, which the committee did not address, was 
nearly indecipherable and clearly unfair to domestic and 
small commercial customers. Though the committee correctly 
understood the connection between rates and consumption, the 
rates it proposed would not stimulate consumption or expand 
services. The rates recommended by the Lafaye committee, the 
Item argued, would not invite investment and would not in­
duce NORLC to compromise with the council. The Item recom­
mended that the council apply a "cost-of-service" formula
aTNew Orleans Item, July 14-19, 1915; New Orleans Times- 
Picayune, July 14, 1915.
for determining rates of service. The plan added a specific 
rate of return— in this case, six percent— to the cost of 
service, permitting the company to lower cost and expand 
services while guaranteeing investors a fair profit.Ba
The president of the MIL, Dr. Valentine K. Irion, ac­
knowledged that the Lafaye report was "an important docu­
ment, " but, he argued, the committee temporized on the issue 
of rates and failed to address several essential issues. The 
rates offered to NORLC under the Lafaye report were one hun­
dred percent higher than the rates assessed by Cleveland's 
municipally owned electric light and power company. Cleve­
land did not have a primary and secondary system (such a 
plan, Irion said, had "no foundation in reason or common 
sense") and it did not discriminate between domestic and 
commerical use, and the city furnished cheap, efficient 
electric service. The committee concentrated too much, he 
said, on the rate issue, virtually ignoring the deficien­
cies in service and the willful disregard for the obliga­
tions of franchise. But, most important of all, the Lafaye 
committee ignored the need for a vigorous, independent, pub­
lic service commission. Without the authority to fix rates, 
to set the standards of service, or control the financial 
and corporate arrangements of NORLC, the municipal govern­
ment would never be able to determine the character and de-
°°New Orleans Item. July 16, 19, 23, 1915.
velopment of public services in New Orleans.09
Daniel D. Curran, the president of NORLC, declined to 
comment on the content of the report until attorneys for 
the company and its board of directors had the opportunity 
to review the proposals and demands of the Lafaye committee. 
Curran, who had become president of NORLC in February, 1915, 
assured the committee that NORLC would comply with the rec­
ommendations of the committee, but only if they were consis­
tent with the interests of the ownership and management of 
NORLC. For the next several days, the boards of directors 
for NORLC, ACC, and UGEC met with the chief executives of 
the Whitney Central and the Hibernia National banks to dis­
cuss the Lafaye report. The directors and the bankers pro­
mised to give the report thorough consideration. They were, 
they said, anxious to do the "right thing by all concerned," 
particularly to its investors and employees.70
Near the end of July, three days before the deadline 
set by the Lafaye committee, Daniel Curran wrote to Commis-
H9New Orleans Item, July 16, 25, November 13, 1915.
7°New Orleans Item. July 13-16, 19, 21-24, 1915; New 
Orleans Times-Picavuner July 14, 16, 21-24, 1915. Curran 
was born in Ireland in 1855, coming to the United States 
a few years later. In 1893, after eleven years with several 
steam railroad companies, Curran became the Superintendant 
of the New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad. Curran's 
success in the business world (he lived on Audubon Place, an 
exclusive and private street in Uptown New Orleans) spilled 
over to the social world as well. Within a few years of his 
arrival in New Orleans, Curran joined the Boston and Pick­
wick clubs, the two most exclusive clubs in New Orleans. For 
biographical information on Curran, see. New Orleans Item. 
December 12-16, 1914, January 9, 1915.
sioner Lafaye informing him of the "unanimous" decision of 
the boards of directors. Curran wrote that the directors of 
NORLC, ACC, and UGEC were mindful that "the best interest of 
New Orleans and the best interest of the company are identi­
cal; that prosperity of one spells the prosperity of the 
other," but, he continued, "that which unjustly cripples or 
injures either has its reflex in a like loss and detriment 
to the other." Mindful of its obligations to its employees, 
its investors, and, ultimately, to its patrons, the manage­
ment of NORLC had no other choice but to reject the schedule 
of rates proposed by the select committee. Those rates were 
unfair to "all concerned" and would never result in the ex­
pansion or improvement of services. However, Curran contin­
ued, the management of NORLC and the board of directors of 
parent companies recognized the need for a "material" reduc­
tion in rates that would satisfy the needs of the city and 
the demands of investment. Beginning with the first day of 
September, Curran announced, NORLC would inaugurate a new, 
flat rate schedule of nine cents per kwh for domestic cus­
tomers and a primary and secondary scale of nine cents and 
six cents for commerical users.71
Commissioner Lafaye responded with another scalding 
arraignment of the management of NORLC. The Commissioner of 
Public Property labeled Curran's offer "unacceptable" in
71New Orleans Item, July 25, 26, 1915; New Orleans Times-
Picavune. July 27, 1915.
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every aspect. The "decrease* generously offered by NORLC 
would result in a twenty-five to thirty percent increase in 
the cost of electric service in New Orleans. Undoubtedly, 
that increase would not rehabilitate or expand the present 
electric plant, but would be returned to the investors (ACC 
and U6EC) as dividends. Curran's proposal, Lafaye declared, 
was an admission that present rates were too high, that the 
company could still prosper at reduced rates, and that a re­
duction in rates would not result in the loss of service. 
Lafaye suspected, then, that NORLC could expand service and 
return a substantial profit to investors on rates below 
those suggested by the citizens committee.'72
Curran's proposal admitted to more than just excessive 
electric light and power rates. It was. Commissioner Lafaye 
said, an admission of the company's disregard for the legal 
and political authority of the municipal government and of 
its indifference to progress and reform. From the start of 
the investigation, the council and the select committee ex­
hausted themselves in studying every piece of available in­
formation, consulted noted authorities on utilities and 
utility regulation, and reviewed the latest and most pro­
gressive literature on regulation. The city and its citizens 
conducted this investigation with circumspection and at 
great expense to public and private resources. NORLC, on the
‘72New Orleans Item. July 19, 26, 27, 1915; New Orleans
Times-Picavune. July 27, 28, 1915.
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other hand, offered no data or expert commentary, resorting 
only to assertions that the city government is "unfair to 
capital" and incompetent to manage public services.73
The city government, Lafaye insisted, possessed the 
legal and political power to determine rates and it was com­
petent to operate or regulate public services. The municipal 
government, however, had to seek additional authority and 
powers to revise the methods of regulation and to diminish 
or remove the authority of NORLC over the public services of 
New Orleans.7* Lafaye recommended two plausible alterna­
tives. The council could obtain the constitutional authority 
to build and operate a municipal electric light and power 
plant (Lafaye still believed that the municipalization of 
the entire public service system was beyond the financial 
capabilities of the city), funding construction and mainte­
nance of the plant through taxation and revenues and manag­
ing the system through an independent board. If municipali­
zation was not practical, then, Lafaye suggested that the 
council grant a short-term franchise drawn to met the coun­
cil's specifications. Those specifications should include 
the authority to determine rates on the basis of the cost of 
service, the right of purchase at "fair value," and the 
right of council members to sit as voting members of the
7 3 Ibid..
7«Ibid.
232
company's board of directors.78
Lafaye*s remarks and recommendations frightened the 
owners of NORLC and the newspapermen of New Orleans, parti­
cularly Norman Walker of the Times-Picavune and Item.'s 
James Mcllhaney Thomson. Within a few days of Lafaye's pro­
nouncements, James S. Pevear, a senior executive with UGEC 
and a former president of NORLC, arrived in New Orleans and 
held a series of lenghty discussions with Curran and the 
board of directors for NORLC and ACC. Pevear and two local 
bank executives, John D. O'Keefe of the Whitney Central Bank 
and Trust and Rudolph S. Hecht of the Hibernia National 
Bank, were concerned about the municipalization movement in 
New Orleans. They understood that municipalization had the 
qualified support of Mayor Behrman and at least two other 
councilroen. They counseled Curran and his board of directors 
to accept the contours of Lafaye's plan before the council 
formally committed itself to municipalizing the electric 
system. Norman Walker opposed municipalization because he 
believed that the city could ill-afford a costly and unsuc­
cessful experiment in the municipalization of public ser­
vices. James Thomson of the Item, on the other hand, had be­
come an advocate of municipalization, but he remained an un­
reconstructed opponent of the Behrman administration. James 
Thomson was not concerned that the municipalization of pub-
■^New Orleans Item, July 22, 27, 28, 30, August 20, 1915
New Orleans Times-Picayuner July 27,28, 31, 1915.
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lie services under Mayor Behrman and the Regular Democrats 
would fail, but rather that it would succeed, strengthening 
the political standing and credibility of "ring rule". He, 
too, urged Curran and the other members of the board of 
directors to accept the conditions proposed by Lafaye in 
July, eliminating the possibility of a "politicized" elec­
tric light and power system.7®
Despite the entreaties of the business community and 
the editorial support for compliance, Daniel Curran and the 
board of directors for NORLC refused to accept the condi­
tions of the Lafaye report. Instead, Curran and the board 
instructed the management of NORLC to conduct an "analytical 
study" of the effects of Lafaye's proposals on NORLC. The 
study, completed in less than a week, confirmed the initial 
impressions of management that the recommended schedule of 
rates was "utterly impractical" and, in fact, harmful to the
ys
company and to the city. The study "proved" that the rates 
proposed by the select committee would reduce revenues by 
nearly $500,000, leaving a balance, after taxes, deprecia­
tion and replacement of equipment, and improvements, of only 
$170,900, a rate of return of less than three percent. The 
report insisted that NORLC could not survive under such 
terms, and it recommended rejecting the rates offered by the 
select committee.77
7®Ibid.
77New Orleans Item, August 10, 11, 13, 25, 1915; New 
Orleans Times-Picavune. August 10, 12, 1915.
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The study asserted that the company could operate ef­
fectively and still meet it financial obligations with 
slightly lower rates, provided there was a corresponding re­
duction in taxes and other financial obligations required 
under the franchise. The report proposed that the city renew 
its contract with the company for ten years at rates of 
seven and four cents per kwh. It also suggested that domes­
tic and commercial customers pay nine cents and six cents 
per kwh for the next sixteen months, when NORLC would reduce 
its rates to eight cents and five cents for primary and sec­
ondary service. President Curran, in a letter to the commis­
sion council, insisted that the rate schedule proposed by 
the company study was "substantially lower than that exist­
ing in most (other) cities," and that it was "an unusually 
low rate for the city of New Orleans, in view of the low per 
capita and customer consumption, and the great area which 
the distribution system covers, by reason of New Orleans 
having such large corporate limits." Curran insisted that 
the company could not manage its affairs or meet its obliga­
tions under lower rates, and, he predicted, he could not 
foresee the time when rates could be any lower, for the fac­
tors that determined the rate of service were "too numerous 
and separately too uncertain" for a prudent businessmen or 
a conscientious public offical to anticipate or manage.ya
78Hew Orleans Item. August 10, 11, 13, 25, 1915; New
Orleans Times-Picavune. August 10, 12, 1915.
Edward E. Lafaye, however, believed that NORLC could 
manage its business affairs with lower rates and that pru­
dent and competent men could plan and manage the course of 
public policy. The Commissioner of Public Property dismissed 
the NORLC proposal as self-serving and unacceptable. Lafaye 
announced that the commission council had anticipated the 
response of NORLC and had already begun preparations for 
municipalizing NORLC and for securing interim sources of 
electric power.
The newspapers and the business establishment pressured 
Curran and the other managers of NORLC to settle with the 
city. Without public support for its initial proposal, NORLC 
agreed to "compromise1* with the Behrman administration. The 
company agreed to submit to the administration's demands for 
"unlimited and unrestricted" access to the company books, 
which city officials believed was an acknowledgment of the 
city's authority to regulate rates and service. NORLC also 
agreed to replace the outdated public street lighting sys­
tem, which the city agreed to purchase after ten years of 
service at a cost of $350,000. NORLC proposed that domestic 
customers pay either a flat rate or a sliding rate scale 
based on the cost of service plus a "fair rate of return". 
Commerical users would pay six cents and three cents for
79New Orleans Item, August 11, 1915; New Orleans Times- 
Picayuner August 12, 14, 1915. The council commissioned 
Frederick Ballard to determine the cost of municipalization.
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primary and secondary service, but would not, like resi­
dential customers, pay a twenty-five cent charge each month 
for the privilege of service.**0
Commissioner Lafaye endorsed the concepts behind the 
latest proposal, calling them a "radical change" from other 
proposals offered by NORLC. Mayor Behrman and the council 
agreed, and instructed Lafaye and his staff of utility ex­
perts to review the proposals and to formulate the council's 
response. Lafaye and his experts recommended that the coun­
cil accept the proposals of NORLC on a tentative basis until 
the administration and NORLC arrived at a permanent agree­
ment. Under the tentative arrangement, NORLC would charge 
domestic users seven cents for the first twenty kwh of ser­
vice every month, six cents for 21 to 50 kwh, five cents for 
51-200 kwh, and four cents for all service over 200 kwh. 
Commissioner Lafaye recommended the same formula for large 
and small commerical customers. The formulas and rates pro­
posed by the municipal government would, Lafaye contended, 
lower cost for every customer and relieve residential and 
small commerical users of the major portion of the cost of 
service. Lower rates, he promised, would enable NORLC to ex­
pand and improve service, and he urged the company to accede
°°New Orleans Item, August 26-28, September 8, 13, 26, 
29, 1915; New Orleans Times-Picavune. August 28, 1915. The 
city would pay only three-and-one-half cents per kwh.
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to the panel's recommendations.BX
One peculiar item, though, bothered the panel of ex­
perts. NORLC recommended eliminating the minimum service 
charge (fifty cents per month) in favor of a service charge 
of twenty-five cents a month. The panel feared that the ser­
vice charge would violate state law against overcharging. It 
recommended, then, that the council include both fees in the 
ordinance, requiring NORLC to test the legitimacy of its re­
quest in the courts. The council consented to all other rec­
ommendations of the panel as well, and passed the Lafaye 
lighting ordinance in December, 1915.82
The outcome of the electric rate controversy left the 
city and the Behrman administration in a confident and eu­
phoric mood (Behrman and his commission council were return­
ed office without opposition and it was the last summer of 
peace in America). Journalist Ethel Hutson, writing in the 
National Municipal Review, characterized the outcome of the 
electric rate issue as "a complete victory" for the city and 
the Behrman administration, producing things of "lasting im­
portance". The Behrman administration had cut the excessive 
and regressive rates, making it possible for many more
BXNew Orleans Item. September 26, 29, 1915, October 25- 
27, 1915. NORLC agreed to the rates, believing that the 
guarantee of a service charge would offset lower rates.
82New Orleans Item. December 14, 1915; New Orleans Times- 
Picavune f December 15, 1915; Ethel Hutson, "New Orleans 
Lighting Victory," National Municipal Review. V (January 
1916), 105-07; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Boss,"
79. Act 297, Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the 
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1910.
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residents to enjoy and benefit from electric ligting and 
power. The administration acquired the ownership rights to 
the public lighting system, giving the city a vested inter­
est in the expansion of service and in the safety and wel­
fare of its residents. In addition to those impressive and 
permanent achievements, the Behrman administration accom­
plished two other things of major significance. The commis­
sion council showed that it appreciated the public needs and 
that it could act without regard or reference to partisan 
advantage. Its actions were at all times disciplined and 
prudent, displaying the competence to govern and restoring 
the public trust in government. The administration also dis­
played a mastery over NORLC, compelling the company to lower 
rates, expand and improve services, and submit to "regula­
tion" .83
The two Lafaye ordinances were not, despite Hutson's 
journalistic hyperbole, complete victories for the city and 
they did not accomplish things of "lasting importance". In 
comparison to the rates charged in other cities, rates in 
New Orleans after the enactment of the Lafaye ordinances re­
mained high. The demand for electric service increased 
steadily with the expansion of the size and population of 
New Orleans, but service remained insufficient. The commis­
a:!,Hutson, "New Orleans Electric Lighting Victory," 105- 
07. Though the voters returned Martin Behrman and his coun­
cil to office in 1916, William Thompson did not seek re- 
election .
239
sion council's "mastery" over NORLC extended only to the 
issue of electric rates, and even there the council's abil­
ity to affect rates and service depended on factors 'too nu­
merous and separately too uncertain' for prudent and con­
scientious public officials to anticipate or control. The 
Behrman administration, as Lafaye pointed out, recognized 
that the regulation of the public utilities industry could 
not depend solely on the good faith of NORLC. The municipal 
government needed the legal authority to regulate every as­
pect of the public service industry.
The commission council also realized that, despite its 
prudent behavior and undeniable success in resolving the 
electric light controversy, it did not enjoy the full confi­
dence of several influential segments of the public. Munici­
palization of the public utilities would not generate confi­
dence in the Behrman administration, but only fears and 
accusations of the "politicization" of vital city services 
(James Mcllhaney Thomson was more concerned that municipal 
ownership would succeed, not fail). The logical and practi­
cal response to these needs and fears, of course, was the 
creation of a municipal public service commission. But, as 
we shall see, the same interests and fears that prevented 
the municipalization of NORLC emasculated municipal regula­
tion. And, aided by the effects of the Great War, those same 
interests and fears demoralized and nearly bankrupted muni­
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cipal reform in New Orleans.0*
"•Hutson, "New Orleans Lighting Victory," 105-07.
Chapter Five
War and Reform
The regulation of the public utilities industry, wrote 
the editor of the New Orleans Item near the end of the elec­
tric rate controversy, was a simple matter of business.
After all, the newspaper wrote, no one of any civic or 
political consequence was disturbed that local businessmen 
and bankers had lost control of the public service companies 
and that ownership and management had passed to northern in­
vestment institutions and utility holding companies. Those 
issues were of no lasting importance to the "intelligent" 
and dispassionate citizens of New Orleans. All that the 
people of the city demanded was quality service at reason­
able rates and fares and the guarantee that the company re­
invest a "fair" portion of its earnings back in the city in 
the extension and modernization of services and the retire­
ment of debt.3-
Ordinarily, the Item wrote, the independent and compe­
titive structure of the American business system would 
assure the people of efficient and effective service at 
reasonable cost. But the public service corporations were 
not ordinary companies. The public utility companies that 
served New Orleans were, as in other American cities,
xNew Orleans Itemr December 13, 16, 1914.
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"natural monopolies," completely indispensable to the 
public and private lives of the people of New Orleans, 
unaffected by the restraints of the marketplace, and, for 
all intents and purposes, governed by public ordinance.
There was, the Item remarked, no intrinsic danger to the 
social and political integrity of New Orleans from a corpo­
rate structure of interlocking directorates and giant hold­
ing companies. The only true danger to the integrity of New 
Orleans came from the "unnatural" and corrupt relationship 
between the utility companies and the municipal government. 
The only way to break that alliance was to remove the 
utility industry from municipal politics. The disinterested 
regulation of the public utility industry by an independent, 
nonpartisan commission would eliminate the financial and 
corporate abuses associated with a politicized public mono­
poly like NORLC.2
The regulation of the public service industry was not, 
as the New Orleans Item asserted, a simple matter of busi­
ness, but a matter of an inherent political significance—  
and a matter of considerable political debate. The utility 
companies were to a large extent "public corporations". 
Municipal and state ordinance defined the right and manner 
by which these companies did business, and every aspect of
2Ibid. In its editorials, the Item blamed the Behrman 
administration, not NORLC, for the corrupt utility problem 
in New Orleans. For a different view, see McCormick, "The 
Discovery that Business Corrupts Politics," passim.
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the industry affected the public interest. Regulation, then, 
served a public, as well as a private, interest. Regulation 
promised to maintain private control and management of the 
utilities industry while permitting greater public direction 
over the development and distribution of public services.3
"As in so many other aspects of American politics," 
writes Thomas K. McCraw, the foremost student of regulation 
in America, "the fundamental controversy underlying the his­
tory of regulation has been an ongoing need to work out the 
inevitable tradeoffs between the good of the whole society, 
on one hand, and the rights of the individual, on the 
other." In political terms, McCraw writes, "regulation is 
best understood as a political settlement, undertaken in an 
effort to keep peace within the polity." The politics of 
regulation, however, was anything but peaceful. The advo­
cates of regulation were deeply divided over the best means 
of regulation. Many students of regulation favored state 
regulation, arguing, as did the Item, that the state govern­
ment was better equipped to regulate the public service in­
dustry because it had greater authority and resources, was 
more disinterested, and was less political. An equal number 
of "utility experts" endorsed municipal regulation, claiming
3Thomas K. McCraw, The Profits of Regulation Charles 
Francis Adams. Louis D. Brandeis. James M. Landis. Alfred E. 
Kahn, (Cambridge, 1984), 301-02; McCraw, "Regulation in 
America: A Review Article," Business History Review. 49 
(Summer 1975), 158-83; McCormick, "The Discovery that Busi­
ness Corrupts Politics," 271.
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that municipal regulation was more direct and democratic 
than state regulation.4
Proponents of state regulation acknowledged that cities 
had a perfect right and obligation to regulate those utili­
ties that were wholly local. Few public utilities, however, 
these experts argued, were purely local. Public service was 
rarely confined to the corporate limits of the cities and 
generally extended into other governmental jurisdictions.
The business and corporate realities of the utilities indus­
try also extended beyond the authority and ability of the 
municipal government to manage effectively. Municipal regu­
lation would impose a financial hardship on the city govern­
ment, as well. Many cities, like New Orleans, were already 
overwhelmed by debt and could not afford the money to employ 
the battery of attorneys, accountants, utility experts, and 
support staff necessary for a permanent, effective, and in­
corruptible public service commission.9
The municipal regulation of public utilities, critics 
alleged, would, as well, threaten the stability of the pub-
4McCraw, Prophets of Regulation. 302; McCormick, "The 
Discovery that Business Corrupts Politics," 258-59; Delos F. 
Wilcox, "Supplement to the National Municipal Review: A Cor­
rect Public Policy Toward the Street Railway Problem," NMR.
9 (April 1920), 253; Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts," 
221.
9John Morton Eshleman, "State vs. Municipal Regulations 
of Public Utilities," NMR. 2 (January 1913), 15-16; Wilcox, 
"Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Franchises," NMR. 3 
(January 1914), 13-16; J. Allen Smith, "Municipal vs. State 
Control of Public Utilities," ibid., 42-43; Nord, "The Ex­
perts versus the Experts," 228-29.
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lie utility companies and compromise the integrity of the 
municipal reform movement. Municipal regulation, opponents 
asserted, was inherently corrupt and politically dangerous. 
Political considerations and public sentiments too often 
controlled the policies and actions of the municipal govern­
ments, making it more politically expedient to lower rates 
than to protect and encourage investment. Municipal regula­
tion, then, would compel investors and management to exert 
every available force, including bribery and crude political 
manipulation, to protect their interests and goals.*9
Beyond those rudimentary fears, proponents of state 
regulation argued, the investors and management of public 
utility companies saw municipal regulation as the prelude to 
municipal ownership and the unjust confiscation of private 
property. Regulation, these experts contended, was simply an 
imperative of technology and a response to the innovations 
of business and finance. It was never intended, they said, 
as a means of advancing reforms aimed at redistributing the 
social and political wealth and power of the community. And, 
critics said, municipal regulation would actually undermine 
democractic reform in the cities. It concentrated an unjus­
tified expression of power in the hands of public officials 
incapable of properly regulating the interests of investors.
“Smith, "Municipal vs. State Control of Public Utili­
ties," 34-35; Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts," 221- 
23, 228-29.
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management, and citizens.*7
State regulation of the public utilities industry, on 
the other hand, had none of the liabilities of municipal 
regulation. State jurisdiction and authority extended beyond 
the city limits, preventing the public utility companies 
from escaping "meaningful" regulation because they did busi­
ness in more than one county or parish. The state govern­
ment, admittedly, had more financial and administrative re­
sources at its disposal than the municipal governments, and 
state regulation would relieve the cities of the tremendous 
financial obligation of regulation. Moreover, state regula­
tion would remove the public service companies from munici­
pal politics. Placing regulation in the hands of an indepen­
dent, nonpolitical board of experts would preserve the sta­
bility and solvency of the utility companies and guarantee 
the integrity of the municipal reform movement."
The advocates of municipal regulation acknowledged that 
the modern public service industry was no longer a simple 
enterprise controlled by local management and funded by 
local bankers and businessmen for the benefit and enrichment 
of the municipal community. Regional and national financial 
institutions, like American Cities Company and United Gas 
and Electric Corporation, now controlled and managed the 
municipal service companies for their own interest and pro­
*7Ibid.
"Ibid.
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fit. The influence and resources of these national utility 
corporations far exceeded those of any municipal government, 
making regulation more difficult, but all the more essential 
for the millions of urban and suburban residents.9
Despite the realities of the new corporate power and 
chronic disabilities of municipal government, the proponents 
of municipal regulation were unmoved by the arguments of 
state regulation. The structure and management of the public 
utility corporation had changed over the past ten to fifteen 
years, but, argued municipal regulation advocates, the ser­
vices furnished by the utility company remained urban and 
local, and the company remained dependent on local ordinance 
and revenues for its existence and well-being. In the modern 
city, where utilities are "absolute necessities," touching 
on every facet of urban life, the people of the city must 
retain the authority to determine the character and quality 
of service and possess the right and authority to contract 
for service. If the people of the city were to retain that 
right and authority, regulatory authority should not be 
shifted to a "distant authority not politically responsible 
to the people of [the] city and not thoroughly acquainted, 
by residence in the city, with local conditions and 
needs. "xo
"Wilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Fran­
chises," 13-16; Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts," 224- 
225.
x°Wilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Fran- 
chies," 16-17.
It would be a mistake, as well, to assume that the 
municipal governments were incapable of sustaining effective 
regulation. Many cities, like New Orleans, possessed a 
powerful and highly developed city government with suffi­
cient authority and resources to manage the public service 
industry and to direct it along "rational and progressive 
lines". In those cities with an active and progressive 
government and population, it was unlikely that the public 
service companies and their allies in banking and business 
would dictate public utility policy. Municipal regulation 
did not threaten the financial stability of the public ser­
vice industry or the political integrity of the municipal 
reform movement. In fact, state regulation, critics claimed, 
seemed the greater threat to private interests and the pub­
lic welfare. State regulation, its critics alleged, tended 
to ignore the interests of minority stockholders, the de­
mands of labor, and the needs of consumers. State regula­
tion, especially in the form of an independent, "nonpoliti­
cal" board, opponents asserted, was a move toward "unneces­
sary" centralization of authority, menacing the integrity of 
municipal government and the democratic process.xx
For the advocates of municipal regulation, then, the
xxWilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Fran­
chises, 13-16; Smith, "Municipal vs. State Control of Public 
Utilities," 42-43; Eshleman, "State vs. Municipal Regulation 
of Public Utilities," 15-19; Lewis R. Works, "State vs. Mu­
nicipal Regulation of Public Utilities," NMR. 2 (January 
1913), 24-30; Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts," 221- 
233.
regulation of public utilities was more than just a simple 
matter of "private" business or the bureaucratic response 
to advancements in technology and business administration. 
Nor was it a simple matter of removing the public service 
companies from the control of municipal governments. Rather, 
the proponents of municipal regulation tended to see regula­
tion in political and sociological terms. {Few serious advo­
cates of state regulation considered regulation in simple 
terms, devoid of social and political consequences. The 
local press and other popularizers of the regulation issue 
simplified, in some cases bastardized, the social and 
political complexity of regulation for popular consumption.) 
Local regulation, these advocates believed, was more repre­
sentative of the social needs of the people, assured greater 
accountability from the public and private administration of 
the utilities industry, and furthered the aspirations of mu­
nicipal home-rule government. It promoted the "active and 
intelligent" interest of the voters and it reaffirmed the 
relevancy and expediency of democratic ideals in the modern, 
corporate world.x*
In New Orleans, however, politics was never academic or 
simple. Though the advocates of state regulation spoke in 
terms resonating the arguments of the experts, their princi­
pal concern was the political consequences of municipal reg­
ulation. They believed that state regulation, despite its
x*Ibid.
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apparent weaknesses and failings in other settings, was pre­
ferable to municipal regulation, no matter what its virtues, 
under the Behrxnan administration. They feared above all the 
"politicalization" of public services and the public utility 
company, which they saw as a menace to the interests of the 
"active and intelligent" citizens of New Orleans and to 
their idea of democratic municipal reform.
The Behrman administration, too, was concerned with the 
political consequences and implications of regulation. In 
its view, state regulation was wholly inadequate to the pub­
lic service needs of the city and detrimental to its politi­
cal independence. State regulation clearly favored the in­
terests of NORLC, placing it beyond the reach of the elected 
municipal officials of New Orleans and isolating it from the 
concerns and needs of the ordinary citizen and customer. 
State regulation, especially under an appointed, "indepen­
dent" commission, would allow "private" business and social 
interests— the BLCD, the Association of Commerce, the busi­
ness exchanges, and, of course, NORLC— to determine the pub­
lic utility policy of New Orleans, contrary to the mandate 
the voters gave Martin Behrman in 1912.
The Behrman administration was also aware of the severe 
limitations of its mandate. Despite years of political agi­
tation against it, NORLC had managed to avoid any signifi­
cant degree of regulation. The commission council still did 
not possess the authority to regulate the external and in­
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ternal affairs of that "public" corporation. The council 
could not set fares and rates or determine the standards of 
service except through a series of binding (except, it seem­
ed, on NORLC) and regressive franchise ordinances. More im­
portantly, the city administration did not have the confi- 
fidence of a large portion of the so-called commerical and 
civic elite. Indeed, as we have seen already in a number of 
public debates (the Favrot commission council charter, the 
Public Belt Railroad Commission, and the Sewerage and Water 
Board), the public and private elect of New Orleans, for a 
myriad of social and political reasons, opposed and impeded 
the municipal reform policies of the Behrman administration. 
That same public and private elite opposed any utility 
reform measure suggested by the Behrman administration, com­
promising the utility reform effort and delaying the regula­
tion of NORLC. The Behrman administration, overly sensitive 
to criticism and facing another municipal election in the 
fall of 1916, agreed to an ill-advised compromise measure 
that divided and diluted regulatory authority and, in 
effect, allowed NORLC to escape regulation.
In May, 1911, the New Orleans Item, disturbed by the 
consolidation of the public utility companies under NORLC 
and ACC, called for the creation of a public service commis­
sion, independent of the municipal government and the Regu­
lar Democtatic Organization, to regulate the public and pri­
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vate affairs of the New Orleans Railway and Light Company 
and its subsidiaries. Apparently, nothing came of the Item’s 
plea, and the issue remained dormant for nearly a year.3-3 
By February, 1912, however, with utility service deteriorat­
ing and cost rising, the demand for greater public regula­
tion of NORLC became more organized and influential. The 
Item reported that many members of the city council, the 
Behrman administration (the commission council charter did 
not take effect until December, 1912), the legislative dele­
gation, and a number of civic and neighborhood associations 
favored the creation of municipal public service commission 
to regulate the utilities industry in New Orleans. And, the 
Item reported, most citizens approved granting the public 
utilities commission plenary power over the public service 
companies.x*
While the Item saw the need for a public service com­
mission with near plenary powers, it could not endorse any 
form of utility regulation that the Behrman administration 
and the RDO favored. The newspaper again called on the busi­
ness community to recommend the creation of a state public 
service commission, independent of the city government and 
governed by an independent, nonpartisan panel of business­
men.3-9 The Progressive Union responded to the Item's, call
“ New Orleans Item, May 9, 20, 1911, February 7, 1912.
“ New Orleans Item, March 28, 1912, July 27, 1915.
“ New Orleans Item, February 7, 13, 15, 28, 1912; Fair- 
clough, "Public Utilities," 49.
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and, after a tense and protracted debate over the relative 
merits of municipal ownership and public regulation, drafted 
a bill that satisfied the requirements laid down by the 
Item.1”
The bill created an independent state public service 
commission, appointed by the governor and funded by the mu­
nicipal government of New Orleans. The bill did not grant 
the commission the "precise and plenary" powers over NORLC 
called for by the Item. Rather, the bill more closely resem­
bled the desires of the more conservative municipal affairs 
committee of the Progressive Union. The public service com­
mission would have no authority over consolidations, valua­
tion, or rate of return. It did have the authority to "set" 
rates and fares and to determine the "quality" of service.17
The draft attracted formidable opposition at the 
regular session of the General Assembly in the summer of 
1912. Governor Luther E. Hall, who apparently misunderstood 
the content and intention of the bill, thought another "pub­
lic service commission" unnecessary and costly. The state 
railroad commission already possessed the authority and the 
funding, Hall said, to regulate the public services of New 
Orleans. The creation of a separate and independent board 
would dilute the authority of the state government and drain 
its meager resources. Despite the glib assurances from the
xaNew Orleans Item, February 16, April 24, May 21, 1912; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 15, 1912.
^Ibid.
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Item and the municipal affairs committee that the so-called 
Provosty bill did not dilute state authority or sap the 
state treasury, the Hall administration remained opposed to 
the bill throughout the session.3-"
The Behrman administration and a majority of the city's 
legislative delegation also opposed the bill, but for more 
intelligent and substantive reasons than those given by 
Governor Hall. Senator Henry L. Favrot, chairman of the Sen­
ate Committee on City Affairs and author of a "minority" re­
port on the Provosty bill, argued that the bill favored the 
interests of NORLC and its principal stockholders and that, 
in removing regulatory control from the civil authorities of 
New Orleans, the bill was clearly unconstitutional and un­
democratic. An "independent" state commission of business­
men, nominated by other businessmen and serving without the 
approval of the people, Favrot suggested, would be more in­
clined to favor property rights over the rights of consumers 
and franchise rights over franchise obligations. In effect, 
state regulation would be sanctioning the interests of NORLC 
and ignoring the interests of the people.3-9
The bill, contrary to the arguments of its sponsors, 
Favrot contended, violated the state constitution and ig­
nored the several precedents established by the courts. The
x"New Orleans Item. May 21, July 18, 29, 31, August 2, 
1912; Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of 
the State of Louisiana. 1912 (Baton Rouge, 1912), 580.
X9New Orleans Item. June 12, 14, 1912; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. June 12, 1912.
city, he argued, possessed exclusive authority over the re­
gulation of its public utilities and streets and it could 
not legally relinquish that authority to any private inter­
est.20 (The bill also violated provisions of the constitu­
tion providing for the election of all local officials who 
exercised the "police powers" of the state.23-) But, more 
importantly, the bill was, Favrot said, "demonstrably undem­
ocratic". It demeaned the moral intelligence of the people 
and their government and violated the principle of home 
rule.22
Proponents of the Provosty bill lambasted the Favrot 
report, labeling it as partisan and reactionary. The Behrman 
administration was not interested, they asserted, in regu­
lating NORLC or in promoting the public and social needs of 
the city. Municipal regulation under the Regular Democrats 
meant the complete politicization of public services and the 
continuation of excessive costs and abysmal service. The ad­
ministration's call for an elected municipal public service 
commission, they charged, was not a call for democracy, but 
an attempt to block reform aimed at ending the abuses of a
2°See, for example, Canal and Claiborne Street Railroad 
Company v. Crescent City Railroad Company. 6 Southern Re­
porter 849 (1889); New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Com­
pany v. Crescent City Railroad Company. 12 Federal Reporter 
308 (1881); New Orleans City and Lake Railroad Company v.
City of New Orleans. 11 Southern Reporter 77 (1892).
21Board of Public Utilities v. New Orleans Railway and 
Light Company. 82 Southern Reporter 281.
22New Orleans Item, June 12, 14, 1912; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. June 12, 1912.
I
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politicized and corrupt utilities company and its allies 
in the municipal govrnment.23
With the civic and political leadership of the city 
divided, the legislature postponed consideration of the so- 
called provosty bill, returning it to the calender and, in 
effect, killing it. Undoubtedly, NORLC and its associates in 
the New Orleans banking establishment pressured the legisla­
ture to "kill" the Provosty bill. But they were opposed to 
any form of public utility regulation, especially municipal 
regulation, and no doubt would have fought against any muni­
cipal regulation bill that the Behrman administration had 
prepared. The Behrman administration, too, "pressured" the 
legislature into postponing consideration of the Provosty 
bill, but, unlike the management of NORLC and the Hibernia 
and Whitney banks, the city government was not opposed to 
public regulation. Mayor Behrman and many other Regular 
Democrats believed what they said about the Provosty bill, 
and they worked to defeat it. The bill was, to be sure, 
ill-prepared and violated several conspicuous and important 
provisions of the state constitution. It was, as well, a 
weak and insufficient piece of legislation, denying the 
public service commission the authority to regulate the
23New Orleans Item. March 28, July 18, 29, 31, August 2, 
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 18, 1912. The Behrman 
administration prepared a municipal regulation bill, but did 
not introduce it to the legislature. Apparently, the city 
administration preferred concentrating on enacting the 
Favrot commission charter.
257
more salient aspects of the public service industry, most 
notably, capitalization, valuation, and rate of return. 
Finally, the bill was sectarian, more concerned with "pre­
venting" the city government and the RDO from "politicizing" 
NORLC than with the regulation of the public utilities. The 
bill was, then, as Favrot suggested, partisan and 
reactionary.
By the spring of 1914, at the height of the electric 
rate controversy, public sentiment began focusing on issues 
of monopoly and valuation and their relationship to the 
cost, quality, and development of public service. Still, as 
in 1912, the civic and social leadership of New Orleans, 
though more concerned with the intrinsic questions of regu­
lation, was preoccupied with preventing the "politicization" 
of the public service industry. In April, the Municipal Im­
provement League, (MIL) a civic reform association dedicated 
to utility regulation and led by Dr. Valentine K. Irion, 
authored another state regulation bill that repeated the 
provisions and reasoning of the Provosty bill of 1912. The 
MIL bill created a separate, independent board, appointed by 
the governor and empowered to set rates and the standards of 
service. The bill would, if enacted, Irion promised, reduce 
the cost of service and eliminate the corrupt influence of 
NORLC over city politics. State regulation, Irion said,
2*Senate Journal. 1912. 580; Schott, "John M. Parker," 
114-15, especially, footnote 46.
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would place the issues of cost and service beyond the reach 
of NORLC and its allies in city government. It also would 
prevent the Behrman administration from manipulating public 
services and from "politicizing" the workers of NORLC.23
The New Orleans Item agreed, but contended that a pro­
gressive public service commission must do more than merely 
preventing the Regular Democrats from manipulating the work­
ers of NORLC for partisan and political reasons. The public 
service commission must have regulatory management over 
capitalization, valuation, and rate of return. That sort of 
control, the Item argued, would protect the legitimate 
interests of investors, consumers and employees, and the 
public. Capitalization that did not represent the "actual" 
value of the company cheapened the value of investment, 
cheating the legitimate investors of an honest return on 
their investments and placing illicit profit above public
2SNew Orleans Item, January 30, April 14, May 5, 10, 21, 
June 24, 1914; New Orleans Times-Picavune. May 10, 12, 1914. 
According to Dr. Irion, the MIL formed sometime in 1913 be­
cause of the "crying need for [the] proper regulation of 
[the] public service corporations" in New Orleans. The men 
who formed the MIL were "professional men" and businessmen, 
who represented the "great and respectable middle classes, 
neither capitalists nor laborers". The goal of the MIL was 
the proper and just regulation of the utility companies. The 
MIL believed that regulation was "at heart" a political 
question, requiring it to become involved in local and state 
politics as a nonpartisan. Proceedings had at the special 
meeting of the Commission Council, City of New Orleans,
August 17, 1918, Portfolio 1, Proceedings of the National 
War Labor Board, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge, hereafter cited as "Special Meet- 
ing," PNWLB, LSU. I would like to thank Professor Paul Pas- 
koff for helping me secure the records of the NWLB.
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service. Bloated capitalization also meant excessive rates 
and pitiful service. Utility revenues went to satisfy the 
demands of fictitious investment, denying the operating com­
panies of the resources necessary to improve and develop 
services. Excessive capitalization, too, denied the city 
government the opportunity of controlling and directing the 
development of the city. As long as revenue and profit stood 
as a barrier to service and development, the Item remarked, 
New Orleans would remain a regressive and "politicized"
* city.2®
The Behrman administration agreed with the assessment 
of the Item, and it, too, called for the creation of public 
service commission with "plenary" authority over the public 
utility companies of New Orleans. The commission council, 
however, favored the creation of an "independent" municipal 
public service commission. The city administration proposed 
creating a five member commission consisting of the Mayor 
and the Commissioner of Public Utilities and three other 
members chosen by the mayor upon the recommendation of the 
business "exchanges". The three "laymen" would serve without 
pay and, presumably, without deference to the administration 
and NORLC. The bill, drafted by the City Attorney's Office, 
the Commissioner of Public Utilities, and the Commissioner 
of Public Property, authorized the municipal public service 
commission to regulate all public utility companies in the
2®New Orleans Item, May 10, 11, 1914.
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city, in particular, the gas, electric, transit, telephone, 
and telegraph companies. The bill gave the municipal public 
service commission the power to regulate capitalization, 
valuation, and rate of return, permitting the city govern­
ment to fix rates, extend and improve service, and determine 
the physical and social development of the city with due and 
just regard for the interests of investment, management, and 
consumers.27
Commissioner of Public Utilities William Thompson de­
fended the bill and the motivation of the Behrman adminis­
tration before the legislature. The bill, he explained, did 
not threaten private property or "politicize" vital city 
services or the employees of the utility companies of New 
Orleans. Municipal regulation was, Thompson said, an intel­
ligent and established policy, endorsed by utility experts, 
investors, and the business community. The bill simply gave 
the city the authority and the means of setting the quality, 
extent, development, and cost of service by allowing it a 
voice in determining the public value of service and the de­
gree of profit. Valuation and rate of return were not the 
exclusive concern of the management and investors of the
27New Orleans Item, April 29, June 9, 1914. Newspaper ac­
counts are vague on specific provisions and powers of the 
municipal commission and there is no extant copy of the 
bill. It is reasonable to assume, perhaps, given the diffi­
culty the city administration experienced with the PBRRC in 
1913, that the Behrman government would want the "lay" 
members of the commission to serve at the discretion of com­
mission council.
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utility companies, for those issues clearly affected the 
public interests and determined the public welfare. Only the 
municipal government, Thompson said, could fairly judge 
those issues because the municipal government was the only 
authority representative of the public interests and welfare 
of the people of New Orleans. Immediate and direct account­
ability lessened the possibility that a municipal public 
service commission would "politicize" public services.2"
Despite Thompson's poised and considered assurances and 
the endorsement of the Association of Commerce, the Manion 
bill (Representative Martin H. Manion, a member of the RDO 
from Uptown New Orleans, sponsored the bill) did not reach 
the floor of the House of Representatives. Neither did the 
state regulation bill. Though committed to the regulation of 
the public utilities industry, the civic and political lead­
ership of New Orleans was, quite obviously, divided and, 
despite their common concern, unwilling to compromise. Some 
time after the regular legislative session, in November, 
1914, the Behrman administration asked Governor Hall and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Lee E. Thomas, to
2"New Orleans Item. June 16, 1914; New Orleans Times- 
Picavune. June 16, 1914. The board of directors for the 
Association of Commerce reviewed and endorsed the municipal 
public service commission bill, stating that it was superior 
to the bill drafted by the MIL or urged by the Item.
Several notable and influential men served on the board of 
directors for the Association of Commerce. They were 
Edgar Stern, Samuel W. Weiss, E. L. Gladney, Frank Dameron, 
Leon Simon, M. B. Kreeger, Albert Mackie, C. H. Willard, and 
Gender Abbott.
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commission a joint executive-legislative commission to study 
state and municipal regulation and to make its findings and 
recommendations available for the regular legislative ses­
sion in 1916.589
The New Orleans Item cautioned the commission against 
recommending a partisan public service bill. The Item admit­
ted that any commission regulating the public utility system 
in New Orleans must be familiar with the city's "unique" 
financial, social, and political conditions and it must be 
sympathetic to those conditions. A public service commis­
sion, the Item remarked, must also be representative of the 
"unique" financial, social, and political interests of the 
city. Those facts alone, the newspaper said, precluded any 
member of the commission council or the RDO from sitting 
on a municipal or state commission. The commission council 
and the voters of New Orleans were not, to be sure, repre­
sentative of those "unique" interests and were, conse­
quently, unsuited for determining the membership of the 
public service commission. Municipal regulation under the 
guidance of the Behrman administration or under the guise of 
democracy would, the Item concluded, upset the "delicate" 
political balance between the reformers and the machine 
politicians. State regulation under the guise of municipal
a9Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of 
Representatives of the State of Louisiana. 1914. (Baton 
Rouge, 1914), 368, 389, 769; New Orleans Item. June 19, 24, 
July 2, November 24, 1914.
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regulation, the Item believed, would maintain the "balance" 
of power between the Regular Democrats and the municipal 
reformers.30
The Behrman administration, too, believed that a public 
service commission had to be representative of the "unique" 
political and social interests of New Orleans and had to 
maintain the proper balance between private and public 
interests. Neither the Provosty bill nor the original MIL 
bill granted the public service commission the authority 
sufficient to represent the interests of the city against 
NORLC and NOGLC and neither one balanced the representative 
political interests of the city. The Manion bill, on the 
other hand, proposed establishing a representative and 
balanced public service commission. The bill granted the 
commission the authority and resources to regulate NORLC and 
NOGLC and accorded the city administration, business (though 
not labor), and the public a voice in establishing public 
utility policy for the city. Opposition to the Manion bill 
and to the joint executive-legislative commission convinced 
the Behrman administration that compromise and balance were 
pointless. And it abandoned the idea for an independent mu­
3°New Orleans Item, November 24, 1914. The Item confessed 
that the incumbent commission council was representative of 
the "unique" social and political interests of the city. As 
members of any political body associated with Martin Behrman 
and the RDO, however, those "unbossed" councilmen were sus­
ceptible to unwarranted political presssures. Subsequent 
councils, as well, may not have the same social, profes­
sional, or political integrity as the present council.
2 6 4
nicipal public service commission in favor of the regulation 
of public utilities by the commission council.
Early in 1916, Commissioner of Public Utilities William 
Bess Thompson began a series of private discussions and cor­
respondences with City Attorney Moore on municipal regula­
tion under the commission council. In response to Thompson's 
inquiries, Moore outlined the regulatory powers and limita­
tions of the city government. In brief, Moore wrote, though 
the city could compel service and fix rates, it could only 
do so within the terms of its franchises with NORLC and 
under the reasonable limitations of its police powers. As 
the law and its practices stood at the moment, Moore said, 
the council did not have the exclusive power to set rates, 
fares, valuation, or capitalization. The experiences of the 
past several years and the impending consolidation of the 
underlying companies under NORLC, he wrote, only reempha­
sized the "necessity for a municipal [public] service com­
mission" invested with the authority to regulate the public 
affairs of NORLC. **
After several more weeks of close study and direct con­
sultation with Moore, CPU Thompson went before the full com­
mission council with recommendations for creating a munici­
pal public service commission. Thompson urged the council to
3XMoore to Thompson, undated (probably between February 
13-19, 1916), vol.7, CAP. CA, NOPL.
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abandon the idea of an "independent" municipal public ser­
vice commission. Instead, Thompson recommended creating a 
municipal service commission within the Department of Public 
Utilities, staffed by utility experts and administered by 
the Commissioner of Public Utilities under the direct super­
vision of the commission council. In essence, the city coun­
cil would serve as the municipal public service commission 
for New Orleans.32
Politics lay behind Thompson's recommendations— though 
not the sort imagined by the New Orleans Item and the other 
critics of the Behrman administration. The commission coun­
cil charter of 1912, whether by design or through omission, 
did not specify the authority and responsiblities of the 
commission council or the Commissioner of Public Utilities 
over the public utilities of New Orleans. Thompson and the 
council wanted to assure that the elected officials of the 
municipal government had the authority and prestige to de­
termine public utility policy. A municipal public service 
commission directed by the Commissioner of Public Utilities 
and controlled by the council guaranteed the municipal 
government the authority to determine public utility policy. 
"Independent" municipal utility commissions, composed ex­
clusively of businessmen (like the PBRRC), often compromised 
the public authority of the commission council, subjecting
32New Orleans Item, May 3, 23, June 7, 14, 1916; New Or­
leans Daily States. May 3, June 13, 1916.
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public policy to the excessive demands of pcivate business 
and political interests. "Independent" boards were, as 
well, indifferent and incompetent, serving on a part-time 
basis and usually without any technical knowledge of regula­
tion or experience in public law, administration, or 
finance.
The Behrman administration, on the other hand (at 
least from Thompson's point of view), was more tolerant of 
the concerns of private interests and more competent and ex­
perienced in governing New Orleans than anyone in the busi­
ness community. The Manion municipal public service bill was 
an indication of the administration's concern for balancing 
the interests of the business community with the public de­
mands for an authoritative and competent regulation of 
public services. The bill acknowledged the role of private 
interests in formulating public policy by giving the large 
business associations a discernible, though modulated, voice 
on the public service commission. But the business and civic 
leadership of New Orleans, except the Association of Com­
merce, attacked the Manion bill as partisan and questioned 
the sincerity and competency of the Behrman administration. 
In Thompson's eyes, then, compromise with the so-called 
civic and commerical elite was impossible.
Compromise also seemed unnecessary. Despite the campaign 
against municipal regulation, the Behrman administration 
enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the voters of New
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Orleans and "commanded" the alligiance of most of the city's 
state representatives and senators. Apparently, the adminis­
tration convinced most citizens that municipal regulation 
was a reasonable, authoritative, and expedient means of 
regulation and that the commission council possessed the ex­
perience and competence to regulate NORLC. The commission 
council, then, endorsed Thompson's concept, instructing him 
to draft legislation authorizing the council to regulate the 
public utilities of New Orleans.33
For the next several weeks, Thompson and City Attorney 
Moore pieced together a municipal public service bill. The
draft gave the municipal public service commission the power
to subpoena records, compel testimony from witnesses, hear 
and adjudicate cornsumer complaints, fix rates and schedules, 
force extensions of services, determine a fair valuation, 
assure a reasonable rate of return, and establish any policy 
or practice that promoted and protected the public welfare. 
The bill gave the Behrman administration "near" plenary 
authority over NORLC. The council readily approved the bill,
introducing it to the legislature at the beginning of the
regular session in the summer, 1916. 3"*
Sponsored by State Representative John Nix, the admin­
istration bill also attracted intense opposition from the 
anti-Regular reformers of New Orleans. As in the past, their
33Ibid.
3,*New Orleans Daily States. May 19, 1916; New Orleans 
Item. June 18-20, 1916.
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opposition to municipal regulation stemmed from a fear of 
the "politicalization" of public services and the public 
service industry. Their arguments against municipal regula­
tion strained common sense and exposed a pernicious and ir­
rational side to anti-Regular municipal reform. Percy Saint, 
for example, an attorney and a member of the Louisiana State 
House of Representatives from Uptown New Orleans, labeled 
the Nix bill a fraud and naked power grab, permitting NORLC 
to escape regulation, yet enabling Behrman and the Regulars 
to extend and strengthen their grip on the "vital" public 
services of the city.33
The Item agreed with Saint. It was obvious to all 
"unbossed" and "intelligent" citizens, the Item asserted, 
that the RDO and the Behrman administration were not serious 
about regulating the utility companies. In the past twelve 
years, the newspaper wrote, Mayor Behrman and the Regular 
Democrats had allowed NORLC to go virtually unchecked. The 
past three city administrations had permitted NORLC to con­
solidate its control over the producing companies, ignore 
its franchise obligations, and exact exorbitant profits from 
the city. Now, prated the Item, after years of controversy 
and agitation over NORLC, the Behrman Democrats suddenly 
demanded the plenary authority to "regulate" the utilities 
of New Orleans.3®
3SNew Orleans Item, June 15, 21, 1916.
3®New Orleans Item. June 15, 1916.
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The current commission council was competent and pro­
gressive, the Item admitted, but it was uncharacteristic of 
previous "ring" administrations and it was unlikely that the 
RDO would renominate the same sort of commission ticket for 
the fall elections. (If the Regulars renominated [without 
Behrman, of course] the same sort of ticket, then, the Item 
revealed, it would endorse the concept of a municipal public 
service commission, replete, of course, with the proper 
safeguards and restrictions.) Still, the newspaper reminded 
its readers, the "machine that stands behind [the commission 
council], and limits its usefulness to a large degree, is a 
hungry and ambitious institution more than likely to sacri­
fice reform for power and patronage." 37
Perhaps because of the abusive criticism leveled at the 
Nix bill, the House Committee on City Affairs (HCCA) held 
hearings on the bill a week ahead of the scheduled date. The 
only witness at the hearing, at least according to the press 
accounts, was CPU Thompson, the "author" of the bill. The 
HCAC's action, naturally, prompted charges of "railroading" 
from the critics of the bill. The HCCA ignored those allega­
tions, giving the municipal service bill an unqualified fa­
vorable recommendation. On the floor of the House of Repre­
sentatives, however, the Nix bill encountered resistance;
3-7New Orleans Item, June 15, 1916. In a later editorial, 
the Item reversed its position on supporting municipal regu­
lation, arguing that municipal regulation went against the 
"overwhelming preponderance of American experience in regu­
lating public utilities." See Item. June 21, 1916.
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this time from another, even more determined quarter, the 
New Orleans Railway and Light Company. In a letter addressed 
to Speaker of the House Hewitt Bouanchaud, attorneys for 
NORLC complained that the Behrman administration, for its 
own partisan purposes, used its immense political influence 
with the HCCA to stifle debate and to manipulate the pas­
sage of the Nix bill, and hey urged the House of Representa­
tives to recommit the bill for a full and more judicious 
hearing before HCCA.3"
Commissioner of Public Utilities Thompson disputed the 
attorneys' version of events. The city administration, he 
protested in a published statement, did not have to coerce 
the HCCA into giving the Nix bill a favorable recommenda­
tion. The bill had its own intrinsic value and had the sup­
port of several important civic and political organizations.
A favorable recommendation for the Nix bill did not preempt 
further debate on the bill or preclude consideration of 
other public service bills. The attorneys and management of 
NORLC, Thompson said, could hardly feign ignorance or sur­
prise over the contents of the Nix bill, or suggest that 
they were "uninvited" to public hearings, or question the 
integrity or motives of the Behrman administration. City
3°New Orleans Item, June 14, 15, 1916; New Orleans Daily 
States. June 13, 1916. In their letter, attorneys Bernard 
McCloskey, John Patrick Sullivan, and Charles F. Buck, Jr., 
implied that the Behrman administration wanted to "capital­
ize" on the recent controversy over public utilities to 
gain control over the 3,700 men and women who worked for 
NORLC and NOGLC.
Attorney Moore and he, Thompson explained, met with the 
attorneys £or NORLC and ACC as the administration prepared 
the Nix bill. At the conference, Moore and Thompson ex­
plained each provision of the legislation, permitting the 
attorneys the chance to express their opinions and to 
raise objections. At no time during the conference or any 
time before the HCCA hearing (a period of seventeen days) 
did NORLC object to the content, tone, or purpose of the 
bill.33
Daniel Dennis Curran, president of NORLC, disputed 
Thompson's claims. Curran claimed that the attorneys for 
NORLC attended the conference with Moore and Thompson only 
to learn the purposes and means behind the administration's 
public utility policy. The attorneys were not there to par­
ticipate in drafting legislation, Curran said, and they had 
no authority to bind NORLC to any bill or policy, something 
the Behrman administration knew in advance of the meeting.*°
In addition, Curran went on to say, when the municipal 
officials introduced the Nix bill to the HCCA, the board of 
directors of NORLC informed the commission council that it 
was "emphatically and unanimously'' opposed to the bill and 
to the policy of municipal regulation. In their letter to 
City Attorney Moore on June 9, the NORLC attorneys informed
39New Orleans Item. June 14, 16, 21, 1916; New Orleans 
Daily States. June 14, 16, 21, 1916.
■*°New Orleans Item, June 16, 1916; New Orleans Daily 
States. June 16, 1916.
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the commission council that the board questioned the wis­
dom of municipal regulation. The financial communities in 
New Orleans and New York, the attorneys said, were fearful 
that municipal regulation would impair future financing and 
investment. Investors and managers were extremely skeptical 
about municipal regulation, particularly when the municipal 
public service commission was highly politicized. Such a 
piece of radical legislation would, unquestionably, disturb 
the financial stability of the company and have a corres­
ponding effect on the political equilibrium of the city. 
Curran then reminded the Behrman administration that NORLC 
was willing— and had been since 1914, he said— to accept 
regulation by some state agency, preferably the State Rail­
road Commission. State regulation fit the national stan­
dards, he said, and was familiar and acceptable to manage­
ment, investors, and consumers, and would not disturb the 
order and rhythm of the utilities industry or the business 
of municipal government.1,1
The Behrman administration favored municipal regulation 
precisely because it would disrupt the established order of 
the utilities industry and because it would, to some degree, 
realign political authority in New Orleans (regulation by an 
independent state board would curb some of the excesses of 
the utility industry, but would not "realign" political au­
thority in the cities). The management of NORLC understood
«xIbid.
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the implications of municipal regulation and did all it 
could to prevent its adoption. And it endorsed state regula­
tion to avoid the financial and political costs of municipal 
regulation. In addition, Curran's indictment of the city ad­
ministration and the HCCA was unwarranted and self-serving. 
The president and management of NORLC knew of the council's 
intention of drafting the Nix bill, but it made no public 
comment on its objection to municipal regulation. It par­
ticipated in a formal conference with municipal officials 
and learned firsthand the content of the Nix bill, and 
still it made no public protest. Even after its board of 
directors went "on record" opposing the bill, NORLC chose 
not to contest the bill until after the HCCA had endorsed 
it. NORLC, then, had every reasonable opportunity to influ­
ence the course of the NIX bill, but chose to remain silent 
only later feigning injury.*2
The Behrman administration and the HCCA acted with un­
necessary haste in considering the Nix bill before the 
scheduled time, but there was no effort to deceive the pub­
lic or opponents about the content of the Nix bill or to 
"steamroll" the bill into law. The uninitiated public knew 
the general contents of the bill weeks before the HCCA de­
liberated on it and the commission council discussed the 
bill in public on separate occasions. As any reasonably in­
*2New Orleans Item, May 3, 23, June 7, 9, 14-16, 1916;
New Orleans Daily States, June 7, 9, 14-16, 19, 20, 1916.
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formed citizen knew, the recommendation of the HCCA did not 
prevent the House or the State Senate from considering other 
utility regulation bills or from amending the Nix bill. In 
fact, even after the House passed the Nix bill by an over­
whelming majority, the General Assembly considered two 
separate bills authorizing the state regulation of the muni­
cipal utilities of New Orleans and finally consented to 
amending the original Nix bill.'*3
In the Louisiana State Senate, NORLC and the other cri­
tics of municipal regulation lobbied against the Nix bill, 
proposing instead that the legislature place NORLC under the 
"supervision" of either the State Railroad Commission or an 
independent state public service commission. The spokesmen 
for NORLC (there were six of them who appeared against the 
Nix bill) told the Senate Committee on City Affairs (SCCA) 
that municipal regulation was a dangerous and radical doc­
trine that frightened investors and threatened private pro­
perty. The Nix bill gave the Behrman administration a re­
gime already biased against business, the authority to set 
arbitrary limits of capitalization, valuation, and rate of 
return, force the extension of services into undeveloped and 
unprofitable sections of New Orleans, and in general inter-
■*3New Orleans Item. May 3, June 14-16, 1916; New Orleans 
Daily States. May 3, June 13, 19, 1916. Following the pas­
sage of the Nix bill. Representative Percy Saint introduced 
a bill creating a state-municipal public service commission 
for New Orleans. In the Senate, George Williams sponsored a 
bill drafted by attorneys of NORLC granting the State Rail­
road Commission authority over NORLC and NOGLC.
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fere with the policies and management of a private corpora­
tion. The investors and management of NORLC, its spokesmen 
said, appreciated the business and political justification 
for regulation, but for obvious reasons they objected to 
regulation by a politicized municipal commission. State 
regulation, by contrast, was a "fixed doctrine" compatible 
with the political, economic, and constitutional tenets of 
the free enterprise system. The company would submit to 
state regulation, preferably under the State Railroad Com­
mission, but it would accept regulation by an independent 
state public service commission.**
Appearing for the city administration. Mayor Behrman 
and Commissioner of Public Utilities Thompson assured the 
SCCA that municipal regulation was no radical doctrine and 
no threat to private property or public services. Municipal 
regulation under the Nix bill, they said, would allow the 
citizens of New Orleans, through their elected representa­
tives, to manage their own essential needs, chart their own 
development, without compromising or diluting their author­
ity and integrity or threatening private investment. The 
bill did not contemplate governing the internal, private 
affairs of NORLC (valuation, rate of return, and rates and
'•‘•New Orleans Item, June 15, 19-21, 1916; New Orleans 
Daily States. June 21, 1916. The men who represented NORLC 
were its principal executives and attorneys. They were Hugh 
McCloskey, chairman of the board of directors, Francis C. 
Homer, president of ACC, Bernard McCloskey, general counsel, 
and attorneys Henry Favrot, Charles Buck, Jr., and John Pat­
rick Sullivan.
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fares were, they argued, hardly private concerns), but did 
intend to compel service and establish rates and fares in 
line with the city's ability to pay. The bill gave the city 
administration no direct or indirect control over the em­
ployees of NORLC, and the administration had no intention of 
using its regulatory powers to manipulate customers and 
workers. The only threat posed by municipal regulation and 
the Nix bill, they said, was to NORLC's "monopoly" over the 
cost and development of public services in New Orleans. The 
SCCA agreed with Behrman and Thompson, recommending the Nix 
bill but with one dissenting vote.1-3
The administration was confident that the Senate would 
approve the Nix bill, claiming that it had the votes to pass 
the measure on the first ballot. Instead, the Behrman admin­
istration, overly sensitive to the intemperate criticism of 
its political rivals and ever susceptible to the necessities 
of city politics, agreed to a series of amendments that 
divided and clouded the regulatory authority of the city.**
The compromise, offered by two rural parish senators 
(but surely authored by the attorneys of NORLC and arranged 
by its business associates with the city banks and on the 
Board of Liquidation), called for the creation of an inde­
pendent state board of public utilities, consisting of the 
Commissioner of Public Utilities and four other citizens of
••"New Orleans Item, June 21, 1916; New Orleans Daily
States , June 21, 1916. The vote was 12 to 1.
■•"New Orleans Item, June 25, 1916.
New Orleans chosen by the governor. The new Nix bill em­
powered the Board of Public Utilities (BPU) to enact "all 
just, reasonable, and adequate rules and regulation for the 
supervision and regulation" of NORLC and NOGLC. The BPU
could determine "reasonable and just rates," adjusting those
rates and fares in relation to the net earnings and divi­
dends of the two companies. It could, as well, "encourage"
the utility companies to reinvest profits back in the com­
panies in the form of debt repayment, physical improvements 
and replacements, and business economies and efficiencies. 
The BPU could require the utility companies to extend their 
services into those areas of the city "sufficiently populous 
to insure a reasonable revenue" to the companies. Finally, 
for the purposes of setting the cost of service, the BPU 
could determine the "fair value" of all "facilities dedi­
cated to the public use". The Behrman administration con­
sented to the compromise amendments and the bill became law 
without much difficulty or delay.*-7
The law was far from adequate. It ended the discredited 
practice of fixing rates and fares by individual contract 
and ordinance, though, in effect, it allowed the utility 
companies to continue fixing rates and fares. The act re­
quired the BPU to establish a "sliding" scale of rates and
■*',Act 36, Acts Passed bv the General Assemhly n-F the 
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1916: New Orleans 
Item. June 23, 1916; New Orleans Daily States. June 22, 23, 
1916; New Orleans Times-Picayune. June 23, 1916.
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fares based not on the "cost of service" but on the profits, 
dividends, and valuation of the companies. In adjusting the 
rates and fares for NORLC, the BPU also had to consider the 
earning capacity of the entire company, permitting the com­
pany to charge higher rates or fares for one service to off­
set lower earnings in another service. The law, however, did 
not give the BPU the authority to set the rate of return or 
to limit the earning capacity of the companies.
In determining the valuation of the two utility compa­
nies, the BPU had to follow a complex and controversal 
formula. In formulating the "fair value" of NORLC and NOGLC, 
the BPU had to consider the original cost of construction, 
the current market value of all bonds and stocks, the 
earning capacities of the underlying companies, the depre­
ciation of equipment, the cost of reproduction, and "devel­
opmental and going concern value". Such an equation would 
add tens of millions of dollars to the valuation of the two 
companies (bloating its fixed financial obligations) and 
millions of dollars in revenues and profits. By contrast, 
the BPU could only "encourage" innovation and modernization, 
allowing obsolete equipment and debt to figure into the 
determination of value and rates. The BPU could not, un­
fortunately, even encourage the extension and development 
of public services. Under the revised Nix act, the BPU could 
not compel either NORLC or NOGLC to extend services to areas 
that did not have the population to guarantee a return on
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investment. In essence, then, the compromise diluted the 
regulatory power of the municipal government, allowing the 
companies to determine the character and development of 
public services in the city.*3
The amended Nix act further weakened the regulatory au­
thority of the municipal government by dividing it between 
the commission council and the independent Board of Public 
Utilities. The BPU was, in theory, independent of the muni­
cipal government, but the Commissioner of Public Utilities 
served as the chairman of the board, the City Attorney was 
its legal counsel, and the city administration alone deter­
mined the budget for the board. The act clearly restated the 
council's "unassailable" authority over rates, franchises, 
and service. But just as clearly, the act invested the coun­
cil and the BPU with the authority to "supervise and regu­
late" NORLC and NOGLC. There was, as well, considerable 
public speculation that the Nix act was unconstitutional, 
that it violated provisions of the state constitution and 
the municipal charter of New Orleans that required the 
election or selection by the commission council of any 
municipal official exercising the reserved powers of the
*"Act 36, 1916. The act also gave the utility companies 
the "right to appeal to any Court of competent jurisdiction 
to test the legality, validity, constitutionality, or rea­
sonableness of any order, decree, rule, regulation, or or­
dinance" of the commission council or the BPU. The companies 
did not have this right under the original Nix bill.
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state or municipal governments. The Board of Public Utili­
ties clearly fell into that category. *•*
Why, then, did the Behrman administration abandon one 
of its major legislative and political initiatives without 
apparent reason or provocation? Critics of municipal regula­
tion and the original Nix bill claimed that the Behrman ad­
ministration submitted to the compromise out of political 
desperation. Public sentiment, they insisted, was suspicious 
of municipal regulation and of the Behrman administration. 
Municipal regulation concentrated too much power over pro­
perty and service in the hands of the city's elected munici­
pal officials. Elected municipal officials were hardly dis­
interested public administrators but rank politicians, sus­
ceptible to too many political pressures to effectively and 
dispassionately manage the public service needs of the 
city.*0
In New Orleans the political dangers of municipal regu­
lation were compounded by the presence of a voracious poli­
tical machine bent on controlling every feature of the pub­
lic and private lives of the people. The "intelligent" and 
"sober" citizens of New Orleans recognized the Nix bill as a 
transparent "power grab," designed solely to further the
■•"Moore to Edward J. Glenny, Commissioner of Public Util­
ities, February 28, August 3, 1917, August 8, 24, November
26, 1918, John F. C. Waldo to Moore, August 24, 1918, vol.8,
CAP, CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item. December 5, 1918; New
Orleans Daily States, December 5, 6, 1918.
*°New Orleans Daily States. June 22, 23, 1916; New Or­
leans Item, June 23, 1916.
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political ambitions of the Regular Democratic Organization 
and the Behrman administration. These citizens exposed the 
corrupt features of municipal regulation under the Nix 
bill, eroding its legislative support and forcing the RDO 
and the administration to abandon their scheme and to submit 
to a compromise bill. The new Nix bill, the product of the 
best legal and business minds in the city, allowed the true 
representatives of the people— the civic and commerical 
leaders of New Orleans— to regulate NORLC and to check the 
ambitions of the Regulars and the Behrman government.31
Later, after the failure of the BPU to regulate NORLC, 
these same sober and intelligent citizens invented another 
explanation for the Nix compromise. According to this 
version, the Behrman administration conspired with NORLC and 
its allies in the business community to prevent the regula­
tion of the public utilities industry in New Orleans. Appar­
ently, the original Nix bill was nothing more than an elab­
orate ruse designed to prevent the passage of a more ex­
acting state regulation bill. The Behrman administration had 
no intention of regulating NORLC and it offered the original 
Nix bill only to arouse the considerable opposition to muni­
cipal regulation, gulling critics into accepting amendments 
the administration knew were insufficient and unconstitu­
tional .3a
31 Ibid..
3aEthel Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience," 79.
Neither of these two highly partisan and illogical ac­
counts is, to say the least, an accurate explanation of the 
genesis of the Nix bill or of the reasons behind the compro­
mise. The Behrman administration did not agree to the Nix 
compromise out of political desperation and it was not in­
clined toward a cynical and impolitic alliance with the man­
agement of NORLC. The Behrman administration was, as we have 
seen already, a sincere and consistent proponent of munici­
pal regulation. In the years prior to 1912, the administra­
tion, using precedents set by previous administrations, reg­
ulated the public utility industry through the customary 
methods of franchise, taxation, and contract. Though the 
municipal government never abandoned those practices, con­
solidation and monopoly made them inadequate, placing the 
utility companies beyond the control of municipal authority. 
Modern regulation theory and practices promised to restore 
public control over essential services without compromising 
the tenets of private enterprise or incurring the large debt 
and tax obligations associated with municipal ownership. 
Municipal regulation, with its ties to home rule and cen­
tralized authority, appealed to an administration bent on 
determining both public services and municipal policy.
Political necessity, however, advised the Behrman ad­
ministration to accomodate public utility policy to the 
legitimate interests of the business and reform elements of 
the city, sharing with those interests visible authority
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over public service policy. The Manion bill of 1914 extended 
public control over the modern public service industry, 
according the municipal administration and the business and 
civic leaders an "equal" share of authority over public ser­
vice. The civic leadership of the city, in particular the 
Item and the MIL, opposed the Manion bill, insisting that 
the Behrman administration merely wanted the jobs and power 
that flowed from municipal regulation. In 1914, without ex­
perience or success in the regulation of the public utility 
companies, the commission council did not believe that it 
could manage the regulation of public services without the 
active support of the business and civic leadership of New 
Orleans.
Over the next several years, however, the commission 
council learned that it could regulate some of the actions 
of the utility companies without the assistance of the or­
ganized and vocal business and reform elements. Between 1914 
and 1916, the city council, acting as its own municipal pub­
lic service commission, addressed several public service 
issues. Though the administration performed reasonably well 
in those areas, its inability to influence matters of capi­
talization, valuation, and rate of return stymied efforts to 
compel service and establish fair rates. In 1916, faced with 
growing demands for better, cheaper services and drawing on 
the lessons of the past five years, the administration 
drafted the Nix bill, giving the commission council exclu­
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sive authority over NORLC. Dividing regulatory power as the 
civic reformers suggested only compromised the force of reg­
ulation and relinquished authority over public matters to 
private concerns.
Those private concerns, however, were part of the 
commonwealth of interests that energized the public life of 
New Orleans, and in the end proved too powerful for the 
Behrman administration to resist. The Behrman administra­
tion, then, did not seek compromise because it lacked con­
viction, but because compromise promised.,to do more than 
conviction. It promised to bring private and public concerns 
and interests into concert and to bring a measure of peace 
to the public life of the city. The revised Nix bill prom­
ised both service and regulatory reform, something not truly 
possible without the cooperation of NORLC, the civic reform­
ers, and the commission council. The management of NORLC 
agreed to the compromise because it removed exclusive regu­
latory control from "municipal" authority and because it 
allowed the company to determine valuation, profit, and the 
extent of service. The anti-Regular reformers were satisfied 
with the revised bill because the BPU was, with one excep­
tion, independent of the city administration, allaying their 
fears of a powerful municipal government and, more to the 
point, giving them a formal and potent voice in determining 
public service policy. The Behrman administration accepted 
the compromise because it guaranteed service and because it
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reformed public utility policy, expanding and strengthening 
the authority of the commission council over that policy.
The compromise, however, could not fulfill its promises 
and it collapsed under the weight of politics and the strain 
of war. The compromise did not allow the management of NORLC 
to determine the value, rate of profit, and character and 
pace of the development of the public service industry in 
New Orleans. The municipal population demanded additional 
services at prices nearly too low to support existing ser­
vices, while the financial market, operating under the de­
mands of a wartime economy, demanded higher returns on its 
investment. Fares and rates were already set by municipal 
franchise and ordinance, and municipal officials were re­
luctant to increase fares and rates without imposing more 
exacting restrictions on the utility companies. The Behrman 
administration, faced with the growing financial and politi­
cal crisis in the utility industry, questioned the necessity 
of an independent public service commission, ignoring its 
recommendations and refusing to meet its financial requests. 
Several high-ranking municipal officials, particularly com­
missioners Lafaye and Glenny and City Attorney Moore, 
questioned the expediency and wisdom of the Nix act, viewing 
it as an impediment to the regulation of the utility com­
panies of New Orleans. The act— and the political compromise 
that stood behind it— simply could not restore the financial 
and civic integrity of the utility industry in New Orleans
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or invest the municipal government with the political 
authority to manage public services. But, if the act and 
compromise could not resolve the long-standing financial 
and political problems of municipal regulation, then, 
perhaps, America's entry into the Great War might provide 
the financial and political resources to end the stalemate 
and to suggest a democratic solution.93
Old cities like New Orleans, wrote the editorialist for 
the New Orleans Item in the spring of 1918, tended to be 
politically and socially "self-centered, clanish, and, in a 
sense, provincial". Old families and old ideas had for years 
commanded the commerical and civic life of the city, retard­
ing the financial and social development of New Orleans. In 
more recent years, however, under the leadership of Mayor 
Behrman and the new men of the commission council, there 
were indications that the city was discarding its old paro­
chialism and was embracing the spirit of progress and re­
form. Prior to 1917, however, the municipal reform movement 
lacked a sense of urgency and common design. The war, more 
than any other event in the city's recent past, gave the 
municipal reform movement a sense of moral and practical 
necessity and purpose, quickening its pace and sharpening
93Moore to Glenny February 28, August 3, 1917, August 8, 
November 26, 1918, Waldo to Moore, August 24, 1918, vol.8, 
CAP. CA, NOPL.
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its focus.**
The war that would make the world safe for democracy 
would also advance democratic, progressive reform at home. 
The war effort and the public good required that the munici­
pal administration suppress social vice and promote social 
hygiene (see below Chapter Seven), sanction and secure woman 
suffrage (see below Chapter Seven), restructure relations 
with business and labor, and redesign the structure of muni­
cipal politics and government (see below Chapter Nine).
Those issues, of course, predated the war, but the wartime 
emergency, the Item suggested, gave them a greater sense of 
poignancy. But the war not only rekindled the spirit of re­
form, it also tested the resiliency of the municipal reform 
movement. The war tested the public and private resources of 
the city, demanding of those resources more and better pub­
lic services, better living and working conditions, higher 
wages, recognition of the rights of labor, incentives and 
subsidies for business, and a more direct and responsive in­
volvement of the municipal government with the private and 
public lives of the people of New Orleans. The first test 
was not long in coming.**
Early in 1918, the management of NORLC announced that 
the company was near bankruptcy. The financial and contract­
ual conditions imposed on the company by the wartime emer-
**New Orleans Item, March 11, April 25, 1918.
**New Orleans Item. April 25, 1918.
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gency and by a misguided form of regulation prevented the 
company from meeting its financial obligations or refinan­
cing itself. Unless the company received the financial as­
sistance of the federal government and an increase in rates 
and fares from the commission council of New Orleans, then 
it would either lapse into receivership, curtailing services 
and laying off personnel, or cease operations altogether, 
plunging New Orleans into an economic and social crisis.sa
There was no guestion that the wartime emergency con­
tributed to the financial troubles of NORLC, worsening its 
condition and hastening the impending crisis in the company 
and in the national public utilities industry. Though de­
signed to preserve private capital and to restrain infla­
tion, the fiscal policies of the Wilson administration did 
just the opposite. Federal policy prompted heavy borrowing 
from the banking industry, exhausting the credit supply and 
driving up the costs of essential materials and services to 
unprecedented levels. The war was particularly hard on the 
public utilities industry, which survived and prospered on a 
constant flow of credit and a cheap, abundant supply of raw 
materials and labor. Though its gross revenues rose in 1917 
by $540,000, NORLC reported that its operating expenditures 
for the same year increased by $604,000, a four per cent 
rise in one year. The enormous increase in the cost of fuel, 
labor, and finance nearly paralyzed the company, reducing
saNew Orleans Itemr February 20-21, 1918.
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its earning capacity and jeopardizing its standing in the 
financial market.9*7
The war, however, was not solely responsible for the 
financial and political problems of NORLC or the public ser­
vice industry. The immense problems of the public utilities 
industry— overcapitalization, absentee ownership, the fixed 
term franchise, and a perverse, seemingly corrupt, involve­
ment in municipal politics— predated the war. In the early 
years of the twentieth century, investment bankers seized 
control of the public utilities industry. These bankers, 
anxious to promote and profit from the electrification and 
consolidation of the companies they controlled, overcapital­
ized the companies, turning stocks into bonds and dividends 
into "fixed" interest. Old debt and obsolete equipment was 
never retired or amortized, but simply recapitalized and 
allowed to "earn" dividends. Overcapitalization, however, 
did not benefit the public service industry. It actually im­
paired credit, making future financing more difficult to ob­
tain and more expensive to manage. It also prevented the
^ Proceedings of The Federal Electric Railways Commis­
sion. (Washington, 1919), vol. 1, 538, 555, vol. 3, 2138-40, 
2174-77, 2182-92, 2271; "Exhibit C, Information relative to 
[the] New Orleans Railway and Light Company System, December
31, 1917, Brief on Behalf of New Orleans Railway and Light 
Company, October 4, 1918," Portfolio 2, Proceedings of the 
National War Labor Board, hereafter cited as PNWLB, Troy H. 
Middleton Libray, LSU; Delos F. Wilcox, "Problem of Recon­
struction With Respect to Urban Transportation," National 
Municipal Review. 8 (January 1919), 33, 36; David M. Ken­
nedy, Over Here: American Society and the First World War 
(New York, 1980), 94, 101-03.
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operating companies from expanding and improving services, 
eroding public confidence and further impairing the credit 
of the companies.90
Despite the deteriorating financial and physical condi­
tion of the public service companies, legal and business ob­
ligations required them to pay huge dividends on their pre­
ferred and common stock. The preferred and common stock of 
the operating companies were held by large holding compan­
ies, which, in turn, were owned by still larger companies or 
by investment banks and insurance companies. The holding 
companies did not own any physical property, but, by holding 
the preferred and common stock, they controlled and managed 
the operating companies. The holding company system made 
possible the consolidation of lesser companies and the ex­
pansion and improvement in services, providing the capital 
and management to keep the underlying companies solvent and 
operating. The holding company system, however, based its 
management of the operating companies on the volume of their 
securities and on the frequency of refunding and exchange.
In brief, profit came not from prudent financing, careful 
management, or exemplary service, but from manipulating the 
bond and stock issues. Operating companies were stripped of 
all resources and incentives for improvements, no longer 
responsible for their own actions and no longer responsive
" PFERC. vol. 1, 554-555, 562; vol. 2, 1203-04; vol. 3, 
2136-37, 2161, 2266-67; Wilcox, "Problem of Reconstruction," 
HMR. 34-35.
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responsive to the needs of the community.38
Industry spokesmen, however, defended the early devel­
opment of the public service industry, arguing that the 
municipal and state governments shared the blame for the de­
plorable condition of the public utilities industry. At the 
beginning of the modern public utilities industry, spokemen 
claimed, few people in either management or government had a 
"proper conception" of the best means of financing, opera­
ting, or regulating the public service industry. The princi­
pal blame, however, lay with the character and policies of 
public regulation. Early in the history of the modern public 
utilities industry, public officials insisted on fixed, com­
petitive franchises that compelled the utility companies to 
needlessly expand and "improve" services, but required them 
to operate and survive on a limited, fixed revenue. Industry 
spokesmen asserted that the fixed-term, fixed-revenue fran­
chise impaired the credit of the industry and, ultimately, 
resulted in the neglect and deterioration of services. The 
term franchise became worthless at expiration, and, without 
the guarantee of renewal or reimbursement, franchise owners 
were forced to extract a profit high enough to return their 
initial investment and to give them a fair rate of return. 
The fixed-term franchise also fixed rates and fares and pre­
vented the utility company from adjusting its revenues to
38PPERC, vol.l, 537-55, vol.2, 1,203-04, 1,221, 1,271; 
vol.3, 2,173, 2,269-70; Wilcox, "Problem of Reconstruction,"
35.
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meet the changing conditions of the economy and the demands 
of municipal regulation. Consequently, service deteriorated 
and the companies faced bankruptcy.00
The financial and legal limitations imposed on the in­
dustry by an inapposite form of regulation, industry spokes­
men argued, forced the utility companies to finds ways of 
negating or avoiding the provisions of their franchises. In 
effect, then, despite the fulroinations of politicians and 
civic associations, the utility companies were providing the 
best service possible. The industry could, with adequate 
financial assistance, the appropriate legal flexibility, and 
good will of the people correct the abuses apparent in the 
system and restore service to prewar standards.ex
In New Orleans, as elsewhere throughout the United 
States, it was the public utilities industry, not the muni­
cipal authorities, that had depleted the local utility com­
panies of the resources to sustain services, manipulated the 
legal and political circumstances to serve their own inter-
0OPFERC, vol.l, 63-G5; vol. 2, 1223; vol. 3, 2137-38, 
2161, 2166-67, 2268, 2270; James E. Allison, Report on the 
Street Railway Service of the Citv of New Orleans Made to 
the Committee on Transporation Facilities of New Orleans.
(New Orleans, 1917), 3, 6-7, Louisiana Collection, Howard- 
Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University; Valerie Jean 
Conner, The National War Labor Board Stability. Social Jus­
tice. and the Voluntary State in World War I. (Chapel Hill, 
1983), 68-69.
“ Bentley W. Warren, "Argument and Brief Submitted to the 
Federal Electric Railways Commission on Behalf of the Com­
mittee of One Hundred Acting for the American Electric 
Railway Association," PFERC. vol. 3, passim. Warren was the 
General Counsel for the American Electric Railway Associa­
tion.
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ests, and jaundiced public sentiment against them. NORLC was 
"notoriously" overcapitalized and operated virtually without 
regulation. Most of its revenue went to sustain its heavy 
debt, leaving virtually nothing in reserve to improve or ex­
tend services. For years the company flaunted its disregard 
for the strictures of its municipal franchises, and it 
labored continually and successfully to prevent or dilute 
municipal regulation. The character of the public utility 
industry and the policies of its management— not the wartime 
emergency— precipitated the crisis in the industry and ex­
hausted the good will of the people of New Orleans.
The Behrman administration responded to the "latest" 
crisis at NORLC by reexamining the feasibility of municipal 
ownership and by asserting the direct authority of the muni­
cipal government over the public services of the city. The 
wartime emergency rekindled interest in municipal ownership 
of public utilities. The new proponents of municipal owner­
ship, like the New Orleans Item, argued that private owner­
ship was inept, profligate, and corrupt. It extracted enor­
mous and illicit profits from the city, denying it adequate, 
quality service and preventing it from planning and deter­
mining its own development. Municipal ownership, the Item 
asserted, was less costly, more efficient, and more democra­
tic. It would result in lower fares and rates, provide more 
and better services, lower and equalize taxes, and end the 
corrupt monopoly of private interests over public affairs.
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The dangers of municipal ownership still existed, but they 
were minimal and insignificant when compared to the substan- 
cial dangers of private ownership. The Item urged the city 
administration to make preparations for the municipalization 
of the entire NORLC system, including the properties of the 
New Orleans Gas Light Company. The commission council, al­
ready considering the benefits of municipal ownership, com­
plied with the Item’s request and instructed Edward J. 
Glenny, the Commissioner of Public Utilities, to study all 
aspects of municipalization.
The barriers erected to municipal ownership by the 
utilities company and by the wartime emergency were many and 
formidable, however. The municipalization of NORLC and NOGLC 
required the Behrman administration to conduct a comprehen­
sive legal and financial study that convinced the legisla­
ture, the Board of Liquidation City Debt (the bankers of New 
Orleans), the general business community, and the common 
citizens of New Orleans of the necessity, wisdom, and expe­
diency of municipal ownership. The management and ownership 
of NORLC and NOGLC would, undoubtedly, contest any reduction 
in the purchase price that threatened the "integrity" of 
their investment, delaying and, most certainly, increasing
o:zNew Orleans Item, February 20, 21, 23, March 18, May
23, October 10, 1918; PFERC. vol.3, 2282. The state legisla­
ture enacted legislation in 1918 authorizing the "municipal­
ities" of the state to own and operate electric streetcar 
and power companies. Act 128, Acts Passed bv the General As­
sembly of the State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 
1918.
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the cost of municipalization. The taxpayers of New Orleans 
would, in all likelihood, question the wisdom and practical­
ity of municipalization. Municipal ownership would require 
the city government to spend millions of dollars, borrowed 
at wartime interest rates, in purchasing, improving, and 
operating public services. And municipalization would not 
guarantee an immediate reduction in rates or a discernible 
improvement in services. In brief, it would be extremely 
difficult to create and maintain a political consensus in­
fluential and patient enough to sustain the municipalization 
of public services in New Orleans.63
The Behrman administration possessed the influence and 
the patience to sustain a consensus on municipalization, but 
it did not have the resources or the time to invest in 
creating one. Even under the best conditions, municipaliza­
tion was an expensive and protracted undertaking, requiring 
the municipal government to invest immense amounts of money, 
energy, and time into the process. Even in the best of 
times, the condition of city finances prevented the Behrman 
administration from seriously considering municipalization. 
The war played havoc with city finances. The inflation 
spawned by the war required the Behrman administration to 
raise assessment rates, but city revenues never kept pace 
with the cost of running the city, compelling the adminis-
63New Orleans Daily Statesr February 20, November 7, 
1918; PFERC. vol.l, 540-49, 556, vol.3, 2148, 2160, 2215.
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tration to curtail, not expand, services. The war confounded 
city finances in other ways. The war drove up interests 
rates and allocated investment capital to legitimate war­
time projects. Simply put, municipalization bonds were un­
likely to attract investors, and, even if the administration 
found a willing lender, the city could not afford to borrow 
the money.
The war— and the administration of Woodrow Wilson— did 
not accord the city administration the time to municipalize 
public services in New Orleans. Secretary of the Treasury 
William Gibbs McAdoo convinced President Wilson that the 
utility industry was essential to the war effort and the 
federal government must not let the war weaken the public 
service industry. The industry, McAdoo wrote, was "closely 
connected with and [is] an essential part of our prepara­
tion and successful prosecution of the war..." Given the 
local nature of the utility industry, McAdoo continued, the 
federal government must insist on local responsibility and 
accountability for the industry. President Wilson agreed 
with McAdoo. It was essential, wrote the president, that the 
public utilities be kept at "maximum efficiency," and that 
the federal government should do whatever was "reasonable" 
to sustain the utility companies, primarily by encouraging 
the municipal governments to respond promptly and positively 
to the immediate needs of the companies and the community. 
The president and Secretary McAdoo suggested that the feder-
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al government would, under the right conditions, furnish 
loans to the cities to keep the utilities operating. Munici­
pal authorities, then, would guarantee the continuation of 
service and prevent the financial collapse of the public 
utilities industry— at least for the duration of the war.®'* 
Encouraged by the administration's assurances, batter­
ies of attorneys and lobbyists representing the public ser­
vice industry descended on Washington, seeking guaranteed 
loans and calling for the establishment of a federal loan 
agency to subsidize the faltering utilities industry. The 
management of the public service corporations believed that 
an ingestion of federal money would save the companies from 
defaulting on their financial obligations, eliminating the 
likelihood of costly reorganizations. The companies saw, 
too, that the federal government would require security for 
its loans, forcing the municipalities to raise rates and 
fares and preventing them from pursuing any policy that 
might impair the credit and performance of the utility com­
panies. Despite the objections of several prominent senators 
and congressmen to the idea of bailing out the public utili­
ties industry. Congress enacted legislation creating the War
®‘€William Gibbs McAdoo to Wilson, February 15, 1918, 
Wilson to McAdoo, February 18, 1918, as found in "In the 
matter of Arbitration Between Division No. 196, Amalgamated 
Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of 
America of New Orleans, Louisiana and New Orleans Railway 
and Light Company," July 1918, Appendix, Exhibit A, PNWLB. 
LSU; New Orleans Item. February 22, May 31, June 1, 1918; 
New Orleans Daily States. February 28, June 1, 1918.
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Finance Corporation, authorizing it to extend loans to banks 
and industries deemed "good risks" and "essential to the war 
effort". One of its first applicants was the New Orleans 
Railway and Light Company."9
In May 1918, several officials of NORLC and the Ameri­
can Cities Company, including the chairman of the board of 
ACC, Francis T. Homer, appeared before the applications com­
mittee of the WFC. The executives of the two companies re­
counted for the committee the desperate financial condition 
of the New Orleans public utilities company and they asked 
the WFC to grant the company a loan of 5.2 million dollars. 
Despite weeks of persistent lobbying by the management of 
the two utility companies, the committee rejected their re­
quest, explaining that the WFC did not have the authority to 
grant loans directly to companies like NORLC and ACC. The 
applications committee informed the utility executives that 
the WFC could, with the proper guarantees, extend a loan to 
either the City of New Orleans or to a local bank on behalf 
of the company. Before the WFC would consent to such a loan, 
however, NORLC had to demonstrate that it was properly man­
aged and in reasonable financial condition and the commis­
sion council of New Orleans had to underwrite the loan by
"McAdoo to Wilson, February 25, 1918, Arthur S. Link, 
ed.. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, hereafter cited as PWW. 
(Princeton, 1984), vol. 46, 442-43; William P. G. Harding to 
Wilson, July 12, 1918, ibid.. vol. 48, 597-99; PFERC. vol.3, 
2154; New Orleans Item, February 21, March 2, May 7, Novem­
ber 19, 1918; New Orleans Times-Picavune. February 27, 1918.
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raising the rates and tares of the company."®
Company officials maintained that the railway and elec­
tric divisions of the company were, despite their financial 
problems, "well and honestly managed, and well maintained 
and operated," and saw no need for an increase in rates and 
fares for the moment. Apparently, though NORLC wanted and 
sought an increase in rates and fares, the company did not 
want to involve the Behrman administration in determining 
the size and duration of the increases. An increase in fares 
and rates would require weeks of public discussion, delaying 
the loan process and accentuating the need for greater pub­
lic control over rates, valuation, and expenditures. An in­
vestigation by the WFC, however, found the New Orleans util­
ities company a potential "bad risk," and the directors of 
the WFC wanted the Behrman administration to guarantee the 
loan. William P. 6. Harding, the managing director of the 
WFC and a member of the Federal Reserve Board, informed the 
management of NORLC and the city administration that the WFC 
would not consider a loan to the utility company until the 
WFC and the Behrman administration had come to a "definite
""Committee on Applications, Minutes of Meeting, May 28, 
29, 1918, "Application of American Cities Company and New 
Orleans Railway and Light Company," vol. 1 War Finance 
Corporation. Record Group 154. National Archives (hereafter 
cited as WFC, RG 1541; William P. G. Harding to Martin 
Behrman, May 31, 1918, ibid.: New Orleans Daily States. May 
18, June 1, 1918; New Orleans Item. May 23, 24, 31, June 1, 
1918; Conner, The National War Labor Board. 83-84.
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understanding regarding increased revenues" for NORLC.67
Mayor Behrman dispatched Commissioner of Public Utili­
ties Edward J. Glenny and City Attorney I. D. Moore to meet 
with the WFC, assuring the federal officials of the adminis­
tration's "full cooperation" and explaining to them the 
legal processes and possible political impediments in in­
creasing utility rates and fares. Mayor Behrman informed the 
WFC that the city administration recognized the "necessity 
of assisting public utility properties to render the ser­
vices contemplated in their franchises," and that the com­
mission council would honor any reasonable request or 
recommendation that allowed NORLC to continue operating. The 
mayor also assured the people of New Orleans that the admin­
istration would make a thorough and deliberate assessment of 
the financial condition of NORLC, confining the increase to 
the requirements of service and protecting "the genuine pub­
lic interest to the government's fullest extent of power."so
The request and recommendations offered by NORLC, how­
ever, were hardly reasonable. The company asked the WFC to 
loan it in excess of five million dollars at five percent 
interest, secured by a one cent fare increase (one-half cent
"■'William P. G. Harding to Martin Behrman, May 31, 1918, 
WFC. RG 154; "Exhibit C...Brief on Behalf of New Orleans 
Railway and Light Company, October 4, 1918," Portfolio 2, 
PNWLBr LSU; Allison, Report on the Street Railway Service 
of the City of New Orleans. 3; New Orleans Daily States.
May 18, 22, 1918; New Orleans Item. May 22, 23, 24, 26,
1918.
""New Orleans Daily States, May 22, 27-28, 31, June 1,
1918; New Orleans Item. May 22, 26-27, 31, June 1, 1918.
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for repayment of the loan and one-half cent for improvements 
to service), reducing services, ending the transfer system 
and discount fares for school children (and free rides for 
the Catholic clergy and religious), and several minor econo­
my measures. It seemed unlikely that the WFC would lend such 
a substantial sum of money to a minor utility corporation 
that federal investigators had already characterized as a 
poor risk. The WFC was not in the business of rehabilitating 
or refinancing utility companies, but in preventing them 
from collapsing and damaging the war effort. Even if the WFC 
agreed to loan NORLC five million dollars, a one cent in­
crease could hardly be deemed the proper security for such a 
huge debt. In theory the six cent fare increased revenues by 
only twenty percent, an increase of $800,000 a year. With 
the other economies, the company could expect an increase of 
1.6 million dollars, a sizeable savings but hardly enough to 
satisfy the WFC. For in reality, the six cent fare would not 
yield a twenty percent increase in revenues, and there was 
no guarantee that the company could economize or that the 
city would accept a reduction in services. Moreover, there 
was considerable public opposition to any increase in the
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cost of public services.®*
From the start, the local press, long critical of the 
Behrman administration, doubted the wisdom of the adminis­
tration's policy and questioned the expediency of the six 
cent fare. The utility policy of the Behrman administration, 
the New Orleans Item remarked, was, as ever, nearsighted and 
extravagant. The city administration pledged millions of 
dollars in additional revenues for NORLC, permitting the 
company to borrow millions more in public funds so it could 
continue operations and avoid another costly refinancing and 
reorganization. The NORLC did not deserve the assistance of 
either the federal War Finance Corporation or the people of 
New Orleans. The company was, as everyone knew, grossly 
overcapitalized and shamelessly mismanaged, requiring man­
agement to send millions of dollars in illicit dividends to 
New York and Philadelphia banks and allowing property and 
services to disintegrate. With the assistance of the Behr­
man administration, the company avoided any meaningful 
degree of public regulation, insolating itself against
®*PFERC, vol.l, 539, 557, 560; Wilcox, "Problem of Recon­
struction," 38-39; Wilcoc, "Effect of Fare Increases Upon 
Street Railway Traffic and Revenues," NMR, 9 (October 1920), 
633-35; New Orleans Item, May 28, 29, 31, 1918; New Orleans 
Daily States. May 27, 29, 1918. Railway experts predicted 
that the six cent fare would substantially reduce the number 
of riders, offsetting the superficial benefits of a one 
cent increase. Any increase over one or two cents, moreover, 
would be financially and politically damaging to the 
utility companies. The management of NORLC claimed that the 
six cent fare brought a thirty percent increase in New 
Orleans, but conceded that it did not permit the company to 
meet its financial obligations and improve services.
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public scrutiny and accountability. Now, after years of 
prodigal fianancing and behavior, the company claimed that 
unless it received the immediate assistance of the federal 
and municipal governments it would default on its financial 
obligations and cease operations.70
There was, as ever, the Item remarked, no truth to the 
dire predictions of NORLC, and there was, as well, no appar­
ent benefit to rescuing the company from a disaster of its 
own making. An emergency federal loan and a raise in the 
costs of services would not prevent a thorough and permanent 
collapse of NORLC. The federal government was unwilling and 
unable to loan NORLC the sort of money that would allow the 
company to meet all its finacial obligations, attract new 
investment, and avoid collapse. The loan would be small and 
the WFC would expect repayment with interest. The one cent 
fare increase would not help the company in refinancing and 
reorganizing itself, either. The six cent fare would not 
generate enough money to help NORLC repay the WFC loan or 
meet its crushing debt, operate the system, and attract new 
investment. Ultimately, the company would default on its 
debt and continue operating under a private receiver until 
the stockholders agreed on a suitable refinancing plan. In 
any event, the Item concluded, the city would have spent 
millions of dollars on preserving public services and would 
lose millions more in the rehabiliation of NORLC. It urged
7°New Orleans Item, May 23, 24, 26, 27, 1918.
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the Behrman administration, then, to avoid another public 
humiliation and to "municipalize" NORLC and NOGLC.71
Mayor Behrman, however, under pressure from the Wilson 
administration and from the public to keep NORLC operating, 
dismissed the idea of municipalization as premature and com­
mitted the administration to the six cent fare and a more 
direct and vigorous regulation of NORLC. The municipal ad­
ministration wanted to avoid any crippling interruptions in 
service, and saw the fare increase as an effective and rea­
sonable means of preserving public services. Above all else, 
however, the commission council wanted to prevent NORLC from 
lapsing into receivership. Unlike the Item, the Behrman ad­
ministration believed that receivership threatened the pro­
gress and welfare of the city. The principal obligations of 
any receiver were to preserve the investment of the stock­
holders and to reduce the obligations of service that per­
mitted the company to continue operating until the stock­
holders refinanced and reorganized the company. Both of 
these duties could run counter to the interests of the city, 
minimizing the regulatory authority of the municipal govern­
ment and curtailing public services.72
The one cent fare increase was, unquestionably, the 
"simplest solution," and it offered the Behrman administra-
7XNew Orleans Item. May 22-31, 1918.
72New Orleans Item. May 22, 26-27, 31, 1918; New Orleans 
Daily States. May 27, 28, 31, 1918, January 5, 1919; PFERC. 
vol.2, 1,263-64; Moore to Behrman, undated, (but probably 
between May 22 and 31, 1918), vol.9, CAP. CA, NOPL.
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tion its only opportunity to reconstitute public utility 
policy in New Orleans. The Nix bill authorized the commis­
sion council to regulate fares and rates without regard for 
the fixed charges provisions of the franchise ordinances 
and utility contracts the city had with NORLC and NOGLC.
The council could, then, by simple ordinance, set fares 
and rates and avoid the delay and expense involved in 
granting a new franchise. The one cent increase was, as 
well, reasonable, equitable, and politically acceptable. The 
war had pushed up the cost of doing business, and a fare in­
crease seemed thoroughly justified given the wartime econom­
ic circumstances. If NORLC discontinued service for any 
length of time, the loss of services would effect businesses 
and the quality of life throughout New Orleans. The Behrman 
administration could, as well, justify a modest increase in 
fares because the war had pushed up wages and salaries (even 
city employees received a raise during the war) and commut­
ers could, with little hardship, absorb the increase in car­
fare. Politically, a fare increase was acceptable because 
the adminstration and public saw it as a temporary, wartime 
measure that would expire with the end of the war. Of more 
importance, however, the Behrman administration viewed the 
fare increase as an opportunity to rectify the deficiencies 
in the Nix act and to expand and enhance the council's power 
over NORLC and NOGLC.73
73Ibid.
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As expected, the MFC refused the request of NORLC for 
five million dollars, citing, as it did before, that the 
WFC charter prohibited it from loaning money directly to 
NORLC and that the loan request far exceeded the immediate 
needs of the company. The WFC again informed the officers 
of NORLC that it would consider a smaller loan negotiated 
through New Orleans banks and underwritten by the city 
government.74 Disappointed and desperate, the management of 
NORLC had no other choice but to seek the assistance of the 
Behrman administration. Within a matter of a few hours fol­
lowing the ruling of the WFC, Daniel Dennis Curran, presi­
dent of NORLC, wrote to Mayor Behrman and the commission 
council, requesting their help in obtaining a federal loan 
for NORLC.'73
In his letter, Curran emphasized the importance of 
NORLC to the growth and prosperity of New Orleans, arguing 
that the prosperity of the company was indispensable to the 
further progress and wealth of the city. In the past eight 
years, he wrote, NORLC furnished the city with outstanding 
service and added "materially" to the welfare and develop­
ment of the city. The company provided cheap, efficient gas,
^••Committee on Applications, "Minutes of Meetings, May 
29, 1918;" William P. G. Harding to Behrman, May 31, 1918, 
vol.l, WFC. RG 154: New Orleans Item. May 29, 31, 1918; New 
Orleans Daily States. May 29, 30, 1918.
79Curran to Martin Behrman and the Commission Council, 
May 31, 1918, Appendix, Exhibit A, Portfolio 1, PNWLBf LSU; 
New Orleans Item, June 1, 1918; New Orleans Daily States. 
June 1, 1918.
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electric, and transit service and returned millions of dol­
lars to the community in services, improvements, wages and 
salaries, civic and charitable contributions, and taxes. In 
the past three years alone, Curran said, NORLC spent over 
three million dollars in improvements to services, and, in 
1917, paid almost $500,000 to the city in property taxes. 
NORLC and NOGLC employed nearly 4,000 people, many of whom 
deserved substantial wage and salary increases.7*1
Despite the many improvements and an overall increase 
in revenues, Curran remarked, NORLC faced severe economic 
problems that threatened to bankrupt the company and, possi­
bly, end services. The economic dislocation brought on by 
the war— not past mismanagement— was responsible for the 
company's troubles. The wartime emergency drove up the costs 
of essential materials and services, making it impossible 
for the company to meet its "fixed" financial obligations 
and requiring it to delay or forego needed replacements and 
improvements. Those conditions alone, Curran insisted, com­
pelled the management of the company to seek the aid of the 
federal government and the Behrman administration, and he 
requested that the commission council investigate his 
claims, satisfying itself that the war alone was responsible 
for the financial crisis at NORLC.77
The commission council convened at a special session to
7eIbid.
77Ibid.
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consider Curran's proposals and to listen to Mayor Behrman's 
explanation and suggestions. The mayor testified to the im­
portance and urgency of crisis at NORLC. The mayor was con­
vinced that NORLC was incapable of resolving its financial 
problems by itself, that it required the assistance of the 
Wilson administration in Washington and the municipal gov­
ernment of New Orleans. The management of the company was, 
for the most part, Behrman suggested, responsible for the 
financial and physical conditions of the company, but the 
war worsened those conditions, inflating the cost of opera­
tion, consuming private investment, and jeopardizing public 
services. The company was, the mayor reported, unable to 
continue operating under these conditions, but neither muni­
cipalization nor receivership was an acceptable answer. The 
Wilson administration designated the public utilities indus­
try an essential wartime industry and made the municipal 
and other local governments responsible for its continuing 
operation and essential welfare. If the commission council 
temporized or failed to take the appropriate action, NORLC 
would probably cease operations, conveying to a candid world 
"a failure in the commerce of this city of the first magni­
tude". 78
■'"Martin Behrman to Commission Council of New Orleans, 
June 4, 1918, Appendix, Exhibit B, In the Matter of Arbitra­
tion Between Division No. 194, AASEREA, July 1918, Port­
folio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item. June 4, 1918; New 
Orleans Daily States. June 4, 1918, January 5, 1919.
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A candid city administration, however, could not in 
good conscience dismiss the past mismanagement of NORLC. 
Mayor Behrman insisted that before the council consider 
Curran's proposals it impose certain conditions and qualifi­
cations on NORLC that would "safeguard and protect the in­
terest of the people of this community”. The mayor made six 
recommendations, and he insisted that NORLC submit to each 
of them before the council agreed to raise carfare. Behrman 
proposed that three members of the commission council, the 
mayor and the commissioners of Public Utilities and Public 
Property, become permanent, voting members of the board of 
directors for NORLC, according the Behrman administration a 
direct and influential role in formulating the broad corpo­
rate policy of the company. Behrman also proposed that the 
mayor select (subject to the approval of the board of direc­
tors) the general manager of NORLC, giving the city adminis­
tration an indirect hand in managing the physical property 
of NORLC. 73
Sitting on the board of directors and appointing the 
general manager of NORLC was of little intrinsic importance 
unless the council could free itself of the Nix act and re­
solve the issues of valuation, rate of return, and service. 
The Behrman administration was aware of the numerous defi­
ciencies in the Nix act and it saw the fare increase issue
73Ibid.; "Proceedings had at a special meeting of the 
Commission Council of the City of New Orleans held on Satur­
day August 17, 1918," Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU.
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as an opportunity of rectifying those problems. Before the 
Behrman administration consented to any fare increase, NORLC 
had to submit to a "complete and full" survey of all proper­
ties, determining "for all future time" the legitimate valu­
ation of the company. The Nix act required the Board of Pub­
lic Utilities (and the commission council) to use three 
standards for determining the "fair value" of NORLC: origi­
nal cost of construction, the earning capacity of the secur­
ities, and the costs of reproduction.80
Clearly, those standards favored NORLC, bloating its 
valuation out of proportion to its actual value. The city 
administration, mindful of the injustice of those standards, 
refused to abide by them, proposing instead that the commis­
sion council (not the Board of Public Utilities) set valua­
tion on the "actual cash value" of all properties, irrespec­
tive of outstanding capital issues. In other words, Mayor 
Behrman wanted the commission council to "squeeze" out all 
watered stock, relieving much of the financial crisis of the 
company and, ultimately, reducing the cost of service. The 
mayor’s recommendations, however, went beyond reducing rates 
and fares, but had two other, more significant, purposes. 
Behrman believed that his recommendations would permit the 
city government to reorient the public utility industry to­
ward service, rather than profit, and it would allow the 
city government the time to give "serious" consideration to
aoIbid.
i
311
public ownership. The last three recommendations were 
designed to accomplish those ends.®1
The mayor proposed that the commission council, after 
determining the "actual cash value" of NORLC, also set a 
fixed purchase price for the company. And that the council 
reserve for the city the right to buy NORLC at any time 
during the war or for the two years immediately after the 
war. During the "option period," the commission council 
would, in addition to determining rates, fares, and wages, 
also set the rate of return, fixing it a six percent. 
Finally, if the council failed to exercise its option to 
purchase NORLC, the administration would forfeit its right 
to select the general manager, determine wages, and limit 
the rate of return. However, the commission council would 
retain its seats on the board of directors and require NORLC 
to return its "excess" profit to the city."2
At first, there were few— if any— critical responses to 
Mayor Behrman's proposal. The business establishment, in 
particular the banking and legal associates of NORLC, were 
unusually silent. And the New Orleans Item, the severest 
critic of the Behrman administration, was lavish in its 
praise of the plan. It characterized the proposal as "busi-
aiIbid.
a2Ibid. Behrman's final proposal guaranteed NORLC a rate 
of return no less than seven percent, but required the com­
pany to give the city fifty percent of any return between 
seven and eight percent and seventy-five percent of any 
return above eight percent.
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like" and "substantially sound in principle," offering a 
just solution for every interest, especially to the stock­
holders (ACC and UGEC) of NORLC, who faced a costly recei­
vership unless they cooperated with the administration in 
reorganizing and rehabilitating the company. The editor and 
publisher of the Item were pleased and surprised by the con­
tent and tone of Behrman's recommendations, given the the 
administration's previous reliance on older, less enlight­
ened notions of public utility regulation. The plan, the 
Item said, signaled a shift in the administration's policy 
toward NORLC and marked a fundamental change in its philoso­
phy of politics and municipal government.aa
There was, to be sure, nothing truly surprising or 
novel about the proposals offered by the Behrman administra­
tion. And, almost needless to say, the plan hardly repre­
sented a radical transformation in the policies and politi­
cal philosophy of the Behrman administration. Since early in 
1912, the Behrman administration had been considering many 
of the proposals offered by Mayor Behrman in June, 1918. The 
municipal regulation bills proposed by the Behrman adminis­
tration in 1912, 1914, 1916 authorized the municipal govern­
ment to adjust rates and fares, assure a reasonable and ad­
justable rate of return, and determine a "fair and just"
B3New Orleans Item. June 4-6, 1918.
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valuation.84 Between 1916 and 1918, as the crisis within the 
public utilities industry became more apparent and acute, 
the Behrman administration became disenchanted with the Nix 
act compromise, and, as the deficiencies of the act became 
more apparent, the administration looked for ways of repeal­
ing its provisions.88
In the early summer of 1917, the city administration, 
beset with complaints about railway service and demands from 
NORLC to curtail services, commissioned a critical survey of 
the entire public transportation system. The study, con­
ducted by James E. Allison, a railway expert, recommended 
that the commission council be accorded representation on 
the board of directors of NORLC and that the mayor appoint 
the general manager for the company. Given the right circum­
stances and with the proper guarantees, Allison insisted, 
the joint management of the company would assure a higher 
quality of service and greater, more efficient profit.
Allison also argued that a guaranteed, though flexible, rate 
of return would convince stockholders of the safety of their 
investment and induce them to expand services and return a 
portion of their profit to the community. These guarantees 
would, above all else, make the interests of the company
a*Moore to Thompson, undated (probably between February
13-19, 1916) vol.7, CAP. CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item. March
28, 1912, April 29, June 9, 16, 1914.
BBMoore to Commissioner of Public Utilities E. J. Glenny
February 28, August 3, 1917, August 8, November 26, 1918, 
Waldo to Moore August 24, 1918, vol.8, CAP. CA, NOPL; New 
Orleans Item December 5, 1918.
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identical with those of the community, ending years of 
mutual suspicion and restoring the faith of the people in 
public services and public administration. “
Predictably, the management of NORLC was critical of 
the tone and content of Behrman's proposals. In a letter to 
the commission council, NORLC president Daniel Curran com­
plained that the municipal government ignored the damage 
done to NORLC by the war and that it refused to consider the 
company's needs and proposals. The war had disrupted the 
normal financial and business operations of the company, and 
the company now faced bankruptcy and receivership unless it 
found alternative sources of investment and income. In nor­
mal times, reorganization under a private receiver would be 
preferable to public rehabilitation, but the war prevented 
the private reorganization of the company. Moreover, recei­
vership during the wartime crisis, Curran suggested, would 
only result in higher fares and a reduction in services, 
jeopardizing the prosperity of the community and compromis­
ing the nation's war effort. In short, the company could not 
continue operating unless it received federal aid and an in­
crease in local revenues. And neither was available to the 
company unless it submitted to the regimen forced on it by
BBAllison, Report on the Street Railway Service of the 
City of New Orleans. 7-8.
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the war and the Behrman administration.87
Despite its reservations about public rehabilitation, 
Curran announced, the management of NORLC would submit to 
the administration's plan— with one critical exception. The 
company would welcome the mayor and the commissioners to the 
board of directors and it would agree to limit the rate of 
return to six percent. But it would never consent to a per­
manent public valuation by the Behrman administration, nor 
would it agree to any valuation based solely on "actual cash 
value". Such a formula, Curran charged, undermined the in­
terests of the stockholders and threatened the future, pri­
vate rehabilitation of the company and the development of 
the community.B"
Though Curran's assessment was, to say the least, self- 
serving, it was not an idle criticism. As Curran asserted, 
the plan offered by the Behrman administration ignored the 
adverse effects the war had on the public utilities company, 
and instead concentrated on issues that were, in effect, un­
related to the wartime emergency. Though the Wilson adminis­
tration insisted that the municipal governments take respon- 
siblity for the industry, public management, an agreed upon 
rate of return, and a public rehabilitation of the industry 
were not necessary to assure the continuing operation of the
"7Curran to Behrman June 10, 1918, Appendix, Exhibit C, 
In the matter of arbitration between Division No. 194 AASE- 
REA and NORLC, July 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New 
Orleans Item. June 10, 1918.
"■Ibid.
company. From the standpoint o£ the management of NORLC, 
then, the administration's demands were unwarranted and in­
sidious. The board of directors did not determine the finan­
cial or business policies of the company (it was a court of 
last resort in labor disputes, though), and, from the view 
of management, the presence of the Behrman administration on 
the board of directors tended only to "politicize" the 
crisis Circumscribing the valuation and the rate of return 
only deepened the crisis and made the private rehabilitation 
of the company more costly."*
In these matters, however, the Behrman government acted 
not from ignorance or self-interest, but with a sense of 
purpose. As Mayor Behrman explained in defense of his pro­
posals, the federal government made the municipal government 
responsible for the continuing operation of NORLC. The city 
was, in effect, lending its "full faith and credit" to the 
company, requiring its citizens to bear the burden of higher 
fares. It seemed only just and fitting that the council 
"manage" the public affairs of the company, imposing the 
conditions that assured the permanent rehabilitation of the 
company and that established the strictest regulatory au­
thority over its public affairs and obligations.90
Like many other progressive reformers and public ser­
vants, the commission council of New Orleans saw the war as
B9Ibid.
9°New Orleans Daily States. June 13, 1918.
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a time and an opportunity to address those problems that, 
for one reason are another, escaped resolution in the years 
that preceded the war. Indeed, the Behrman administration 
acted from the basic premise of the progressive politics:
"the conviction that government should actively pursue the 
public interest in a society whose private sector seemed in­
creasingly indifferent or hostile to that interest." The 
Behrman administration was not interested simply in remedy­
ing the immediate problems of NORLC, though it understood 
the necessity of preventing the collapse of service. Nor was 
the municipal government interested in simply managing the 
business affairs of the company for the duration of the war. 
The mayor and the council, instead, saw their presence on 
the board of directors as an opportunity to manage the pub­
lic rehabilitation of NORLC. The Behrman administration be­
lieved— perhaps naively— that public rehabilitation meant a 
thorough and fair reduction in the valuation of the capital 
"investment" in the company, lower rates and fares, greater 
efficiency and accountability from the corporate manage­
ment, and more reliable service. The council also believed 
that public rehabilitation gave greater authority to public 
regulation and made municipal ownership possible."x
The Behrman plan was, of course, not without its flaws
"xLafaye to Behrman and the Commission Council, December 
30, 1918 as quoted in the New Orleans Daily States. January
5, 1919; New Orleans Item, July 1, 3, 1918; New Orleans 
Daily States. June 13, July 1, 1918; David M. Kennedy, Over 
Here, 97.
and ambiguities. It was apparent from the discussions on re­
habilitation that the one cent fare could not fund the refi­
nancing and reorganization of the company and other in­
creases would be necessary. The Behrman plan, remarked 
Rudolph S. Hecht, the executive vice-president of the 
Hibernia National Bank, a large holder of NORLC securities, 
would not attract the intelligent investor. No prudent in­
vestor, he said, "with sense enough to have money to lend," 
would invest in NORLC under the Behrman plan. It did not 
provide adequate protection or incentive for investors and 
would prevent the thorough "overhaul" necessary to rehabili­
tate the company. Nor would management accept any valuation 
formula that ignored the accrued and legitimate interests of 
investors. In short, the management of NORLC would contest 
the public rehabilitation of the company at almost any 
cost.92
That cost did not include federal loans, however. When 
the Behrman administration agreed to the one cent fare in­
crease, the management of NORLC applied immediately for a 
loan from the War Finance Corporation. The company asked 
for and received a loan of one million dollars to pay the 
interest on the securities of several underlying companies 
and make improvements. NORLC pledged $1.6 million in bonds 
as security and promised to repay the loan with interest and
92New Orleans Item, June 12, July 1, 3, 1918; New Orleans
Daily States. June 13, July 1, 1918.
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not to borrow except for current expenses. The WFC voted to 
extend the money to the company, contingent on an increase 
in revenues. Commissioner Lafaye, speaking for the Behrman 
administration, proclaimed that the loan now afforded the 
administration and the company the time and incentive to 
reorganize and rehabilitate the company. But others were 
less sanguine. Speaking for investors and management,
Rudolph Hecht cautioned that the WFC loan would not "solve 
the financial difficulties of the company, but... only tide 
it over the immediate emergency".93
Neither Lafaye nor Hecht was correct. The momentum and 
character of the war did not accord the Behrman administra­
tion and the management of NORLC the time and latitude to 
rehabilitate the public utilities industry as they had 
planned. Rehabilitation went beyond resolving the financial 
difficulties of the electric street railway industry or cor­
recting the deficiencies of public administration and regu­
lation. But included the issues of a "living wage," collec­
tive bargaining, the closed shop, race, and "the rights of 
the community". Until the Behrman administration and NORLC 
resolved those and other issues, the rehabilitation of the 
public utilities industry in New Orleans would remain an
S3Committee on Applications, Minutes of Meeting, June 25, 
26, 1918, vol.l, WFC. RG 154: Typescript of Indenture be­
tween New Orleans Railway and Light Company and the War 
Finance Corporation, July 30, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB: New 
Orleans Daily States. July 11, 1918; New Orleans Item, July 
11, 1918.
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elusive reform.
Chapter Six
On Neutral Ground
In December, 1917, John G. O'Kelley, the Federal Fuel 
Administrator for New Orleans, wrote to Commissioner of Pub­
lic Utilities Edward J. Glenny and to Nelson H. Brown, the 
general manager of NORLC, asking them to recommend ways of 
reducing the coal consumption of the giant utilities com­
pany. Meeting with O'Kelley in early January, Glenny and 
Brown informed the Fuel Administrator that the surest and 
simplest method of reducing coal consumption without incon­
veniencing the public or compromising the war effort was to 
reduce the number of streetcars serving the city. By elimi­
nating unnecessary streetcar service, they asserted, the 
company would save hundreds of tons of coal each week, pre­
venting interruptions in electric light and power services 
and, by consolidating lines, actually enhancing streetcar 
service. O'Kelley endorsed the idea, and Glenny and Brown 
set out immediately to put their idea into practice.1
xNew Orleans Item, January 11, February 4, 1918; New 
Orleans Daily States. January 3, 13, 17, February 1, 4, 5, 
1918. The Fuel Administration began operations in August, 
1917 under the direction of Harry A. Garfield, the president 
of Williams College. Kennedy, Over Here, 123-24; Burl 
Noggle, Into the Twenties The United States From Armistice 
to Normalcy. (Urbana, Illinois, 1974), 62; Robert D. Cuff, 
"Harry Garfield, The Fuel Administration, and the Search for 
a Cooperative Order During World War I," American Quarterly. 
30 (Spring 1978), 39-40, 46-47.
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The council and NORLC agreed to reduce a number of cars 
on specific lines during "off hours" and to consider elimi­
nating and consolidating lines feeding into Canal Street. At 
the end of the first month of the new schedule, company 
officials claimed that rerouting saved 110 tons of coal a 
week (twenty-four tons on Sundays alone). NORLC president 
Daniel D. Curran claimed that despite the reduction in the 
number of cars, there was "no decrease in service to the 
public other than the elimination of...wasteful and dupli­
cated services". Despite reservations about several aspects 
of the rerouting plan, Commissioner Glenny believed that 
the reduction in car services had saved fuel and had 
improved services. Though he regretted the minor delays 
and other inconveniences associated with the rerouting plan, 
Fuel Administrator O'Kelley expressed his satisfaction with 
the overall success of the plan and encouraged the adminis­
tration and the company to continue their efforts.2
Despite the obvious advantages of the Glenny-Brown re­
routing plan, there were, as well, several aspects of the 
plan that troubled the Behrman administration and the other 
public and private leaders of the city. Neighborhood associ­
ations, merchants, and, most especially, the Carmen's 
union were angered by the implications and repercussions of 
the rerouting plan. Neighborhood civic associations, partic-
2New Orleans Daily States. February 5, 7 8, 10, 16,
1918; New Orleans' Item. February 7, 1918.
ularly in the Seventh, Ninth, and Twelfth Hards, complained 
to the Board of Public Utilities (an action that irked the 
commission council) that the company had arbitrarily re­
routed lines and curtailed service long before federal offi­
cials sanctioned a reduction in service. In the Garden Dis­
trict (Twelfth Hard), a group of citizens, led by Paul H. 
Maloney, filed a petition with the BPU calling on NORLC to 
restore car service to their neighborhood and offering to 
defray some the cost of restoring service. The board of di­
rectors for the Dryades Building and Loan Association filed 
suit against NORLC and the Commission Council (but not the 
BPU), claiming that NORLC had, in violation of its 1912 
franchise with the city, consolidated the Peters and Dryades 
Street lines. Though the court upheld the position of the 
company and the city, the Behrman administration was truly 
disturbed by the response of the public. But no more so than 
by the response of the Carmen's union.3
The carmen took their protest directly to Commissioner 
Glenny. Since the end of 1916, they noted, NORLC, in viola­
tion of its franchises with the city and in contravention of 
its contract with the union, had been reducing service and
3New Orleans Daily States. January 3, 13, 17, February
5, 22, 28, March 11, 1918; New Orleans Item. January 11, 
February 4, 6, 19, 23, March 11, 12, 1918; New Orleans Times 
Picayune. February 23, 1918. Judge Porter Parker dismissed 
the suit, remarking that the "evidence clearly shows that 
this rerouting did not originate with the railways company, 
but was done as a conservation measure by a public offi­
cial" .
324
consolidating lines. The company justified its actions as 
wartime economy measures, designed to eliminate waste, con­
serve energy, and to keep vital services operating at "maxi­
mum efficiency". The company was not interested, the carmen 
insisted, in conservation or efficiency, but in reducing its 
own cost and maintaining its rate of profit and in eliminat­
ing jobs and crippling the labor movement. The rerouting 
plan, then, the union charged, only gave the company the 
license to exploit the community further and to assault and 
weaken the labor movement in New Orleans.4
Despite the apparent justice of many of the complaints 
against the rerouting plan, the Behrroan administration was 
unwilling to repudiate it completely. The rerouting plan and 
other conservation measures (heatless Mondays, for example) 
significantly reduced coal consumption in the city and 
allowed the company to increase and improve electric light 
and power services. There were, in addition, other long-term 
benefits to the plan. In 1913, the Behrman administration, 
in response to numerous complaints about deteriorating rail­
way service, conducted a study of the entire street railway 
system. The study, done under the supervision of Commission­
er of Public Utilities William Bess Thompson, recommended
4Gus Bienvenue to W. D. Mahon, International President 
of the Amagamated Association of Street and Electric Railway 
Employees of America [AASEREA], November 16, 1916, W. V. 
Seber to Union membership, November 21, 1916, Street Railway 
Union Collection, hereafter cited as SRUC, box 1, Special 
Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane 
University; New Orleans Daily States. February 14, 1918.
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the consolidation of several streetcar lines and the cre­
ation of a "loop" system on Canal Street. The commission 
council, under pressure from Canal Street merchants and 
neighborhood civic associations, delayed consideration of 
Thompsonfs recommendations, pending the investigation and 
recommendations of street railway experts. The investiga­
tion, begun in the summer of 1917 under the direction of 
James E. Allison, a St. Louis railway expert, confirmed Com­
missioner Thompson's initial findings and recommendations. 
Despite expert analysis and recommendation, the Behrman ad­
ministration could not overcome the concerted, politicized 
opposition to consolidation and rerouting. The fuel crisis, 
then, provided the administration with an opportunity to 
accomplish what peacetime politics would not permit.9
The city administration was, however, fully aware of 
the hardships faced by most citizens. In addition to the 
interminable delays in traffic, New Orleanians, like most 
other Americans, were beset by rising food and clothing
®Waldo to Moore, June 30, 1910, vol.5, Moore to Thomp­
son, January 6, 1913, vol.6, CAP. CA, NOPL; unsigned to 
Thompson, February 19, 1915, Ninth Ward residents to Thomp­
son, May 5, November 17, 1914, September 7, 1915, West End 
residents to Thompson, January 8, 1916, Napoleon Avenues 
residents to Thompson, February 9, 1916, Central Carrollton 
Improvement Association to Thompson, March 21, 1916, William 
V. Seeber to Thompson, November 21, 1916, Department of Pub­
lic Utilities, Petitions and Correspondence, vol.l, CA,
NOPL; New Orleans Item, Daily States. Times-Picavune. Octo­
ber through December, 1914; Allison, Report on the Street 
Railway Service of the City of New Orleans. 3-7, Louisiana 
Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane Univer­
sity.
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prices, higher rents, shortages in housing and fuel, and 
self-imposed rationing (meatless Mondays, wheatless Wednes­
days). At the end of 1916, food prices in New Orleans had 
increased thirty-five percent over 1915, and the cost of 
living had jumped nearly twenty-six percet. By early 1918, 
the Item reported that food prices in New Orleans had in­
creased 127% over 1914. And, between December, 1917 and 
December, 1919, the cost of living in New Orleans had risen 
another thirty-four percent.®
Real wages, however, particularly among the unskilled 
and semi-skilled worker, had not kept pace with the rising 
cost of living. Street railway workers, especially the con­
ductors and carmen who operated the streetcars, suffered 
even more than the common "day laborer". Between 1900 and 
1907, under a succession of one year contracts, wages for 
street railway workers of NORLC changed very little, ranging 
from fifteen cents an hour in 1901 and to twenty cents in 
1907. The 1910 contract, the second in a line of three year 
contracts, raised wages from twenty-one and a half cents an 
hour to twenty-two and three quarters cents, an increase of 
one and a quarter cents an hour. Between 1910 and 1913,
NORLC increased wages by one quarter cent each year, giving
"New Orleans Item. May 19, 1913, October 4, 26, November 
4, 1916, January 2, February 1, 3, 1918; Paul H. Douglas,
Real Wages in the United States 1890-1926. (Boston, 1930),
55. According to figures compiled by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, despite a sufficiency of federal law and a 
battery of regulatory agencies, the cost of living rose 70% 
between 1916 and 1918.
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senior employees twenty-three and one quarter cents an hour 
in 1912-1913. And, in 1913, the company and the union signed 
a five year contract, agreeing to pay "regular time" conduc­
tors and operators twenty-four cents an hour for the first 
three years of the contract, twenty-four and a quarter in 
the fourth year, and twenty-four and one-half cents in the 
final year of the contract. By contrast, "platform men" 
(conductors and operators) in other Southern cities, like 
Dallas, Atlanta, Shreveport, Louisville, and Charleston, all 
made more money than the platform men in New Orleans. And, 
in many cases, unskilled and semi-skilled workers employed 
by NORLC made more money than most carmen.*7
John Stadler, the president of the carmen's union in 
1918, denounced the increases as "meaningless" and as an 
indication of the pathetic working conditions at NORLC.
Since 1913, he said, the company had been consolidating
^"Minutes of the Hearings in the Street Railway Cases," 
July 20, 1918, 1, 46-47, 49v Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; Con­
tracts between Local 194, AASEREA and New Orleans Railways 
Company and New Orleans Railway and Light Company, 1902- 
1907, 1910, 1913, SRUC. box 13, SCD, H-TML, TU; "Before the 
National War Labor Board Employees versus New Orleans Rail­
way and Light Company On re-Hearing Brief On Behalf of the 
New Orleans Railway and Light Company," October 4, 1918, 2-
19, Portfolio 2, PNWLB; New Orleans Item. May 15-30, June 
1-5, 1913; New Orleans Daily Picayune. May 24, 25, June 1, 
5-7, 1913. The carmen wanted a one year contract, paying 
them twenty-five cents an hour and requiring them to work a 
nine hour shift in a ten hour day. They also wanted to elim­
inate the no strike clause and to compel NORLC to discharge 
any worker dismissed from the union. The men received none 
of those demands, but they earned the praise of the local 
press. The Item characterized the union men as mature, de­
termined, conservative, and, above all, "amendable to rea­
son" and simple justice.
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lines and rerouting cars, contrary to the demands of the 
public and the instructions of the Behrman administration. 
The removal of cars and the consolidation of lines not only 
inconvenienced commuters and evaded franchise obligations, 
but also threatened jobs and compromised on the labor move­
ment. In rerouting lines, the company was, in effect, reduc­
ing the number of men assigned to regular hours shifts, 
forcing the carmen to accept part-time pay, and, consequent­
ly, lowering income and forcing men to leave work and the 
union. "The men are simply unable to make ends meet,” he 
said. Unless the company offered the union a "living” wage 
and better conditions, many union workers would, of neces­
sity, resign from the company and seek employment in some 
other, more rewarding and satisfying line of work."
Stadler's criticisms and warnings could only have dis­
turbed and dismayed the Behrman administration. John Stadler 
was, after all, the president of one of the largest and, un­
doubtedly, the most visible labor union in the city— a union 
with a storied past and a deep and abiding relationship with 
the Regular Democratic Organization, dating back to the 
General Strike of 1892.9 Stadler had not only denounced the
BNew Orleans Daily States. Hay 13, 15, 18, 1918.
9At every important juncture of its development, the 
union had the support of the Regulars, who prevented 
management from using the police powers of the state or city 
to break the movement. See John Fitzpatrick to Hugh 
McCloskey, May 23, 24, 31, November 7, 1892, Fitzpatrick to 
Joseph Lemon, November 8, 1892, Paul Capdevielle to William 
Mehle, October 2, 1902, MCLMO. vols.67 and 82.
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the rerouting plan as harmful to the public good and order, 
but, by implication, also accused the Behrman administra­
tion, a principal architect of the rerouting plan, of being 
either indifferent to the social repercussions of the 
plan. And, even more menacing to the public good and the 
social order, was Stadler's promise of mass resignations if 
NORLC and Behrman administration (the mayor and two other 
commissioners were about to assume their seats on the board 
of directors of NORLC) did not meet the wage and contract 
demands of the union.
Contrary to the accusations leveled at the Behrman ad­
ministration, then and now, it was not unsympathetic to the 
interests of organized labor. Nor did it act on the belief 
that those interests were irrelevant to the public rehabili­
tation or regulation of NORLC. The administration often en­
couraged the interests of organized labor, but would not 
permit organized labor— or management— to disrupt public 
services or in any other way threanten the public order or 
the social good of New Orleans. The administration consider­
ed service the primary obligation of both management and 
labor, and it saw the resolution of the wage and contract 
dispute as indispensable to the rehabilitation of the com­
pany.10
1QFor an opposite point of view, see George M. Reynolds, 
Machine Politics in New Orleans. 1897-1926 (New York, 1936), 
139-43; Adam Fairclough, "The Public Utilities Industry in 
New Orleans," 49-51.
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In June, 1918, Martin Behrman addressed the NORLC board 
of the directors for the-first time as one of its newest 
members and executive officers. The mayor acknowledged the 
myriad of important and pressing problems the company faced. 
But, he told his new colleagues, their most important prior­
ities must be establishing a fair and just wage and settling 
contract differences with the street railway union. The 
union wanted a substantial pay increase and several signifi­
cant reforms and concessions from the company, but the com­
pany had its own set of concerns and also had serious finan­
cial difficulties. Any settlement, then, would require pa­
tience, understanding, and an attentiveness to the common 
concerns of the company, the union, and the community. The 
mayor encouraged the board and the management of the com­
pany to begin those discussions at once and, most important­
ly, in earnest.11
The management of NORLC actually needed little prompt­
ing from Martin Behrman; it was prepared to grant a modest 
pay increase, but it was determined as well not to concede 
to the union's list of demands. Those demands were, even by 
past standards, truly remarkable. The union insisted that 
the current wage scale was far below regional and industry 
standards, a disparity compounded by the ever-rising cost of 
living in New Orleans. Working conditions, in particular the
xlNew Orleans Item, June 12, 13, 1918; New Orleans Daily
States. June 12, 13, 1918.
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ten hour day and the part-time schedule, were unacceptable. 
Justice and necessity, then, impelled the union to seek a 
substantial increase in pay and a decrease in hours. The 
union also insisted that the financial condition of the com­
pany was irrelevant and that industry standards and local 
economic conditions alone should determine the size of the 
wage increase. The union demanded, then, that the company 
pay motormen and conductors forty-five cents an hour for a 
nine hour day and time and a half for work over nine 
hours.12
Those were not the only demands the union made. In 1917 
the local union received permission from the "international" 
office to begin recruiting nonunion workers in the electric 
and "gas house" divisions for membership and to include them 
in all wage and contract agreements. Over the next year or 
more, local union leaders persuaded the unskilled and semi­
skilled workers of the electric and gas divisions, many of 
them black, to join the carmen's union. The union advised 
the company of its activities, and insisted that the new 
wage and contract agreement include all workers in the gas 
and electrical divisions, granting them the same percentage 
increase as the carmen. The wage increase proposed by John
“ New Orleans Item, Hay 15, 18, June 17, 18, 19, 1918;
New Orleans Daily States. May 7, 13, 16, 18, June 17, 18,
1918.
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Stadler would exceed two million dollars.X3
Union membership, perhaps more so than money, was the 
essential issue, and the union wanted provisions in the con­
tract assuring it control of the work force and, in effect, 
the character of the work place. The carmen insisted on a 
two year contract, preventing the company from locking the 
union into wages or agreements outdated by changing economic 
conditions. More to the point, the union demanded that NORLC 
agree to a formal and detailed grievance procedure that pro­
tected the worker against the anti-union activities of man­
agement. And, most important of all, the union demanded that 
NORLC recognize the union shop, agreeing to dismiss any 
eligible worker who refused to join the union.x"*
The management of NORLC was not surprised by the char­
acter of the union's demands, and it was, as expected, 
opposed to every feature of the proposals. It acknowledged 
that the men deserved a pay increase, but it argued that the 
union's demands were excessive and out of proportion with 
prevailing regional and industry standards and conditions 
and beyond the ability of the company to pay. The cost of 
living in New Orleans, management asserted with no apparent 
sense of irony, had been "overestimated" by the union, and
x=*William B. Fitzgerald, First Vice-President, Interna­
tional AASEREA, to John Stadler, May 14, 1918; William D. 
Mahon to Gus Bienvenue, June 17, 1918, box 2, SRUC. SCD,
HTML, TU; New Orleans Daily States. May 7, 13, 16, 31, June 
10-14, 17-19, 1918; New Orleans Item. May 13, 18, June 
12-14, 17-18, 1918. 
x«Ibid.
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did not justify the sort of increase demanded by the carmen 
The wage increase demanded by the union would only further 
exhaust the meager financial resources of the company and 
would absorb the WFC loan and the six cent fare, either 
forcing the company to default on its loan and requiring the 
Behrman government to increase fares and rates. In addition, 
to include nonunion workers in the wage agreement would vio­
late the charter of the Carmen's union and antagonize the 
craft union workers already under contract with NORLC. And, 
management insisted, the company would never relinquish con­
trol over the conditions of employment and would never sub­
mit to demands for a union shop.13
Company management assured the union that it would seek 
a reasonable wage increase for the motormen and conductors, 
but it refused to negotiate (for the moment) any of the 
other issues raised by the union. Rather, the company sug­
gested that the union submit its proposal to include "non­
union" workers in the agreement to the International leaders 
in Chicago or to the Orleans Parish Civil District Court, in 
either case damaging the credibility of the local union.xa
President John Stadler, too, refused to negotiate the 
issue of union membership. He accused NORLC of misrepre-
1BNew Orleans Daily Statesr June 17-19, 1918; New Orleans 
Item. May 29, June 17-19, 1918; Typescript Exhibit dated 
September 19, 1918, "Brief on Behalf of New Orleans Railway 
and Light Company," October 4, 1918, Portfolio 3, PNWLB. LSU. 
x"New Orleans Item. June 19-20, 1918; New Orleans Daily 
States. June 19-20, 1918.
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senting the legitimate rights of the local union and of 
trying to disguise its own intentions. The local union, he 
said, and not NORLC, was the principal judge of the qualifi­
cations of its membership. The local began recruiting gas- 
house and electric workers with the approval of the Interna­
tional office, and it notified NORLC of the new composition 
of the union long before contract discussions began. The 
company had no reason, other than corrupt self-interest, 
for refusing to bargain with the local union. The company's 
reasons were, Stadler intimated, simple and obvious. NORLC 
simply did not want to pay its employees (other than top 
management) a representative wage or salary and it did not 
want to relinquish its exploitive grip on labor. Until NORLC 
recognized the AASEREA as the representative of the gas and 
electric workers, there would be no further "discussions".17
In a manner of speaking, negotiations were never truly 
suspended, but carried on in public discussions and private 
correspondence. Mayor Behrman reminded the union and NORLC 
of their joint commitment to public services, and he insist­
ed that they reopen their discussions, submitting any major 
disagreements to mediation by the federal National War Labor 
Board (NWLB). The company, much to its later regret, readily 
agreed to the mayor's suggestion, but the local union balked 
at the idea of a mediated settlement. But, after consulting 
with the International leadership, who assured the local
1-7 Ibid.
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that the NWLB would grant workers a "substantial increase," 
the local union consented to Behrman's proposals. The local 
agreed to negotiate issues of membership, employment, and 
the union shop with NORLC and to submit the wage issue to 
the NWLB. NORLC, too, expressed its willingness to compro­
mise, confident that it could dilute proposals for the union 
shop and that the NWLB would grant an inconsequential pay 
increase.xa
Representatives of the company and the union met con­
tinually for a week, devising two separate agreements. The 
"primary" agreement, a preliminary, though binding, con­
tract, concentrated on eligibility, grievance procedures, 
and provisions for a union shop. In essence, the primary 
agreement acknowledged the authority of the local AASEREA to 
set eligibility standards for its membership and, in part, 
determine the character of the labor force. Under the terms 
of the primary agreement, the conditions of the contract 
would extend to all eligible gashouse and powerhouse employ­
ees. Those employees not presently eligible would be covered 
under the contract until the AASEREA ruled on their eligi­
bility. If the International chose not to embrace those non­
union members of the gashouse and powerhouse divisions (an
1BBehrman to National War Labor Board, June 19, 1918, 
Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; Mahon to Stadler, June 15, July 11, 
1918, Mahon to Bienvenu, June 18, 26, 1918, box 2, SRUC,
SCD, HTML, TU; New Orleans Item. June 13, 14, 17-19, 21-23, 
1918; New Orleans Daily States. June 13, 14, 17-19, 22, 23, 
1918.
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unlikely event given the commitment of the local AASEREA to 
unionizing unskilled and black workmen), then those workers 
could form separate unions. NORLC and NOGLC would then use 
the 1918 contract as the basis for contracts with the new 
unions.X9
The primary agreement also promised to restructure 
disciplinary and grievance procedures, giving the employee 
and the union a more open and formal means of contesting 
company discipline and expressing discontent. The company 
insisted, however, that grievances had to be resolved with­
in the individual divisions of the company and always "in 
favor of the maintainance of the organization and discipline 
of the company". And, though the employee and the union had 
the right of appeal, there was no appeal beyond the board of 
directors. The company also retained the "unrestricted 
right" to discharge any employee for just cause— legitimate 
union activity was not just cause. Despite the intimidating 
language of this provision, in effect it provided for com­
pulsory arbitation of disputes, according the carmen and 
other union members a right previously withheld from them.20
“ Agreement and Supplemental Agreement entered into be­
tween the New Orleans Railway and Light Company and the 
Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Em­
ployees of America, Division No. 194 of the City of New Or­
leans, State of Louisiana, July 1, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB, 
LSU; box 13, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU; New Orleans Item. June 26,
28, 1918; Carpenter, "The New Orleans Street Railway Strike 
of 1929-30," 17-19; Pairclough, "Public Utilities," 50-51.
“ Ibid. The most common grievance concerned promotion. 
The agreement ended that dispute by making senority the sole 
standard for promotion.
New Orleans Railway and Light Company and the local 
also agreed to a union shop. All current employees of NORLC 
eligible for membership with the AASEREA would be required 
to join the union after the new contract went into effect. 
New employees were, as well, required to join the union 
following a probationary period of sixty days, and no member 
of the the AASEREA would be expected to work with any non­
union worker except in emergencies.21
The "supplemental" agreement was, by comparison, brief 
and direct. The union and the company simply agreed to sub­
mit the dispute over wages to the NWLB and to abide by its 
decision. Mediating the wage issue and reconciling the union 
and NORLC to the decisions of the NWLB, on the other hand, 
was more intricate and difficult than either the union, the 
railway company, or the Behrman administration anticipated. 
Mediation of the dispute took more than four months, invol­
ving a lengthy rehearing and producing a controversal re­
vision of the initial wage award. And the decisions of the 
NWLB contributed to the collpase of NORLC and hampered the 
Behrman administration in its efforts to bring about a pub­
lic rehabilitation of NORLC.22
21Ibid. The carmen agreed to work nine hours within a 
twelve hour shift. To avoid disputes over part-time pay for 
full-time work, the company agreed to pay motorroen and con­
ductors time and a half for any "run" of work under six 
hours and regular time for "runs" between six and nine 
hours. The union also promised not to strike or engage in 
any work stoppage that might "materially cripple any service 
rendered" by NORLC.
22Ibid
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The decisions reached by the National War Labor Board, 
however, were in part the result of the diverse interests 
of labor and management and the intense rivalries within 
the Wilson administration. Organized labor and management, 
of course, sought to use the NWLB to their own advantage, 
and would not consent to government arbitration of vital, 
vested interests. Organized labor opposed any effort to set 
a minimum wage standard, fearing that it would become the 
acknowledged maximum wage. Business, on the other hand, 
feared setting standards too high, fueling inflation, 
further "destablizing" the economy, and strengthening the 
position of organized labor. The Wilson administration, for 
its part, was badly divided and uncertain about its author­
ity and ability to establish a common, fixed labor policy.
It was, as well, intent on preserving the integrity of the 
peacetime executive departments and committed to the policy 
of "voluntary cooperation".33
The Wilson administration, then, carefully defined and 
restricted the power of the NWLB. The NWLB could not intrude 
on the labor policies of the permanent, peacetime executive 
departments and agencies unless a department or agency vio­
lated an established principle of the NWLB. The board could 
mediate most other labor-management disputes, but even in
33William B. Wilson to Wilson, Agust 5, 1918, 181, August 
5, 1918, 206-07, Wilson to William B. Wilson, August 28,
1918, 367, vol. 49, Arthur S. Link, ed., The Papers of 
Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1985); Valerie Jean Conner, The 
National War Labor Board, 30-31, 50-67.
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those cases its authority was severely limited. The board 
could not "arbitrate" a dispute unless management and labor 
agreed to arbitration and the board arrived at an unanimous 
decision. In those cases, its decision was binding, but it 
had no means o£ forcing compliance with its decision. If 
labor or management wanted the board to mediate a disagree­
ment, the board could recommend a settlement. But, as in the 
case of "arbitration," either side could refuse to accept 
the recommendations of the NWLB. In effect, then, the NWLB 
had no actual power, save that of "moral suasion".
The principles laid down for the NWLB reflected the 
same inner tensions and conflicting interests, and signaled 
only a "modest advance" in labor-management relations. Labor 
and management pledged that there would be no strikes, lock­
outs, or other actions that might impair the war effort, in 
effect compelling them to negotiate or mediate their differ­
ences. Management acknowledged the right of labor to orga­
nize and to bargain collectively, and agreed that no employ­
ee would be dismissed because of union membership or for any
^William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, March 8, 1918, 
vol.46, 578-80, Robert W. Wooley and Matthew Hale to Wilson, 
April 19, 1918, vol.47, 376-79, William B. Wilson to Wilson, 
April 29, 1918, vol.47, 461-65 in Arthur S. Link, ed.. The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1984); "Proclamation by 
the President of the United States, National War Labor 
Board," Portfolio 1, PNWLB, LSU; Conner, The National War 
Labor Board, 30-31; Robert D. Cuff, "Herbert Hoover, The 
Ideology of Voluntarism and War Organization During the 
Great War," Journal of American History. 64 (September 
1977), 358-72; Cuff, "The Politics of Labor Administration 
During World War I," Labor History. 21 (Fall 1980), 546-69.
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legitimate union activity. The NWLB principles preserved the 
union shop where it already existed. In an existing open 
shop, however, unions could not force workers to join a 
union or coerce management into accepting a union shop. 
Finally, the NWLB would guaranteed all laborers, regardless 
of their union affiliation (or sex), a living and equitable 
wage, taking into account, of course, local wage standards 
and economic conditions.2®
In June, the NWLB, under the direction of co-chairmen 
William Howard Taft and Frank P. Walsh, began deliberations 
on the wage award issue. Industry spokesmen testified that 
few, if any, railway companies could survive the sort of 
wage increases contemplated by the unions and the NWLB un­
less there was a corresponding increase in fares. Wartime 
conditions and adverse public regulation, rather than indus­
try mismanagement, were responsible for the street railway 
crisis. Neither the local communities nor the federal 
government would acknowledge their proper responsibility
2®"Principles and Policies to Govern Relations Between 
Workers and Employess in War Industries for the duration of 
the War," Portfolio 1, PNWLB, LSU; SRUC. box 14, SCD, HTML, 
TU; New Orleans Item, April 15, 1918; Conner, National War 
Labor Board, 29-30. Several railway companies entertained 
the idea of hiring women as conductors and motormen as war­
time replacements for men serving in the armed services. 
Union officials, however, complained that management was not 
concerned with helping women but with using women to reduce 
wages and demoralize the union. Eventually, the union con­
sented to the idea, insisting, however, that women work 
under the same conditions and at the same pay and that they 
be required to join the union. See J. B. Lawson, Chairman 
General Executive Board International AASEREA, to all 
locals, August 21, 1918, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU.
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toward the industry. Local regulatory authorities refused 
to increase rates and fares because local political consid­
erations were too overpowering for them to resist. Federal 
policy was, as well, harmful. Though the president possessed 
the authority to regulate the industry and increase fares, 
he relied on a flawed policy of local regulation and volun­
tary cooperation. The only sensible policy, spokesmen said, 
called for direct federal aid to the industry and tying the 
wage increase to a corresponding increase in railway 
revenues.28
The two chairmen informed President Wilson that the 
NWLB would grant a substantial increase to street railway 
employees, advising him that the increases, though justi­
fied, would bankrupt many companies, disrupting services 
and threatening the war effort. Taft and Walsh suggested 
"with all the emphasis possible" that Wilson increase rail­
way rates or ask Congress to give him that authority.
Wilson refused to alter his policy. He believed that direct 
federal aid to the utilities industry was an unwise policy, 
and he continued to place great trust and faith in local 
government and voluntary coooperation. The board soon aban­
doned efforts to tie wage increases to increases in rates 
and fares. Late in June, the board announced its decision.
28Conner, The National War Labor Board, 68-72. Attorneys 
for the railway industry argued in addition that the NWLB 
could raise rates independent of the President's authority 
to assume control of the industry.
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Neither the financial condition of the railway companies nor 
their need for additional revenues would have any relevant 
bearing on the wage awards granted to street railway 
employees. The only pertinent issue was the determination of 
a fair and living wage for railway workers that would sus­
tain them in the midst of the increasing cost of living.2"7
Early in July, 1918, three days after the carmen and 
NORLC agreed to refer their wage dispute to the NWLB for 
"investigation and readjustment," representatives of the 
company wrote to the board asking for an immediate hearing 
and a favorable "readjustment". Consumed with the issues of 
a "living wage" and direct federal aid to the railway indus­
try, the NWLB delayed its hearings until later in July, but 
counseled the union and the company to anticipate high wage 
awards. The board began hearing agruments in the New Orleans 
case on July 20.28
The Carmen's union, represented by International presi­
dent William D. Mahon, general counsel James H. Vahey, and 
local president John Stadler, spoke first. The railway com­
pany will argue, the union representatives said, that the
27Taft and Walsh to Wilson, July 1, 1918, as cited in 
Wilson to Tumulty, July 5, 1918, vol.48, 526-27, The Papers 
of Woodrow Wilson: New Orleans Item, June 24, 25, 1918; New 
Orleans Daily States. June 25, 1918; Conner, National War 
Labor Board, 68-88.
2BCurran to Taft and Walsh, July 3, 1918, Francis T. 
Homer and H. Generes Dufour to NWLB, undated, W. Jett Lauck, 
Secretary, NWLB to Curran, July 8, 1918, Lauck to Behrman, 
Curran, Stadler, and others, July 13, 1918, Portfolio 1, 
PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item, July 14, 1918; Conner, The 
National War Labor Board, 50-88.
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wage increase demanded by the union was unjustified, that 
economic conditions in New Orleans were not as acute as the 
union portrayed them, and that any sizeable increase in 
wages would inhibit he company's ability to maintain 
service, resulting in the collapse of NORLC. The wage 
demands, union spokesmen said, were justified for three 
principal reasons. Since 1916, the employees of the railway 
department of NORLC had been subsisting on twenty-four and 
a half cents an hour, a standard lower than many cities in 
Louisiana and the South. The company had, as well, reduced 
the number of cars in service, consolidating runs, and 
forcing many men to work "overtime'* in order to make ends 
meet. Many of these men had invested many years of service, 
acquiring seniority with the company and the union, and they 
were unwilling and, in many cases, unable to change jobs.
The majority of the better paying jobs in New Orleans 
required men of specialized skills; most of the carmen and 
other men represented by their union were not skilled 
workers, but fell into the category of "semi-clerical" 
workers.23
29"In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Division No. 
194 the Amalgated Association of Street and Electric Railway 
Employees of America of New Orleans, Louisiana and the New 
Orleans," July, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU, hereafter 
cited as "Arbitration Between AASEREA and NORLC," 1, 2, 9,
10; "Minutes of the Hearing in the Street Railway Cases,
July 20, 1918," 1, 49, ibid.; Contracts between AASEREA, 
Division No. 194 and New Orleans Railways Company and New 
Orleans Railway and Light Company, box 13, SRUC. SCD, HTML, 
TU.
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The second reason, the union contended, was even more 
compelling than the first. Since the beginning of the Great 
War, the cost of living, even in warm-weather cities like 
New Orleans, had increased over ninety percent, while "real" 
income for the carmen had not increased since 1910. Simple 
economic justice and the vital necessity of the railway in­
dustry to the war effort and the development of New Orleans 
justified the demands of the carmen for a substantial in­
crease .
Finally, though the financial condition of the company 
was not relevent to establishing the wage award, the union 
argued, NORLC had the resources and the earning capacity to 
fund the wage increase and to maintain services. Admittedly, 
the war skewed the financial and investment arrangements of 
the company, forcing it to seek federal aid from the War 
Finance Corporation, but on the whole it remained solvent 
and successful, despite warnings of its imminent collapse. 
Though the WFC loan prevented NORLC from defaulting on cer­
tain securities, the people of New Orleans, not the stock­
holders, underwrote the loan. These additional revenues, in 
the form of a six cent fare and a reduction in services, 
amounted to nearly one million dollars, all coming at the 
expense of the people of New Orleans and the employees of 
NORLC. Though it claimed it had no money to maintain service 
or to pay its workers a fair wage, NORLC continued, despite 
the war, to pay huge dividends to its stockholders and tre-
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mendous salaries and fees to its management and retainers.
In short, the union suggested, the company could, without 
question, pay the wage increase authorized by the NWLB.30
H. Generes Dufour, the general counsel for NORLC, 
agreed with the union that the NWLB should consider the 
financial condition of the company in determining the wage 
award. The company, Dufour told the NWLB, was in serious 
financial difficulty, mostly as a result of the rigors of 
the wartime crisis, but to some degree from the failure of 
government to properly assess the needs of the public ser­
vice industry, particularly in the South. The war increased 
the cost of operation, including labor, and absorbed the in­
vestment capital normally reserved for private enterprise.
As a result, though gross earnings increased $744,000 from 
1914 to 1917, operating cost rose $1,200,000 over the same 
time. The added cost of operation compelled the company to 
seek government assistance. The WFC loan would not resolve 
the financial difficulties of the company, but only prevent
3°Charles E. Thomas to Taft, July 21, 1918; Auditor's
Report, New Orleans Railway and Light Company System, June,
1918; Exhabit A, Brief on Behalf of New Orleans Railway and
Light Company, October 4, 1918, Portfolio 2, PNWLBf LSU;
Comparative Payroll Statement, New Orleans Railway and Light
Company, undated, ibid. According to the data furnished to
the NWLB by NORLC, the company paid nearly $2,000,000 in
interest and dividends for 1917, but that figure may be in­
accurate and misleading. Many of the company's "fixed"
charges— rentals and leases— were, in fact, dividends paid
to itself. See Simon Boro and Company, et. alia, v. New
Orleans City Railroad Company, et alia.. 244 Federal Report­
er 617. Curran earned $23,500, railway manager Nelson Brown
$5,000, NOGLC president Lee Benoist $6,000, and attorneys
retainers totaled $22,700 a year.
346
it from defaulting on certain outstanding bonds. Though the 
loan was contingent on the six cent fare, the stockholders, 
along with the people of New Orleans, would guarantee the 
WFC loan.31
The six cent fare would, as well, guarantee the carmen 
a fair and reasonable wage. The company, Dufour informed the 
NWLB, would devote only a portion of the six cent fare to 
redeeming the WFC loan. The other portion it would dedicate 
toward a wage increase for the carmen. After consulting with 
city officials (the Behrman administration had just given 
city employees a fifteen to twenty percent wage and salary 
increase) and studying the wage scales in other cities, man­
agement offered the union a twenty-five percent increase, 
raising wages for carmen to thirty-one cents an hour and 
giving other "union" employees between a ten and fifteen 
percent raise. But the union insisted on a eighty-three per­
cent increase for the platform workers and a portional in­
crease for all other employees, totaling in excess of two 
million dollars. A wage award of that calibre would leave 
NORLC with a deficit it could not erase with any reasonable 
increase in revenues or economies and promised the thorough
31"Arbitration Between AASEREA and NORLC," ibid., 1-3.
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collapse of the public utilities industry in New Orleans.33
If, on the other hand, the union relented in its wage 
and contract demands and accepted the proposal of the com­
pany, Dufour asserted, the carmen would make more money than 
motormen and conductors in most other major southern cities. 
In the process, the carmen would be preserving the jobs of 
hundreds of their fellow workers and assuring the integrity 
of industry and labor in the South. The "natural advantages" 
of the southern climate and the "radical difference in the 
economic and industrial [racial] fabric in the South,"
Dufour informed the board, justified a lower wage scale for 
the southern labor. "Upon this fundamental economic fact," 
he said, "rests Southern industry and commerce." The lower, 
Southern wage enabled the utility industry to compete suc­
cessfully for investment and to provide public services at 
reasonable and profitable prices. "It would prove destruc­
tive of the South's economic situation if any artifical con-
32Ibid.. 4-6. Commissioner of Public Property Edward E. 
Lafaye testified that municipal employees were "generally 
satisfied with the wage increase granted to them by the 
Behrman administration, regarding it as a "living wage" suf­
ficient to meet the rising cost of living in New Orleans. 
Though Lafaye acknowledged that carmen made less than most 
municipal workers, he considered NORLC's offer "fair".
Dufour capitalized on Lafaye's remarks, reminding the NWLB 
that "It is a well-known fact that employees of municipal­
ities throughout this country are, so far as wages paid them 
be concerned, regarded as favored employees and are never, 
as a rule, underpaid." "Statement of Edward E. Lafaye, Com­
missioner of Public Property of the City of New Orleans in 
connection with the Arbitration Before the United States War 
Labor Board of the Wage Scale to be Paid Employees of New 
Orleans Railway and Light Company, July, 1918," Portfolio 1, 
PNWLB. LSU.
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dition were brought about by mere fiat of establishing uni­
formity in the wage scale throughout the country." In other 
words, imposing a higher, uniform wage scale on southern 
labor would hinder the development of the South's "natural 
advantages," retarding industrial and economic progress, and 
threatening racial accomodations and peace in the South.33
A week after the close of the hearings, the NWLB 
rendered its decision. Before publizing its findings and 
specifying the wage awards, however, the NWLB admonished the 
union, the industry, and the municipal authorities against 
exploiting the wartime emergency for their own advantage.
The war, the chairmen declared, "is not a normal period of 
industrial expansion from which employers should expect un­
usual profits or employees abnormal wages;...it is an inter­
regnum in which industry is pursued [by industry, labor, and 
government] only for common cause and common ends." The pur­
suit of those common ends, nonetheless, necessitated a sub­
stantial increase in the wages paid to the carmen and allied 
union workers. By the same token, the war threatened the 
electric railway industry with insolvency, and, though the 
industry was guilty of past mismanagement and questionable 
financial practices, it surely merited the assistance of the 
federal and local governments. The NWLB recommended, then, 
that Congress and the president consider legislation remedi­
ating its financial problems and creating a federal agency
3 3 I b i d . .  6 - 1 1 .
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to assist in its reform.3'*
Consideration of any sort of "remedial" legislation, of 
course, would take months and the would require the approval 
of a wary Congress and a president intent on maintaining the 
integrity of local authorities. For the present, then, local 
communities and authorities were solely responsible for 
remedying the problems of the electric street railway busi­
ness. The NWLB called on the Behrman administration to in­
crease railway fares to meet the requirements of the wage 
award. In considering the fare increase, the board advised, 
the administration should disregard the past sins of NORLC. 
"Over capitalization, corrupt methods, exorbitant dividends 
in the past," the chairmen wrote, "are not relevant to the 
question of policy in the present exigency. In justice, the 
public should pay an adequate war compensation for a service 
which can not be rendered except at war prices." Those war­
time fares, however, should not be governed by the demands 
of stockholders or management, but by "the immediate 
pressure...to keep street railways running so that they may 
meet the local and national demands for their services."33
The NWLB divided the wage award into three, graduated
3'•"Resolution Adopted by the National War Labor Board," 
July 31, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; Docket No. 98, 
"Findings of Joint Chairmen as Arbitrators in re Employees 
versus New Orleans Railway and Light Company, July 1918, 
ibid., hereafter cited as "Findings of Joint Chairmen," box
14, SRUC. SCD, HTML,TU; Committee on Public Information,
The Official Bulletinr August 3, 1918, Portfolio 3, ibid.; 
New Orleans Item. August 1, 2G, 1918.
33Docket No. 98, "Findings of the Joint Chairmen," ibid.
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classifications. The award was retroactive to July 1 and was 
effective over the duration of the war. The board granted 
experienced platform workers in large metropolitan areas, 
where the cost of living was considered at its highest, 
a wage of between forty-eight and fifty cents an hour. Those 
carmen working in smaller, presumably less expensive cities 
would earn up to forty-five cents an hour, and in cities 
with a recognized lower cost of living, the board awarded 
motormen and conductors forty-two cents an hour. Carmen 
working for NORLC fell into this third category. They would 
receive thirty-eight cents an hour for the first three 
months of the award, forty cents over the next nine months, 
and forty-two cents thereafter. The board considered other 
railway workers and the employees of the gashouse division 
covered under the "primary agreement" in a separate deci­
sion. Those workers, many of whom were unskilled and black, 
received increases between seventy-one and 180 percent, 
elevating their wages above those of the many skilled, white 
workers.36
In general union leaders were satisfied with the award, 
though they were disappointed that the board placed New 
Orleans in the third classification. The board's reasoning, 
at least according to the Official Bulletin, the journalis­
tic organ of the United States Committee on Public Informa­
36Ibid.? Conner, The National War Labor Board, 77-81; New
Orleans Item. August 1, 10, 12, 1918; New Orleans Daily
States, August 10, 1918.
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tion (the Creel Committee), was climatic and economic. "In 
New Orleans the wage was fixed lower than in other larger 
cities," the Bulletin wrote, "the reason being the climatic 
conditions, which made possible the ommission of the items 
of fuel and heavy clothing from the cost of living budgets." 
Apparently, the board did not give consideration to the 
oppressive heat and humidity that characterized and distin­
guished New Orleans weather. The NWLB acknowledged, though, 
the distinctive character of the Southern economy. The wage 
award granted to the New Orleans Carmen's union recognized 
and justified the lower wages paid to southern workers— with 
one noteable exception. The board, for some unaccountable 
reason, granted unskilled black workers an increase that 
paid them wages equal to those of white men. Apparently, the 
board, at least for the moment, did not fathom the social 
and economic implications of its ruling. But NORLC did. And 
with its assistance, the board moved to correct the "unin­
tended" consequences of its decision.3-7
The management of NORLC was, to say the least, dismayed 
and alarmed by the board's decision, and it asked for an 
immediate reconsideration and readjustment. In a series of
3-7Docket No. 98, "Findings of Joint Chairmen", Portfolio 
1, PNWLB. LSU; Curran to Taft and Walsh, August 10, 1918, 
ibid.; Official Bulletin. August 3, 1918, Portfolio 3, 
ibid: New Orleans Item. August 10, 1918. For the initial 
response of the union see, Gus J. Bienvenue to W. Jett 
Lauck, August 16, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB and William D. 
Mahon to Stadler, August 21, 1918, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML,
TU.
352
letters to the board, NORLC president Daniel Curran reiter­
ated the company's initial arguments for a "reasonable" wage 
award and explained the damaging economic and social conse­
quences of the board's decision. That decision, he wrote, 
was "unjust and unfair" and completely "out of proportion 
with the necessities of the case". The wage award authorized 
by the board exceeded the company's ability to pay, threat­
ening its financial stability and jeopardizing its loan with 
the WFC. If the board did not reajust its initial decision, 
NORLC would be required to pay an additional two million 
dollars for labor, which current revenues could not meet.
The company would then be forced to cut services and demand 
fares and rates that neither politics nor business could 
justify.30
The award also compensated unskilled, "common" workers 
beyond their value and contribution to the company, Curran 
said. This later aspect of the award would only serve to 
"demoralize" the carmen and the other skilled workers with 
NORLC. It would, as well, disrupt labor throughout the city 
and the region. This "common" class of laborer, Curran in­
formed the board, was of the "same class as Southern farm 
labor, [and was] composed almost exclusively of negroes.—
3BCurran to Taft and Walsh, August 8, 10, 1918, Portfolio
1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item. 1, 2, 10, 12, 14, 15, 29,
1918; New Orleans Daily States, August 1, 2, 10, 14, 1918.
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It is patent," Curran warned, "that a disturbance o£ the 
labor conditions in this city and in the agricultural dis­
tricts o£ this state will result from the above condi­
tions. "3®
It was evident, as well, that Curran's warning disturb­
ed the NWLB. The board, anxious to avoid any labor unrest 
and eager to "harmonize" all interests, dispatched two field 
investigators under the supervision of W. Jett Lauck, the 
executive secretary of the NWLB, to New Orleans to examine 
Curran's claims. The field investigators remained in New 
Orleans for about two weeks, conducting "interviews" with 
company management, union officials, and civic leaders 
(there is no evidence that the two investigators spoke with 
the mayor or members of the commission council). From these 
"interviews" they concluded that there was some merit to 
Curran's assessment. There was no immediate possibility that 
NORLC would collapse under the wage award. But with the 
commission council bending to political pressure not to in­
crease carfares, there was the danger that the railway com­
pany would suspend some operations and "lay off" workers.
3*Ibid. For the most obvious and compelling reasons, most 
black workers for NORLC displayed no public dissatisfaction 
with Curran's remarks. A few black workers, however, ignored 
convention, complaining in writing to President Wilson and 
the NWLB about the naked racial prejudice woven into the 
appeal of NORLC. Their protest, however, was muted with 
resignation. The southern white man, they said, would submit 
to paying any "colored laborer" a wage equal to the white 
man. See Nemis Paper to Wilson, September 6, 1918, W. Celles 
to Taft and Walsh, September 11, 1918, Portfolio 1 PNWLBr 
LSU.
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And, with many common "colored" laborers earning wages under 
the award in excess of their merit or due, there existed the 
chance for a "great deal of strife and industrial unrest" in 
New Orleans. The report suggested that the board review its 
decision, modifying it with the intention of "harmonizing" 
the financial, social, and political interests of New 
Orleans.
The report convinced the NWLB to review and reconsider 
its initial decision in the New Orleans case. The board then 
temporarily suspended the award for all workers except 
motormen and conductors, and it scheduled a rehearing for 
early October. Union representatives vigorously protested 
the suspension, arguing that NORLC would use the suspension 
to negate its contract agreements with the union. The union 
also pointed out, with some justification, that NORLC had 
not yet produced any tangible evidence that the wage award 
was damaging to the company or demoralizing to the workers 
and the community. The suspension of the award was, there-
'•°Lauck to Curran, August 12, 1918, Report Arthur Sturgis 
and M. Joseph Chiesa to W. Jett Lauck, August 31, 1918, 
Portfolio 1, PNWLB, LSU. In many respects, the report re­
flected the interests of NORLC, repeating its arguments for 
reducing the size and scope of the wage award and suggest­
ing that NORLC already paid black workers an adequate wage.
The report also accused the Behrman administration of suc­
cumbing to organized labor and oppositing to the six cent 
fare. The report ignored the opposition of the Board of 
Public Utilities and other so-called middle-class reformers 
to the fare increase. It also ignored NORLC's demands for 
an immediate increase as a means of avoiding public rehabil­
itation. For different view, see Conner, The National War 
Labor Board. 81-82.
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fore, unjust, and would, the union leaders insisted, damage 
the men's morale and could disturb the public order.*1
The board, already predisposed toward revising the 
wage award, refused to lift the suspension and, after some 
delay, proceeded with the rehearing.** The Mew Orleans Rail­
way and Light Company filed a lenghty and detalied brief 
with the NWLB, seeking, as the brief explained, only "simple 
justice" and arguing that the wage award was "unworkable and 
excessive". NORLC contended, as it had throughout the entire 
proceedings, that the wage award was beyond the company's 
ability to pay. Working with current revenues, the award 
would produce a deficit estimated at $2,526,000, $1,700,000 
coming from the railway division alone. Even with the most 
generous and feasible fare increase and the most reasonable 
reduction in services, under the present wage award the com­
pany faced huge deficits. And, the company insisted (with no 
justification), political conditions in New Orleans made it 
nearly impossible for it to secure any substantial fare in­
crease. The regulation of public utilities in New Orleans
*xWalsh to unknown, August 30, 1918, Lauck to Curran, 
August 30, 1918, Lauck to Stadler, August 30, 1918, Stadler 
to Lauck, August 30, 1918, Lauck to E. M. Nolan, undated, 
Lauck to Curran, September 19, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. 
LSU; Mahon to Stadler August 21, 1918, box 2, SRUC. SCD, 
HTML, TU; Stadler to Lafaye, September 19, 1918, Lafaye 
to Stadler, September 19, 1918, box 14, ibid.; New Orleans 
Item. September 20, 1918; New Orleans Daily Statesr Sep­
tember 20, 25, 1918.
*3!Walsh to unknown, August 30, 1918, Lauck to Curran, 
August 30, 1918, Lauck to Stadler, August 30, 1918, Port­
folio 1, PNWLB. LSU.
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was wholly inadequate and thoroughly politicized. The Nix 
act, which was to govern the regulation of public utilities 
in New Orleans was, in fact, a dead letter. The Behrman ad­
ministration dismissed the Board of Public Utilities as 
unnecessary and subjected the provisions of the act to poli­
tical expediency. Simply put, the municipal government was 
unwilling to increase carfares because it feared a backlash 
from consumers and organized labor.*3
A sizeable reduction in the wage award, however, would 
permit the company to maintain services, meet its financial 
and contractual obligations to investors and employees, 
without demoralizing either of them, and allow the Behrman 
government the political latitude to increase fares. For the 
reduction to satisfy and harmonize all interests, it had to 
extend to all classifications and divisions of workers, 
skilled and unskilled, gas, power, and railway. Skilled 
workers for NORLC, the company suggested, were immune to the 
seasonal and occupational reverses that tormented skilled 
labor in other fields of work. The union wage scale, design-
*3Before the National War Labor Board, Employees vs. New 
Orleans Railway and Light Company On Re Hearing, "Brief on 
Behalf of the New Orleans Railway and Light Company, October 
4, 1918," 2, 19, Portfolio 2, PNWLB. LSU, hereafter cited as 
"Brief On Behalf of NORLC,". The brief estimated that the 
six cent fare would result in a deficit of $636,000, the 
seven cent fare $170,000, and the eight cent fare $110,000. 
Management suggested that it could "operate" under the award 
if it abandoned many services and elimimated whole depart­
ments of the company. For example, the company could dismiss 
the entire maintenance crew (600 men) and 150 carmen. Obvi­
ously, management said, considerations of that sort were im­
possible.
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ed to protect the skilled laborer from those seasonal and 
occupational reverses, did not apply to the skilled employ­
ees of NORLC, and their award, the brief argued, should be 
reduced to a figure below the prevailing union scale.■“■“
The wage award accorded to the unskilled, common black 
laborer, NORLC argued, was unjustified and potentially 
damaging to the economic and social fabric of the community. 
The award given to the common black laborer placed him on a 
par with motormen, conductors, and railway supervisors, all 
of whom were white and more skilled. "In dealing with [the] 
problem of Southern industry," the company reminded the 
NWLB, "this Board cannot ignore the fact that there is a 
different scale of living between the negro [sic] and the 
white man generally and that the character of this [black] 
labor is such that an increased wage will not improve the 
standard of living but will merely result in idleness and 
dissipation." A high wage for black workers encouraged 
absenteeism and resulted in a decline in productivity, 
forcing the company to hire more men, draining the rural 
parishes of productive farm laborers, swelling the city with 
uninitiated citizens, and placing a greater strain on 
housing, santitation, and other vital city services.*s 
Though not nearly as damaging and dangerous to the 
city’s economy and social order, the wage awarded to the
■“■•"Brief on Behalf of NORLC," 4-11. 
«Ibid., 8-9.
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motormen and conductors, too, threatened vital public ser­
vices and the industrial peace of the city. Even with a re­
duction in the awards to skilled and common workers, with 
present revenues or with a six cent fare, the current wage 
scale for the carmen exceeded the company's ability to pay. 
Nor did the platform men merit the sort of wage authorized 
by the NWLB. The carmen did not perform specialized, skilled 
work, as they insisted. Rather, it was, at best "semi- 
clerical" work, requiring only average intelligence, judg­
ment, and coordination. Yet, under the present wage scale, 
motormen and conductors were making more money than experi­
enced railway supervisors and skilled mechanics, fostering 
discontent among labor and draining the company of precious 
resources and skilled workmen.48
The company recommended that the board rescind its ini­
tial award, replacing it with the wage scheme used by the 
Railroad Administration. Under such a system, carmen would 
receive a maximum of thirty-four and a half cents an hour, 
commom workers twenty-six cents, and skilled labor an in­
crease of between thirty and forty percent. The Railroad Ad­
ministration system, the brief contended, guaranteed company 
employees a just settlement and allowed the company to main­
tain services and to meet its financial obligations. Without 
an immediate and favorable revision, NORLC would collapse
48Ibid.. 7-13, 16.
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into bankruptcy and probably cease operations.*7
The response of the NWLB was neither immediate nor 
completely favorable. The board, anxious to protect the WFC 
loan and to tie the wage and fare increases together, de­
layed announcing its decision for nearly three weeks, only 
further complicating and aggravating an already tense and 
bitter debate over the necessity and character of a fare in­
crease. Only after the Behrman administration "resolved” the 
rate and fare controversy, did the NWLB announce its deci­
sion. The original award for motormen and conductors would 
remain unchanged. The NWLB acknowledged, however, that 
the awards for unskilled and skilled workers were made in 
"error". Unskilled, black workers would earn a minimum of 
thirty-eight cents an hour, almost doubling their current 
wages. The revised award granted skilled (presumably white) 
workers a ten cent increase, provided the increase did not 
surpass the prevailing union wage scale. * a
* 7 Ibid..
*aWinthrop More Daniels to Wilson, October 1, 1918, The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilsonr vol. 51, 242-48; Behrman to Lauck, 
October 23, 1918, Lauck to Behrman, October 23, 1918, Lauck 
to Bienvenue, October 24, 1918, "Revision of Award of the 
Joint Chairmen as Arbitrators in re Employees versus New 
Orleans Railway and Light Company, October 24, 1918," Arthur 
Sturgis and M. Joseph Chiesa, Examiners National War Labor 
Board to New Orleans Railway and Light Company and to Local 
194, AASEREA,” November 20, 1918, Portfolio 2, PNWLB. LSU; 
SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU; New Orleans Daily States. October 21, 
23-26, December 18, 1918; New Orleans Item. October 21, 23- 
25, November 15, December 18, 1918; Conner, The National War 
Labor Board. 82-83.
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The revision pleased no one and did not, as one scholar 
recently suggested, "harmonize" the competing economic and 
political interests of New Orleans. The management of NORLC, 
for the moment, refused to accept the revised award, pro­
testing that it, too, would bankrupt the company. Union 
representatives also complained, calling the new award "a 
grave and serious injustice" that would force the skilled 
workmen to accept wages designed to compensate and satisfy 
unskilled, common laborers. The board rejected the appeals 
of the company and the union, insisting that the new awards 
were generous and fair and that the new fare and rate ordin­
ance enacted by the Behrman administration provided NORLC 
with sufficient income to maintain services and fund the 
wage increases.
The wage awards granted to the carmen and to the other 
workers were, at least by the standards of New Orleans, fair 
and generous. And the fare and rate increases enacted by the 
municipal administration at the insistence of federal au-
■•"Francis T. Homer to Philp H. Gadsden, Representative of 
the American Electric Railway Association, War Board, Octo­
ber 26, 1918, Gadsden to Lauck, October 28, 1918, Stadler to 
Lauck, November 1, 1918, Stadler to Charlton Ogburn, Ex­
aminer, National War Labor Board, November 6, 1918, Stadler 
to Taft and Walsh, December 2, 1918, Homer to Dufour and the 
National War Labor Board, December 6, 1918, "Appeal to the 
National War Labor Board for Revision of the Award, October 
27 [24], 1918, an Interpretation given by Messrs. Chiesa and 
Sturgis," November 21, 1918; "Opinion on Appeal," December 
14, 1918, National War Labor Board, "Response to Employees' 
Appeal, Employees v. New Orleans Railway and Light Order in 
re Appeal from Examiners Interpretation of Revision Award," 
December 17, 1918, Portfolio 2, PNWLB. LSU; Conner, The 
National War Labor Board. 83.
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thorities, too, seemed sufficient to fund the wage increases 
and to refund the WFC loan. Federal policy was, however, 
generous to a fault, "ordering" wage and rate increases that 
neither the company nor the city administration seemed will­
ing to absorb. The awards prompted NORLC into curtailing 
services, dismissing workers, and contemplating receivership 
as a means of avoiding the consequences of the wage settle­
ment and public rehabilitation. The union and the city ad­
ministration, understandably, objected to the dismissals and 
elimination of services. The union threatened to delay the 
efforts of the Behrman administration to increase rates and 
fares (a threat the administration took seriously), unless 
the council tied the rate increases to a thorough, public 
rehabilitation of NORLC. Fearing the collapse of the city's 
economy, the Behrman government cabled the Wilson adminis­
tration, requesting him to take over the operation of NORLC, 
freeing the city to pursue, in a logical and expedient 
fashion, the public rehabilitation of the company. The 
federal government refused the city's request. The local and 
regional character of the utility industry and the peculiar­
ities and dissimilarities of public utility law, Wilson in­
formed the mayor, prevented the formulation of a common 
policy, allowing the federal government to operate the rail­
way industry. However, Wilson wrote, "It is imperatively 
necessary that local and state authorities should take [the] 
action necessary for [the] immediate relief" of the public
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utilities industry.*0
Despite its assertions respecting and encouraging the 
independence and authority of local governments, the public 
utility policy of the Wilson administration, denied them the 
authority to pursue the public rehabilitation of the utili­
ties industry and, as a consequence, discouraged immediate 
relief. Federal policy was, in the first place, inconsistent 
and confusing, the result of a protracted debate within the 
Wilson administration.91 The Behrman administration, antici­
pating either federal management or municipal ownership, 
delayed relief to NORLC, worsening the company's financial 
crisis. The wage awards granted by the NWLB, given without
9°Behrman to Joseph Patrick Tumulty, Behrman to Wilson, 
August 12, 1918, Wilson to Tumulty, August 13, 1918, The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 49, 240-41; New Orleans Item. 
August 13, 14, 1918. For an indication of how the Behrman 
administration preceived the threat of the organized labor—  
and other interests— to public rehabilitation, see "State­
ment of Edward E. Lafaye, Commissioner of the Department of 
Public Property of the City of New Orleans in connection 
with the arbitration Before the United States War Labor 
Board," July, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU.
9:1The debate revolved around the issues of direct federal 
aid and "management" of the public utilities industry. Those 
who favored such a policy, like NWLB co-chairman William 
Howard Taft, Secretary of the Treasury William Gibbs McAdoo, 
Secretary of Commerce William Cox Redfield, and WFC chairman 
William Procter Harding, urged President Wilson to create a 
railway administration empowered to manage the electric 
street railway industry. Others, like ICC chairman Winthrop 
More Daniels, believed that federal management was a "dan­
gerous policy," further burdening the federal treasury and 
undermining the authority of the local governments. See, as 
examples of the debate, Harding to Wilson, July 12, 1918,
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 48, 597-99; Daniels to 
Wilson, August 5, 1918, ibid.. vol. 49, 183-84, Wilson to 
Daniels, August 7, 1918, ibid., 204, Wilson to Redfield,
August 7, 1918, 207, Daniels to Wilson, September 2, 1918, 
420-22.
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regard for the financial condition of the company or the 
city, made public rehabilitation under the six cent fare im­
possible, forcing the Behrman administration to accomodate 
higher rates and sustaining to those who opposed the public 
rehabilitation of New Orleans Railway and Light.32
In the beginning of August, 1918, after months of ex­
haustive and inconclusive debate, Daniel D. Curran called on 
Mayor Behrman and the commission council to suspend their 
investigation into the financial condition of the company 
and to extend immediate and unqualified relief to it. The 
wage award granted by the NWLB, he said, coupled with the 
increasing cost of business, would, if left without remedy, 
create a deficit of nearly three million dollars. Unless the 
council granted the company substantial increases in railway 
fares and gas and electric rates, the company could not meet 
its financial obligations, including the WFC loan and the 
NWLB award, causing it to cease operations.39
Over the next several days, representatives of NORLC 
met with the officers and membership of several important 
business associations, including the New Orleans Clearing­
house, a consortium of bankers, and the Association of
"New Orleans Daily States. August 13-15, 18-19, 1918;
New Orleans Item. August 13-15, 18-19, 1918.
"Curren to Behrman and Council, August 14, 1918, Portfo­
lio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item. August 14, 1918; New 
Orleans Daily States. August 14, 1918.
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Commerce, the conservative successor to the more progressive 
Progressive Union. H. Generes Dufour, appearing before rep­
resentatives of the Clearinghouse and several exchanges, 
maintained that with sufficient funding and proper regula­
tion the company could erase its huge deficit, provide ade­
quate service, and avoid the dangers and embarrassment of 
bankruptcy. For the increases to be effective, he argued, 
they had to be sufficient and equitable; large enough to 
sustain operating expenses and shared by the entire communi­
ty. He recommended, then, a two cent increase in carfare, a 
twenty-five percent hike in gas and electric rates, and a 
five percent reduction in railway services. The business 
associations required little coaxing. Convinced that it was 
the obligation of the commission council to meet the crisis 
"squarely, courageously, patriotically, and without delay," 
the businessmen called on the council to discontinue its 
investigation and to grant NORLC the increases it requested 
without qualification.*■*
The Association of Commerce, unlike the commodity ex­
changes and the New Orleans Clearinghouse, was not content 
with petitioning the commission council. The Association of 
Commerce, with financial and personal ties to NORLC, offered 
a specific plan that gave NORLC the sort of increases it de­
manded, removed regulatory control from the commission coun-
a-#New Orleans Item. August 15-16, 1918; New Orleans Daily
States. August 15, 1918.
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cil, and provided for the private rehabilitation of the com­
pany. The plan, authored by former Commissioner of Public 
Safety Harold W. Newman, provided for a seven cent fare and 
a thiry percent increase in gas and electric rates. The 
proposed increases offered by the Behrman and Wilson admin­
istrations were designed to meet specific wartime demands 
and obligations and were, by and large, unconcerned with the 
financial condition of NORLC. But the increases recommended 
by the Newman committee and the Association of Commerce, on 
the other hand, were permanent rates, adjusted to meet the 
financial condition and obligations of the company and 
designed to assist in the private rehabilitation of NORLC.3S
Moreover, the Newman plan provided for the appointment 
by the commission council of a permanent, independent and 
"nonpartisan" board to regulate the rates and fares of the 
public utilities company. The new board would replace the 
ineffective and discredited Board of Public Utilities and 
would, presumably, better preserve the interests of the 
business community and NORLC. With rates and fares finally 
secured, private investors, with the "encouragement" of the 
Behrman administration, would reorganize and refinance NORLC 
in a proper and businesslike fashion, providing for adequate
s3"Typescript of Resolutions of [the] Commerical Ex­
changes and Home Labor Organization to Commission Council," 
August 16, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item, 
August 16-18, 1918; New Orleans Daily States. August 16-18, 
1918. Newman left the Behrman administration in late in 
1917, protesting the mayor's stand on the closing of Story- 
ville. See below pages
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public service and guaranteeing sufficient protection for 
investment.*B
The commission council met in extraordinary session on 
Saturday, August 17, to listen to the request of NORLC for 
an immediate, unconditional increase in rates and fares. The 
council also welcomed suggestions and commentary from sup­
porters and critics of the proposed increases, particularly 
from those who either endorsed or opposed the Newman plan. 
Attorney H. Generes Dufour, as he had so often, presented 
the case for the company. Dufour recounted for the council 
essential character and obvious needs of the company. Public 
utilities were "absolutely essential to modern life," and 
without them the city's economy would collapse. These utili­
ties were also vital to the overall war effort; without them 
essential wartime industries and projects, like the proposed 
Industrial and Navigation Canal, would collapse as well.*7
The war also disrupted the normal course of business, 
Dufour continued, driving up prices, exhausting traditional 
sources of credit, and compelling the company to seek alter­
nate sources of revenue. The federal government, one of the
*BIbid. Among those guarantees was a provision calling 
for an investigation by the Association and the new board 
of the NWLB wage award. The intent of the provision was, of 
course, to reduce the size of the award and diminish the 
authority of the union over the company and its workers.
S7"Proceedings had at a special meeting of the Commission 
council of the City of New Orleans held on Saturday, August 
17, 1918," Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU (hereafter cited as 
"Special Meeting"); New Orleans Daily States. August 17,
1918; New Orleans Item. August 17, 1918.
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two possible sources of credit and revenue available to the 
company, not only failed to respond to the critical needs of 
NORLC, it also contributed to the company's worsening finan­
cial condition. The Wilson administration refused to grant 
NORLC the funds necessary to maintain services and meet its 
financial oblgations. And the National War Labor Board, 
without regard for the financial condition of the company, 
granted a wage increase to workers that even in the best of 
times could only bankrupt the company.9"
The only other source of revenue left open to NORLC, 
Dufour assured the commission council, was the people of 
New Orleans. In seeking the increase, the company had pro­
vided the Behrman administration with sufficient evidence, 
legitimating its claims and enabling the administration to 
make a fair and complete assessment of those claims. Despite 
the public pressures, the municipal government, in good con­
science and with the best interest of the city in mind, 
cannot delay or qualify the increase in revenues. There were 
no legitimate reasons for delay or qualification. Without an 
immediate increase the company would collapse, defaulting on 
all its financial and contractual agreements, ruining many 
of its smaller creditors ("widows, orphan asylums, and 
trust funds"), and damaging the economy of the city for 
years to come. Further qualification was, as well, unneces­
sary. NORLC had already agreed to the mayor's regulation and
3"Ibid.
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rehabilitation plan, assuring the council adequate authority 
over the public services companies. Should the council re­
quire additional assurances, however, Dufour suggested 
placing the rate and fare increases on a trail basis, re­
pealing them should they prove no longer necessary.39
Few critics of the Newman proposal actually questioned 
the need and justice of some sort of fare and rate increase. 
It was obvious that the company needed additional revenues 
to fund the NWLB wage award and to repay the WFC loan, and 
it was equally apparent that consumers should share in meet­
ing the cost of operations. The principal opponents of the 
Newman plan— the carmen's union, the Board of Public Utili­
ties, and the newspapers— objected to the financial condi­
tions and the political consequences of the proposal. These 
critics maintained that there was no compelling reason for 
the commission council to suspend its investigation and to 
grant NORLC an immediate and unqualified increase in rates 
and fares. A thorough investigation, they assured the coun­
cil, would reveal that the rates and conditions proposed by 
the Newman plan were excessive and harmful, compelling the 
public to pay for the entire cost of operations, with no 
corresponding guarantee of improved services, and allowing 
the company to avoid the consequences of public rehabilita­
tion and regulation.50
39Ibid. 
soIbid.
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Under the Newman plan, critics charged, the rate and 
fare increases assessed by NORLC would fall heaviest on the 
working man and woman, requiring them to pay a dispropor­
tionate share of their income to transportation and the 
other vital public services. Such increases would transform 
public utilities into private conveyances and conveniences 
for those who could afford to pay for them. It was apparent, 
as well, that the proposed increases would extend beyond the 
wartime crisis, becoming more or less permanent rates and 
allowing management to employ public funds to refinance the 
company without rehabilitating it.®1
After hours of nearly endless discussion and debate, 
the commission council tabled the Newman proposal. As Mayor 
Behrman explained, the council understood the concerns of 
NORLC and the business community, but it did not share their 
sense of urgency. The Ballard investigation, commissioned by 
the council in June, was nearly complete. Undoubtedly, its 
findings would enable the council to formulate a permanent 
and just solution to the utilities crisis in New Orleans. 
There was, then, the mayor announced, no need for a "quick 
fix".62 Unfortunately, for Mayor Behrman and the commission 
council, the Ballard investigation dragged on for several 
more months, never permitting the Behrman administration to 
enact a "permanent" solution to the utilities crisis and
eiIbid. 
®2Ibid.
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contributing to the demands for a "quick fix".
Late in September, 1918, William Proctor Harding, the 
Managing Director of the War Finance Corporation, wrote to 
Martin Behrman demanding that "quick fix". Direct and un­
compromising, Harding reminded the mayor and the council of 
their promise to raise revenues for NORLC. Without a size­
able increase in rates and fares, NORLC faced bankrutcy, 
jeopardizing the security of the WFC loan and exposing the 
council's "bad faith". Meeting in emergency session, the 
mayor and the council entertained proposals from the WFC 
calling for an immediate increase in fares and rates. As 
agents for the WFC explained, a six cent fare and a thirty 
percent increase in gas and electric rates would enable 
NORLC to meet its loan obligations, the NWLB award (soon 
to be reduced), and, ultimately, provide the company with a 
modest surplus.®3
Though it had no other reasonable choice but to consent 
to the WFC demands, the council attached several conditions 
to the ordinance increasing fares and rates. Drafted by the 
City Attorney's Office and introduced by Commissioner of 
Public Utilities Edward J. Glenny, the ordinance recounted 
in some detail the origins of the fare and rate increases,
®3W.P.G. Harding to Behrman, September 30, 1918, "Minutes 
of Meeting," October 1, 2, 1918, WFC. RG 154: New Orleans 
item. October 1, 2, 1918; New Orleans Daily States. October
1, 2, 1918. Economists for the WFC estimated that the fare 
and rate increases would generate an additional $2,400,000 
for 1918-1919, while expenses for the same time would 
increase another $2,200,000.
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emphasizing their wartime character and suggesting that the 
Wilson administration was responsible for its adoption. The 
ordinance allowed NORLC and NOGLC to collect the new fares 
and rates only over the term of the WFC loan. And required 
the companies to dedicate the increases solely to retiring 
the loan and subsidizing the NWLB award (the wage award 
expired with the end of the 1918 contract). In addition, the 
new ordinance authorized the commission council to "regu­
late" fares and rates on the basis of the valuation set by 
the Ballard investigation, nullifying the valuation provi­
sions of the Nix act and reiterating the full authority of 
the commission council over the regulation of public ser­
vices in New Orleans. One week later, despite the objections 
of the union and the Board of Public Utilities, the commis­
sion council formally enacted the Glenny ordinance. It went 
into effect immediately.e*
Opposition to the Glenny ordinance was immediate and, 
for the most part, ineffective. Wilbert Black, a union rep­
resentative, filed suit in Civil District Court against 
NORLC, attempting to prevent the company from collecting the 
fare increase (the union planned separate suits against the 
increase in electric and gas rates). The suit contended that 
the Glenny ordinance was illegal, arguing that the municipal 
government had no legal authority under its charter or the
"■•Ordinance No. 5257, CCS. CA, NOPL; Behrman to Harding, 
October 9, 1918, vol.2, "Minutes of Meeting," WFC. RG 154: 
New Orleans Item, October 2-4, 8-9, 1918.
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laws of the state to regulate fares, and that the increase 
in fares represented an unjust and unconstitutional tax on 
the people of New Orleans. Civil District Court Judge Hugh 
C. Cage ruled against the union, arguing that the commission 
council possessed the "full authority" to regulate the qual­
ity and cost of public services. In effect, then. Cage's 
ruling questioned the legitimacy of the Nix act and the au­
thority, to say nothing of the existence, of the Board of 
Public Utilities.®3
The Board of Public Utilities recognized the implica­
tions of the Black decision, and it acted quickly to assure 
its existence and to "preserve" its authority. The board ac­
knowledged that the authority of the commission council was 
unquestioned in matters of contracts, franchises, routes, 
and schedules. But, under the provisions of the Nix act, 
and contrary to the opinions of the City Attorney and the 
decision in the Black case, the council had no authority 
over the regulation of rates and fares. That authority, 
board members asserted, lay clearly and exclusively with the 
board. And they called on the Behrman administration to re­
scind the rate and fare provisions of the Glenny ordinance 
and to underwrite the board in a suit defining the authority
®"Black v. New Orleans Railway and Light Company 82 
Southern Reporter 81; New Orleans Daily States. October 3, 
9, 10, 16, 22, 31, November 25-27, 1918; New Orleans Item, 
October 9-10, 16, 31, November 25-27, 1918.
373
of the council and the board under the Nix act.*®
The city administration, convinced of its own authority 
and anxious to pursue an independent course, encouraged the 
Board of Public Utilities to test its authority under the 
Nix act. The administration insisted that it could not par­
ticipate in a suit against itself, and it suggested that the 
BPU initiate its own suit, asking the state government to 
represent it in court. The BPU, constrained by the opinions 
of the city attorney and without independent resources, com­
plied with the council's recommendations. Early in December, 
the BPU issued an "ordinance," canceling the rate and fare 
increases enacted under the Glenny ordinance, and ordering 
NORLC to surrender all "appropriate" documents concerning 
the fare and rates increases. Officals for the company, 
citing the opinions of the city attorney, refused to obey 
the order, contending that the board had no regulatory 
authority that the company was bound to respect.67
BBMoore to Martin Behrman and the Commission Council, 
November 26, December 9, 1918, vol.8, CAP. CA, NOPL; "Spe­
cial Meeting," Portfolio 1, PNWLB, LSU; Black v. New Orleans 
Railway and Light Company. ; Board of Public
Utilities in and for the Citv of New Orleans v. New Orleans 
Railway and Light Company. 82 Southern Reporter 280; New Or­
leans Daily States. December 5, 6, 16, 18, 1918, February 
13, April 1, 2, June 7, 10, 1919; New Orleans Itemf December 
5-6, 1918, April 1, 2, May 6, 1919.
67,Board of Public Utilties v. New Orleans Railway and 
Light Company. 81 SR, 281; Moore to Glenny, February 28,
1917, August 3, 1917, August 8, 1918, November 28, 1918, 
December 9, 1918, John F. C. Waldo to Moore, August 24,
1918, vol.8, CAP. CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item. December 5,
10, 1918; New Orleans Daily States, December 5, 10, 1918.
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Acting on orders from Governor Ruffin G. Pleasant, the 
state Attorney General filed suit on behalf of the board, 
seeking to repeal the Glenny ordinance and to establish the 
full and complete authority of the board over public ser­
vices in New Orleans. At a preliminary hearing, NORLC ques­
tioned the constitutionality of the Nix act, arguing that 
the act violated provisions of the state constitution re­
quiring the election of all municipal officials "exercising 
the police [inherent] powers or administering the affairs" 
of the city. The Civil District Court ruled against the BPU, 
reaffirming the authority of the commission council to regu­
late the cost of service and declaring the Nix act unconsti­
tutional. In nullifying the act, the court agreed with the 
contention of NORLC that the Board of Public Utilities was a 
municipal board invested with the inherent powers of the 
city. The Louisiana constitution required that the people of 
New Orleans select all municipal officials and boards exer­
cising the police power of the city, and prevented the leg­
islature from abating or abridging those powers.""
On appeal, the state Attorney General argued that the 
City of New Orleans, as a "creature" of the state, enjoyed 
its inherent powers at the sufferance of the state legisla­
ture and that the legislature could, as it desired, con­
""Board of Public Utilities v. New Orleans Railway and 
Light Company. 82 SR 281-283; New Orleans Item. January 6,
7, 10, 11, 1919; New Orleans Daily States, January 3, 6, 10,
11, 1919.
tract, expand, or withdraw those powers. In this instance, 
the legislature delegated the inherent powers of the state 
to the state Board of Public Utilities, clothing it with the 
"auxiliary municipal powers" to regulate the public utili­
ties of the city. The Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged 
the authority of the legislature to delegate its reserve 
powers as it desired, but, the court ruled, when the legis­
lature chooses to delegate those powers, it must respect the 
bounds placed on it by the Louisiana constitution. In all 
matters concerning New Orleans, the constitution required 
the election of all officials invested with the inherent 
powers of the city. There were no exceptions. Whether the 
BPU was a state board holding "auxiliary" municipal powers 
or a municipal board, the state government had no authority 
over its selection. And, since the neither the legislature 
nor the governor had the power to "breathe existence" into 
the board, the act had no vitality and the remainder of its 
provisions were without authority.69
The decision of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the "lull 
authority" of the municipal government over the public ser­
vice utilities of the city, reuniting public regulation 
under a single authority and freeing the administration from 
the ruinous valuation and rate of return provisions of the
S9Board of Public Utilities v. New Orleans Railway and
Light Company 82 SR. 281-83; New Orleans Daily States. Janu­
ary 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, April 1, May 6, 1919; New Orleans Item.
January 6, 7, 10, April 1, 2, May 5, 1919.
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Nix act. Freeing the city of the excessive valuation and 
rate demands of NORLC, however, proved more difficult than 
restoring full regulatory authority to the muincipal govern­
ment. During the summer of 1918, as part of its plan for the 
public rehabilitation of NORLC, the Behrman administration 
hired Frederick W. Ballard, a utility expert from Cleveland, 
to conduct a valuation survey of the physical and financial 
properties of NORLC. The council instructed Ballard to de­
termine the cost of rehabilitating NORLC under "normal" eco­
nomic conditions. Ballard's poor health and the tedious 
quality of the survey delayed completion of the survey until 
November. The city administration delayed releasing the sur­
vey until late in December, giving itself time to digest the 
report and to suggest corrections.70
Ballard established the valuation of NORLC and NOGLC at 
$32,739,193, more than $20,000,000 less than what management 
claimed as "fair and adequate" valuation. The teport, as 
critics of NORLC and the Behrman administration concluded, 
revealed the personal and corporate bankruptcy of private 
ownership of public services and the dangers of "quasi regu­
lation". The Ballard report, the newspapers suggested, con­
firmed what every one already knew: the financial problems 
of NORLC did not stem from the economic dislocation of the 
war or from the profligate wage awarded to employees.
7°"Special Meeting," Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans
Item. June 22, July 2, August 17, October 24, December 6,
14-16, 21, 25, 1918.
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Rather, those problems were the result of decades of corpo­
rate mismanagement, finacial exploitation, and politicized 
public regulation. The solution to those problems obviously 
lay in a thorough and uncompromising reorganization and re­
habilitation of the company and the depoliticization of 
public service regulation. In exposing the problems of the 
public service industry and suggesting a solution to the 
crisis, the Ballard report, the Item wrote, was an important 
move toward a "more satisfactory control of the public ser­
vice question". ‘7:L
The Behrman administration, on the other hand, was 
completely dissatisfied with Ballard report. The Ballard 
valuation differed dramatically with other, recent assess­
ments conducted by the State Board of Affairs (the equaliza­
tion board) and by two "utility experts" employed by NORLC. 
The discrepancies between the Ballard report and the other 
valuations were too glaring to ignore, suggesting that Bal­
lard had either misunderstood or ignored the council* s in­
structions concerning the sort of valuation it desired. In 
any event, the administration recognized that a low valua-
’7XF. W. Ballard and Company, "Valuation of the Property 
of New Orleans Railway and Light Company, Property in All 
Parishes, Final Summary All Departments," November 30, 1918 
(hereafter cited as Ballard, "Valuation of NORLC"); New 
Orleans Item, December 31, 1918, January 1, 5, 7, 1919, May 
7, June 3, 12, 30, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. December 
31, 1918, January 2, 1919. An unidentified valuation for the 
NWLB estimated the valuation of NORLC at between $37 and $38 
million. See "Actual Valuation, New Orleans Railway and 
Light Company," undated, Portfolio 3, PNWLB. LSU.
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tion would force NORLC into receivership, compromising the 
public reorganization and rehabilitation of the utilities 
industry in New Orleans.72
In an effort to stave off receivership, the Behrman ad­
ministration sought a second opinion. Commissioner Edward E. 
Lafaye commissioned General G. W. Goethals, the chief engi­
neer of the Panama Canal and the principal architect of the 
New Orleans Industrial and Navigation Canal, to conduct 
another, more acceptable valuation. Though more inclusive 
than the Ballard survey, the Geothals valuation was hardly 
more acceptable to the city administration. In making his 
assessment, Goethals simply split the difference between the 
Ballard and NORLC valuations. As the general explained in 
his report, Ballard disregarded many business intangibles, 
fixing the valuation for rate making purposes only. Though 
the administration could use the Ballard figures for rate 
making, it could not use them to reorganize and rehabilitate 
the company. The method of valuation employed by the experts 
for NORLC was too generous to the company, setting its valu­
ation on the cost of reproduction at wartime prices. Though 
the administration could rehabilitate NORLC at the price set 
by company experts, the cost to the consumer was completely
72New Orleans Daily States. January 3, 5, 1919; New 
Orleans Item. January 3, April 6, 13, 1919. The Board of 
Affairs placed the market value of NORLC and NOGLC at $47 
million in 1918, while the firms of Ford, Bacon and Davis 
and J. H. Perkins placed its valuation at between $55 and 
$57 million.
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prohibitive. In an ef£ort to find some neutral ground, then, 
Goethals recommended a figure of $44.8 million for rate mak­
ing and a generous rate of return for both "old" and "new** 
money."7 3
Several days later, Commissioner Lafaye reported his 
own findings to the council, suggesting a blueprint for the 
public rehabilitation of the company. It was obvious, Lafaye 
told the council in his last public act as Commissioner of 
Public Property (he would resign several days later), that 
the valuation offered by NORLC was excessive and unrealis­
tic, and he recommended that the council reject it out of 
hand. He also recommended that the council disregard the 
valuation set by Frederick Ballard as incomplete. The city 
administration, Lafaye reminded the council, had never been 
interested in establishing the valuation of NORLC for rate 
making purposes only. Rather, from the start, the council 
considered valuation as part of a process that would reor­
ganize and reorient the public utilities industry, assuring 
service based on the public needs, rewarding sound, effi­
cient management, protecting legitimate investment, and 
attracting the additional investment required to fund the 
rehabilitation of the industry.'7'*
Though an advocate of municipal ownership, Lafaye con­
sidered it inexpedient, and he counseled the administration
'73New Orleans Item, January 3, 5, 1919; New Orleans Daily
States. January 5, 1919.
'7*New Orleans Item, January 5, 8, April 6, 13, 1919.
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to reject municipalization. Instead, Lafaye recommended that 
the commission council take a "direct" and "supervisory" 
role in the rehabilitation, management, and regulation of 
NORLC and NOGLC. Lafaye proposed, then, that the council 
grant NORLC an "indeterminate" franchise to operate transit, 
electricity, and gas, guaranteeing the companies an assured 
rate of return on a "fixed" valuation, and adjusting rates 
and fares within the limits set by the rate of return. As 
the first step toward assuring the rehabilitation of NORLC, 
Lafaye proposed establishing the valuation of NORLC at $38.3 
million and setting the rate of return at five percent for
1919. ‘5's
The Lafaye plan, though, was not the first step toward 
the rehabiliatation of the company, nor did it succeed in 
preventing NORLC from declaring bankruptcy and seeking the 
protection of the federal courts. On January 8, Daniel D. 
Curran informed the commission council that the American 
Cities Company had filed a petition in federal district 
court, asking Judge Rufus E. Poster to place NORLC in re­
ceivership for failing to meet its financial obligations to 
the stockholders of ACC. Judge Foster consented to the peti­
^"Ibid. The proposal also allowed the council to adjust 
the valuation over the years, permitting the company to is­
sue additional stock with the approval of the council. The 
plan increased the rate of profit to six percent in 1920 and 
seven percent in 1921. Lafaye urged the administration to 
sever its relationship with NORLC by resigning from the 
company's board of directors. In April, Mayor Behrman and 
the other councilmen resigned from the board. New Orleans 
Item, April 14, 1919.
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tion, appointing John D. O ’Keefe, the executive vice-presi­
dent of the Whitney-Central Bank, as receiver for the com­
pany, instructing him to "preserve, manage, and operate" 
the three utility divisions as an unified corporation.7"
The public response to receivership was, of course, 
mixed. The Daily States asserted that though the Behrman ad­
ministration worked "patiently, intelligently, and earnest­
ly," to resolve the utility crisis, receivership meant that 
the city administration lost the opportunity to direct the 
reorganization and rehabilitation of the company. A more as- 
stute assessment came from the New Orleans Item. Receiver­
ship would not prevent some form of public rehabilitation of 
NORLC. Undoubtedly, the newspaper suggested, receivership 
would further complicate and delay the reorientation of the 
industry, but it also enhanced the opportunity to reorganize 
the company along the progressive principles of scientific 
management and public regulation. The complications the Item 
foresaw, however, delayed the public rehabilitation of the 
company for another three years, disrupting the "good order" 
of the city and contributing to the defeat of the Behrman 
administration in 1920.77
7"New Orleans Item, January 9, 10, February 5, 1919; New 
Orleans Daily States, January 8-10, 1919. Press accounts 
described O'Keefe as a man of "unusual ability," realistic, 
resolute, and, above all, independent of NORLC. In fact, 
O'Keefe was a member of the board of directors for NORLC, 
and the Whitney-Central was one of the largest creditors of 
NORLC.
77New Orleans Daily States. January 10, 1919; New Orleans 
Item. January 9, 10, 1919.
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Chapter Seven
Readjustment and Reform
The period of economic and political readjustment that 
followed the Armistice of 1918 had a profound, though 
enigmatic, effect on the public regulation and rehabilita­
tion of New Orleans Railway and Light Company. The policy of 
readjustment initiated by the Wilson administration saw the 
disassembling of the federal wartime administrations and 
boards and, as one reliable student suggested, the eroding 
of the concessions won by organized labor during the war.3- 
During the period of readjustment, the management of NORLC, 
under the direction of Receiver John D. O'Keefe and the pro­
tection of the federal court, assailed the rights and con­
cessions won by the union in 1918. Their actions triggered a 
lengthy and divisive strike, eventually compelling the union 
to accede to the demands of management. The strike damaged 
the reputation and credibility of the Behrman administra­
tion, though, in fact, the administration did much to bring 
about a peaceful and reasonable solution. Still it was not 
enough to satisfy the partisan reform press of New Orleans, 
which blamed the strike on the failed public utilities 
policy of the Behrman administration.
xAdam Fairclough, "The Public Utilities Industry in New 
Orleans: A Study in Capital, Labor, and Government, 1894- 
1929," Louisiana History. XXII (Winter 1981), 45-65.
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The war and readjustment, the city newspapers and other 
critics charged, exposed the failure of partisan municipal 
regulation and the incompetence of the Behrman administra­
tion. During the war and readjustment, the Behrman commis­
sion council ignored the provisions of the Nix act, politi­
cizing municipal regulation and allowing federal agencies 
and the interest of NORLC to determine public policy. 
Operating with the protection of the city council and the 
approval of the federal government, NORLC curtailed street­
car service, permitting the company to avoid its franchise 
obligations and antagonizing commuters and employees. The 
wartime economy and the financial mismanagement of the com­
pany (ignored, if not condoned, by the Behrman administra­
tion) nearly bankrupted the company, compelling the city 
administration to raise rates and fares to underwrite a 
federal loan and to meet an increase in wages ordered by 
the federal National War Labor Board.
The Armistice did not see a restoration of services or
reduction in cost, but the bankruptcy of the company and an
increase in fares. Nor did it see the reestablishment of
public authority over NORLC, but its further deterioration.
Exhausted by the war and motivated by partisan advantage, 
the Behrman administration refused to participate in the re­
habilitation of NORLC, allowing the company to set the con­
ditions for its reconstruction and regulation.
There was a measure of truth in the complaints of the
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city press, but it misread the intentions of the Behrman 
administration. Though exhausted by the ordeal of war and 
"reconstruction," the commission council offered a series of 
temperate and workable proposals for the rehabilitation of 
NORLC aimed at restoring and strengthening municipal author­
ity. But the Behrman administration did not possess plenary 
authority over the rehabilitation process, nor did it enjoy 
the respect of Receiver O'Keefe or the confidence of the 
city newspapers. And the politics of readjustment, like 
municipal politics in general, served both private and pub­
lic concerns, giving them a hand in shaping public policy 
and tempering public authority in the name of private rights 
and restraining private interests on behalf of the public 
good.
The policy initiated by the Behrman administration in 
1918, despite the criticisms of a partisan press, ended the 
streetcar strike of 1920 and brought about the public reha­
bilitation of NORLC and the "restoration" of municipal regu­
latory authority over the public utilities industry in New 
Orleans. Though carried out by the "reform" administration 
of Andrew McShane (see Chapter Eight), the Behrman policy 
scaled down the valuation of NORLC, aligned rates and fares 
with the cost of service, limited the rate of profit, per­
mitted the municipalization of public utilities, and recog­
nized the municipal government as the exclusive "regulatory" 
authority of public services in New Orleans.
Near the end of 1919, on the eve of the first anniver­
sary of the November Armistice, William D. Mahon, the presi­
dent of the AASEREA, wrote to union leaders and members, 
cautioning them against antagonizing management during the 
period of "readjustment". Management, he said, obviously 
considered readjustment an opportunity to reassert its con­
trol over labor, regaining the rights and concessions it 
lost before and during the war. Union workers should respond 
to every complaint and demand of management, then, with cir­
cumspection and vigilance, never permitting the companies 
to blame the decline in services and the rise in prices on 
the union and never relinquishing fundamental rights. John 
Stadler, the outgoing president of the New Orleans AAESREA, 
reiterated Mahon's message to the local membership. He urged 
the carmen to perserve in their work, reminding them of 
their service and contract obligations and of the anti-union 
sentiment of Receiver John D. O'Keefe.2
The concerns of the union leadership were legitimate. 
During the period of receivership and readjustment, the 
quality of service deteriorated further and working condi­
tions remained intolerable. Receiver O'Keefe mananged the 
company for the benefit of the stockholders, curtailing ser­
vice wherever possible and maintaining revenues at any ex­
pense. The brunt of his economies, predictably, fell on the
2Mahon to Locals, November 10, 1919, Stadler to Members 
of Local Division 194, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU.
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customers and employees o£ NORLC. O'Keefe was, as well, a 
devoted company man. He was a member of the board of direc­
tors of NORLC, an executive officer of one of its principal 
creditors, the Whitney-Central Bank, and he was openly crit­
ical of the policies of the Wilson and Behrman administra­
tions and bitterly resentful of the concessions granted to 
the union. Prom his perspective, it was the misappropriation 
of authority and power by the government and the union 
during the war, and not the financial mismanagement of the 
company, that led to the collapse of NORLC. It was his task 
as receiver, then, to readjust and reapportion that author­
ity and power to suit the interests of the company. His 
first major opportunity came in the spring of 1920.3
Early in June, after several months of preliminary dis­
cussions (conducted in the newspapers), the carmen's union 
and Receiver O'Keefe began negotiations for the 1920 con­
tract. The union, citing increases in the cost of living and 
poor working conditions, demanded a "substantial" increase 
in wages and a similar reduction in hours. The union wanted 
an increase of thirty-five cents an hour, raising wages from 
the forty-two cents granted by the National War Labor Board 
in 1918 to seventy-seven cents an hour. The men also demand­
ed an eight-hour day, a six-day week, and time and a half 
for Sundays and all holidays. The total wage award for all
3New Orleans Item. January 9, 1919; Stadler to Member­
ship, June 4, 1919, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU; Fairclough, 
"Public Utilities," 53.
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union workers, including common day labors and gashouse 
workers, was $3 million.4
Receiver O'Keefe acknowledged that the carmen deserved 
a wage increase, but, he argued, the union demands were un­
realistic and unjustified, demanding much, conceding little. 
He told the carmen, however, that he would agree to a "sub­
stantial" increase in wages and a modest change in hours, 
provided the union submitted to certain conditions. First, 
the union had to reduce and revise its wage demands. The 
wage demanded by the union exceeded industry and regional 
standards, and, more importantly, exceeded the ability of 
the company to pay, threatening it with complete collapse.
The company could, though, offer a sliding scale that 
increased wages from forty-two cents to fifty cents an hour, 
provided the men agreed to a nine hour work day and agreed 
not to oppose the increase in fares the company needed to 
fund the pay raise.®
The pay increase and the readjustment of power, though, 
required other, more demanding conditions. O'Keefe would not 
agree to any pay raise or reduction in hours unless the 
union agreed to exclude common day laborers— a majority of 
whom were black— and gashouse employees from the contract.
The common worker, O'Keefe insisted, did not share any of
“■New Orleans Item. March 1, 8, 10, May 17, 31, June 6,
7, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. May 17, 23, June 6, 7,
1920.
®New Orleans Item, June 7, 10, 22, 29, 1920; New Orleans
Daily States, June 7, 15, 23, 1920.
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the concerns or meet any of the standards of carmen's union. 
The employees of New Orleans Gas Light Company, many of them 
skilled and experienced workers, were thoroughly dissatis­
fied with their standing within the carmen's union and de- 
maned separate contracts. The union's demand to continue 
representing these workers was unreasonable and detrimental 
to the reorganization of the company, elevating the union to 
the status of management and preventing the stockholders 
from employing the economies necessary to rehabilitate the 
company. O'Keefe would not continue discussions until the 
union consented to his demands and would not agree to a pay 
increase until the commission council assented to an in­
crease in carfares.8
Neither the council nor the union acceded to O'Keefe's 
demands. The commission council was, understandably, sus­
picious of any petition from NORLC asking for additional 
revenues. Though the Behrman administration entertained the 
receiver's request for a fare increase, the council delayed 
consideration of the proposal until a more "appropriate" 
time. Mayor Behrman informed the council that a seven cent 
fare would serve no more "useful purpose" than the six cent 
fare. At the time of the six cent ordinance, the mayor said, 
the company assured the council that the increases in fares 
and rates would prevent receivership and further the reha-
aNew Orleans Pailv States. June 10, 14-15, 23, 27, 1920; 
New Orleans Item, June 15, 22, 29, 1920; Fairclough, "Public 
Utilties," 53-54.
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bilitation of the company. The increases did neither. 
Receiver O'Keefe, the mayor said, insisted that the seven 
cent fare would do what the six cent fare could not do. But, 
Behrman continued, there was no guarantee that an increase 
in fares would allow the receiver to meet expenses and re­
habilitate the company. Without those and other assurances 
from the receiver, the council should not agree to any 
increase in fares and rates. Without dissent, the council 
postponed consideration until a later date.7
The union, however, refused to suspend discusssions or 
to postpone consideration of O'Keefe's demands. James Rod­
gers, who replaced John Stadler as president of the local 
union, characterized O'Keefe's remarks as false and mislead­
ing, intending to deceive the people and demoralize the 
union movement. The receiver maintained that wages had to 
match regional and industry standards, the increase in the 
cost of living, and the demands of employment. But the wage 
scale suggested by the receiver, Rodgers argued, did not 
meet with the standards he had announced. The carmen's job 
reguired skill and concentration, as well as dedication to 
the safety and comfort of the passengers, something, James 
Rodgers insisted, the receiver consistently ignored. More to 
the point, however, the receiver sought to use the wage 
issue as an ultimatum against the union, forcing it to re­
linquish control of its membership and denying representa-
7Ibid.
390
tion to those who needed it most. The union would not,
Rodgers insisted, abandon its members at any price. To 
eliminate those men from the contract would violate their 
trust, diluting the strength of the union and ending, no 
doubt, in the destruction of the union movement.*1
Over the next several days, discussions degenerated 
badly. Though each side offered revisions in the wage scale, 
neither side would compromise on the fundamental issue of 
union representation. And, despite the intercessions of city 
and federal authorities, the union membership voted over­
whelmingly to strike on July 1." In the interim, the Behrman 
administration and federal officials arranged for a series 
of conferences between Receiver O'Keefe and the union lead­
ership. Receiver O'Keefe spoke briefly, reiterating the 
difficulties facing the company. He could not operate— much 
less rehabilitate— the company under the wage and contract 
provisions demanded by the company. The union had to reduce 
its wage demands and relinquish its control over personnel 
and management decisions. Agreeing to those concession, he 
said, would permit him to manage the company more
"New Orleans Daily States. June 15, 17-20, 22, 1920; New 
Orleans Item. June 18, 20, 29, 1920. Rodgers admitted that 
some skilled workmen withdrew from the AASEREA. But, as he 
pointed out, the 1918 contract allowed those skilled workers 
to join unions that represented their craft.
"New Orleans Daily States. June 23-27, 29, 1920; New Or­
leans Item, June 24, 26, 30, July 1, 1920. The union revised 
their wage demands to sixty-five cents an hour. The receiver 
countered with a sliding scale of forty-six, forty-eight, 
and fifty-one cents an hour. The strike vote was 2,414 to 
twenty-five, with twelve abstensions.
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efficiently, furthering its recovery and rehabilitation. 
Without those concessions, O'Keefe argued, the company would 
collapse.xo
The union representatives disputed O'Keefe's remarks. 
The union, they said, only wanted what the NWLB and the 
management of NORLC agreed to in 1918. The NWLB refused to 
consider the financial condition of NORLC in setting the 
wage awarded to the carmen. Instead, the board based 
wages on the cost of living and the prevailing regional and 
industry standards. There was no compelling evidence to sug­
gest, the union contended, that conditions and circumstances 
had changed at all to warrant a change in policy. Regarding 
union eligibility, the union asked only to continue repre­
senting the same classification of workers under the same 
terms and provisions agreed to in 1918. The union did not 
seek then or now to supplant management, but only to pre­
serve the contractual and personal rights of the men it 
represented.xx
With discussions at standstill and the strike rapidly 
approaching, Mayor Behrman appointed a special, nonpartisan 
committee of business, labor, and civic leaders, chaired 
by former commissioner Harold W. Newman, to investigate the
xoIbid.
xxNew Orleans Daily States. June 28-30, 1920, July 1, 15, 
1920; New Orleans Item. June 28, 30, July 7, 1920. The dis­
cussions did not advance much beyond the restating of well- 
known positions, except to establish that a wage of sixty- 
five cents would pay the carmen $150.00 a month and would 
require a ten cent carfare.
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issues and demands raised by the union and the receiver and 
to suggest ways of mediating a settlement. Initially, the 
committee did little more than "reexamine" the evidence and 
lecture the union about its obligations to "public service" 
and the "public order". Newman appealed to the union to de­
lay the strike until after the Fourth of July holiday, per­
mitting the commmittee to study the issues and recommend a 
settlement. A strike, Newman scolded the union, would not 
serve the public interests, and he warned the union that the 
city government would be within its rights to enjoin the 
union from striking. "There can be no strike," Newman said, 
mimicking Calvin Coolidge, "against the public wishes."“
Mayor Behrman and union representatives were in a more 
conciliatory mood. The mayor, too, counseled the union to 
delay the strike, suggesting that delay would allow the ad­
ministration and the special committee the time to decipher 
the conflicting testimony and to propose a workable solu­
tion. Union representatives insisted that the membership 
would not submit to veiled threats or vague promises, but 
probably would consent to a delay if the special committee 
would guarantee a monthly wage of $150.00, a nine hour day, 
and a six-day week. Union eligibility and representation, 
however, were not negotiable. Nonetheless, the Newman com­
mittee ignored the mayor and the union, calling on the union
“ New Orleans Daily States, June 30, 1920; New Orleans
Item, July 1, 2, 1920.
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to postpone its strike in the interest of the public good 
and the public safety. Without the guarantees it sought and 
in response to the obtuse policy and rhetoric of the Newman 
committee, the union rejected the demand that it delay the 
strike.13
The strike began at daybreak with the completion of the 
last "nightrun". Later that morning, O'Keefe secured a court 
order from Judge Foster, enjoining the union from any "vio­
lent" action taken against the company, its officials, work­
ers, or property. As a precaution against labor violence, 
Judge Foster ordered federal marshals to ride the street­
cars of New Orleans, "augmenting" the New Orleans Police 
Department and further assuring the safety of passengers and 
the protection of property. He would not use federal troops, 
he said, unless there was "actual" violence.14
The injunction and its companion order augmenting the 
New Orleans police with federal marshals were unnecessary, 
more an indication of O'Keefe's intentions than of the 
union's "tendenacy" to violence. The injunction was not, as 
it asserted, aimed at preventing violence, but rather at 
blaming the union for the distruption of service and the 
inconvenience to passengers. The union recognized the damage 
violence would do to its cause and standing with the commu­
nity, and it worked diligently and, for the most part, suc-
13New Orleans Daily States, July 1, 2, 1920; New Orleans 
Item. July 1, 2, 1920.
14Ibid.
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cessfully to prevent the violent disruption of service. The 
court order, too, was disingeneous. The carmen's strike 
against the receiver for NORLC, operating under the protect- 
tion of federal bankruptcy laws, was not a strike against 
the United States government. There was, then, no legal 
justification for employing federal marshals as "private" 
security. And, federal marshals did not "augment" the New 
Orleans Police Department for the simple reason that the 
Behrman administration did not use the police force to keep 
the streetcars operating.1*
The union seemed unmoved by the tone and content of the 
court's injunction and order. The union paraded and picketed 
against NORLC, but, at the same time, it sought to reopen 
negotiations with Receiver O'Keefe, first through the Newman 
committee, then through Judge Poster. The Newman committee 
refused to discuss any issues or arrange for discussions 
with John O'Keefe until the men returned to work. The union, 
of course, declined the offer, and instead sought an inter­
view with Judge Foster. Foster arranged for O'Keefe to meet 
with union representatives, but O'Keefe's remarks angered 
union leaders, further complicating a serious problem and 
revealing O'Keefe's true intentions.1®
In an emotional and caustic speech, Receiver O'Keefe 
called on Judge Foster to declare NORLC an open shop, in-
lsIbid.
1BNew Orleans Daily States. July 2, 9, 13, 1920; New 
Orleans Item, July 3, 10, 1920.
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sisting that the local carmen's union and its national spon­
sor should forfeit their standing as the bargaining agents 
for the employees of the traction, electric, and gas divi­
sions of NORLC. These unions and their officers, O'Keefe 
claimed, were a "bar to progress and service," conspiring to 
take over the management of the company, preventing its pro­
per financial reorganization and rehabilitation, and threat­
ening the stockholders with financial ruin. The origins of 
this conspiracy were recent and clearly visible. With the 
nation preoccupied with war and the company near financial 
exhaustion as a result of that war, O'Keefe said, the unions 
and their allies in local and national governments, exacted 
huge wage awards from the company and wrested control of the 
company from management. The wages granted by the National 
War Labor Board exceeded every rational industry and social 
standard and damaged irreparably the financial condition of 
the company, forcing the company into receivership.3-7
The provisions and conditions of the 1918 contract, ex­
tracted from the company under duress, O'Keefe asserted, 
were even more ruinous. The union, contrary to its bylaws, 
incorporated workers into its ranks who were ineligible for 
membership, compelling the company to include them in the 
wage award and according them the privileges of union repre­
sentation. In addition, the contract of 1918 wrested control
X7New Orleans Daily States, July 2, 9, 13, 1920; New Or­
leans item. July 3, 10, 1920.
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of the company from its managers and gave it to the union. 
Under the terms of that contract, labor imposed a closed 
shop on the company, forcing management to relinquish con­
trol over personnel, discipline, promotions, and grievance 
procedures. Despite these immense privileges and powers, the 
local, at the insistance of the national union, now sought 
to expand its power over management by imposing another ex- 
horbitant wage demand on the company and its customers and 
absorbing the clerical staff into the union. The company, 
O'Keefe predicted, could not survive, let alone reorganize, 
under such conditions. And, though O'Keefe promised to re­
cognize the men's right to organize and bargain collectively 
through a representative of their own choosing, he refused 
to deal with the AASEREA or its local affiliate and asserted 
his right to contract with whom ever he chose.1®
The union, of course, denounced O'Keefe, labeling him 
as anti-union and censuring his remarks as contemptable lies 
calculated to prejudice the public against the union. The 
wages awarded to the union in 1918, its representatives 
said, did not exceed either industry or Southern standards 
and did not surpass the company's ability to pay. In fact, 
the wage awarded to the carmen and other union workers fell 
below industry and regional standards and barely matched 
the cost of living in New Orleans. And, company executives 
convinced the NWLB to revise a portion of the wage award,
18Ibid.
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reducing the scales paid to unskilled, common labor. Company 
executives also managed to fanagle reductions in services 
and increases in revenues from the city, providing them with 
ample savings and resources to fund the wage award. In 
brief, then, there was no truth to O'Keefe's assertions that 
the union dictated the wage award and, as a consequence, 
contributed to the collapse of NORLC.3-9
Nor was there any truth to the allegations that the 
union dictated the 1918 contract, supplanting management to 
the detriment of the union, the company, and the city. The 
management of NORLC freely participated in the contract dis­
cussions and, though it had had reservations about several 
aspects of the union's proposals, management eventually 
agreed to every provision of the "primary" agreement. The 
receiver, union representatives charged, willfully miscon­
strued the intent and effect of the 1918 contract. The union 
did not reconstitute its membership to supplant management 
or to establish a closed shop. Rather, the union merely ex­
tended representation and organization to those workers who 
were, prior to 1917, unorganized and without representation. 
The contract of 1918 did not impose a closed shop on NORLC 
(the NWLB guidelines prevented the union from doing that), 
but a union shop, requiring eligible workers to join the 
union and preventing the company from dismissing workers for
X9New Orleans Daily States, July 2, 3, 12-15, 22, 1920;
New Orleans Item. July 3, 1920.
I398
legitimate union activity. The other personnel provisions 
did not threaten the authority and integrity of management, 
but simply and clearly accorded the employees of NORLC 
greater, more formal protection against the unfair labor 
practices of management. It was this regressive and profli­
gate management— and O'Keefe's administration perpetuated 
it— that formed the greatest obstacle to the social progress 
and industrial peace of New Orleans.2"
Management was also uncompromising and determined to 
break the strike and the union. O'Keefe rejected the union's 
offer to return to work under the 1918 contract while a 
special arbitration board and the Behrman administration 
determined the size of the wage and fare increases. O'Keefe 
also convinced Judge Foster (who did not require much con­
vincing) to issue a special order, declaring that the men 
had "quit" their jobs in the wage and contract dispute and 
directing O'Keefe to "restaff" the railway division and to 
restore normal operations with "all convenient speed". In 
effect, the order locked out the union and set aside the 
1918 contract. The order recognized the right of employees 
to organize and to bargain collectively through a represen­
tative of their own selection, but it also asserted the 
right of the receiver to contract with whom he pleased. In 
hiring his new staff, the receiver was to give preference to 
"former" employees, permitting them to return to work under
2°Ibid.
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the NWLB wage scale and "restoring" their seniority. The 
order tied any wage increase to the financial condition of 
the company and to an increase in the fares. The receiver 
and the court, then, would alone decide the size of the wage 
increase. Seniority, as well, was no longer the sole stan­
dard for promotion and advancement within the company. Pro­
motions would be determined on the basis of tenure of ser­
vice and ability, and would be granted at the discretion of 
the receiver. Foster also rescinded the grievance provi­
sions of the 1918 contract, leaving all personnel matters to 
the discretion of management.33*
Judge Foster tried to assure the striking carmen that 
his order was a temporary contract, permitting the receiver 
to continue operating the streetcar system and affording the 
carmen every reasonable protection. Once back to work, the 
carmen, through their own bargaining agent, and the receiver 
could negotiate a new contract and could work toward a rea­
sonable wage increase. O'Keefe did not seek to destroy the 
union or to deny its members a living wage, Foster said, but 
sought only to rehabilitate the company in the most judi­
cious and economical manner. O'Keefe could not rehabilitate 
the company in a reasonable fashion unless the union "read­
justed" its demands for a wage increase and relinquished its
3*New Orleans Daily States. July 3-4, 8, 11-13, 1920; 
New Orleans Item. July 3-4, 8, 12, 1920. O'Keffe set July 12 
as the deadline for "rehiring" striking carmen. After that 
date, he would show no preference for former employees. Only 
one former employee, H. J. Bellocq, applied for his old job.
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complete control of the labor force to management.22
The union saw no reason to agree to FosterTs so-called 
contract. The order offered scant protection to workers, 
allowing the receiver to use wages, hours, and promotions to 
discipline workers and to emasculate the union. Though it 
"recognized" the right of employees to organize and to bar­
gain collectively, the order did not compel management to 
bargain with their chosen representative. In fact, the order 
did not obligate the receiver to contract with any union 
representative. Without the protection of a union contract, 
with specific obligations for management and provisions for 
a "living wage," the union saw no reason to return to work. 
In short, "no contract, no work".23
The union's response and vote outraged Foster, and he 
reacted in anger. The issue, he told reporters, was no long­
er a matter of wages, hours, and conditions (these concerns 
were important, though secondary to the issues of membership 
and representation), but a question of the fundamental right 
of contract. "The real question now at issue is," he said, 
"are the courts of the United States to be governed by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States in their deci­
sions or be subjected to the dictation from any organized 
group of men." The resolution of this question, Foster an­
22New Orleans Daily States. July 3-6, 15; Hew Orleans 
Item. July 3-7, 1920.
23New Orleans Daily States, July 4, 6, 9, 1920; Hew Or­
leans Item. July 6, 7, 9, 1920. The union voted 1,500 to one 
to reject Judge Foster's order.
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nounced, was "paramount and superior to any temporary incon­
venience the public may suffer".**
The settlement of the strike did not depend, as Judge 
Foster believed, on resolving the fundamental right to con­
tract. But, rather, on adjusting and accomodating the pri­
vate interests of the carmen and the company (the dictation 
of organized groups of men) with the interests of the public 
(themselves an association, a commonwealth of private inter­
ests). The strike would end, not in the courtroom, but in 
the boardroom of NORLC, the lunchrooms of union halls, the 
editorial rooms of the New Orleans newspapers, the meeting 
rooms of neigborhood civic and political associations, and, 
perhaps most important of all, the public rooms of City 
Hall.2®
The car strike of 1920 was a costly affair, both finan­
cially and politically. Each day of the strike (it lasted 
nearly a month) cost the motormen and conductors over $5,600 
in wages and benefits, far exceeding the "strike benefits" 
they obtained from the AASEREA and other sympathetic unions. 
The local union spent money of its own in support of its
“ New Orleans Item. July 8, 13, 1920.
“ Despite the ex cathedra pronouncements of jurists like 
Foster, most students of American law did not recognize the 
freedom of contract as a catholic and infalliable doctrine. 
The courts had long recognized the authority of the states 
to alter or nullify contracts. For a most able analysis on 
this subject, see Melvin I. Urofsky, "State Courts and Pro­
tective Legislation during the Progressive Era: A Reevalu- 
tion," The Journal of American History. 72 (June 1985),
63-91.
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members and in an attempt to win public and political 
support for its cause.28 Por NORLC, the strike was even more 
expensive. The interruption of streetcar service, of course, 
saw a dramatic and threatening loss in operating revenue.
The New Orleans newspapers claimed that the strike cost 
NORLC between $20,000 and $30,000 a day in lost revenue and 
nearly $20,000 in wages for "replacement" workers.3*7
The strike cost NORLC and the union more than money.
The strike cost NORLC whatever public confidence it may have 
possessed, discrediting, if only temporarily, its anti-union 
policies and practices and compelling it to accept mediation 
and compromise. And though the union enjoyed the support of 
the public, the Regular Democrats, and the press, the strike 
forced the union to accept a compromise mediated by a spe­
cial board and approved by Judge Poster that negated several 
concessions won by the union during the war. The Behrman ad-
3"The union received nearly $13,600 from the AASEREA and 
other contributors and it spent $12,700 in managing the 
strike. See "Expenses of Strike of 1920," and William D.
Mahon to J. B. Lawson, August 7, 1920, box 2, SRUC. SCD,
HTML, TU; New Orleans Item, July 1, 1920; New Orleans Daily 
States. July 12, 13, 1920.
3,/New Orleans Item, July 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 13, 1920; New 
Orleans Daily States, July 1, 6, 11-13, 17, 1920. Receiver 
O'Keefe claimed that some 1,300 men applied for the jobs 
vacted by the striking carmen. O'Keefe's claims were exag­
gerated for political effect. O'Keefe wanted to give the
impression that the company enjoyed the complete confidence 
of the public, which, as we shall see, it did not. The State 
of Louisiana also spent a good deal of money on the strike—  
and for political effect only. Governor John M. Parker, the 
intractable opponent of the Behrman administration, in an 
attempt to embarrass the mayor and the commission council, 
sent state troops to New Orleans to aid the city government 
in keeping the peace.
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ministration also paid dearly for the strike. The strike 
came at the beginning of a very bitter municipal election 
campaign and contributed to the impression that the Behrman 
administration was incapable of resolving the public utili­
ties crisis or of governing the city.
At the beginning of the strike, John O'Keefe promised 
the customers and stockholders of NORLC that there would be 
no interruption in normal operations. It was a promise he 
could not keep. On July 1, the first day of the strike, 
there was no commercial streetcar service (the union kept 
its pledge, however, to deliver newspapers and other forms 
of mail), requiring commuters to find other ways of getting 
to work or to the store. The public seemed prepared for the 
first day of the strike (at least that was the impression 
the press wanted to give a concerned and weary public), but 
soon after grew tired of the abbreviated schedules, the in­
numerable delays, and the hazardous nature of public trans­
portation. On the second day of the strike, the Daily States 
reported that management had restored service on only four 
lines, three above (west) and one below (east) Canal Street, 
virtually paralyzing traffic and resulting in missed ap­
pointments, unmade sales and purchases, and leaving the pub­
lic overheated and overwrought. Streetcar service, the Daily 
States reported, was not only inadequate and inconvenient, 
but also dangerous. The management of NORLC replaced the 
striking carmen with inexperienced workers, given virtually
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no training and no supervision. In a single day, more than 
two weeks into the strike and with fewer than 100 cars "on 
line," these "trainees" were involved in more than thirty 
accidents, resulting in more intractable delays and a few 
"minor" injuries.2*
Two weeks into the strike, it was apparent, at least to 
the New Orleans press, that O'Keefe was "losing" the strike. 
Public sentiment, the newspapers reported, favored the car­
men and blamed O'Keefe, Foster, and the stockholders of 
NORLC for the strike. The public was convinced that O'Keefe 
and the ownership of NORLC orchestrated the streetcar strike 
for its own selfish interests. It was apparent that O'Keefe 
and the management of NORLC intentionally maneuvered the 
union into striking for better wages and working conditions, 
hoping that the strike and the courts would break the union 
movement. It was equally apparent, the press reported, that 
NORLC hoped to use the wage dispute to exact higher fares 
and rates from the public, rehabilitating the company with 
public funds yet avoiding the consequences of public re­
habilitation.2*
O'Keefe and the management of NORLC did not really 
"lose" the strike. The union simply won over public senti­
ment to its side. The union avoided "radical" demands and
2<*New Orleans Daily States. July 1, 6-9, 11-13, 15, 21, 
1920; New Orleans Item. June 26, 30, July 2, 3, 7, 1920.
2*New Orleans Daily States. July 12-15, 1920; New Orleans 
Item. July 10-13, 1920.
threatening rhetoric, eschewed violence, and sought conser­
vative associates and counsel. Throughout the strike, the 
union and its triends spoke only o£ conserving their inter­
ests and of maintaining their rights. These tactics impress­
ed critics and won supporters for the union. Charles I. 
Rosen, an inveterate opponent of the Behrman administration 
and its pro-union "tendenacies," complemented the union and 
exonerated it from blame. Clearly, he told reporters, the 
carmen were not "bolsheviki" or members of the outlawed IWW. 
The carmen were not bent on socializing the public utilities 
industry in New Orleans. They sought only a living wage and 
the right to organize— rights recognized by conservative and 
patriotic Americans like William Howard Taft and Rufus E. 
Foster.30
Though O'Keefe had not really lost the strike, by the 
end of the second week he had clearly surrendered the initi­
ative. Not to the union, but to the Behrman administration
3°New Orleans Daily States. July 13, 1920. The union even 
won the support of several members of the Orleans Democratic 
Association, the municipal political organization of such 
conservatives as John M. Parker, John Patrick Sullivan (an 
attorney and lobbyist fox NORLC), and Andrew McShane, the 
ODA candidate for mayor in 1920. The most prominent ODA 
member to support the carmen was James Comiskey of the Third 
Ward. Comiskey's endorsement of the union may have been 
prompted by Third Ward politics. Before Comiskey gave his 
endorsement, Arthur and Michael Mitchell, RDO precinct 
leaders from the Third Ward and longtime opponents of Sulli­
van, Parker, and Comiskey, called on the people of the ward 
to endorse the union shop and to refuse to ride on "scab" 
car lines.
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and the civic and business leadership of the city."1 At the 
end of the second week, the Behrman administration filed a . 
petition with Judge Foster, asking him to rescind his order.
In its petition, the council argued that the position of the 
receiver concerning the union was untenable. The union and 
the company had a longstanding relationship, dating back to 
at least 1908 and continuing to this day. The union sought 
merely to retain the rights and concessions it had acquired 
over the years; rights and concessions agreed to by the man­
agement of NORLC. The lockout of striking union workers, the 
council suggested, was unjustified as well. It provoked con­
frontation and, in effect, prevented the union from offering 
or accepting any reasonable compromise. Rescinding the order 
would end the strike, restoring the relationship between the 
union and the company, encouraging the men to return to work 
under the existing contract, and providing the opportunity 
for compromise."2
Judge Foster agreed to consider the petition and to 
hold "public" hearings on it. Clearly, the petition favored 
the union and no doubt O'Keefe and Foster would have re­
jected it. But they did not have to reject it. Several days 
after the council filed its petition, the Newman committee
3XOn July 15, O'Keefe offered a "new" proposal that mere­
ly reiterated earlier pronouncements and demands. The union 
and most responsible public and private leaders rejected the 
offer as meaningless. New Orleans Daily States. July 14-20, 
1920; New Orleans Item, July 14-20, 1920.
""New Orleans Daily States. July 16-17, 20, 1920; New 
Orleans Item, July 20-21, 1920.
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offered another plan, one that clearly favored the receiver. 
The Newman committee proposed that the men return to work 
under Foster*s order, ending the strike and requiring the 
men and the receiver to submit their differences to arbitra­
tion. The Newman plan called for Judge Foster to appoint a 
three member committee of "Special Masters," authorized to 
determine, subject to Foster's approval, wages, terms and 
conditions of the contract, union recognition and eligibil­
ity, the necessity and extend of fare and rate increases, 
and the conditions for the rehabilitation of NORLC. The de­
cisions of the Special Masters were not binding and could be 
appealed to the federal courts.33
O'Keefe accepted the terms of the Newman plan (except 
the proposal dealing with the rehabilitation of NORLC), but 
the union rejected the idea of returning to work under 
Foster's order and relying on a special committee composed 
exclusively of Foster's appointees. Over the next several 
days, then, a special "conference committee"3'* worked to 
find a plan acceptable to the union and the receiver. The 
committee suggested that the men return to their jobs with­
out a contract, working, however, under the same conditions, 
wages, and protections of the 1918 contract and NWLB award.
33New Orleans Daily States. July 21, 23, 1920; New Or­
leans Item. July 21, 22, 1920.
3*Martin Behrman, O'Keefe, Newman, James B. Edmonds, 
publisher of the Times-Picayune. J. B. Lawson and William 
Byrnes of the union, and Reginald H. Carter of the United 
States Labor Conference made up the conference committee.
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The conference committee also recommended that the union and 
the company each select one member of the Special Masters, 
allowing Mayor Behrman to choose the third (and presumably 
impartial) member of the arbitration board. The Special Mas­
ters would be authorized to consider and decide questions of 
union recognition and eligibility, wages and hours, contract 
conditions, and fare increases. And, over the objections of 
the receiver and despite the opposition of the Behrman ad­
ministration, the conference committee instructed the 
masters to devise a plan for the rehabilitation of the com­
pany. The decisions of Special Masters were not binding, 
allowing the union and the receiver to challenge and reject 
any unwelcomed recommendation.3*9
The union leadership and Receiver O'Keefe agreed to the 
recommendations of the conference committee, permitting the 
striking carmen to return to work and restoring full service 
within a matter of days. As the men returned to work, the 
special selection committee of the mayor. Receiver O'Keefe, 
and union attorney William Byrnes met to select the Special 
Masters. After deliberating three hours a day for three 
days, the selection committee chose Charles J. Theard, the 
president of the Citizens Bank and Trust Company, president 
pro tempore of the Sewerage and Water Board, and a close 
friend of Mayor Behrman, George H. Terriberry, an admiralty
33New Orleans Daily States. July 23, 27, 1920; Hew Or­
leans Item. July 23, 1920.
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lawyer, an executive with the Association of Commerce, and a 
member of the Newman Committee, and John P. O'Leary, presi­
dent of the Jefferson Construction Company and a RDO co­
leader of the Fourteenth Ward (O'Leary replaced George 
Glover, a contractor, who declined to serve). Judge Foster 
approved the selections, and the Special Masters began their 
deliberations a week later.9B
At the opening session, the Special Masters established 
the principles that would guide their deliberations. First, 
the masters announced that they would not give considera­
tion to "unsubstantiated" statements. The receiver and the 
union, then, would be required to submit written, factual 
evidence and testimony "substantiating" their contentions 
and allegations. Second, regarding wage and fare increases, 
the masters would rely principally on the policies of the 
National War Labor Board. The financial condition of NORLC 
was irrelevent to the issue of a pay increase. Questions of 
its ability to fund a wage increase would have no bearing on 
the recommendations of the masters. If the cost of living 
justified an increase, the masters said, they were prepared 
to award one to the carmen and to all other eligible 
workers. The Special Masters would, as well, structure any 
wage award to meet industry, regional, and local standards, 
and would apply the same formula for skilled and unskilled
38New Orleans Daily Statesr July 27-29, August 3, 1920;
New Orleans Item. July 27, August 3, 1920.
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workers used by the NWLB in its revised award o£ October,
1918. And, though the wage awarded to the carmen and other 
workers would not depend on the company's ability to pay, 
the masters would consider tying the wage increase to a cor­
responding increase in rates and Cares.37
The Special Masters heard testimony and accumulated 
"documented" evidence for nearly three weeks. The union pre­
sented statistical evidence and "expert" testimony showing 
that the wages paid to the carmen under the 1918 wage award 
had not kept pace with the cost of living during the period 
of readjustment. The union also contended that the wage in­
crease offered by the receiver failed to meet the standards 
set by the NWLB in 1918, disregarded the recommendations of 
the Federal Electric Railway Commission for a "living wage," 
shortened hours, and humane working conditions for all elec­
tric street railway employees, and ignored the wishes of 
Judge Foster that the men earn at least $150.00 a month.3"
John O'Keefe acknowledged that the carmen deserved an 
increase in pay and that, with the proper guarantees and 
"adjustments," the company was prepared to offer a just and 
living wage. However, the wage demands of the union were, as
37New Orleans Daily States, August 3, 1920; New Orleans
Item. August 3, 1920.
3®New Orleans Daily Statesr August 3-4, 6, 11, 19, 1920; 
New Orleans Item. August 3-4, 11, 18, 20, 1920. President 
Wilson, at the insistence of several members of his cabinet, 
commissioned the Federal Electric Railway Commission in
1919. The hearings and recommendations of the FERC cover 
several thousand pages and three volumes.
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in 1918, excessive and harmful, exceeding the cost of living 
in New Orleans, industry and regional wage standards, and 
the company's and public's ability to pay. With a corre­
sponding fare increase, however, the company could offer the 
carmen a respectable pay increase that met every reasonable 
standard.39
The proper guarantees and adjustments that O'Keefe 
alluded to concerned union representation and eligibilty and 
the elimination of the so-called closed shop provisions 
found in the 1918 contract. William Byrnes and the other 
union representatives argued that the union alone possessed 
the authority to set eligibility requirements and that with­
out that authority the union movement would collapse. Union 
spokesmen also pointed out that the change in the "composi­
tion" of the union had no effect on the relationship between 
the union and the company. The union represented the same 
sort of workers that it had in 1908 when it began its rela­
tionship with NORLC. Despite the contentions of the receiver 
and the new General Manager of NORLC, Arthur Kempster, the 
1918 contract did not alter the relationship between NORLC 
and its workers. And the contract did not create a closed 
shop, as the new management contended, and it did not pre­
*"New Orleans Daily States. August 3-4, 6, 11, 19, 1920; 
New Orleans Item, August 3-4, 11, 18, 20, 1920. O'Keefe pro­
posed that the council grant the company an eight cent fare, 
but only a portion of the two cent increase would be used to 
"fund" the wage increase. The company would dedicate the 
other portion to improving services.
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empt the prerogatives of management.40
The new management of NORLC, nonetheless, argued that 
the changes in the character of the union and the terms of 
the 1918 contract altered the traditional relationship be­
tween management and labor and contributed to the financial 
collapse of the company and now threatened its plans for 
reorganization and rehabilitation. In his testimony before 
the Special Masters, General Manager Arthur Kempster insist­
ed that the recent changes in the union and the closed shop 
provisions of the 1918 contract "alienated" the employees 
from the company, causing them to be dishonest in their re­
lationship with the company, impairing service and endanger­
ing the community. The closed shop, he told the masters, was 
"obnoxious, unfair, and un-American," and its elimination 
alone would restore control of the union movement to the 
local carmen and control of the company to local management. 
With the restoration of these traditional and normal rela­
tionships, management could assure the workers just wages 
and fair working conditions, the stockholders a fair return 
on their investments, and the city excellent service at a 
reasonable cost.41
4“New Orleans Daily States. August 16, 1920; New Orleans 
Item. August 8, 16, 21, 25, 1920.
41New Orleans Pally Statesf August 20-24, 1920; New 
Orleans Item. August 20-25, 29, September 2, 1920. According 
to the union leadership, O'Keefe hired Kempster after he had 
helped break a streetcar strike in Seattle. The union also 
accused Kempster of hiring special strikebreakers from 
St.Louis, Chicago, and Mexico. Kempster and O'Keefe denied 
the charges.
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Two weeks after concluding the investigation, the Spe­
cial Masters filed their report with the federal district 
court, releasing their recommendations to the public the
same day. The report began by emphasizing the public nature
and social obligations of the public utilities industry. The 
masters reminded the company and the union that they were 
engaged in a business
impressed with a public service, and that
without regard to the rights and obliga­
tions that exist between them as parties
to this contract, they owe to the public 
the duty and obligation to provide and 
render safe, adequate, continuous, and 
efficient public service, and to that end 
they have entered into these mutual cove­
nants with full recognition of the paramount 
rights and interests of the public and of the 
obligation to fully and sincerely co-operate 
to meet the public's requirements.
Meeting the public's requirements, however, also meant sat­
isfying the private needs and interests of the carmen and 
the company. The carmen and the other employees of NORLC 
were entitled to a "fair and just" wage and to the right to 
organize and bargain collectively through a representative 
of their own choice. Similarly, the company was entitled to 
an adequate and reasonable return on all legitimate invest­
ment and to the reasonable and legitimate protection of its 
property. "The attainment of those ends," the masters wrote, 
"constituted the moving and controlling consideration for
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this agreement."*5*
The masters recommended, then, a graduated wage scale, 
paying the carmen forty-nine cents an hour for the first six 
months of the contract, fifty-two for the second half year, 
and fifty-five cents for the last full year of the contract. 
Skilled and unskilled workers covered under the NWLB award 
and 1918 contract would receive proportional increases, 
raising some wages by as much as ten cents an hour. Under 
the terms set by the conference committee, the wage award 
was retroactive to July 1, and could be, like all other 
recommendations of the Special Masters, appealed to the 
federal district court. In addition, though the Special 
Masters refused to tie the wage award to a fare increase 
(and they had no authority to bind the Behrman administra­
tion to any ex parte agreement), they nonetheless recom­
mended that the commission council "fund" the award by 
granting NORLC an eight cent fare.**
The public character of the street railway industry, 
the Special Masters continued, required the receiver and the 
company to recognize the legitimacy and the limits of each
^"District Court of the United States For the Eastern 
District of Louisiana No. 15,960 In Equity In the Matter of 
Receivership of New Orleans Railway and Light Company Report 
of the Special Masters," box 14, SRUCP SCD, HTML, TU, here­
after cited as "Report of the Special Masters"; New Orleans 
Daily States. September 21, 1920; New Orleans Item. Septem­
ber 21, 1920.
*3"Report of the Special Masters," ibid.; Byrnes to 
Rodgers, September 21, 1920, box 2, ibid.: New Orleans Daily
Statesr September 21, 1920; New Orleans Item, August 26, 
September 21, 1920; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 54.
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other's private rights. The union must acknowledge the right 
of management to the full and complete control of the corpo­
ration and that thats necessitated the enforcement of em­
ployee discipline "under such reasonable and proper rules 
[it] may from time to time establish". Management, on the 
other hand, was obliged to recognize and accept the rights 
of labor to organize and to bargain as a union. With those 
principles in mind, then, the masters recommended that 
Receiver O'Keefe sign a contract with the local division of 
the AASEREA and that the contract include all classes of 
workers covered under the 1918 contract. The masters recom­
mended, as well, that the receiver and the union use the 
1918 contract as the basis for a new agreement, with two 
important changes. The masters proposed eliminating the 1918 
grievance procedures, replacing them with a system of ap­
peals through management. In addition, the masters recom­
mended that management alone determine promotions, making 
ability and merit the measure of advancement within the 
company with seniority only a minor consideration.**
The receiver and the union filed exceptions to the 
recommendations of the Special Masters with Judge Foster. 
O'Keefe told the judge that the wage settlement proposed by 
the masters went beyond the company's and city's ability and 
willingness to pay. The wage schedule recommended by the 
Special Masters exceeded the offer made by the company by an
««Ibid.
additional $250,000 a year and would require a ten cent 
fare, which neither the company nor the city could tolerate. 
The receiver remained adamant in his opposition to the local 
and national AASEREA and to the inclusion of "ineligible" 
workers in the carmen's contract. O'Keefe would remove his 
objections to the AASEREA (but not to the "ineligible" 
workers), however, if Judge Foster removed all "closed 
shop" provisions from the 1920 contract and not just those 
recommended by the Special Masters.*®
The union also had three principal objections to the 
recommendations of the Special Masters. The carmen believed 
that the wage award offered to them was fair, and they 
agreed to accept it. They objected, however, to the propor­
tional wage recommendations for all other union workers, 
claiming that those recommendations actually decreased the 
wages of skilled and unskilled workers in the electric and 
gas divisions and, in effect, deprived them of union eligi­
bility and representation. The Special Masters, the union 
told Judge Foster, tied the wage award to the fare increase, 
making the wage award dependent on the company's "ability" 
to pay and making the municipal government and the patrons 
of the street railway responsible for pay increases. That 
proposal, the union argued, was contrary to the principles 
estabished by the NWLB in 1918 and reiterated by the Special
*®New Orleans Daily States. September 22, 26, 29, 1920;
New Orleans Item. September 22, 25, 29, October 1, 1920.
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Masters in 1920, and was, as well, detrimental to the union 
and to the city. Finally, the union would not accept the 
recommendations permitting management to dismiss employees 
for arbitrary reasons and to promote "company” men over 
senior union men.*"
At the end of September, Judge Foster issued an opinion 
on the exceptions filed by the receiver and the union and on 
the recommendations of the Special Masters. In general, the 
judge considered the wage recommendations of the masters to 
be fair and eguitable, conforming, for the most part, with 
industry and regional standards and local conditions. The 
only exceptions Foster cited concerned the wage awards for 
certain classifications of skilled and unskilled workers.
The judge refused to decrease the wages paid to unskilled 
workers, and he ordered Receiver O'Keefe to ignore the 
recommendations concerning those workers. However, Foster 
considered the proportional wage increase awarded to other 
classes of workers too high, and he reduced their increase 
from ten cents to five cents an hour. Foster ordered O'Keefe 
to begin paying the new wage schedule, retroactive to July 
1, but contingent upon a corresponding increase in street 
railway fares. To meet the new wage award, Foster instructed 
the receiver to petition the commission council for an eight
""Ibid.
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cent fare.*'1'
Poster also ordered O'Keefe to comply with the contract 
recommendations of the Special Masters. The judge noted the 
principal objections of the receiver and the union, but 
found their objections without merit. The receiver argued 
that he did not want to contract with the AASEREA because it 
had Illegally unionized workers, wrested personnel and dis­
cipline authority from management, and sought to supplant 
management by imposing a closed shop on the company. Foster 
saw no evidence that the international or local AASEREA 
recruited "ineligible" workers and saw no reason to exclude 
those workers from the 1920 contract. Foster ordered O'Keefe 
to contract with the AASEREA, but left the matter of union 
eligibility for the union and the receiver to settle during 
the contract discussions to follow. Judge Foster also saw no 
evidence, as weel, that the 1918 or 1920 contract as pro­
posed by the union supplanted the prerogatives of management 
or imposed a closed shop on the company. Under the terms of 
those agreements, the receiver was free to hire any one he 
chose. And, though all workers were required to join the
47"Opinion of the Court on the Report of the Special Mas­
ters Filed September 30, 1920." United States District Court 
Eastern District of Louisiana, Empire Trust Company versus 
New Orleans Railway and Light Company. Number 15,960. box
14, SRUC, SCD, HTML, TU, hereafter cited as "Opinion of the 
Court"; "In the District Court of the United States for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana at New Orleans, Number 15,960 
in Equity," Empire Trust Company, as Trustee. Complainant 
against New Orleans Railway and Light Company. Defendant. 
Consolidated Cause, ibid. hereafter cited as "Court Order";
New Orleans Daily States, September 30, October 1, 1920.
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union, the union could not deny them membership. The agree­
ments, the judge said, did not abridge the rights of manage­
ment or the union, but recognized principles and rights al­
ready well-established in labor-management relations.'40
Foster dismissed the exceptions of the union, too. The 
union wanted promotion based solely on seniority and object­
ed to granting management pleanary authority over promotion. 
Management, Foster wrote, must have authority over the ad­
vancement of workers to assure the safe, economical, and 
efficient operation and management of the company. Promotion 
solely on the basis of seniority served only the interests 
of labor, and did not serve to promote and protect those of 
investors and management. Judge Foster also denied the 
union's petition for reinstating the arbitration provisions 
of the 1918 contract. The recommendations of masters would 
not compromise the rights of workers or subject them to ar­
bitrary discipline or dismissal. Under the terms of the new 
provisions, the men retained the right to appeal to the 
principal management and to the board of directors of the 
company. "It is not to be supposed," wrote Foster, "that the 
heads of an extensive organization (like NORLC] will arbi­
trarily discharge a man who is competent and doing his
^"Ibid.; New Orleans Item, October 1, 1920.
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duty."*»
At first, the union leadership was convinced that it 
had exacted a near "complete victory," preventing the recei­
ver and management from dismembering the union and eroding 
the authority and morale of the union movement in New Or­
leans. In a "special notice" issued to the membership on the 
day of the deciding vote on Foster's ruling, union leaders 
catalogued the essential points "won" by the union. The 
Special Masters and the courts, the leaders argued, acknow­
ledged and confirmed the right of unionization and collec­
tive bargaining and forced the receiver to accept the essen­
tial provisions of the 1918 contract, including those 
guaranteeing the union shop. There was but one major "set­
back". The masters eliminated the 1918 grievance provisions, 
substituting an appeal process through the upper management 
of the company. Though the appeals process was unsatisfac­
tory, the union had the assurances of the court that the new 
arrangement would not compromise the rights of any man or 
the union movement. Despite its dissatisfaction with the 
wage award and with Foster's ruling, the union, following 
the suggestions of its leadership, voted overwhelmingly to 
accept the wage and contract provisions recommended by the
'■"Foster to William Byrnes, January 7, 1921, box 2, J. P. 
O'Leary to Mayor Arthur J. O'Keefe, August 12, 1926, SRUC.
SCD, HTML, TU; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 51, 61-65; 
Carpenter, "The New Orleans Street Railway Strike," 1-3,
18-20, 23-25.
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Special Masters and approved by Judge Foster.00
The carmen's vote "ended" the 1920 strike, but the 
agreements o£ 1920 did not settle the dispute between labor 
and management. The 1920 agreement allowed the receiver to 
retain strikebreakers, incorporating them among the union 
work force and directing them to promote dissent and dissat­
isfaction within the carmen's union. The "first" sign of 
that dissatisfaction came in the summer of 1921. In August 
union president Edwin Peyroux introduced a resolution at a 
membership meeting calling for a separate charter for black 
union members, effectively segregating and abandoning them. 
Black union members protested, but the international AASEREA 
agreed with the white membership, calling for an equal but 
separate "sub-division" for black union members. When the 
black unionists refused a separate charter, the white major­
ity read them out of the union, refusing to include them in 
union contracts and, in effect, yielding to the company's 
complaints about union eligibility.01
For the next ten years, the principal issues remained 
unchanged. The company, reorganized and operating under 
"new" management, systematically schemed to end the union
"""Special Notice to Membership, Division 194 from Con­
ference Committee," October 6, 1920, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML, 
TU; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 54.
01Mahon to Gus Bienvenu, August 13, 1921, George Mosley 
to Mahon, August 15, 1921, William B. Fitzgerald and J. B. 
Lawson to local membership, March 12, 1922, box 2; Mahon to 
Bienvenu, January 7, 1924, Edward A. VeilIon to Mahon, June 
8, 1926, box 3, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU.
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shop and to break the union. The union, now divided and com­
promised from within by company men, sought in vain to re­
store the mandatory arbitration of individual and union 
grievances. In 1926 company officials demanded the end of 
the closed shop, no longer requiring management to dismiss 
workers who were no longer in good standing with the union. 
The union demanded a new contract preventing the company 
from firing employees without submitting the decision to 
arbitration. The board of directors for the company rejected 
the union's demands, insisting that such a provision would 
cripple the company's prerogative to "discipline our em­
ployees and to control the affairs of our company," and the 
board announced that it "cannot and will not consent to any 
proposals which impair or encumber... proper control and 
direction" of the company. After an abortive strike attempt, 
the union and the company submitted to an agreement that 
favored the company. By 1929, with the declining importance 
of the street railway system to the company (electric and 
gas service had replaced transit as the principal source 
of revenue for NORLC-NOPSI), a sizable company union 
already in place, and the help of the federal courts, the 
company eventually broke the union, obtaining all that John
f423
O'Keefe demanded in 1920.*a
In August, 1920, Albert S. Richey, a professor of 
electrical engineering at Worchester (Massachusets) Techno­
logical Institute and a public utility consultant employed 
by Receiver O'Keefe, appeared before the Special Masters, 
explaining to them the nature of the street railway crisis 
and suggesting a potential solution. Federal and local war­
time utility policies, Richey told the masters, were, in 
part, responsible for the current financial and political 
problems of the electric street railway industry. Those 
policies dramatically increased the cost of operation, 
particularly in the area of labor, and, at the same time, 
denied the companies the additional revenues needed to main­
tain and to expand public services. As damaging as those 
policies may have been, Richey said, they only hastened and 
worsened existing problems. Public utility legislation and
*aWilliam B. Fitzgerald to Bienvenu, May 21, 1921, box 2, 
VeilIon to Mahon, October 30, December 28, 1925, January 1, 
June 26, July 17, 1926, Veillon to Fitzgerald, October 30, 
1925, Fitzgerald to Veillon, November 3, 1925, Mahon to 
Veillon January 2, June 26, 1926, John P. O'Leary to Mayor 
Arthur J. O'Keffe, August 12, 1926, box 3, SRUC. SCD, HTML,
TU; New Orleans Daily States. May 3-17, 1921, July 3, 1925, 
July 30-31, August 11, 1926; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 
62-65; Carpenter, "New Orleans Street Railway Strike," 19- 
24. Wages and hours, of course, were important, though it 
seems, secondary issues. In May, 1921, O'Keefe secured a 
fifteen to twenty percent reduction in salaries, which man­
agement formalized in the 1922 and 1924 contracts. And, 
though the legislature passed a nine hour law, Governor John 
M. Parker vetoed the bill. See New Orleans Daily States.
May 3-17, 1921, June 7, 22, July 1-19, 1922; New Orleans 
Item. May 5-9, 1921, May 16, June 22, July 1-3, 1922.
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regulation were, for the most part, to blame for the 
problems of the public utilities industry. The requirements 
of the conventional public utility franchise and the demands 
of municipal regulation encouraged inefficiency and profi­
teering, inhibited the growth and development of service, 
and "politicized" the public service industry. The obvious 
solution to the utilities crisis, Richey concluded, lay in a 
thorough overhaul of existing franchise laws and a detailed 
revision of municipal regulatory policy."3
Richey recommended that the commission council repeal 
all street railway franchises, replacing them with a single, 
"indeterminate" franchise that would allow MORLC (or its 
successor) to operate the streetcar system on a "service at 
cost" basis. Under the "service at cost" (SAC) plan, rates 
and fares would automatically be adjusted to meet the total 
cost of service. That cost would include wages, the cost of 
production, maintenance, depreciation of the physical pro­
perties, taxation, and rate of return. The rate of return, 
based on a "fair valuation" of all properties, Richey said.
"3New Orleans Daily Statesr August 12, 1920. Richey was 
not alone in his condemnation of municipal and federal util­
ity policies. Several utility experts, even those who favor­
ed either more rigorous municipal regulation or municipal 
ownership, were critical of established regulatory policies. 
See, for example, the testimony of Jacob Newman in the 
PFERCr vol.l, 557-74; Delos F. Wilcox in the PFERC. vol.3, 
2135-40; Allison, Report on the Street Railway Service of 
New Orleans. 3-8; John Bauer, "Deadlock in Public Utility 
Regulation II Nothing Ever Settled," National Municipal Re­
view, 10 (October 1921), 498; Wilcox, "Problem of Recon­
struction With Respect to Urban Transportation," ibid. r 8 
(January 1919), 33-48.
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should be generous enough to safeguard original investment 
and to attract the additional money necessary to rehabili­
tate the company. With a fair valuation and a generous rate 
of return, the company could maintain and expand services, 
contributing immeasurably to the growth and development of 
the city.***
The service at cost plan, Richey told the masters, 
would, in addition to protecting legitimate investment, pro­
viding adequate operating revenues, and assuring profits and 
service, strengthen and expand municipal regulatory author­
ity, while eliminating politics from the public service 
issue. Under the SAC plan, the city administration would de­
termine (in cooperation with management and ownership) a 
fair valuation, an acceptable and sufficient rate of return, 
and reasonable and adequate rates and fares. After estab­
lishing the initial valuation, rate of return, and rates and 
fares (clearly a political act, requiring open, public de­
liberations and approval), adjustments in cost and in ser­
vice would be automatic, determined by expert analysis and 
arrived at with precision and equity. To assure fairness and 
equity, Richey suggested that the city administration create 
a special board of supervisors, serving under the direction 
of the Commissioner of Public Utilties and funded by NORLC. 
The new public utilities board would be authorized to recom­
mend adjustments in rates, fares, and profits and have
***New Orleans Daily States. August 12, 1920.
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direct and uncontested access to the company's books. It 
would have no authority, however, over stock issues, the 
development of services, or the other perogatives of manage­
ment .
The service at cost or assured service plan, as it was 
later termed, had the unqualified approval of the executive 
management of the street railway industry (including John D. 
O'Keefe), and won the endorsement of the Federal Electric 
Railway Commission. But the plan had its detractors, too, 
particularly among the more "liberal" utility experts, like 
Delos F. Wilcox, the New Orleans press, and the Behrman 
administration. Though not a novel concept or invention and 
coming after years of slow and often imperceptible reform 
of the public utilities industry, the service at cost plan 
attracted considerable debate and aroused intense feelings 
and interests on both sides of the issue.
At the center of the service at cost plan was the pub­
lic recognition of a permanent monopoly, granted and perpet­
uated through a single, comprehensive, "indeterminate" fran­
chise. Proponents of the assured service plan contended that 
the conventional and outdated term franchise was a "worth­
less scrap of paper." The limited term of the franchise 
undermined the value of the investment, denying the investor 
the proper financial security, encouraging speculative and 
questionable financing, and resulting in deplorable and
BBIbid.
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costly service. Under the terms of the limited term fran­
chise, investors were forced to seek a "profit as will not 
only give them a fair return upon their investment but will 
also return them their capital," discouraging them from re­
investing their money in renewals and replacements and 
resulting in delapidated equipment and deplorable service.
By contrast, supporters of the service at cost plan argued 
that an indeterminate franchise, granted without a specific, 
limited term, competitive bidding, and unnecessary franchise 
obligations, would properly secure investment, encouraging 
further investment and assuring quality service.
Franchise reform alone, of course, would not resolve 
the street railway crisis, for it could not attract the new 
investment needed to restore and rehabilitate the industry. 
Investors in public utilities sought additional assurance in 
the form of a guaranteed rate of return or profit. Manage­
ment agreed that a fixed and generous rate of return would 
protect old investment and attract new investment, speeding 
the rehabilitation of the industry and furthering the devel­
opment of new and better services. But for these events to 
take place, the rate of return had be "certain" and "rea­
sonable," and had to include old as well as new investments, 
requiring government and consumers to agree to higher, more 
flexible rates and fares and to accept a more generous
®"PFERC, vols.1-3, passim; Allison, Report on the Street 
Railway Service. 3-8; Wilcox, "Service at Cost In Local 
Transportation," NMR. 9, (December 1920), 765-72.
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valuation of property.***
The valuation of property went to the heart of the pub­
lic utilities crisis. Management, government, and consumers 
agreed that setting a fair and reasonable valuation was in­
dispensable to the resolution of the street railway crisis 
and to the rehabilitation of the public service industry. 
Yet, there was intense, often bitter, disagreement over the 
proper means and ends of setting a fair and reasonable 
valuation. The public utilities industry maintained that a 
"fair" valuation would restore and preserve the credit of 
the industry, respecting the worth of previous investments 
and prompting new investors to assist in the rehabilitation 
of the street railway industry. From the standpoint of the 
industry, there were two principal means of establishing the 
valuation of property. The first (and the less preferable) 
was the historical approach. This method allowed the company 
to include all properties and services (stock and bond pro­
motions, discounts, rentals) in valuating property, irre­
spective of their current condition or contribution to the 
operation of the system. However, the historical method 
valued property and services at their original costs, ignor­
ing the increased value of property as part of a "going con­
cern". The second (and more appealing) was the reproduction
3-yPFERC. vol.l, 540, 546, 557-58, 568-69, vol.3, 2266, 
2271, 2282-83; Allison, Report on the Street Railway 
Service. 7; Bauer, "Deadlock in Public Utility Regulation 
I: Collapse of Credit," NMR, 10 (September 1920), 474; New 
Orleans Item, October 4, 1920.
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method. This method established the value of property on the 
basis of the cost of reproducing or replacing the entire 
system at current prices. The reproduction formula allowed 
companies to include properties and services in valuating 
property that no longer contributed to the operation and 
maintenance of services, permitting the companies to "earn" 
profit from useless property. The war and the "confused 
state" of valuation law in the United States played finan­
cial havoc with the reproduction method. Prices during the 
war and the period of readjustment, flucuated greatly, 
skewing costs and values and making it nearly impossible, 
not to mention politically inexpedient, to determine a 
"fair" valuation under the reproduction method.""
The public, too, saw the value of establishing a fair 
and reasonable valuation of utility properties. An estab­
lished valuation would "end" disputes about excessive, spec­
ulative capitalization, restore public confidence in the 
public utilties industry (and in public regulation), and 
would hasten the rehabilitation of services. Utilities ex­
perts, however, were well-aware of the industry's "passion"
""PFERC, vol.2, 1264, vol.3, 2142-43; Bauer, "Deadlock in 
Public Utility Regulation II: Nothing Ever Settled," NMR.
10, (October 1920), 499-500; Bauer, "The Supreme Court and 
Reproduction Value in Rate Making," NMR 12 (September 1923), 
529-32; Bauer, "Reproduction Cost Has Not Been Adopted by 
the Supreme Court," NMR 12 (November 1923), 644-48; Wilcox, 
"Service at Cost," NMR. 9 (December 1920), 765-72. The 
United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify the issue 
of valuation on several occassions, but was unable to define 
"fair valuation" with precision.
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for overcapitalization. And feared that the industry would 
exaggerate the historical or reproduction cost. For the most 
part, these experts favored the so-called actual cash value 
method. It set the value of properties on the basis of cash 
"actually and prudently" invested in existing and useful 
property, giving no allowances for certain classes of intan­
gibles, like promoters fees or stock and bond discounts."
Critics of the cost of service plan admitted that the 
plan would restore and preserve the credit of the public 
utilities industry, in theory eliminating speculation in 
utility securities, assuring both profit and service, and 
restoring public confidence in private management and in 
the regulatory authority of government. In theory, rates and 
fares were tied to service and profits. The utility company 
could increase its dividends only by a corresponding reduc­
tion in rates and fares, making efficiency and service the 
only proper and true concern of management and government.00
These critics pointed out, however, that in this case 
theory did not match reality. In reality, rates and fares 
would increase automatically to meet the demands for a "rea­
sonable" and generous rate of return, eliminating any need 
for efficient and economical management. And, as testimony 
before the FERC revealed, utility experts could not deter­
mine what sort of fares and rates would produce a fair rate
" Ibid.
"Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and the Progres­
sive Tradition (Boston 1981), 28.
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of return. "There are not enough brains in the street rail­
road business...," Jacob Newman told the FERC, "to answer 
that question." Nor could experts agree on what constituted 
a "fair" rate of return. They were, as well, unable to de­
termine if the rate of return should be fixed permanently or 
should be adjusted from time to time to meet changing market 
conditions, or if old money should receive the same rate of 
return as new investment capital. In short, critics pointed 
out, the cost of service plan was untested and uncertain and 
unlikely to resolve the public utilities crisis.**
Despite the uncertainty of the cost of service plan. 
Receiver John O'Keefe endorsed the concept in his testimony 
before the Special Masters. The company could no longer 
oprate under present conditions and obligations, he said.
The rates and fares awarded to the company in 1918 were 
wholly inadequate and could not bring about the restoration 
of public credit or the rehabilitation of the company. The 
cost of service plan, on the other hand, he assured the 
masters, would solve the company's problems, permitting it 
to meet its financial and service obligations, bringing 
about the restoration of its credit and reputation, and
"•'•PFBRC. vol.l, 540, 546, 557, 568-69, vol.2, 1234-1257, 
vol.3, 2135-36, 2143-48; Hilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and 
Public Utility Franchies," NMR 3 (January 1914), 22-26; 
Wilcox, "Problem of Reconstruction With Respect to Urban 
Transportation, NMR 8 (January 1919), 37; Wilcox, "Service 
at Cost," NMR. 9 (December 1920), 766; Bauer "Deadlock in 
Public Utility Regulation II Nothing Ever Settled," NMR 10 
(October 1920) 498-501; New Orleans Item, September 21, 27, 
October 4, 1920.
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assuring the rehabilitation of the utilities industry in Mew 
Orleans.82
The following month the Special Masters recommended to 
the court and the commission council the adoption of the 
cost of service plan. The masters noted that the plan had 
the endorsement of the FERC and several "leading" utility 
experts. The plan, as recommended by the FERC, would pose 
the fewest legal, managerial, and financial obstacles for a 
proper rehabilitation of the industry, and could, if adapted 
to local conditions, provide quality service. In addition, 
the assured service plan would allow the receiver and the 
principal stockholders to rehabilitate the company on terms 
acceptable to the municipal authorities and, even more im­
portantly, would permit for a more precise, less politicized 
regulation of the public utilities company.83
The masters were not content with simply recommending
82New Orleans Item. February 25, 28, August 18, September 
14, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. February 26, August 18, 
1920. O'Keefe maintained that after meeting all operating 
expenses, the company earned only $1,000,000, hardly a sum 
sufficient to rehabilitate the company. Also appearing 
before the Special Masters was Rudolph S. Hecht, president 
of the Hibernia National Bank and the chairman of the Bond­
holders Protection Committee, a consortium of investors 
holding NORLC bonds. Hecht proposed that the city municipal­
ize NOGLC, placing it under a special utility board orga­
nized like the Sewerage and Water Board. He also recommended 
that the city grant NORLC a service at cost franchise, set­
ting its valuation at $50 million and providing for a two- 
tiered rate of return for old and new investment.
83"Report of the Special Masters," ibid.: Fairclough, 
"Public Utilities," 54; New Orleans Item. September 21,
1920. The masters defined the cost of service as the 
"actual" cost of operation: wages, power, fuel, regulation 
cost, taxation, replacement cost, and fair rate of return.
the adoption of the assured service plan. The success of the 
plan and the relevancy of the masters' study depended on 
establishing an acceptable valuation, rate of return, and 
schedule of rates and fares. The masters "confessed" that 
they had great difficulty determining these questions, 
primarily because of the "wide differences of opinion among 
experts on these questions". Despite these difficulties and 
differences, the masters arrived at what they considered 
reasonable and acceptable terms. They set the valuation of 
NORLC (for rate making purposes) at $41.5 million, the 
average of the four previous valuations conducted since
1918. e * The masters also fixed the rate of return at seven 
percent, suggesting, however, that with rehabilitation the 
company could operate profitably at rate of return between 
six and seven percent. The masters recommended, as well, an 
increase in streetcar fares from six cents to eight cents, 
with discounts for advanced ticket buyers and school chil­
dren. In their report, the masters contended that the eight 
cent fare would permit the company to meet its financial 
obligations, including the new wage awarded to the carmen, 
and, at the same time, fund the rehabilitation of the 
company.as
««Ibid. Ballard: $32.4 million 
Lafaye: $38.3 million
Goethals:$44.8 million 
NORLC: $52.1 million
average $42.0 million
•“Ibid.
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O'Keefe bristled at the masters' report, petitioning 
Judge Foster to dismiss the recommendations as insufficient 
and inappropriate in light of the evidence and testimony of 
expert witnesses. The valuation suggested by the masters, 
O'Keefe told Judge Foster, ignored established principles 
and procedures for determining the valuation of public util­
ity properties and summarily dismissed the evidence present­
ed to them by independent, expert witnesses. Recent court 
decisions, O'Keefe argued, established the reproduction 
method as the only equitable means of determining the legi­
timate valuation of public service properties. The masters, 
O'Keefe suggested, may have been ignorant of the precedents 
set by these cases, but they simply chose to ignore the 
testimony of the company's witnesses."■
During the hearings, the company presented evidence 
from two "independent engineers and appraisal experts,"
J. H. Perkins (a former employee of NORLC) and J. Frank 
Coleman, discrediting previous valuations and describing 
their valuation as equitable and legitimate. Perkins and 
Coleman estimated that the cost of reproducing NORLC and 
NOGLC at current prices was nearly seventy-four million 
dollars, a staggering price by any standard and completely 
unacceptable for rate-making purposes. But, basing the cost 
of reproduction on the average of prices from 1915 to 1919
""New Orleans Daily States, September 29, 1920; Reclas­
sification of the Electric Plant. 52-54.
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and accounting for a reasonable depreciation in property, 
Perkins and Coleman set the valuation of NORLC and N06LC at 
$55.6 million, seventeen million dollars more than the 
Lafaye valuation and nearly eleven million dollars higher 
than General Goethals's assessment. O'Keefe believed that 
the Perkins-Coleman valuation was too low, but agreed to 
accept it if the city administration set the rate of return 
for this and other investments between eight and eight and a 
half percent. Anything less than a $55 million dollar valua­
tion, an eight percent rate of return, and an eight cent 
fare, O'Keefe told the judge, and the company would 
collapse.■7
Foster would not permit the company to "collapse". He 
set aside the masters' recommendations concerning valuation 
and rate of return, categorizing them as unrealistic and un­
necessary. Obviously, the judge concluded, the masters did 
not do a thorough analysis of the valuation and rehabilita­
tion issues. They set the valuation and rate of return "too 
low" to aid in the rehabilitation of the company, and their 
recommendations may have exceeded their authority. The valu­
ation and rehabilitation of the company, Foster suggested, 
were too important to leave to an ad hoc, ex parte committee 
of private citizens. Rather, those issues were the proper 
concern of the receiver (and, by implication, the court) and
"^Reclassification of the Electric Plant. 54-55; New
Orleans Daily States. August 13, 16, September 29, 1920;
New Orleans Item. October 1, 1920.
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the municipal government.®B
Foster also dismissed the masters' fare schedule as 
"impractical" and "inadequate". Discounted fares for school 
children and ticket buyers only complicated the receiver's 
task, adding unncessary expense to the cost of operations. 
And they did not adequately compensate the receiver for the 
cost of service. An eight cent fare, on the other hand, un­
complicated by discounts and tickets, would enable the com­
pany to retire the receiver's certificates, pay the wage in­
crease awarded to the carmen, and allow the company to keep 
operating. Though the eight cent fare alone could not reha­
bilitate the company, it was, in the opinion of the court 
and the receiver, sufficient to restore credit and attract 
new investment that would aid in the refinancing and reor­
ganization of NORLC. Foster then "ordered" O'Keefe to peti­
tion the commission council for an eight cent fare, suggest­
ing to the administration the necessity for quick action by 
tying the wage increase to the enactment of an eight cent 
fare ordinance.®9
Speaking for the commission council, Mayor Behrman ac­
knowledged the need for quick and resolute action, and he 
promised to give any proposal or petition serious considera-
"""Opinion of the Court," box 14m SRUC. SCD, H-TML, TU; 
"Court Order," ibid.; New Orleans Daily States. October 1, 
1920; New Orleans Item. October 1, 1920.
"""Opinion of the Court," ibid.: "Court Order, ibid.: 
New Orleans Daily States. August 18, October 1, 1920; New 
Orleans Item. August 18, October 1, 2, 1920, February 16,
1921.
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fcion. But, he said, the council, like the court, questioned 
the authority of the Special Masters to determine valuation 
and rate of return, arguing that the city administration 
alone possessed the authority to regulate utility rates and 
fares and to determine the conditions for the public reha­
bilitation of NORLC. For this reason, Behrman said, the com­
mission council refused to take part in the deliberations or 
to be bound by the recommendations of the Special Masters. 
Nor, Behrman said, would the council accept the authority of 
the federal district court to interdict the authority of the 
city administration to regulate the public utility companies 
in New Orleans. The council also had serious reservations 
about the necessity and expediency of the eight cent fare, 
contending that the eight cent fare may exceed the cost of 
service and arguing that any increase must contribute to the 
public rehabilitation of the company and not simply fund the 
wage award or retire the receiverfs certificates.-70
The city newspapers conceded that the recommendations 
of the Special Masters were without authority or effect, and 
that the administration was right to ignore them altogether. 
(Foster's opinion and order, though not his words, affirmed 
the opinions of the press.) Nonetheless, the newspapers 
assailed the commission council for refusing to participate 
in an attempt to circumscribe its regulatory authority. The
7°New Orleans Itemr August 15, 16, 20, 26, 29, September
21, October 2, 4 11, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. August
23, 28, 29, September 21, October 1-4, 1920.
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press described the policy of the administration as vapid, 
mysterious, and politically motivated, designed to protect 
the interests of an alien corporation intent on profit and 
anxious to escape meaningful regulation. The Behrman admin­
istration, the press reported, failed to prevent the pyra­
miding of stocks and bonds and the usurpation of local own­
ership by giant holding companies that underminded the value 
of the constituent companies and drained millions of dollars 
from the city. That same administration, the reform newspa­
pers continued, stymied direct, democratic regulation, per­
mitting NORLC to avoid public control and, in effect, to 
bring on its own financial bankruptcy. Now, the Behrman 
administration, already discredited at the polls, sought to 
bankrupt the city by refusing to protect its interest and 
threatening it with a second, more destructive strike.71
Despite the illogical and partisan accusations of the 
city newspapers, the policy of the Behrman administration 
did not promise the political bankruptcy of the city or 
threaten it with another disruptive strike. Indeed, the 
policy of the administration was to preserve the political 
integrity of the city and to prevent the receiver and the
71New Orleans Item, August 15, 16, 20, 26, October 1, 2, 
1920; New Orleans Daily States September 22, 1920. Though 
Judge Foster rejected the recommendations of the masters 
concerning the rehabilitation of NORLC, he criticized the 
Behrman administration for failing to accept his decision 
"as sufficient evidence, prima facie,...upon which immedi­
ately to authorize the receiver to put into effect an eight 
cent car fare".
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court from dictating a settlement and stripping the city of 
its authority over the public utilities company. Agreeing to 
the eight cent fare proposal, especially in light of Judge 
Foster's opinion allowing NORLC to set the cost of service, 
would have meant surrendering authority to the court and the 
receiver, allowing NORLC to impose the terms of its own re­
organization and rehabilitation. Nor did the council's re­
fusal to tie the fare increase to the wage award threaten 
the good order of the city. The administration recognized, 
perhaps more clearly than the business community, that the 
strike had exhausted the union and that it was in no posi­
tion to walk out once again. And the policy of the Behrman 
administration on the wage award and the fare increase was 
the same as the union. The city administration insisted, as 
had the union and to some extent the Special Masters, that 
NORLC could, for the time being, fund the wage award with 
present revenues, determining later if the rehabilitation 
of the company warranted an increase in rates and fares. It 
was O'Keefe and Foster who ignored the recommendations of 
the Special Masters on wages and fares, challenging the 
political authority of the city administration and threaten­
ing the good order of New Orleans.
So, too, did the State of Louisiana. Early in October, 
before Receiver O'Keefe submitted his petition to the com­
mission council, the Attorney General filed suit in Orleans 
Parish Civil District Court, seeking to prevent the council
from considering O'Keefe's request for a fare increase. In 
the petition before the court, the Attorney General claimed 
that the state legislature, not the municipal administra­
tion, possessed the exclusive authority to regulate the pub­
lic utilities industry in New Orleans. The city and its 
government, argued assistant Attorney General (and former 
Governor) Luther E. Hall, were creatures of the state legis­
lature, which retained exclusive and pleanary authority over 
city streets and all other avenues of commerce in New 
Orleans. The state legislature merely authorized the munici­
pal government to grant franchises in its name and has the 
authority to rescind or alter that grant of power at its 
pleasure. "The streets of New Orleans," Hall asserted to the 
court, "are state property and not city property and the 
rights-of-way under franchises granted to the railways com­
pany are subject to the control of the legislature." The 
city administration, then, was without authority to grant 
fare increases or in any way alter the terms and conditions 
of the street railway franchises. Similarly, since NORLC 
did not own street railway franchises, but simply leased 
them, the original owners were not released from their fran­
chise obligations to the state, principally, the five cent 
fare. Any fare or rate increase authorized by the commission 
council, then, would violate the will of the state legisla­
ture, the terms of the franchises, and would constitute an
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unjust and illegal tax on the people of New Orleans.7*
City Attorney Moore told the court that the city admin­
istration considered that state suit without foundation in 
law and precedent. The state constitution and the 1912 city 
charter granted the municipal government exclusive authority 
over the city streets, including the authority to grant and 
regulate franchises governing their use. The courts recog­
nized that authority on several occasions, and, in the Black 
decision, affirmed the authority of the municipal government 
to regulate street railway fares. The court, however, found 
merit in the state's argument, and issued a temporary in­
junction preventing the commission council from deliberating 
on the request for a fare increase.73
The court order against the commission council did not 
enjoin public discussion, however. The executive leadership 
of the Association of Commerce proposed that the Behrman ad­
ministration grant the company an eight cent fare for four 
months, enabling the receiver to pay the new wage award.
72New Orleans Item. August 16, October 1, 5, 7, 1920; 
New Orleans Daily States. October 5, 1920.
73New Orleans Daily States, October 6-11, 1920; New Or­
leans Item. October 6, 8-10, 1920. The union and the recei­
ver were, to say the least, displeased with the state 
suit. Union leaders called it a frivolous suit, benefitting 
no one and hurting everyone in the city. The carmen insisted 
that Receiver O'Keefe begin paying the new wage schedule at 
once, asserting that the wage award should not depend on the 
increase in carfares. O'Keefe, of course, declined, citing 
Judge Foster's order and the injunction as his reasons for 
denying the union's request. Despite the possibility of an­
other strike, the union resisted that temptation and remain­
ed on the job.
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satisfying the company's desparate need for additional 
money, and permitting the new municipal administration the 
time to determine valuation, rate of return, and the neces­
sity for a permanent increase in streetcar fares. With these 
guarantees, the receiver and the business community could 
persuade the state to withdraw its suit against the city.7* 
Initially, the Behrman administration dismissed the 
notion of a temporary, unconditional fare increase, remind­
ing the businessmen's association that the six cent fare or­
dinance, enacted in October, 1918, remained in effect and 
contributed nothing toward the public rehabilitation of the 
utilties industry in New Orleans. Instead, Mayor Behrman 
suggested that NORLC dispense with its dividend payments for 
the next four months, appropriating those resources for the 
new wage schedule, and affording the incumbent administra­
tion the opportunity to set a responsible and comprehensive 
public utilties policy. Behrman*s proposal received few en­
dorsements, even one-time supporters like the New Orleans 
Daily States considered the proposal unrealistic. The States 
urged the council to adopt the proposal of the Association 
of Commerce, arguing, in effect, that the new McShane admin­
istration should determine the public utilities policy of 
New Orleans.7*
7*New Orleans Item, October 8-10, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States. October 10-11, 1920.
7*New Orleans Daily States. October 9, 1920.
The next day Mayor Behrman announced that the council 
would, with the proper guarantees, consent to a temporary, 
unconditional fare increase. The mayor hurriedly organized a 
conference with Receiver O'Keefe, assistant Attorney General 
Hall, and the executive leadership of the Association of 
Commerce to discuss the specific features of the eight cent 
fare ordinance and to arrange for the proper guarantees. The 
conference nearly ended before it began. The first of the 
proposals, offered by the Association of Commerce, angered 
the city administration and NORLC general counsel H. Generes 
Dufour, resulting in several heated shouting matches and 
threats to discontinue the proceedings. Under the terms of 
the so-called Carroll plan (Leigh Carroll, the chairman of 
the public utilities committee of the Association of Com­
merce, introduced the plan), the commission council would 
consent to an eight cent fare effective for only six months 
and subject to certain restrictions. During those six 
months, the municipal administration and the State Attorney 
General would restudy the public utilities industry in New 
Orleans, developing a comprehensive utilities policy 
(assistant Attorney General Hall proposed granting NORLC a 
state franchise and regulating service and cost through a 
state regulatory board or commission) and offering the re­
ceiver a realistic plan for the rehabilitation of the 
company. The Attorney General would agree to withdraw the 
state suit if the receiver pledged to use the two cent in-
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crease to fund the wage award and meet legitimate increases 
in the cost of service."7*
City Attorney Moore considered the proposal a fraud and 
an insult to the city and the Behrman administration. The 
proposal granted NORLC a thirty-three percent increase in 
fares without determining its necessity or expediency. In 
addition, plan placed few, if any, significant restrictions 
on the use of the eight cent fare, allowing the receiver to 
dedicate the increase to facets of the company incidental to 
its rehabilitation. Furthermore, the city attorney com­
plained, the association plan sought to exclude the city 
government from the regulation of essential municipal ser­
vices, denying to the people of New Orleans the right and 
authority to determine municipal public policy. Moore then 
turned his criticism toward 'Governor' Hall, exchanging 
"harsh" words with the assistant Attorney General over the 
content of the state suit and Hall's recommendations to the 
conference. Apparently, Hall's suit and suggestions irked 
the city attorney, and he threatened to resign if Mayor 
Behrman and the council consented to the Carroll plan.77
Moore's threat to resign was, perhaps, irrelevant (he 
was, like Behrman and the entire commission council, a lame 
duck) to the discussion, but his criticism of the Carroll
7*Behrman to O'Keefe, October 12, 1920, box 14, SRUC. 
SCD, H-TML, TU; New Orleans Daily States, October 11, 12,
23, 1920; New Orleans Item, October 10, 12-14, 22-23, 1920.
77New Orleans Daily States. October 11, 12, 23, 1920; 
New Orleans Item. October 10, 12-14, 22-23, 1920.
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plan was succinct and correct. State regulation of municipal 
public services was not only unconstitutional but also un­
warranted. As we will see, when the voters of New Orleans 
elected the McShane administration in 1920, they did not 
reject municipal regulation (the McShane commission council 
pursued the policy initiated by the Behrman administration). 
Rather, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the Behr­
man administration and its inability, not unwillingness, to 
construct a comprehensive, workable public service policy. 
Despite their loss at the polls, however. Mayor Behrman and 
the commission council refused to accept any provision, no 
matter how appealing or temporary, that compromised the fun­
damental authority of the municipal government.70
The receiver and management of NORLC, too, objected to 
a temporary fare increase. H. Generes Dufour, the attorney 
for the receiver and the general counsel for NORLC, claimed 
that a provisional fare increase would not meet the immedi­
ate needs of the company, compelling the receiver to suspend 
certain services and requiring Judge Foster to rescind the 
wage award. Dufour also questioned the legality and expedi-
7"I have based this assesment of the utility policy of 
the Behrman administration on the numerous correspondence of 
the Mayor's Office, the City Attorney's Office, and the 
Petitions and Correspondence of the Commissioner of Public 
Utilities. For example, see Moore to Thompson, undated, 
vol.7 (probably between February 13 and 19, 1918), Moore to 
Glenny, August 8, 1918, Waldo to Moore, August 24, 1918, 
vol.8, CAP. CA, NOPL. The newspapers, as well, dispite their 
partisan opposition to the Behrman council, faithfully 
reported the policy statements and actions of the council.
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ency of the provision allowing the commission council or the 
State of Louisiana to determine the use of company revenues. 
Under the conditions of the receivership, Receiver O'Keefe 
could not appropriate revenues to suit the interests of any 
one but the principal creditors of the company. In brief, 
the receiver had to meet the cost of operation, including 
wages and the payment of debts. He could not assign revenues 
for the rehabilitation of the company. Granting the munici­
pal or state government pleanary authority over the alloca­
tion of revenues and other resources, Dufour predicted, 
would paralyze the rehabilitation of the company and end in 
the permanent collapse of the public service industry in Hew 
Or leans. '7"
In the end, however, confrontation gave way to compro­
mise. According to the "informal" agreement, the Behrman ad­
ministration would enact a temporary two cent fare increase, 
effective for six months and dedicated to funding the wage 
award and other legitimate cost of operation. The enactment 
of the ordinance, the agreement read, in no way obligated 
the Behrman administration or the McShane commission council 
to enact a permanent eight cent fare ordinance or to acknow­
ledge the need or expediency of a permanent fare increase.
In brief, then, as City Attorney Moore insisted, these pro­
visions acknowledged that the municipal government alone had
'79New Orleans Daily States, October 11-12, 23, 1920; Mew
Orleans Item. October 11-14, 22-23, 1920.
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the power to regulate the cost of service and, in part, to 
determine the use of specific revenues."0
In addition, the Attorney General agreed to withdraw 
his suit against the city council if the receiver agreed in 
writing to use the fare increase exclusively for the wage 
award and other specific cost of operation. Though the 
agreement required the receiver to appropriate the fare in­
crease for specific cost, it did not require him to dedicate 
any portion of the two cent increase to rehabilitating the 
company. Apparently, this aspect satisfied O'Keefe and 
Dufour, and they agreed in writing to use the increase for 
wages, taxes, and fuel.ax
Finally, the conference left to the McShane administra­
tion the difficult job of constructing and implementing a 
comprehensive public utilities policy that preserved the 
political integrity of the city and resolved the public ser­
vice crisis to the satisfaction of the courts, the receiver, 
the principal owners of NORLC, and the people of New Or­
leans. It was a task that took nearly two years and taxed 
the abilities of the new administration and the endurance of 
people of New Orleans. Eventually, it contributed to the 
near collapse of the McShane administration and to the
“ Ibid.
axIbid.
return of Martin Behrman.02
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82Behrman to O'Keefe, October 12, 1920, box 14, SRUC. 
SCD, H-TML, TU; Ordinance 5892, CCS. CA, NOPL; New Orleans 
Item, October 10, 12-14, 20-21, 1920; New Orleans Daily 
States. October 11-13, 20-22, 1920. Opposition to the eight 
cent fare was meager and ineffective. Working through the 
courts, the receiver and the Behrman administration stymied 
attempts to block the eight cent fare. In addition, critics 
of the ordinance fell short in their attempt to initiate an 
ordinance repealing the eight cent law. See New Orleans 
Item. October 20-31, November 15, 1920, January 5, 1921 and 
New Orleans Daily States. October 23-31, November 2, 4, 8, 
22, December 14, 1920.
Chapter Eight
"A Bad Year For Kings"
Late in the spring of 1919, Donelson Caffery, a friend 
and supporter of John M. Parker and violent critic of the 
Behrman administration, announced the formation of the Demo­
cratic Liberty League (DLL), a "new and permanent" faction 
within the state Democratic party. Its single purpose, he 
said, was the creation and maintenance of "good government" 
in Louisiana and, in particular, New Orleans. Its principal 
goal was the end of ring rule and the other forms of "polit­
ical Kaiserism" in Louisiana, and its chief campaign issue 
was the removal of Martin Behrman and the Regular Democratic 
Organization from power. The League, Caffery told reporters, 
would be a potent force in the approaching state and munici­
pal elections, and its chief interest for the next several 
months would be the thorough political organization of the 
state and city and the selection of anti-ring candidates for 
the major state offices. With the election of an anti-Regu- 
lar governor, the DLL would then challenge Behrman and the 
Regulars for control of New Orleans.x
Despite Caffery's pronouncement, the anti-ring issue
xNew Orleans Item. May 5, 11, 18, 20, 25, 31, June 9,
1919; New Orleans Daily States. May 11, 18, 19, 20, 1919.
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was of secondary importance to many League members and 
found only marginal support among the leading "independent" 
candidates for governor. Only Phanor Breazeale (who had 
the qualified endorsement of former governor Jared Y. 
Sanders) considered ring rule a serious issue, pledging that 
once elected he would remove Martin Behrman and the RDO from 
power in New Orleans and influence in the state. State Sena­
tor B. M. Stafford, who opposed the utilities policy of the 
Behrman administration, acknowledeged that the RDO had a 
"disproportional" amount of power and influence in New 
Orleans and the state, but dismissed the idea of ring rule 
as divisive and misleading, creating an anti-New Orleans 
feeling among the voters and distracting them from the 
essential problems of the state. The New Orleans "machine," 
he said, was not the source of the discontent and stagnation 
in the state. Rather, the problems of Louisiana stemmed from 
its colonial economy, an inadequate and inequitable tax 
structure, and the failure to provide essential services 
like good roads, schools, and public utilities. Percy Saint, 
an ardent opponent of Mayor Behrman and the RDO (and a 
future Attorney General of Louisiana), reiterated Senator 
Stafford's remarks, adding that the state needed to adopt a 
new state constitution, establishing a modern, effective 
state government.2
2New Orleans Item, May 11, July 4, 5, September 1,
10,1919; New Orleans Daily States. July 4, 5, 1919.
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Hone of these men inspired the imagination or ignited 
the hopes of the DLL and its leaders. Breazeale's anti-ring 
rhetoric seemed convenient and insincere, and his failure 
to address other, equally salient issues troubled Caffery 
and the other leaders of the DLL. Though the sentiments and 
platforms of Stafford and Saint appealed to many rural 
parish League members, neither man was truly anti-RDO, and 
did not appeal to the New Orleans reformers, the core of the 
League's support. And, perhaps most important of all, none 
of them could attract the "independent" progressive voter, 
who, the DLL believed, would determine the outcome of the 
state election. These circumstances convinced many League 
members, especially the anti-Regulars, to seek another, more 
acceptable candidate, one who embodied the anti-ring senti­
ment of the DLL and who could appeal to the independent pro­
gressive voter— John M. Parker.3
For the moment, however, John Parker chose not to run, 
refusing to campaign for the endorsement of the DLL or to 
commit to its platform.“ Parker's refusal to accept the en­
dorsement of the League worried several of his supporters.
3New Orleans Daily States, June 9, August 10-12, 15-18, 
1919; New Orleans Item. July 29, August 12, 13, 15-18, 1919. 
Those League members advocating Parker were Governor Ruffin 
G. Pleasant, Donelson Caffery, Hewitt Bounchaud, Albin O. 
Provosty, and John Patrick Sullivan.
“Parker to Leland Moss, August 21, 1919, Parker Papers, 
UNC; New Orleans Item. August 15-19, 21, 1919; New Orleans 
Daily States. August 16-18, 21, 1919.
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and his apparent interest in running for governor again9 
troubled other League members. Leland Moss, perhaps Parker's 
most ardent supporter, pleaded with him to declare his can­
didacy, complaining that Parker's refusal to accept the DLL 
endorsement would divide the independent vote and give the 
election to Martin Behrman and the RDO.* But other League 
members were leery of Parker's intentions, and saw no merit 
in either endorsing him or encouraging his candidacy. If 
the DLL endorsed Parker, he and his supporters would absorb 
the organization, reducing its appeal and turning it into a 
personal political vehicle. If Parker ran independently of 
the League, he could split the independent vote, giving the 
election to the Regulars and their country supporters.7
At the League convention in August, the unaligned 
majority of the DLL realized its worst fears. Parker's 
friends, principally from the New Orleans, attempted to 
postpone the nomination or, barring that event, to make it 
contingent upon "subsequent developments". But opponents of 
the Parker nomination, among them New Orleans reformer Dr.
9Parker campaigned for governor in 1916 as a member of 
the Progressive party. Parker lost convincingly to Ruffin G. 
Pleasant.
"Moss to Parker, August 22, 23, 1919, Parker to Moss, 
August 21, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item.
August 19, 21, 1919; New Orleans Daily States. August 21,
1919. Professor Matthew Schott attributed Parker's indeci­
sion to "personal reasons," but a better explanation seems 
to lie in Parker's willful personality and demand for 
politiical independence. Schott, "John M. Parker," 336.
7Charles J. Turck to Parker, August 28, 1919, Parker 
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Daily States. August 17-19, 1919; 
New Orleans Item. August 17-18, 1919.
Valentine K. Irion, blocked those efforts, eventually en­
dorsing Phanor Breazeale for governor. Following the nomi­
nation of Breazeale, several prominent members11 of the DLL 
"bolted" the convention, announcing their intention of en­
dorsing and campaigning for John M. Parker. Harry Gamble, 
one of the "bolters" and Parker's future campaign manager, 
critized the nomination and the DLL. The times were not nor­
mal, he said. The people were uncertain about the fate of 
the state and demanded men who could command their confi­
dence. John Parker, more so than Phanor Breazeale, commanded 
the respect and trust of the "unbossed," Democratic voter.
And Parker, not Breazeale, could defeat the New Orleans 
machine and lead the state "at this critical time of recon­
struction and rearrangement...". A week later John Parker 
declared his candidacy, taking with him a majority of the 
anti-Regular League members. Without the core of his sup­
port, Phanor Breazeale withdrew from the race, leaving the 
remnant of the DLL to John Parker and the anti-Regular 
reformers."
But John Parker was hardly the ideal candidate, partic­
ularly to those voters who considered the Democratic party 
the party of reform and who saw ring rule as an idle and
"Among them were Esmond Phelps, publisher of the New 
Orleans Times-Picayune, assistant Attorney General Harry 
Gamble, State Representative James J. A. Fortier of New 
Orleans, Dr. Walter S. Oser, and Oliver S. Livaudais.
"New Orleans Daily States, August 17-21, 28, 31, Septem­
ber 4, 21, 23, 24, 1919; New Orleans Item. August 17-20, 31, 
September 3, 5, 23, 24, 1919.
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disruptive issue. And there were many Democrats who doubted 
Parker's ability to defeat the Regulars, especially cam­
paigning on the issue of ring rule at the exclusion of all 
other issues. For John Parker to win the elec ;Ior., then, he 
had to reestablish his credibility as a Democrat, embracing 
the "populistic1* elements and reforms of the party and cam­
paigning on a platform that transcended the narrow partisan­
ship of his past anti-Regular campaigns.xo
Among John Parker's apparent public disabilities, none 
was more troubling to his supporters (or comforting to his 
critics) than his checkered loyalty to the Democratic 
party. As we have seen, first in 1912 and then in 1916, John 
Parker distained "traditional" Southern party politics, 
leaving the Democratic party for Theodore Roosevelt's Pro­
gressive party crusade and completing his apostasy as that 
party's candidate for governor four years later. Galvanized 
by Woodrow Wilson's candidacy in 1916 and swept up by the 
wartime patriotism that surrounded it and uncertain about 
the tone and direction of the third party movement, John 
Parker began a slow, considered move back to the Democratic 
party. With the nation at war, Parker sought and accepted a 
position in Wilson's wartime administration, serving as
x°Moss to Parker, August 19, 20, 22, 1919, D. D. Moore to 
Gamble, October 15, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; Schott, "John 
M. Parker," 335-37. For a superb account of the Democratic 
party in the Progressive Era, see David Sarasohn, The Party 
of Reform Democrats in the Progressive Era (University of 
Mississippi Press, 1989), passim.
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the Federal Food Administrator for Louisiana and endearing 
himself (at least according to his biographer) to the 
state's farmers and consumers. In March, 1918, amidst pub­
licity exceeding the significance of the event, John Parker 
reregistered as a Democrat.xx
But Parker's return to the Democratic party did not 
make him a Democrat. Nor did his former standing in the 
anti-ring movement secure his position as the principal 
leader and ideologue of the "reform" Democrats. To gain the 
acceptance of the Democratic party and to establish himself 
as a credible "reform" candidate, Parker had to do more 
than change parties. Parker aligned himself with several 
noteworthy and influential professional politicians, men 
closely identified with the state's governing establishment, 
men Parker considered at one time ill-fit to govern Louisi­
ana. Those men included the incumbent governor, Ruffin 6. 
Pleasant, State Speaker Lee E. Thomas, former governor 
Jared Y. Sanders, and attorney and lobbyist John Patrick 
Sullivan. “
xxSchott, "John M. Parker," 310-18, 325-337.
“ The majority of those men supporting Parker, of course, 
came from the "reform" establishment, men like Charles I. 
Rosen, Ivy G. Kittredge, Thomas I. O'Connor, and Leland 
Moss. Other less noteable (for the moment) politicians also 
endorsed John Parker, including Percy Saint, John H. Over­
ton, and, of course, Huey Pierce Long. Moss to Parker,
August 19, 20, 22, 27, 1919, L. E. Thomas to Parker, Septem­
ber 13, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. Septem­
ber 1, 19, October 6, 26, 1919; New Orleans Daily States. 
September 1, 19, November 19, 1919; Schott, "John M.
Parker," 335-37.
Parker also identified himself with past Democratic 
reform movements and administrations,X3 emphasizing his com­
mitment to the "true" principles of the Democratic party, 
and justifying his departure in terms of his opposition to 
the RDO. For John Parker and his anti-Regular supporters, 
ring rule was a real issue, and its destruction was a sin­
cere and critical need. They portrayed Martin Behrman and 
the Regulars as "perpetual office holders," destructive of 
good government and devoid of party principle. And they 
equated the destruction of the Regular Democrats with pro­
gressive reform. This campaign, Parker wrote to a friend, 
will be "possibly one of the most bitter fights we have ever 
had in Louisiana, and the only way we will win it is going 
to be by thorough organization and by keeping before the 
people all the time the great principle for which we stand." 
That principle was, he said in a speech, "the destruction of 
the New Orleans ring and all other rings". From that great 
principle stemmed "the reconstruction of our State...".x<*
But Parker could not expect to win the gubernatorial 
campaign by simply aligning himself with the Democratic
X3In November, 1919, Parker wrote to Chief Justice Edward 
Douglass White, asking him to substantiate Parker's support 
of Francis T. Nicholls in 1888 and his opposition to the 
Louisiana Lottery Company in 1892. White confirmed Parker's 
claims. See Parker to White, November 17, 1919, White to 
Parker, November 20, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC.
Xi*Moss to Parker, August 20, 22, 27, 1919, L. E. Thomas 
to Parker, September 3, 1919, Parker to S. B. Hicks, October 
7, 30, 1919, D. D. Moore to Gamble, October 15, 1919, Tran­
script of Speech, October 2, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; New 
Orleans Item, November 1, 1919.
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party elite, or by identifying with past Democratic reforms, 
or by equating progressive reform with the destruction of 
the Regular Democrats. In a more important sense, however, 
for Parker to win the governorship he had to come to terms 
with the character and direction of the modern Democratic 
party. By the late 1890s, if not sooner, Louisiana's Demo­
cratic party had moved beyond Bourbonism, embracing the 
principles of William Jennings Bryan, Louis Brandeis, and 
Thomas Woodrow Wilson.XB
Despite Parker's attraction to the New Nationalism of 
the Progressive party, his reformism hardly moved beyond the 
issues of ballot reform, preference primaries, charter re­
visions, and demands for "business-like" and efficient gov­
ernment. The voters of Louisiana, both rural and urban, 
immigrant and native, Catholic and Protestant, conservative 
and liberal (for want of better words) rejected this elitist 
version of progressive reform in 1912 and 1916. They sought 
good roads, schools, hospitals, modern civic administrations 
and services, and economic opportunity, not civics lessons 
or a government responsive to the interests of a conspicuous
X9Dethloff, "Populism and Reform in Louisiana," passim; 
Ashby, William Jennings Brvan. passim; Cooper, The Warrior 
and the Priest, passim; Sarasohn, The Party of Reform, 
passim.
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and self-satisfied urban elite.xs
Aware of his political liabilities and anxious not to 
repeat the mistakes of the past eight years, Parker's sup­
porters urged him to broaden his appeal, reconciling him­
self to the issues and character of the new Democratic 
party.3-7 Parker took their advice. And though the anti-ring 
issue formed the core of his message, Parker emphasized his 
commitment to reform and progressivism. In his first speech 
of the campaign, Parker sought to reconcile himself with the 
Democratic Liberty League, telling League members that 
he was a conscientious Democrat and a modern progressive 
reformer. He praised the DLL for its role in the struggle
xaSchott, "John M. Parker," 249-76; Schott, "Huey Long: 
Progressive Backlash?," Louisiana History, XXVII (Spring 
1986), 138-39. In his dissertation on John Parker, Professor 
Schott argued that the limited success Parker enjoyed in 
1916 stemmed from the "fairly well consolidated popular re­
sentment on the [sugar] protection issue." He concluded that 
the 1916 general election "reflected to a large degree a 
rational orientation of class and sectional interests, with 
planters, farmers, and working men, without a stake in sugar 
protection, providing a basis for the Democratic victory."
By the "standards of many reformers in 1916 the Louisiana 
Progressive party...stood foursquare on the principles of 
antireform and antiprogressivism." So too did John Parker.
17Moss to Parker, August 20, 22, 27, October 15, 1919, 
Thomas to Parker, September 3, 1919 and undated, Gilbert L. 
Dupre to Parker, September 30, 1919, Moore to Gamble, Octo­
ber 15, 1919, John M. Rodgers to Parker, November 11, 1919, 
Parker Papers, UNC. Early in the campaign, Parker concen­
trated his focus on canvassing south Louisiana and New 
Orleans. But several of his managers pressed him to abandon 
that tactic, telling him he could not win without the 
assistance of north Louisiana politicians and voters. And 
they urged him to curb his feelings toward the "populistic" 
politics of north Louisiana. "These good people," Lee Thomas 
wrote, "supported what they believed to be for the best in­
terest of the country and many of their principles were sub­
sequently adopted by the Democratic party."
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against ring rule and its e££ort to reform and revitalize 
the Democratic party. He was, he assured the DLL, a true 
Democrat and reformer, committed to the principles and poli­
cies of the party. Though he considered ring rule the fore­
most question of the day, he was not a "faction" man con­
cerned with partisan advantage. As a progressive Democrat, 
he endorsed civil service reform and cheap natural gas for 
New Orleans, a "square deal" for capital and labor, an agri­
cultural and mechanical college, woman suffrage, better 
roads, an unlimited constituional convention, and equalized 
assessment and taxation.3-"
John Parker, of course, was not the only Democratic 
candidate. And he was not the only Democrat promising pro­
gressive reform for the state and the city. Frank P. Stubbs 
of Monroe, a retired army colonel and a veteran of the First 
World War, opposed Parker in the Democratic primary. Though 
Stubbs had no real practical political experience, he had 
the support of several leading politicians and civic leaders 
and the endorsement of Mayor Behrman and the Regular Demo­
cratic Organization. Despite his inexperience, then. Colonel 
Stubbs was a serious candidate with money, organization, and
x"Typescripts of speeches, September 18, October 23, 
November 14, December 29, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; New 
Orleans Daily States. September 19, October 8-10, 1919;
New Orleans Item. August 16, September 19, October 5, 7, 8,
11, 23, 26, November 15, December 30-31, 1919.
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political experience behind him.3-9
For the most part, though, the Stubbs supporters mis­
used their political ability, ignoring the virtues of their 
own progressive platform, failing to exploit weaknesses in 
Parker's record and platform, and attacking him on issues 
that no longer concerned the voters.*0 It was a mistake. On 
election day, Parker won an impressive victory, carrying all 
but fourteen parishes and improving his vote of 1916 by 
nearly thirty thousand. He also improved his vote in every 
section of the state, particularly in New Orleans and in 
north and northcentral Louisiana, the citadels of the 
Democratic party in Louisiana.*3-
According to Matthew J. Schott, there were several 
factors that explained Parker's victory. First, Parker's
“ Though the RDO formed the core of Stubbs's support, the
Regulars were not his only source of support. Men like
former governor Luther E. Hall, Fred A. Earhart, George H.
Terriberry, William Guste, and Loys Charbonnet supported
Stubbs, but were independent of the Regulars. And, as we
have seen, not all Regular Democrats were "machine" politi­
cians. Thomas Semmes Walmsley and John Nix, for example, 
were rising figures in the RDO, but could hardly be con­
sidered ringsters. Moss to Parker, August 20, 1919, Parker 
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Daily States, August 18, September
7-11, November 14, 16, 1919. Schott, "John M. Parker," 337.
*°New Orleans Daily States. November 4, 22, 23, 26, 30, 
December 2, 1919, January 4, 7, 11, 17, 1920; New Orleans
Item. August 13, 14, September 1, 20, November 28, 1919, 
January 8, 1920; Schott, "John M. Parker," 336-49. The 
Stubbs platform contained planks not found in the Parker 
platform. For example, Stubbs and the Regulars called for 
the end of child labor, mandatory education through high 
school, state recognition of labor's right to organize and 
bargin collectively, and civil service for all state boards 
and commissions.
23-Schott, "John M. Parker," 347-49.
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return to the Democratic party nullified the issues of race 
and party that contributed to his defeat in 1916. Second, 
the Regular Democrats in New Orleans were badly divided, 
forcing some of them to seek refuge with Parker and giving 
him professional, organized support in the city. Finally, 
with the collapse of the Progressive party movement and a 
favorable readjustment of the sugar tariff, Parker returned 
to a more familiar and conservative variety of progressi- 
vism, allowing him to attract a majority of the "unbossed" 
Democratic voters of Louisiana.2*
Apart from Parker's nominal return to the Democratic 
party (and Stubbs's inept campaigning), it is difficult to 
determine the factors that contributed to the election of 
John Parker. The RDO suffered a number of desertions during 
the state campaign. But desertions were common occurrences 
in New Orleans politics, and there is no conclusive evidence 
that Parker benefitted from them. True, Parker received 
20,603 votes in New Orleans, winning six wards (the Ninth, 
Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth) 
and increasing his 1916 vote by nearly 6,300. And the major­
ity of those votes, nearly 5,000, came from traditional 
"machine" wards and precincts, apparently verifying 
Professor Schott's claim. But these statistics are incom­
plete and misleading. Colonel Stubbs polled 25,044 votes,
22Schott, "John M. Parker," 326-49; Schott, "Progressives 
Against Democracy," 256-67; New Orleans Item. January 11,
1920.
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only 783 votes fewer than Ruffin Pleasant in 1916. Stubbs 
lost but two wards won by Pleasant in 1916, and defeated 
Parker by nearly eight hundred votes in the Third Ward, the 
residence of John Patrick Sullivan.23 The increase in the 
Parker vote, then, did not come from any riffs in the RDO, 
but from a different source. In the 1920 Democratic party 
primary, 5,480 "new" voters went to the polls, roughly a 
twelve percent increase. And, when added to the 783 voters 
who deserted the RDO, these men gave John Parker nearly 
6,300 additional votes.2-*
Though the New Orleans vote was always significant (no 
candidate could win a major state office without a strong 
showing in the city, as Huey Long learned in 1924), Parker 
won the election outside the city. The majority of Parker's 
vote in 1920 came from the rural parishes in the north, the 
central, and the western portions of the state, with the
23Professor Schott argued that Sullivan's desertion from 
the RDO was "indicative of the lessening cohesion in Choctaw 
ranks". Schott attributed this "development" to the effects 
of the commission council system and to the "inability of 
each ward boss to obtain political favor except by the grace 
of the increasingly quarrelsome and demanding Mayor 
Behrman." In truth, Behrman and the RDO forced Sullivan from 
their ranks in 1913. Schott's other assertions are also 
without merit. The commission council system enacted in 1912 
gave the mayor enormous powers, but, as we have seen, the 
commission system tended to diffuse power, and Mayor Behrman 
encouraged independence and initiative, allowing the other 
commissioners to effect public policy. Schott, "John M. 
Parker," 342.
2*The Secretary of State did not promulgate returns 
except on a parish basis. I have compiled these figures from 
the city newspapers. There are a few discrepancies in the 
returns, but, by and large, the newspaper accounts appear to 
be accurate.
463
principal increase coining from those sections that rejected 
Parker in 1916. In those rural parishes, John Parker re­
ceived an additional 24,731, eighty percent of his total in­
crease and fifty percent of his entire vote. These heavily 
Democratic and predominately "populistic" parishes elected 
John Parker in 1920. Parker did not win their confidence and 
their vote by returning to a more conservative variety of 
progressivism or by thundering against ring rule. Rather, he 
received their votes by promising to fulfill his platform, 
a platform not completely of his making or to his liking.29
Immediately after his election in January, 1920, John 
Parker returned to New Orleans to begin his campaign against 
Martin Behrman and the Regular Democratic Organization. In a 
speech delivered to the Young Men's Busines Association (a 
civic and business association formed in November, 1919), 
the governor-elect urged the city's young reformers to begin 
in earnest the business of "redeeming" their city from the 
carpetbaggery of ring rule. Anti-Regular reformers of all 
ages, of course, shared Parker's sentiments. James Thomson, 
the publisher of the New Orleans Item and an inveterate 
opponent of Martin Behrman and ring rule since early in the 
decade, also prompted New Orleans reformers (and disaffected 
Regulars) to redouble their efforts to remove Martin 
Behrman from office. The election of John Parker, the Item
2"Schott, John M. Parker," 270-73, 347-49.
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wrote, ensured that the state would remain free of the cor­
rupt and reactionary influence of the RDO. With his assis­
tance, the anti-ring Democrats of New Orleans could "redeem" 
the city, restoring the people to power and ushering in a 
new era of good government.a"
For most New Orleans reformers, though, the Parker vic­
tory itself did not signal the approaching defeat of Mayor 
Behrman or promise the end of ring rule in New Orleans. 
Parker's showing in New Orleans undoubtedly sustained their 
faith in anti-ring reformism and promised a distinct hope 
for victory in the municipal elections in September. Yet, 
experience cautioned against expecting an easy and complete 
defeat of Martin Behrman and the RDO. From time to time, 
the RDO had suffered losses at the polls and survived. It 
was, after all, a resilient organization, favored by power­
ful allies and sustained by an army of witless voters and 
self-interested workers anxious to prevent municipal reform 
and to retain their influence and position in political and
2®John Parker to New Orleans Times-Picayune and New 
Orleans Item. January 21, 1920, Parker Papers, UNC; New 
Orleans Item, January 22, 1920. According to Crawford 
Ellis, an insurance executive and member of the city's so- 
called commerical-civic elite, ring rule extended beyond 
politics into the chambers of commerce. Writing to Governor- 
elect Parker, Ellis pleaded with him to remove William Bess 
Thompson, the former Commissioner of Public Utilities (1912- 
1916), from the Board of Commissioners for the Port of New 
Orleans, the Dock Board. See Ellis to Parker, January 23, 
1920, John M. Parker Papers, Southwestern Archives and Manu­
script Collection, The University of Southwestern Louisiana, 
hereafter cited as Parker Papers, USL.
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municipal affairs in New Orleans.27
Experience also counseled a pragmatic response to the 
impending municipal elections. Before the mayoral campaign 
began, full-time, anti-ring reformers like James Thomson, 
John Parker, and Andrew McShane urged the formation of a 
professional, reform-minded political organization, modeled 
on the RDO and designed not so much to destroy it as to re­
place it.20 Late in December, 1919, when it was apparent
that John Parker would win the election, his campaign man-
»
agers in New Orleans initiated a series of discussions with 
several "disaffected" Regulars, seeking a temporary alliance 
for the municipal campaign. Anxious to disassociate them­
selves from Martin Behrman and his administration, these 
Regulars agreed to "fuse" with the reformers. Soon after 
Parker's election, the alliance assumed a more or less per­
manent character, with reformers and "new" Regulars forming 
the Orleans Democratic Association (ODA).2*
27New Orleans Item, February 27, March 14, August 11, 
1920. In a series of editorials, the Item accused the RDO of 
aligning itself with any interest that could be "purchased, 
influenced, controlled, or fooled". Those interests included 
the city's principal banks, NORLC, and elements of vice. In 
that sense, the Item wrote, the RDO resembled the Radical 
Republicans of the 1860s and 1870s. By implication, John 
Parker and the reformers of New Orleans were like the 
Redeemers of the late 1870s and 1880s.
2"Parker to S. B. Hicks, October 7, 1919, Parker Papers, 
UNC; New Orleans Item, September 14, 1918, December 29,
1919, February 10, March 13, 1920.
2*New Orleans Item, December 11, 21, 1919, January 26, 
1920; New Orleans Daily States, January 10, 1920.
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The new association, the Item announced, was different 
from previous reform organizations. The old reform groups 
were comprised of carnival kings and cotillion leaders, dis­
tainful of politics, resentful of those it served, and un­
mindful of the need for a permanent reform organization. The 
new organization, however, had none of the liabilities of 
its predecessors. The leaders of the ODA were "new men," 
dedicated to the social principles and benefits of demo­
cracy, disciplined by the regimen of war, and convinced of 
the need for a permanent reform organization. These men 
were, above all, realists, and they understood the need to 
democratize municipal reform, opening their organization to 
professional politicians of principle and experience. Their 
alliance with the anti-Behrman Regulars did not adulterate 
reform, but purified politics.30
The sort of realistic reformers the Item described may 
have joined the ODA, but they did not lead it, define its 
character, or set its goals. The reform leaders of the ODA 
were old men, known to any voter and familiar to any student 
of New Orleans politics in the progressive era. Though never 
a member of the organization, John Parker was clearly one of
3°New Orleans Item. February 20, July 31, August 11, 
September 4, 8, 1920. According to the Item, the reformers 
were so anxious to defeat Behrman and the RDO that they 
would tolerate any permanent organization, no matter how 
disreputable, as long as it won the mayoral election for 
the reformers. This "devil's bargain" apparently did not 
trouble the reformers, since, as the Item reported, they 
believed that the individual citizen, not the organization, 
would always control public policy.
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its guiding forces, defining its goals and sustaining it 
with political patronage. Parkerites dominated the reform 
wing of the ODA, sitting on its campaign and "patronage" 
committees, screening potential candidates, and handing out 
jobs to valued political friends. The professional politi­
cians who joined the ODA may have been men of principle, but 
they, like the reformers, were also driven by personal and 
partisan self-interests. They, too, wanted to remove Martin 
Behrman and his Regulars from office. But it seems unlikely, 
given their previous political beliefs and alliances, that 
they shared John Parker's vision of municipal reform and 
good government. Instead, it seems more likely that they 
shared the beliefs and values of the president of the ODA, 
John Patrick Sullivan.31
John Sullivan was the epitome of the professional, 
"machine" politician. At well over six feet and weighing 
more than two hundred pounds, Sullivan was an imposing, 
almost menacing figure, undisciplined and quick tempered, 
with ego and ambition to match his size. Politics ran in the
31Among those Parkerites who joined and served the ODA 
were: H. Dickson Bruns, founder of the Ballots Reform Lea­
gue in 1894 and a charter member of the Citizens League in 
1896, Robert H. Marr, a former District Attorney for Orleans 
Parish, Charles I. Rosen, Harold Moise, Bernard McCloskey, 
Harry Gamble, Andrew McShane, and James Thomson. See New 
Orleans Daily States, April 3, 1920; New Orleans Item, July 
18, 28, 1920. Among the new Regulars were: Edward A. Hag­
gerty, Clerk of the Criminal District Court, Bernard Daly, 
an assistant District Attorney, and Henrico "Co" Desmare, 
the City Comptroller. See New Orleans Daily States. July 10, 
11, 25, 28, 1920.
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family. Sullivan's father was a native of Ireland, arriving 
in Hew Orleans in the decade before the Civil War. Appar­
ently, the elder Sullivan was a successful grocer, amassing 
a "considerable fortune" from wholesaling and sending his 
son to the College of the Immaculate Conception (the Jesuit 
preparatory school) and Tulane University. The father was 
also active in politics, working in the New Orleans Custom 
House during the initial stages of Reconstruction and be­
longing to a small, though conspicuous, group of conserva­
tive Irish unionists.35*
John Patrick Sullivan built on the family tradition. He 
was a successful attorney and lobbyist, representing several 
large corporations and business associations. Sullivan was, 
as well, a conservative Democrat and a consummate spoilsman. 
Early in his career, "Colonel" Sullivan (he was a colonel in 
the Louisiana militia) held several offices of public trust, 
serving as assistant Attorney General, attorney for the 
State Fire Marshall, and attorney for the State Insurance 
Rating Board. Later, Sullivan served as the chief counsel 
or principal lobbyist for several "local" corporations, in­
cluding the New Orleans Railway and Light Company, the New 
Orleans Brewers and Distillers Association, and the Hibernia
32For a description of Sullivan see Williams, Huev Long, 
166-67. For an account of the political activities of 
Sullivan and his familiy see. New Orleans Item. July 2,
1911, March 31, 1916 and, for the unionist activities of the 
elder Sullivan see, Ted Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction 
War. Radicalism and Race in Louisiana 1862-1877 (Baton 
Rouge, 1984), 227.
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Homestead Association. These companies paid Sullivan immense 
fees to represent their financial and political interests in 
Baton Rouge, allowing him to acquire a considerable fortune 
of his own and to pursue his passion for politics.33
In another sense, however, Sullivan's association with 
the interests of these and other companies stymied his pur­
suit of political influence and power. Corporations like 
NORLC and the Brewers and Distillers Association opposed the 
expansion of municipal authority, particularly in the areas 
of regulation and taxation, requiring Sullivan to defend 
their private concerns against the administration's percep­
tion of the public good. As the spokesmen for New Orleans 
Railway and Light Company, John Sullivan worked to defeat 
the Manion public utility bill in 1914 and was instrumental 
in blocking the original Nix bill in 1916, forcing the 
Behrman administration into accepting an unwarranted and un­
constitutional compromise. Sullivan was, as well, an unre­
constructed critic of the 1912 charter and the Behrman ad­
ministration, arguing that the commission council system was 
unrepresentative and undemocratic, concentrating power in 
too few hands and promoting the special interest of the
3:*New Orleans Item, September 19, 1912, February 3, 1920. 
August 3, 6, 20, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. January 4, 
1919, January 4, 10, April 3, August 6, 1920; Edward F.
Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern Citv New Orleans in 
the Progressive Era. 1896-1902, (Ruston, La. 1988), 85, 88,
90; Brian Gary Ettinger, "John Fitzpatrick and the Limits of 
Working-Class Politics in New Orleans, 1892-1896," Louisiana 
History XXVI (Fall 1985), 341-67.
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Behrman administration. Sullivan's partners, practices, and 
beliefs angered Mayor Behrman and the RDO caucus, and they 
read him out of the organization in 1913. The election of 
John Parker, then, afforded Sullivan an opportunity to re­
store his political reputation and to redeem the city from 
the control of Martin Behrman and his "Old" Regulars. And 
John Sullivan was an opportunist.34
Early in May, 1920, Governor Parker announced his sup­
port for the ODA and its municipal candidates (the ODA had 
not yet named them), and he urged his friends in New Orleans 
to join the ODA in removing Mayor Behrman and giving the 
city a "business administration". Ordinarily, the governors 
of Louisiana were more circumspect about interfering in New 
Orleans elections. John Parker, however, was no ordinary 
governor when it came to New Orleans politics. For John 
Parker, the redemption of the city from ring rule was the 
focal point for all other progressive reforms. And it was 
his intention to use the powers of the state government and 
the influence of public opinion to legislate the Behrman 
administration out of office.39
At the beginning of the regular session of the state
34New Orleans Item, February 3, August 3, 6, 20, 1920;
New Orleans Daily States. February 17, March 17, 1920, Octo­
ber 24, 30, 1923, February 23, March 27, November 1-3, 1924.
39New Orleans Item. May 2, July 29-30, 1920; New Orleans
Daily Statesr October 3, 19, December 4, 1919, January 8,
May 2, July 29, 1920.
471
General Assembly in the spring of 1920, Parker supporters 
initiated legislation revising the qualifications for voter 
registration and enhancing the authority of the governor 
over registration in Orleans Parish. The Parkerites claimed 
that the registration bill would promote citizenship, elimi­
nate duplication at the Registrar of Voters office, and 
deter fraud at the polls. In fact, however, the Parker 
administration designed the bill to discourage voting and to 
give the governor and the ODA plenary authority over the 
voting rolls of New Orleans. The new registration law, 
passed by the legislature in July, required that all quali­
fied voters be bona fide residents of Louisiana for two 
years, Orleans Parish for one year, and the precinct six 
months prior to voting in any election. The registration law 
authorized the Registrar of Voters for Orleans Parish to 
conduct a "new and complete** registration of the all quali­
fied voters every four years, and permitted him to purge the 
voting rolls at any time and for whatever reason. Finally, 
the act allowed private citizens to force the removal of 
any voter **illegally or fraudulently" registered, placing
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the burden of proof on the unsuspecting voter.
The new registration law promised much for the future, 
but was of no real value to the ODA in the approaching muni­
cipal elections (it did not go into effect until August, 
only a month before the municipal elections, and the current 
Registrar was W. W. Heard, a friend and supporter of Mayor 
Behrman). For the ODA to win the municipal elections, the 
reformers believed that they had to reduce, if not elimi­
nate, the legislative and patronage power of the Behrman 
administration. Soon after the session opened, Governor 
Parker announced his desire to reduce the size and alter the 
composition of several important legislative committees con-
t
trolled by the Behrman administration. The governor proposed 
eliminating nine committee members from the House Committee 
on City Affairs, giving the city delegation twelve positions 
and the rural parishes three. In the Senate, the proportion 
was roughly the same. Parker's motivation was quite simple. 
By reducing the number of committeemen and changing the
3aAct 166, Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the 
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1920: New Orleans 
Item, January 30, March 7, June 10, 18, July 23, August 
9, 17, 29, September 10, 1920; New Orleans Daily States, 
January 3, 30, June 10, 16, 1920. Between January and Sep­
tember, 1920, the number of registered voters in Orleans 
Parish increased by 146. But, within the individual wards, 
particularly in the so-called ODA wards, there were signifi­
cant changes. In the wards won by Andrew McShane (Third, 
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Four­
teenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, the number of registered 
voters increased by 2,800. And in the wards won by Martin 
Behrman, registered voters decrease by nearly six hundred.
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character of the committees, he hoped to eliminate the power 
of the ring politicians over state and municipal affairs. 
With fewer delegates from New Orleans and so few rural rep­
resentatives on these committees, the Regulars would not be 
able to compromise the interests of the city or bargain away 
those of the country parishes.3-7
The proposal discriminated more against New Orleans and 
and the rural parishes than against the RDO. It demeaned the 
legislative process, suggesting that the legislature was in­
ept and without virtue. It reduced the city*s representation 
on two vital committees, diminishing its influence and 
standing in the legislature and eroding the principle of 
local self-government. The proposal aggravated the regional 
and cultural divisions in the state, portraying New Orleans 
as an immoral and ungovernable place. Soon after Governor 
Parker forced through his proposals, the General Assembly 
provided funds for a legislative investigation into the 
administrative and political affairs of the New Orleans 
municipal government, subjecting the city to further, un­
necessary criticism, eroding the confidence and reducing 
the effectiveness of the reform administration of Andrew 
McShane.3"
37New Orleans Item, Hay 11, 20-25, 1920; New Orleans 
Daily States. Hay 21, 25, 1920.
3aIbid. As a gesture of peace, the House and Senate 
assigned each faction an equal number of committeemen.
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Eliminating a small number oC illicit ring voters and 
curbing the "disproportionate" power of the RDO in the state 
legislature did not necessarily guarantee the defeat of 
Martin Behrman or promise the end of ring rule. Most anti­
ring reformers assumed, almost without question, that the 
RDO and the Behrman administration existed almost exclu­
sively on political patronage, allowing them to buy voters 
and to manipulate the political process to their advantage. 
With this assumption guiding them, the anti-ring reformers 
became the uncompromising opponents of the spoils system and 
the champions of civil service reform. Despite their public 
disaffection with the political patronage system, few 
reformers questioned its importance in combating ring rule. 
And John Parker, John Sullivan, and Governor Ruffin Pleasant 
had no doubt that political patronage would defeat the old 
ring, replacing it with a political faction under their con­
trol and serving their interests.3*
At the start of the state campaign, more than a year 
before the municipal elections, Governor Pleasant, with the 
knowledge and approval of John Parker and the assistance of 
John Patrick Sullivan, began removing Behrman Regulars from
39The reformers overestimated the role and importance of 
patronage in New Orleans politics. Though patronage obvious­
ly influenced public policy, it was not necessarily the only 
or even the most important factor in determining public 
policy. Martin Behrman and the RDO recognized that fact, and 
never relied on patronage exclusively to retain their places 
in municipal government. John Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman of 
New Orleans Memoirs of a City Boss. 299.
475
state and parochial jobs. At first, Pleasant and Sullivan 
concentrated on dismissing executive officials, believing 
that they could not remove or absorb the RDO's workers until 
they controlled the principal administrative and executive 
jobs. From the start of the municipal election campaign, the 
Behrman Regulars accused Parker and Sullivan of creating a 
political machine, dedicated to promoting their own narrow 
"reform" and partisan interests. The Parker-Sullivan 
machine, they claimed, practiced the spoils system with a 
vengence, throwing out experienced workers and replacing 
them with political hacks unmindful of the true needs of 
the city. Sullivan and Parker, of course, denied the forma­
tion of a "second ring". Instead, they argued that the ODA 
employed the tactics of the spoils system only to remove a 
corrupt and ineffective administration from office.40
In the summer, 1919, Governor Ruffin Pleasant demanded 
the resignations of every member of the Board of Commission­
ers for the Port of New Orleans, the Dock Board. The gover­
nor insisted that partisan politics had nothing to do with 
his decision to dismiss the entire board. Rather, he said, 
financial and political circumstances warranted the dismis­
sal of the board. The incumbent Dock Board, he said, under 
the direction of president William Bess Thompson, the former 
Commissioner of Public Utilities, was wasteful, incompetent.
4°New Orleans Item. January 28, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States, March 29, April 1, 3, 1920.
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and thoroughly "Behrmanized41
In a series of open letters. Pleasant catalogued the 
abuses and corruption of the Thompson board. The Thompson 
board, Pleasant wrote, mismanaged the construction and the 
financial obligations of the Industrial and Navigational 
Canal, building a canal too large for the port to use pro­
perly and jeopardizing the financial credit of the state. 
Initially, the board envisioned a smaller, more manageable 
canal, costing a meager four million dollars. With the state 
underwriting the cost of constructing and financing the 
canal, the board expanded the original concept, delaying 
completion and increasing cost five hundred percent.42
Those factors alone, Pleasant said, warranted the dis­
missal of the Thompson board, but there were other more 
serious considerations that influenced his decision. The 
Thompson board favored the political and financial support­
ers of the Behrman administration. This "Behrmanized" Dock 
Board, Pleasant said, financed the construction of an elec-
4Established in 1896, the Board of Commissioners of the 
Port of New Orleans, the "Dock Board," reestablished public 
control over the wharves and port of the city. Originally, 
the governor appointed the board members to staggered terms, 
preventing another administration from controlling the 
majority of the board. In 1910, the legislature amended the 
law, allowing the governor to replace the entire board. Act 
70, Acts Passed by the General Asspmhlv of the State of 
Louisiana, Regular Session. 1896. Act 30, Acts Passed bv the 
General Assgmhlv of the State of Louisiana. ReaularSession. 
1910.; New Orleans Daily States, January 8, 1920.
42New Orleans Item. September 25, 29, 30, October 1, 10, 
14, 1919; New Orleans Daily States. September 25, 26, 29, 
October 1, 4, 10, 1919.
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trie powerline to the canal, violating state law and grant­
ing special favor to NORLC, a company allied with the 
Behrman administration and near financial collapse. In 
addition, the present board had become a warehouse of 
political patronage. Since 1916, the Dock Board had fallen 
under the complete domination of the Behrman administration 
and the RDO, relinquishing its independence and jeopardizing 
the economic and political integrity of the port. According 
to "independent" sources, the RDO controlled 2,700 Dock 
Board jobs, most of them secured or awarded for partisan 
reasons. This excessive partisanship troubled the governor, 
and he believed it "sufficient grounds" for removing the 
Thompson board. But, in this case, he said, partisanship ex­
ceeded its normal, more appropriate bounds and jeopardized 
public policy. In brief he fired the Thompson board because 
it no longer had his confidence. "It is a recognized rule of 
every advanced country or commonwealth in the world," 
Pleasant wrote, "that when the policies, or even the poli­
tics, of the appointees is at variance with the appointing 
power, the proper thing for the appointee to do is to hand 
in his resignation. It is one of those delicate customs of 
public life that men of refinement never fail to recognize, 
but which men immersed in the turbid current of machine
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politics can never see."*3
John Parker denied that he pressured Governor Pleasant 
to remove the Thompson board, but he was, nonetheless, 
elated by the news, asserting that the Dock Board would now 
serve the interests of reform and progress.44 William Bess 
Thompson, of course, denounced Pleasant (Sullivan and 
Parker, too), defending the board and the Behrman adminis­
tration against what he labeled as the "reckless" accusa­
tions and lies of soured politicians and false reformers 
anxious to extend their influence over state and local 
governments. Thompson answered Pleasant with his own public 
letters, justifying the policies and actions of the board
43Ibid. Pleasant's "independent" source was State Senator 
E. M. Stafford. But Stafford's figures were inaccurate and 
bloated by partisanship. According to the independent Bureau 
of Municipal Research, there were but 1,921 Dock Board jobs. 
The Bureau conducted its survey in 1921, but, as we will 
see, Sullivan and the ODA expanded the number of workers 
after the municipal campaign. In addition, in 1915 the state 
legislature created a modest civil service law for Dock 
Board, placing all warehousemen under a board of examiners. 
Municipal Survey Commission, Administrative Survey of the 
Government of the Citv of Hew Orleansr 44; Act 15, Acts 
Passed bv the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana. 
Regular Session. 1915.
44Long an advocate of civil service, the New Orleans 
Item agreed with Parker. Civil service should wait until 
after the elections. In January, 1925, at the height of 
another mayoral campaign, former Dock Board President W.
0. Hudson admitted that during his term Sullivan, Pleasant, 
and Parker removed RDO supporters from their jobs with the 
board, replacing them with men loyal to the ODA. Hudson also 
testified that even after McShane's victory, these men 
kept payrolls high. New Orleans Item, September 27-28, Octo­
ber 2, 4, November 4, 1919, January 24, 28, 1925; New 
Orleans Daily States, September 29, November 15, 1919,
January 8, 13, 14, 26, 1925; Reynolds, Machine Politics. 44; 
Williams, Huev Long. 133.
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and exposing the raw partisanship of Pleasant*s words and 
actions.1*'*
In his letters, Thompson reminded the governor of the 
accomplishments of the board he appointed in 1916. The in- 
cumbent board took over from a board beset by financial pro­
blems and bankrupt of ideas. Within the first year of taking 
office, the Thompson board increased revenues and modernized 
the port— all during a period of deep local and national 
crisis. Despite pressure from local bankers, the press, and 
former board president Hugh McCloskey, the Dock Board and 
the Behrman administration resisted efforts to rush into an 
ill-conceived, ill-designed, and expensive project. The city 
administration and the board secured the expertise and ser­
vices of General George Goethals in planning and building 
the Industrial Canal. From the start of the project, the ad­
ministration maintained that the canal must be large enough 
to sustain modern shipbuilding and repair facilities and 
that the cost would be larger than that projected by the 
business and civic "leadership** of the city. In short, the
■*"Mayor Behrman did not need Thompson to defend him and 
the city administration, but the mayor made only one 
comment. "It wouldn't be becoming," he said, "for the mayor 
of New Orleans to call the governor of the state a liar, but 
if I were not mayor and he were not governor, that is what I 
would call him." New Orleans Daily States. September 24-25, 
29, October 1, 4, 1919; New Orleans Item. September 24-25, 
29, October 1, 4, 1919. James Wilkinson, the attorney for 
the Dock Board, claimed that in firing the Thompson board 
Governor Pleasant violated state the corrupt practices acts 
of 1912 and 1916. Act 213, 1912, Acts Passed bv the General 
Assembly of the State of Louisiana. Regular Session. 1912. 
Act 33, ibid. 1916.
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estimations and policies of the board and the city adminis­
tration were more beneficial and less costly than those pro­
posed by the so-called business leadership of the city.** 
Thompson also accused Pleasant of misrepresenting the 
state's financial commitment to the canal project and of 
distorting the board's relationship with NORLC. The state 
did agree to underwrite the bonds for the Industrial Canal, 
but the state would pay only if the canal failed to make 
money and the Dock Board, Levee Board, Public Belt Railroad 
Commission, and the City of New Orleans defaulted on the 
bonds. For that to happen, Thompson said, the Mississippi 
River had to change course (which, of course, it was trying 
to do) or the board and the city had failed to provide the 
services and incentives necessary to attract business to the 
canal. The board and the city hoped to ensure the success of 
the Industrial Canal by subsidizing the construction of 
services necessary to its construction, operation, and pro­
fit. The board agreed to fund the construction of an elec­
tric power line because it was critical to the completion 
and operation of the canal, and it chose to assume the total 
cost of construction because of the extraordinary financial 
conditions of NORLC, knowing it could recoup its investment 
in reduced electric rates. Subsidizing this and other pro­
jects guaranteed the Industrial Canal, the state, and the
■•“New Orleans Item. October 15, 1919; New Orleans Daily
States. October 5, November 4, 1919.
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municipal government, millions of dollars in revenues.*"*
Finally, Thompson refuted Pleasant's allegations that 
the Dock Board was thoroughly "Behrmanized". As Thompson 
pointed out, the men appointed by the governor in 1916 were 
not professional politicians anxious to distribute patronage 
and win voters. They were, rather, professional businessmen, 
experts in finance, management, commerce, and law, concerned 
with the development and expansion of the port and its con­
tribution to the prosperity of the city. They were, as well, 
men of unblemished personal reputation, with distinguished 
records in public service. Though most board members were 
supporters of the Behrman administration (Thompson and board 
member Edward E. Lafaye served on the commission council 
elected in 1912), all were independent public servants, com­
mitted to upholding the laws governing the Dock Board. And, 
Thompson wrote, at no time in the past four years had Martin 
Behrman or any one associated with his administration tried 
to force the board to hire anyone, no matter how qualified 
or deserving.*8
‘•-,Hew Orleans, Daily States. December 11-12, 14, 1919. 
‘•"New Orleans Daily Statesf September 24-26, 29, October
1, 5, 1919; New Orleans Item, September 20, 24-25, October
5, 1919. The other board members were Bernard Hans, the 
Treasurer of the Liberty Manufacturing Company and Dr.
Edward S. Kelly. Lafaye was the vice-president of the Canal- 
Commerce Bank and Trust Company. The ODA offered little or 
no evidence substantiating Pleasant's claims. ODA spokesmen 
Hayden W. Wren, a wharf supervisor under the Thompson board 
and its successor, released a letter from Martin Behrman to 
him in 1916 instructing Wren to hire several friends of 
former Mayor Fitzpatrick. See New Orleans Item. December 1,
2, 1919. The letter bore a date of December 4, 1916.
Though Thompson probably exaggerated the independence 
of the Dock board from the Behrman administration and the 
RDO (after all, the political ideas and policies of Thompson 
and Lafaye more closely resembled that of Martin Behrman 
than those of Pleasant, Sullivan, and Parker), there can be 
no question that the new board, led by businessman W. 0. 
Hudson, served the personal and partisan interests of John 
Parker, John Sullivan, and, eventually, Andrew McShane. The 
new board assumed responsibilities on October 1, and quickly 
began reviewing and revising the personnel policies of the 
Thompson board. At issue was the interpretation of a 1915 
state law that apparently placed most Dock Board jobs under 
civil service. Acting on the advice of its general counsel, 
the Thompson board extended civil service protection to 
nearly all jobs, including certain classifications of un­
skilled laborers. The new Hudson board, however, rescinded 
the old guidelines, placing an additional three hundred jobs 
under its direct and partisan control.*9
With the announcement of the new guidelines, John 
Sullivan, the board's "efficiency expert," began purging 
workers loyal to the Behrman administration. Sullivan in­
formed those workers uncertain of their political loyalities 
to either join the ODA or lose their jobs. Those men who re­
“•"New Orleans Item, October 1, 1919; New Orleans Daily 
States, October 1, 1919. Pleasant appointed W. 0. Hudson, 
Albert Mackie, W. A. Kernaghan, Rene F. Clerc, and Thomas H. 
Roberts, all businessmen, to the new board.
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fused to leave the RDO were dismissed without explanation or 
recourse.90 The Hudson board also tried to influence the 
hiring practices on the Industrial Canal project. George M. 
Wells, the project manager for the Goethals Company, angrily 
objected to the board's attempt to "politicize" the per­
sonnel policies of his company. Wells claimed that reversing 
the "hands off" policy of the Thompson board jeopardized the 
entire endeavor, and, if the Hudson board continued hiring 
on a "political basis," the Goethals Company would sever its 
contract with the Dock Board.91
President Hudson denied Wells's assertions, but those 
denials failed to satisfy Orleans Parish District Attorney 
Chandler C. Luzenberg, a Behrman Regular. Luzenberg conduct­
ed a public investigation into allegations of criminal mis­
conduct by the Hudson Board. The accounts given by witnesses 
revealed that the Hudson Board dismissed only those workers 
loyal to the Behrman administration, replacing them only 
with men loyal to John Sullivan and pledged to vote for 
John Parker. Board members Hudson, Rene Clerc, and Thomas 
Roberts substantiated the testimony of the other witnesses.
"New Orleans Daily States, November 1-4, 1919; New 
Orleans Item. November 2, 4, 1919. General Counsel James 
Wilkinson, whose ruling on the 1915 civil service law gave 
Sullivan the pretext to dismiss or "convert" RDO workers, 
believed the courts should review the law, and he considered 
the dismissal of workers under these circumstances illegal 
and unethical.
9XNew Orleans Daily States. November 17-18, 20-21, Decem­
ber 3-4, 1919; New Orleans Item. November 20-21, December 4, 
1919.
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Hudson testified that the board deferred to Sullivan and 
Henry Sarpy (supporter of John Parker) in all personnel 
matters, allowing them to discharge "Behrmanized" workers 
and to replace them with workers pledged to reform. This 
"evidence" went to the Orleans Parish Grand Jury, but appar­
ently the Grand Jury took no action. But the Dock Board did. 
The board gave its employees a holiday (with pay) on elec­
tion day, presumably to vote and campaign for John Parker.*2 
Ultimately, however, political patronage would not de­
termine the course of the municipal elections. Urban poli­
tics in the progressive era and in New Orleans was too com­
plex and sophisticated in concept and practice to sustain so 
simplistic a notion. Clearly, the outcome of the municipal 
elections depended on how the voters, particularly the new 
voters, judged the character and performance of the Behrman 
administration. And, perhaps more importantly, whether these 
voters saw the ODA and its policies and programs as a legi­
timate alternative to Martin Behrman and the Regular Demo­
cratic Organization. It should come as no surprise, then, 
that over the course of the municipal campaign the ODA
*2Luzenberg to Parker, November 17, 1919, Parker Papers, 
UNC; New Orleans Daily States. November 17-18, 20-21, Decem­
ber 3-4, 1919; New Orleans Item, November 20-21, December 4, 
1919. The 1921 state constitution staggered the terms of 
Dock Board members and required the governor to demonstrate 
just cause for removing any board member. Sullivan, Parker, 
and the leadership of the ODA also purged other parochial 
boards and commissions of "Behrmanized" workers. The workers 
dismissed from the Levee Board and the Public Belt Railroad, 
for example, were few, but were considered vital to the RDO.
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concentrated on exposing what it considered to be the 
shallow, corrupt, and partisan character of the Behrman 
administration, emphasizing its moral deficiencies and 
political failures and attributing its accomplishments to 
the inspiration and hard work of a better class of citizens. 
The ODA promised to restore moral, political, and financial 
integrity to city affairs, ending the sordid relationship 
between the municipal government and NORLC, protecting pub­
lic servants from a vicious spoils system, and reducing the 
size and cost of government. The ODA campaign promised to do 
those things and more, all without diminishing the quality 
of essential city services.
The Behrman campaign, on the other hand, stressed the 
vivid and tangible accomplishments of past administrations 
and the RDO's commitment to the future. The Regulars also 
questioned the ability and desire of the ODA to continue 
political and governmental reform in New Orleans, warning 
that the election of the ODA municipal candidates meant the 
end of municipal reform and the return of divisive partisan 
politics in New Orleans. But the Behrman campaign, like the 
Behrman administration, was constantly on the defensive and 
seemed incapable of any sustained effort. The emotional and 
political dislocation of war and readjustment and the often 
abusive partisanship of municipal politics exhausted the 
Behrman administration, preventing it from resolving the 
city's most pressing problems. The inability of Martin
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Behrman to govern the city to the expectations of reformers 
and Regulars, then, only gave credence to the issue of ring 
rule.
Few conscientious ODA supporters denied that Martin 
Behrman was in many ways and for many years the most active 
and constructive public official in New Orleans. "His grasp 
of and interest in public affairs and his indomitable ener­
gy," wrote the Daily States, "have been contributing factors 
in the progress of the city...." From 1904 to 1912, the 
Daily States suggested, the Behrman administration, operat­
ing under the democratic restraints of the councilmanic sys­
tem, was the model of conservative and progressive municipal 
government in the South. During those years, the Behrman 
administration completed, then expanded, the drainage and 
sewerage system, lifting New Orleans out of the mud, freeing 
it from disease, and stimulating its growth and development. 
Also in those years, the Behrman administration constructed 
the Public Belt Railroad, and, despite powerful private in­
terest (John Parker and Hunter Leake of the Illinois Central 
Railroad), made it the model for other municipal public ser­
vices. And, finally, despite the opposition of the Board of 
Liquidation City Debt and the private banking interest that 
controlled it, the Behrman administration exerted greater 
public control over municipal finances, allowing the munici­
pal authority to determine, at least in part, the'’' course of
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public policy.**
In the years since 1912, however, with the advent of 
the commission council system, all that changed. The Favrot 
charter concentrated political and executive authority in 
the mayor, allowing him to ignore the demands of popular 
politics and the restraints of limited, democratic govern­
ment. Without these safeguards to temper his judgments, 
Martin Behrman became a willful and arrogant dictator.*4 
But even for the most resentful personal opponents, 
Martin Behrman himself was never really the issue. For the 
most part, the anti-Behrman reformers and Regulars saw the 
mayor as a symbol and victim of a ruthless, cynical, and 
essentially undemocratic political system that sapped men of 
all personal and political integrity (in the case of some 
ODA supporters, opportunity). The real issue, wrote the 
Daily States, was not one of rival personalities or organi­
zations, but of two conflicting ideologies of politics and 
government. The Behrman Regulars stood for "one man rule,” 
special favor, and monopoly. Their concepts of politics and 
government were essentially "undemocratic" and ultimately 
"un-American". By contrast, the Item argued, the ODA and its 
platform promised the restoration of political self-deter-
*3New Orleans Daily States. July 20, August 8, September 
10, 1920; New Orleans Item. September 3, 1920; Williams, 
"Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss,” passim.
®4New Orleans Daily States. February 17, July 20-21, 28, 
August 3, 8, 15, 17, 25, 27-28; New Orleans Item. February 
22, April 6, August 5, 12, 26, 28, 1920, October 6, 1922.
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mination and the return of self-government."
Except for its depiction of Mayor Behrman as a disci­
plined politician and a conscientious municipal reformer and 
administrator, the arguments of the ODA were self-serving 
and specious. The anti-Behrman Regulars, like John Patrick 
Sullivan and Robert Ewing, publisher of the Daily States, 
opposed the commission council system because it denied 
them a specific and favored place in city government. In 
short, they did not have the organization or the votes to 
win a seat on the commission council or directly influence 
municipal policy. The anti-Regular reformers attacked the 
system because they did not control it. Once the reformers 
assumed authority over the municipal government, they became 
devoted advocates of the Favrot charter.
Though the Favrot charter concentrated executive and 
legislative authority in the council and the mayor and ex­
panded and strengthened the power of the city administra­
tion, it did not destroy municipal self-government or sup­
press popular politics. To the contrary, the Favrot charter, 
more so than the charter reforms proposed by the Parker Good 
Government League, preserved republican government and demo­
cratic politics in New Orleans. It did not give the council 
or the mayor plenary authority over every facet of munici­
pal government. And it preserved the political integrity of
"New Orleans Daily States. July 20, 24, 28, 1920; New
Orleans Item. January 5, 14-15, 21, February 25, March 11,
April 2, 3, August 11, September 1, 5, 10-11, 1920.
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the independent boards and commissions that served New Or­
leans. Nor did it establish or promote "one man rule".
Though the 1912 charter broadened the authority o£ the mayor 
(he served on every municipal board and commission), it did 
not invest the office with any extraordinary executive or 
legislative authority. In brief, the mayor was but one of 
the five executives on the commission council. Though clear­
ly a powerful and influential member of the commission, as 
we have seen from our discussions on the electric rate con­
troversy and the interurban issue. Mayor Behrman did not 
dictate solutions, but encouraged consensus and concerted 
action. In that sense, then, he preserved the political in­
dependence of the council and the individual commissioners.
Neither the Favrot charter nor the Behrman administra­
tion inhibited public debate or prevented a democratic solu­
tion to public issues. Again, as we have seen in the charter 
reform debate, the municipal regulation issue, and the dis­
pute over the public rehabilitation of New Orleans Railway 
and Light Company, the Behrman administration responded to 
the concerns of private and public interests in determining 
public policy. If anything, the Behrman commission council 
suffered from an arrant devotion to political democracy.
The ODA campaign, of course, concentrated on more than 
just the ideological differences between reformers and Behr­
man Regulars. ODA spokesmen claimed that in the years since 
1900 (the year the RDO won control of the city government)
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city services and the quality of those services had deteri­
orated badly and were now nearly intolerable. Schools were 
poorly funded, understaffed, and overcrowded. The majority 
of city streets were unpaved, poorly lighted, and in disre­
pair. Open canals and gutters posed serious health and safe­
ty hazards to residents. Police and fire protection were in­
adequate, jeopardizing lives and property and increasing the 
cost of insurance. Taxes were exorbitant and revenues mis­
appropriated. Assessment policies were unfair and politi­
cized, designed to protect the interests of the rich and in­
fluential and to extort votes from property owners. Finally, 
the city administration was cumbersome and inept, and held 
captive by a select group of favored interests, in particu­
lar the New Orleans Railway and Light Company.98
The ODA claims were biased and partisan, but they were 
not without some merit.9,7 In the years since 1916, the 
Behrman administration appeared incapable of governing New
"New Orleans Item. January 14, March 27, April 1, August
6, 12, 15, September 7, 12, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. 
August 7, September 1, 1920.
"Though the ODA blamed the Behrman administration for 
every problem in New Orleans, it refused to credit Mayor 
Behrman with any progress made under his administrations.
The Item, Governor Parker, and Charles Rosen took special 
pains to point out that the Behrman administration and the 
RDO had little or nothing to do with the creation or devel­
opment of the Dock Board, the Public Belt Railroad, the 
Sewerage and Water Board, and the Industrial Canal. Their 
arguments were, of course, untrue, as Robert Webb Williams 
showed in his fine masters thesis. See, for example, New 
Orleans Item. January 12, April 7, 17, August 3, September
8, 1920; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political 
Boss," passim.
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Orleans. And there were visible signs of the Behrman admin­
istration's apparent failures. The 1914 comprehensive paving 
plan, for instance, designed to pave or resurface every city 
street by 1925, failed to work, leaving dozens of city 
streets unpaved or unimproved. The sewerage and drainage 
system, perhaps the most essential of all city services, 
operated at a deficit and could not meet the demands for 
service. In addition, the Sewerage and Water Board required 
tens of millions of dollars for expansion, replacement and 
repair, an investment the city could neither afford nor 
afford to do without. To meet the rising demand and cost of 
city services, the Behrman administration increased taxes 
and raised the rate of assessment, yet most city services, 
like the Orleans Parish school system and police and fire 
protection, remained underfunded and understaffed. City 
finances remained tangled and uncertain, despite an exten­
sive (and expensive) refunding plan enacted in 1916. Though 
the city government had the necessary legal and political 
authority to rehabilitate NORLC, the Behrman administration 
apparently did not have the will. And, finally, the Behrman 
commission council seemed uninterested in "current" issues 
like housing, zoning, city planning, and natural gas.9"
But appearances can be deceiving, particularly in poli­
tics and especially in New Orleans. The Behrman administra­
9"New Orleans Item, August 3, 5-6, 8, September 1, 8,
1920; New Orleans Daily States. April 1, August 3-5, 8,
1920.
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tion was, of course, ultimately responsible for the condi­
tion of municipal affairs in New Orleans, but there were, as 
well, circumstances beyond its immediate control or influ­
ence that mitigated its responsibility. The comprehensive 
paving plan, for example, was never popular with property 
owners, requiring them to absorb most of the cost of paving 
and, consequently, relieving the municipal government (and 
those citizens who owned no taxable property) of a major 
expense. The city administration paved nearly thirty streets 
between 1914 and 1916, and seemed poised to complete its 
comprehensive plan. After 1916, however, paving virtually 
stopped. The war disrupted normal patterns of commerce and 
finance; raw materials for subsurface drainage and paving 
were scarce and expensive and the cost of financing paving 
bonds was nearly prohibitive. Circumstances did not improve 
after the Armistice. Throughout 1919 interest rates and the 
cost of material and labor continued to rise, allowing the 
city administration to pave only a few miles of streets."® 
The same sort of argument could be made for the other 
failures of the Behrman administration. The commission coun­
cil raised assessment rates to sixty-seven percent in 1916, 
seven-five percent in 1918, and ninety percent in 1920,
""Moore to Behrman, March 28, 1913, Waldo to Moore, April 
26, 1913 vol.6, CAP. CA, NOPL, Moore to Lafaye, September
11, 1914, vol.7, ibid; Administrative Survey of the Govern­
ment of the Citv of New Orleans. 210; New Orleans Item.
January 13, June 13, August 5, September 3, 1920.
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raising taxes to the highest level in the city's history and 
increasing revenues by several million dollars. Despite 
those increases, the city curtailed services, increased its 
bonded indebtedness, and operated under a deficit. Every 
level of government, though, increased taxes during the 
First World War, reordered its priorities, and spent more 
than it took in. But the war only contributed to the finan­
cial problems of the city. Their cause lay elsewhere. The 
city's method of determining and collecting taxes was cum­
bersome and wasteful, reflecting the interests of the 
bankers who controlled the Board of Liquidation. Municipal 
policy directed the city administration to collect taxes 
once a year, compelling it to borrow money from the local 
banks to meet the cost of governing the city. The banks 
demanded five percent interest on money loaned to the muni­
cipal government, but the Board of Liquidation, which set 
many of the policies and conditions for city financing, 
placed city revenues in accounts bearing only three per­
cent, creating a sizeable deficit every year and increasing 
the profits of the banks favored by the board.00
“°New Orleans Daily States. January 7, 8, 11, 13, August 
6, 18, 25, September 4, 5, 19, 1920; Mew Orleans Item. 
December 20, 1919, January 13, 14, August 26, September 4-5, 
19-20, 1920; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political 
Boss," 50. The Behrman administration was responsible for 
three percent interest rate. Prior to 1907, the Board of 
Liquidation placed city revenues in accounts bearing no 
interest.
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What was true for the condition of city services and 
municipal finances was equally true for the municipal regu­
lation and rehabilitation of NORLC, the introduction of 
natural gas, and the installation of a comprehensive zoning 
and city planning ordinance. As we have seen, the issues of 
regulation and rehabilitation were, in part, controlled by 
private corporate interests and conservative, partisan 
politics. Eventually, however, despite the power and appeal 
of those interests and politics, the municipal government 
established its regulatory authority over NORLC and NOPSI. 
From 1910 to 1928, every city administration, including 
those of Martin Behrman, attempted to pipe natural gas to 
New Orleans, but without success. Again, those same inter­
ests and politics that retarded the rehabilitation of NORLC 
kept natural gas from New Orleans until 1928. Finally, the 
Behrman administration began considering a comprehensive 
zoning policy in 1915, but the courts and the interests of 
small property owners prevented a thorough revision of 
zoning laws until the early 1920s. Enacted by the McShane 
administration, the comprehensive zoning ordinance reserved 
to the city council the ultimate authority to plan the eco­
nomic and social development of the city— the cardinal tenet 
of the Behrman administration and the Regular Democratic 
Organization.81
81See Chapter Nine.
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The objective of the ODA, of course, was not to debate 
Hartin Behrman and the Regular Democrats, but to replace 
them. In May, four months before the municipal elections, 
the ODA executive committee02 conducted a series of inter­
views with potential mayoral and municipal candidates. By 
the end of July, the committee had made its decisions. The 
committee "recommended" Andrew McShane for mayor.
At fifty-five years old, McShane was a long-time 
anti-ring reformer, and a John Parker partisan. McShane re­
sembled General John J. Pershing, and the press described 
him as a seasoned and assertive leader, experienced in muni­
cipal reform and popular with the average New Orleans citi­
zen. But McShane had an undistinguished political "career". 
He sought election to the commission council in 1912 as a 
member of the Good Government League, but finished nearly 
six thousand votes behind the Regular candidates. Though 
active and visible in reform circles, McShane was silent 
(critics said uninformed) on the important issues in New 
Orleans politics and was, for the most part, unknown to the 
"average" voter. And McShane was not the unanimous or even 
popular choice of the ODA. The ODA executive committee
"Ashton Phelps, publisher of the Times-Picavune. Charles
I. Rosen, James Mcl. Thomson, publisher of the Item. State 
Senator Thomas V. Craven, Bernard John Daly, Robert H. Marr, 
Ivy G. Kittredge, Z. Marshall Ballard, editor of the Item.
John Patrick Sullivan, and James Edmonds formed the ODA 
executive committee. Though not a member of the ODA, John 
Parker influenced its decisions. New Orleans Item. July 17- 
18, 1920.
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considered McShane early in its deliberations, but rejected 
him as unsuitable. Its initial offers went to New Orleans 
businessmen Edgar Stern and Leon C. Simon, but both declined 
to run. Only after considerable debate and over the objec­
tion of John Sullivan did the ODA executive committee rec­
ommend McShane to the ward leaders.®3
McShane also had an abrasive personality and was sus­
picious of the intentions of others. He was, as well, a 
shallow thinker. In his acceptance speech, he parodied the 
beliefs of anti-ring reformism, likening the citizens of New 
Orleans to stockholders and the municipal government to cor­
porate management and promising to manage the municipal gov­
ernment on "sound business principles". By applying the pro­
per business principles, he said, the ODA could reverse the 
decline in public services, reduce the cost of government, 
and end ring rule. McShane's argument, as trite as it was, 
had an obvious appeal to the businessmen in the ODA. The 
executive committee selected four businessmen and a former 
union leader for the commission council ticket. Stanley Ray 
was at one time the managing editor of the Times-Picayune 
and now was the personal secretary to Governor John Parker. 
Richard Murphy was a sugar broker and John P. Norman owned 
the Aurora Planation in Algiers and considered himself a 
planter. Wilbert Black was a former steamship worker, a
®3New Orleans Item. July 17, 18, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States. July 24, 28, 1920.
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leader in the Steam Engineers Union, and the president of 
the Central Trade and Labor Council. None of these men, with 
the exception of Hilbert Black, had any acknowledged experi­
ence in municipal politics or government. And Black's ex­
perience was limited. He and the Central Trade and Labor 
Council opposed the six cent fare ordinance in 1918.04
The Regular Democrats ridiculed the selection of Andrew 
McShane and "his" ticket. The Behrman supporters contended 
that the ODA ticket did not represent the interests of the 
people of New Orleans, but was more in keeping with the 
political agenda of John Parker and the partisan interest 
of John Patrick Sullivan. Clearly, these two politicians 
were instrumental in the formation of the ODA and in the 
selection of its candidates. But they, like their counter­
parts in the RDO, were not manipulators of public sentiment 
or public men. The selection process used by the ODA re­
flected the interests of Parker and Sullivan only because so 
many other men held the same interests. And, the ODA candi­
dates were as representative of the people of New Orleans as 
were Martin Behrman and his commission council ticket.09
““•New Orleans Item, July 20, 21-24, August 13, 28, Sep­
tember 2, 1920; New Orleans Daily States, July 20-21, 23-24, 
August 28, 1920. The other ODA candidates were more "tradi­
tional". The executive committee chose Robert H. Marr, a
former District Attorney, for that position, George E. 
Williams, a former state senator and protege of John Fitz­
patrick, for Criminal Sheriff, Edward C. Haggerty for Clerk 
of Criminal District Court, and John J. O'Neill for Clerk of 
Civil District Court.
"New Orleans Daily States. July 24, 1920; New Orleans
Item. July 31, August 2, 3, 1920.
Early in July, after several days of gentle persuasion 
by his most ardent supporters, Martin Behrman announced his 
candidacy for a fifth term as mayor of New Orleans. The RDO 
caucus extended its endorsement to the mayor the next day, 
ending speculation by the reform press that the RDO would 
not support the incumbent mayor. Apparently, there were 
several Regulars who wanted to replace the mayor with a 
younger, less controversial candidate. But the mayor had the 
support of the majority of the caucus, principally from old- 
line supporters like Arthur J. O'Keefe, the leader of the 
Tenth Ward, Arthur and Michael Mitchell, rivals of John 
Sullivan for supremacy of the Third Ward, and new Regulars 
Charles F. Buck, Jr., Thomas Semmes Walmsley, and Paul H. 
Maloney. Though the last four years had clearly diminished 
Behrman's standing in the community and called into question 
his ability to govern as effectively as in the past, Martin 
Behrman was still an extremely popular mayor and a success­
ful politician. And no one else in the Regular Democratic 
Organization could rival his accomplishments or match his 
record of political success.*®
Several days later, the RDO announced the completion of 
its municipal ticket. In many ways the 1920 ticket resembled 
those of 1912 and 1916. Apart from Martin Behrman, only Paul 
Maloney had any practical experience in municipal politics.
BBNew Orleans Daily States. July 10, 15, 16, 18, 1920;
New Orleans Item. July 18, 1920.
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And though Maloney was active in city politics for years, 
(Governor Pleasant appointed him to the Orleans Parish Levee 
Board in 1919, but removed him in favor of ODA leader Ivy G. 
Kittredge), he had never before sought an elective office 
and his principal advocation was business. The other candi­
dates, Charles S. Barnes, Maurice DePass, and Thomas 
Harrison, were either business or professional men. And the 
mayor's campaign managers, Charles Buck and Semmes Walmsley, 
were from the so-called civic-commerical elite of New Or­
leans. The RDO's municipal ticket did not represent, as some 
critics charged, the desire of the RDO to stave off certain 
defeat. Rather, the 1920 ticket reflected an established 
rule of municipal elections in New Orleans in the progres­
sive era. Political organizations, whether reform or 
Regular, tended to nominate men of established professional 
and social standing for major executive positions, assigning 
the minor, though equally important, positions to men of 
lesser ability and experience. The 1920 ticket was no excep­
tion. •*'
The election campaign was intense, bitter, and short, 
lasting less than two months. Mayor Behrman focused his pub­
lic campaign on three issues: his own record of extensive 
public service and achievements, McShane*s glaring inexperi­
ence in municipal politics and public affairs, and the
"■'New Orleans Daily States, July 10, 15, 16, 21-23, 25,
27, 1920; Williams, Huev Long. 223-24; Teaford, Unheralded
Triumph. 42-54.
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inability of Andrew McShane, or any other member of the ODA, 
to govern New Orleans independently o£ the interests of John 
Parker and John Patrick Sullivan.
Over the course of the municipal campaign, the mayor 
stressed his years of public service, never failing to men­
tion that McShane, Sullivan, and Parker devoted the majority 
of their lives to personal advancement and service to pri­
vate corporate interests. While those men pursued private 
gain (in the cases of Parker and Sullivan, often at the ex­
pense of the public good), he and the RDO exhausted them­
selves in improving the economic and social conditions of 
New Orleans. Those improvements benefitted every segment of 
the New Orleans community, completing the sewerage and 
drainage system, ending the threat of yellow fever, building 
the Public Belt Railroad over the opposition of men like 
John Parker, paving hundreds of miles of streets, establish­
ing a modern, democratic municipal government, and extending 
the authority of the municipal government over city finances 
and the public regulation of essential city services.99
The mayor admitted that his administration was not 
always successful in resolving the problems of the city.
The city needed to expand and repair the sewerage and water 
system, develop the resources of the port, allocate greater 
revenues and energy to the public school system, develop
aaNew Orleans Item, July 25, 26, August 6, September 10,
1920; New Orleans Daily States. August 3, 1920.
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comprehensive paving and zoning plans, bring a just end to 
the streetcar strike, and ensure the equitable rehabilita­
tion of New Orleans Railway and Light Company. With the 
removal of wartime regulations and economic sanctions, the 
city government could complete those projects interrupted by 
the war and move toward the expansion and modernization of 
all city services.**
Though Behrman emphasized his record in every campaign 
speech and publication, he did not believe his record was 
the exclusive issue. For Martin Behrman, a more important 
issue was the "relative merits and abilities" of Andrew 
McShane and his approach to governing the city. The mayor 
contended that McShane, like many so-called reformers, was 
distainful of politics and unfamiliar with public affairs. 
Prior to the ODA nomination, McShane's interest and experi­
ence in municipal politics was limited to voting every four 
years and seeking elective office once. He was uninformed 
and, apparently, unconcerned about the principal issues 
facing the city. In addition, McShane's concept about the 
role of government in the conduct of municipal affairs was 
banal and detrimental to the immediate and future needs of 
the city. McShane wanted to reduce the authority of the 
municipal government over the private and public affairs of 
the people, pledging to be a "hands-off mayor," and commit­
ting his administration to a retrenchment in services and
"•Ibid.
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the reduction of the size and cost of the municipal govern­
ment. Though Mayor Behrman pledged himself to economy and 
efficiency in government, he promised an active, energetic 
administration, dedicated to the further expansion of 
services and proper regulation of municipal affairs.*70
The foremost issue, Behrman reminded the voters, was 
not McShane's inexperience or his effete notions of politics 
and government, but whether he and his administration would 
govern New Orleans or pursue public policies for the parti­
san benefit of John Parker and John Sullivan. The nomination 
of McShane was an indication of the intentions of Sullivan 
and Parker. Andrew McShane was not the best candidate or 
the only candidate available to the ODA. But he was the only
candidate who best met the interests of Sullivan and Parker.
The entire tenor of the campaign suggested that Sullivan, 
Parker, and a few other anti-Regular reformers would con­
trol the McShane administration. And the men behind Andrew 
McShane, the mayor asserted, were narrow-minded partisans 
bent on governing the city to suit the interests of a select 
class of citizens. The Parkerites wanted to restrict politi­
cal participation, curtail services, and reduce the author­
ity of the municipal government over the affairs of business
and corporate interests. The disgruntled Regulars hid be­
hind the banalities of anti-Regular reformism, hoping to
7°New Orleans Daily Statesr August 6-7, 1920; New Orleans
Item. August 6, 13, 26, 1920.
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replace the Berhman regulars and, eventually, remove the 
reformers, too.71
The mayor's criticisms disturbed the confidence of the 
ODA campaign. After the mayor's remarks, the city press 
(Behrman had no newspaper support; even the Daily States 
deserted him) portrayed McShane as a conspicuous leader of 
the anti-ring reform movement, reciting a litany of reform 
organizations McShane supported.73 The newspapers also de­
picted McShane as an experienced and resolute businessman, 
capable of constructing an assertive and independent admin­
istration. Finally, the press described McShane as a self­
less public servant, committed to political democracy and 
economic and social progress. A McShane administration, the 
Item and the Daily States wrote, promised more than the end 
of ring rule and economy in municipal government. It would 
provide better schools and teachers' pay, better fire and 
police protection, and a clearer, healthier New Orleans. The 
commission council under Andrew McShane would bring about a 
reasonable and just settlement of the public utility issue, 
enact a comprehensive zoning and planning ordinance, promote
71New Orleans Daily Statesf August 6, 13, 19, 21, 24, 
1920; New Orleans Item. August 19, September 8, 1920.
7ZMcShane claimed he was active in the Young Men's Demo­
cratic Association (1888), the Antilottery League (1892), 
the Citizens League (1896), the Jeffersonian Democrats
(1900), the Home Rule Democrats (1904), the Good Government 
League (1912), and with John Parker in 1916 and 1920. New 
Orleans Item. August 6, 13, 26, 1920; New Orleans Daily 
States, August 6-7, 1920. The list only proved the point 
Mayor Behrman tried to make. McShane, like other reformers, 
became involved in municipal affairs only every four years.
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the construction of affordable, middle-class housing devel­
opments, improve and expand the sewerage and drainage 
system, pipe natural gas into the city, and provide an 
active and meaningful role for women in the politics and 
municipal government of New Orleans.n*
The anti-Regular press, however, promised more than the 
McShane administration and the ODA could deliver, making a 
prophet of Martin Behrman. Andrew McShane's disposition and 
political inexperience nearly ruined his administration and 
contributed to the collapse of the ODA in 1922. Though 
Parker and Sullivan did not manipulate the McShane adminis­
tration, their partisan concerns compromised the indepen­
dence of the new commission council. And though Parker and 
Sullivan did not run the McShane administration, as Mayor 
Behrman predicted, neither did Andrew McShane. His ill- 
tempered behavior and his critical disapproval of nearly 
every policy proposed by the commission council (and his 
numerous absences from work for chronic, though minor, ill­
nesses) isloated him from his own government, allowing the 
other councilmen to direct the municipal policy of the 
McShane administration.
Those problems were, however, in the future, and were 
not, as Mayor Behrman thought, the issues that concerned 
the voters of New Orleans. Rather, most voters considered
73New Orleans Item. July 18, 20, August 4-5, 24, 26,
1920; New Orleans Daily States. July 20, September 2, 5,
1920.
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Behrman's record and the need for change as the most impor­
tant issues of the municipal campaign. On election day, rain 
threatened to dampen the turnout and the predictions made by 
both factions. The Regulars predicted a record turnout, 
eclipsing previous records and giving Martin Behrman a com­
fortable majority. The McShane supporters were just as opti­
mistic, forecasting a "snug majority" for "Mayor" McShane 
and a complete and unqualified victory for the ODA.*7*
None of the predictions came true (though the rains 
held off), though the ODA spokesmen came closer to the 
actual outcome. McShane received 22,906 votes (fifty-one and 
a half percent), winning ten of the seventeen wards, includ­
ing five ring wards (the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh) and increasing the anti-Regular vote by more than 
2,300. Mayor Behrman, on the other hand, garnered only 
21,541 (forty-eight and a half percent), receiving 3,400 
votes fewer than Frank Stubbs. McShane's majority was indeed 
"snug," only 1,365, but it was, nevertheless, a complete 
victory over Martin Behrman. McShane gained votes in every 
ward but the Second, where both he and Behrman lost votes, 
the Ninth, which he carried by 286 votes, the Fifteenth, 
Behrman's home ward, and the "rural" Seventeenth. In the ten 
wards carried by McShane, the ODA increased the anti-Regular
■'‘•New Orleans Item, September 4-7, 9, 11-13; New Orleans 
Daily States. September 5, 12-13, 1920. The Behrman Regulars 
predicted a six thousand vote victory for Behrman and the 
RDO and the ODA leadership saw McShane sweeping every ward 
and receiving a nine thousand vote majority.
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vote by 1,300 votes, the majority o£ those votes coming from 
the five "ring" wards McShane carried.79
McShane received 16,000 votes from the ten wards he 
carried, approximately seventy percent of his total vote. In 
the five ring wards, McShane polled 9,000 votes or nearly 
forty percent of his vote. Yet, in those wards, McShane re­
ceived only 1,100 more than Martin Behrman. The five "Up­
town" wards, the Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, 
and Sevententh, gave McShane only 7,000 votes, thirty per­
cent of his vote. But in those wards, McShane received his 
largest majorities, garnering 2,300 more votes than Mayor 
Behrman. In short, though McShane made tremendous inroads 
against the Regulars in the traditional ring wards (he also 
received 7,000 votes in the seven wards Martin Behrman
79New Orleans Itenj, September 15-18, 1920; New Orleans 
Daily States. September 15-17, 1920. McShane carried the 
Third (Sullivan), Sixth ("Co" Desmare), Seventh (Daly), 
Ninth (John Nunnemacher), Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Wards. Parker lost 
the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Wards in January. 
The Ninth was a traditional ring ward.
Ward Inc
3 424
6 403
7 36
9 -238
11 323
12 70
13 136
14 128
16 47
17 -27
1,302
507
carried), he "won" the election in the Uptown wards.***
Martin Behrman, on the other hand, lost the election 
in the traditional Regular wards. Behrman lost votes in 
every ward but the Ninth and the Fifteenth. In the seven 
wards he carried, Behrman polled only 9,100 votes, losing 
1,100 votes from the state primary in January. And, in the 
ten wards won by Andrew McShane, Behrman lost 2,200 votes, 
seventy percent coming from the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Wards. Clearly, then, the "traditional" Regular 
voter, including 2,800 new voters, deserted Behrman and the 
RDO, giving their votes, however reluctantly, to Andrew
'7aNew Orleans Item. September 15-18, 1920. The official 
returns were not published on a precinct basis, and the re­
turns that I have compiled only approximate the official 
final count.
Ward*/Vote Gain over Parker Majority
3 2,531 424 303
6 1,166 403 376
7 1,672 36 30
9 2,010 238 286
11 1,589 323 150
8,968 948 1,145
* traditional "machine" wards
Ward*/Vote Gain over Parker Majority
12 1,851 70 564
13 1,596 136 400
14 1,957 128 1,005
16 701 47 180
17 844 -27 216
6,949 354 2,365
* traditional "reform" wards
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McShane and the ODA.77
The elections for the four remaining positions on the 
commission council were even more closely contested. Only 
1,270 votes separated first from second place, 514 second 
from third, eighty-six third from fourth, and fifty-one 
fourth from fifth. Three ODA candidates, Wilbert Black (who 
out polled Mayor Behrman), Richard Murphy, and Stanley Ray, 
won seats on the council. Paul H. Maloney, who finished 
third, was the only Regular to win a place in the municipal 
government. The voting returns in the commission council 
races (and the parochial races, too) followed the pattern 
set in the mayoral election. The RDO candidates performed 
well in the wards and precincts carried by Mayor Behrman, 
while the ODA candidates carried the McShane wards and pre­
cincts. And, as in the mayor's election, the commission 
council (and parochial) elections turned on a sizeable
77New Orleans Itemr September 15-18, 1920.
Ward/Vote Lost vote Majority
1 960 +10 77
2 991 255 258
4 1,106 353 507
5 1,716 222 601
8 1,351 235 190
10 1,699 125 299
15 1,284 +60 613
9,107 1,120 2,545
In Wards 3, 6, 7, 9, and 11 Mayor Behrman received 
7,823 votes, 1,572 fewer than Frank Stubbs, and in Wards 
12, 13, 14, 16, and 17, Behrman polled 4,624 votes, 663 
fewer than Stubbs.
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increase in anti-Regular votes in the traditional RDO wards 
and precincts and a precipitous decline in Regular votes 
throughout the city."7"
Though the election did not portend the imminent 
collapse of the RDO (Paul Maloney had, after all, won a seat 
on the commission council and erstwhile Regulars controlled 
the most important parochical offices), it was, nonetheless, 
as close to a complete victory as the ODA could have ex­
pected. Contemporaries and later students of the 1920 elec­
tion have offered several important, though incomplete, ex­
planations for the defeat of Martin Behrman and the Regular 
Democratic Organization. First, they argue, the campaign of 
John Parker for governor and his startling showing in New 
Orleans legitimized the issue of ring rule and showed that 
Mayor Behrman and the Regulars were vulnerable on that 
issue. Second, the election of Parker encouraged the New
7BNew Orleans Daily States. September 17-23, 1923.
Commission council: Wilbert Black 22,204
Richard Murphy 20,924
Paul H. Maloney 20,420
Stanley Ray 20,334
Maurice DePass 20,283
Thomas Harrison 20,272 
John R. Norman 20,269 
C. S. Barnes 19,560
Parochial offices:
District Attorney Robert H Marr(ODA) 22,255
A.D. Henrigues(RDO) 21,281 
Criminal Sheriff George Wiliams(ODA) 23,206
Richard Meredith(RDO) 20,340 
Clerk, Civil Court John J. O'Neill(ODA) 21,705
Thomas Connell(RDO) 21,573 
Clerk, Criminal Court Edward A. Haggerty(ODA) 22,356
James Byrnes(RDO) 20,303
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Orleans reformers and the disaffected Regulars to create a 
second political organization, dedicated to the removal of 
Martin Behrman and to permanent, practical reform for Hew 
Orleans. The presence of so many important Regulars in the 
ranks of the ODA gave credence to the issue of one-man rule 
and was further evidence that Martin Behrman could be beat- 
ened. These ersatz reformers testified to the venality and 
incompetence of ring rule and the Behrman administration.
The ODA, then, was able to speak with authority about waste 
and incompetence in public services, the inequity of the 
municipal assessment and taxation policy, and the political 
favoritism shown to NORLC.79
As important as those factors were, contemporaries and 
later scholars alike agreed that the "critical factor" in 
the defeat of Behrman and the RDO was John Parker's whole­
sale dismissal of Regular Democrats from state offices and 
jobs and the redistribution of those positions and jobs to 
ODA supporters."0 There is, of course, no sure or precise 
way of determining the number of voters who became part of 
the "critical factor". The New Orleans newspapers were, of 
course, thoroughly partisan, and routinely exaggerated the
79New Orleans Item. September 13, 1920; New Orleans Daily 
States. September 9, December 5, 1920; Reynolds, Machine 
Politics in New Orleans. 1896-1926, 77-78, 208-213;
Schott, "John M. Parker," 104; Williams, "Martin Behrman 
Mayor and Political Boss," 118-24, 130.
*°New Orleans Daily States. September 9, 1920; Reynolds, 
Machine Politics. 77-78, 208-13; Williams, "Martin Behrman 
Mayor and Political Boss," 118-34, 130.
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number of votes won by the redistribution of patronage. And 
when the press reported specific figures, the press accounts 
usually referred to the number of RDO men dismissed from 
their jobs. The number of men replaced, however, was re­
markably small, particularly in proportion to the number of 
state and parochial positions available to John Parker and 
John Patrick Sullivan.BX
Since so few men were dismissed, most students assumed 
that the remaining workers, somewhere between 1,700 and 
2,000 men, became "galvanized" supporters of McShane and the 
ODA. It is conceivable that all 2,300 state workers voted 
for McShane, giving him the increase he enjoyed over John 
Parker and providing the margin of defeat for Martin 
Behrman. But clearly they did not. In the seven wards Martin 
Behrman won, 1,036 men who voted in January abstained from 
voting in the mayoral election. And in the five "machine" 
wards carried by Andrew McShane (undoubtedly, the recipients 
of Parker and Sullivan's cache of political patronage), 
the ODA gained only 948 votes, while 1,020 voters stayed at 
home on election day, unwilling to vote against Martin 
Behrman— or for McShane. The point is simple, though 
surely profound. In modern New Orleans politics, patronage
axAccording to the New York Bureau of Municipal Research 
(directed by historian Charles Austin Beard), there were 
2,333 parochial jobs in Orleans Parish. Of those jobs, 
sixty-two belonged to the Orleans Parish Levee Board, 350 
to various state and parish departments, and 1,921 to the 
Dock Board. Administrative Survey of the Government of the 
City of New Orleansr 43-45.
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did not necessarily translate into votes.
But competent, effective government and sufficient pub­
lic services did. Apparently, from the perspective of the 
majority of New Orleans voters (albeit a narrow one), Martin 
Behrman and the Regular Democrats mismanaged the municipal 
government, allowing municipal services to deteriorate, 
raising taxes, and permitting corporations like New Orleans 
Railway and Light Company to threaten the public order and 
extort higher rates and fares for inadequate services. With 
good reason, then, the voters and politicians of New Orleans 
questioned the ability of Martin Behrman to govern the city.
Despite Mayor Behrman's numerous disadvantages and dis­
abilities, the municipal elections were, nevertheless, ex­
tremely close, suggesting that a great many citizens were 
uncomfortable with the prospect of Andrew McShane, John 
Sullivan, and John Parker governing New Orleans. For the 
most part, the ODA conducted a spiteful, negative campaign, 
promising to curb both the benefits and excesses of munici-
fl2New Orleans Item, September 15-18, 1920.
Ward/Lost vote (Behrman) Ward/Lost vote (McShane)
1 +132 3 250
2 532 6 122
4 299 7 284
5 59 9 146
8 76 11 218
10 12 12 8
15 58 13 72
14 120
1036 16 +50
17 97
1257
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pal government under Martin Behrman and the RDO. The tenor 
and volume of the campaign was so bitter and shrill that 
many critics in the press were concerned that the rancor of 
the campaign might carry over to the next administration.
And the candidacy of Andrew McShane troubled nearly fifty 
percent of the voters of New Orleans. He was, to be sure, an 
acerbic campaigner, given to excessive promises and brusque 
language. He was, as well, a second-rate reformer, never 
leading, but always on the edge of the reform movement.
Given these apparent shortcomings and the presence of 
other, more vigorous men in the ODA (and on the future 
commission council), voters and politicians no doubt 
questioned his ability to govern the political coalition 
and the city that elected him.
They were right. Early in the legislative session of 
1920, Governor Parker insisted that the legislature grant 
him the authority (and the money, $25,000) to investigate 
financial and political conditions in New Orleans. The in­
vestigation was nearly without precedent (a similar "probe" 
in 1912 failed to discover any political corruption in New 
Orleans) and was, without question, partisan. The governor 
and the legislature intended the investigation to embarrass 
the Behrman administration and to contribute to its defeat. 
Though the commission council blocked the "probe," it accom­
plished what Parker and the ODA intended. But, as critics 
feared, the investigation continued on into the next admin­
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istration, proving more of an embarrassment to the McShane 
administration than to Martin Behrman, for the McShane 
council refused to implement any of the recommendations made 
by its own municipal survey commission. Mayor McShane also 
seemed ill-fit to govern New Orleans, and, by his own admis­
sion, was incapable of compromise. He was often ill and 
always (or so it seemed) unpleasant and uncooperative. He 
was, as well, unable to control, much less direct, the or­
ganization that elected him. Within two years of his inaugu­
ration, the New Orleans Item publicly regretted his 
election.
Martin Behrman took his defeat with grace and confi­
dence. As his retirement approached, the mayor seemed calm, 
almost resigned to his new life as a "private" citizen. 
Though he said he had no more personal political ambitions, 
he believed that time would show how well the Regular Demo­
cratic Organization governed New Orleans, and he predicted 
that its "defeat" would be short-lived. The New Orleans Item 
and Daily States agreed with the mayor, but for slightly 
different reasons. The Daily States wrote that the political 
and administrative record of Martin Behrman and the RDO 
spoke of the "excellence [of] their stewardship". Under the 
Behrman administration, the States continued, New Orleans 
progressed more in the past twenty years than in the last 
two hundred. And, the newspaper suggested, the new commis­
sion council would do well to study the policies of past
515
Behrman administrations, perhaps learning more from their 
successes than from their failures. The Item, perhaps 
sensing the volatile character of the ODA coalition, argued 
that it was neither desirable nor possible to destroy the 
political organization that had shaped the public policy of 
New Orleans for more than twenty years. The McShane admin­
istration and the ODA would benefit from the existence and 
active participation of a "secondn political organization 
like the RDO, restraining the ODA and the administration 
from the excesses of one-party rule and one-man government.
The McShane administration and the ODA were the new 
"Regulars" now. But, as the Daily States and the Item 
feared, the new administration could not learn from the past 
and the ODA could not forget it.83
aaNew Orleans Item. September 15, 18, December 5, 1920;
New Orleans Daily States. November 21, December 4-6, 1920.
Chapter Nine
The Irish Interregnum
The McShane administration entered office with great 
anticipation and even greater expectations. The last reform 
administration to govern New Orleans, that of Walter C. 
Flower, left office more than twenty years before, accom­
plishing a great many things for the city, but incapable of 
sustaining itself in office. Since that time, no reform 
movement remotely challenged the electoral supremacy of the 
Regular Democratic Organization and its four-time mayor, 
Martin Behrman. But Andrew McShane and the ODA had humbled 
Martin Behrman and the Regular Democrats, sweeping them 
from office (with one exception) and inaugurating a munici­
pal government dedicated to anti-ring progressive reform.
The new administration was clearly inexperienced in munici­
pal and political affairs, but it was, at least according to 
the reform press, sincere, intelligent, and completely free 
and independent of the quarrelsome, factional politics of 
the past. And, though the margin of victory for the new 
municipal government was extremely narrow, its mandate, 
at least as McShane and the ODA interpreted it, was unmis- 
takeable. It was clear, wrote the Daily States, that the 
mandate of the new administration called for "rigid
5 1 6
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economy" in public finances, a reduction of tax and assess­
ment rates to prewar levels, "depoliticization" of public 
administration and the introduction of municipal civil ser­
vice, expansion of essential city services, including water, 
drainage, sewerage, and paving, a "fair and reasonable" re­
habilitation and regulation of New Orleans Railway and Light 
Company, a fundamental, democratic restructuring of the 
municipal government, and the enactment of a comprehensive 
city planning and zoning law.1
Andrew McShane expected nothing less from himself and 
his administration.2 In his inaugural address, McShane vowed 
to eradicate machine politics from the municipal government, 
erecting in its place an open, independent, democratic gov­
ernment, dedicated to the economical, efficient, and unbias­
ed administration of the "public business". Accomplishing 
these changes required intelligent planning, fortitude, and, 
above all, patience on the part of the city administration
1New Orleans Daily States. September 15, December 2, 4, 
6, 1920, January 2, 1921; New Orleans Item. January 5, 
February 12, 26, May 23, 1921; Raymond O. Nussbaum, "Pro­
gressive Politics in New Orleans," passim.
2When the new commission council convened in December, 
it assigned each councilman to a separate executive depart­
ment (as mayor McShane served as Commissioner of Public 
Affairs). Richard Murphy became Commissioner of Public 
Finance, Wilbert Black the Commissioner of Public Property, 
Stanley Ray the Commissioner of Public Safety, and Paul H. 
Maloney the Commissioner of Public Utilities. McShane ap­
pointed Ivy G. Kittredge as City Attorney, John Klorer as 
City Engineer, Harry Fitzpatrick, his cousin, as Fire Com­
missioner, and John H. Bruns, McShane's son-in-law, as 
Police Commissioner. New Orleans Daily Statesr December 4-9, 
1920.
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and the public. The foundation was being laid, and the new 
commission council was anxious to begin work.3
Achieving those changes, of course, was easier said 
than done, and required more than practicing the "cardinal 
virtues" of prudence, patience, and foritude. It required 
experience, leadership, and, above all, ability. Though the 
new commission council had some ability and could acquire 
experience, it lacked leadership and direction. Or, better 
said, it had too many leaders and went in too many direc­
tions, dividing the McShane administration against itself, 
eroding its foundation, and leading to its collapse. The 
collapse of the McShane administration began before it took 
office, and responsibility for its failure lay with the vol­
atile character of the ODA coalition, the willful and explo­
sive personality of Andrew McShane, the sterility of munici­
pal reform as practiced by McShane, Sullivan, and Parker, 
and the almost intractable problems of governing a large 
and expanding city like Mew Orleans.
Early in the legislative session of 1920, the Parker 
floor leaders in the House of Representatives introduced the 
administration's so-called "probe" bill. Prepared by Parker 
and his principal aides, the bill authorized the governor to 
appoint a special, independent commission, empowered to "in­
vestigate" every aspect of the municipal and parochial gov­
3New Orleans Daily States, December 6, 1920.
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ernments of New Orleans. Over the past eight to ten years, 
the governor explained, Martin Behrman and the Regular Demo­
crats had acquired near pleanary power over the municipal 
and parochial governments of New Orleans, imposing an unre­
sponsive, unrepresentative municipal government on the city, 
monopolizing the debate on public policy, and endangering 
democratic government and reform in New Orleans and the 
state. It was his firm hope, he said, that an investigation 
into the financial, political, and administrative activities 
of the Behrman Regulars might prompt the appropriate politi­
cal and structural reforms to return municipal rule to the 
better citizens of New Orleans and restore the proper polit­
ical balance between New Orleans and the state.4
In the House and Senate, Regular Democrats accused the 
governor of abusing his executive authority and of using the 
legislature to sanction and fund a political "witchhunt". In
4New Orleans Daily States. June 8, July 10-11, 1920; New 
Orleans Item. May 15, June 18, 24, 30, August 3, September
4, 1920. Prom the start, one of the principal objectives of 
the municipal investigation was replacing the existing com­
mission council system with another form of government that 
promoted the interest of the ODA and its supporters. But the 
ODA could not agree on what form of municipal government 
best suited its interests. John Sullivan favored a return to 
the councilmanic system, while McShane favored retaining the 
existing system, with a few modifications, and other ODA 
members wanted wholesale revisions in the municipal govern­
ment. The preamble to the bill declared that its purpose was 
to help the people of New Orleans "obtain [a] form of go­
vernment which will best lend itself to service and effi­
ciency, and that will not serve as a cloak or agency for the 
construction and maintenace of a political ring or 
rings...". Act 37, Acts Passed bv the General Assembly of 
the State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1920.
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the lower house, Representative John Dymond, a Regular from 
New Orleans, offered an amendment to the bill, delaying its 
work until after the municipal and parochial elections. But 
the House refused to amend the bill, and sent it to the Sen­
ate. In the Senate, the bill met greater opposition. Despite 
the pleas (and threats) from Governor Parker and the ODA, 
the Senate Finance Committee amended the bill, preventing 
the investigation until after September 14, the day of the 
municipal and parochial elections. But in the full Senate, 
the Governor and his ODA supporters eliminated the amend­
ment and passed the bill, authorizing Parker to appoint a 
five man commission and appropriating $25,000 for the inves­
tigation. *
In August, one month before the municipal elections, 
Governor Parker selected the New Orleans "municipal survey 
commission,” appointing Frank Dameron, Allison Owen,
Terrance Smith, Albert English, and Thomas H. Roberts, all 
well-known businessmen and "agressive" anti-Regular reform­
ers, as members of the commission (Harold Moise was general 
counsel). But before these men could begin their work, the 
commission council and the mayor filed separate suits
“Act 37, ibid.; New Orleans Item, June 18, 24, 26, 29-
30, July 1, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. July 1, 1920.
Senator Delos R. Johnson from rural north Louisiana expres­
sed best the sentiment of the country parishes. Whether the 
General Assembly was right or wrong about investigating New 
Orleans was "irrelevant," he said. The "hill people" of 
north Louisiana want to see New Orleans get its "just 
desserts," and the probe was the first course. The Parker 
administration was, in part, responsible for this sentiment.
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against the state, attempting to block the investigation. In 
their suits, the council and the mayor acknowledged the au­
thority of the state legislature to investigate the adminis­
tration of the municipal government, but the Claiborne act 
(Representative Ferdinand Claiborne sponsored the bill) was 
a deceitful misuse of the authority of the legislature and a 
gross waste of tax money, designed to further the partisan 
interest of Governor Parker and his supporters in New 
Orleans. The purpose of the Claiborne act and the intent of 
the Dameron commission, Behrman and the council asserted, 
was to discredit the municipal government of New Orleans, 
reward ODA partisans, buy votes for the ODA candidates, and 
allow John Parker to determine, if not dictate, the election 
of the mayor, commission council, and the other municipal 
officers of New Orleans.8
Eventually, the Civil District Court ruled in favor of 
Martin Behrman (the McShane administration withdrew the city 
suit, leaving Behrman as the only petitioner), nullifying 
the Claiborne act and preventing the Dameron commission from 
investigating the municipal government of New Orleans. It 
was, however, a Pyrrhic victory. The opposition of the
8New Orleans Item. August 6-13, 1920; New Orleans Daily 
States. August 7-13, 1920. After the municipal elections, 
members of the Association of Commerce accused Frank Dameron 
and Allison Owen and several other "prominent" civic leaders 
of being excessively anti-Regular. The executive committee 
of the Association, chaired by Arthur Parker, the brother of 
John Parker, exonerated Dameron, Owen, and the others of all 
allegations. See New Orleans Daily States. January 28, March 
1, 1921.
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B£hrman administration to an administrative survey of the 
municipal government convinced many "unaligned" reformers 
and some "disaffected" Regulars of the necessity of such a 
survey- And, more importantly, these interests, for an as­
sortment of reasons, pressured the McShane administration 
into employing the municipal survey as the prinicipal means 
of ending ring rule and establishing a permanent reform gov­
ernment in Mew Orleans.7
Late in December, 1920, barely a week after the McShane 
assumed municipal power, the Tax Payers Association of New 
Orleans (TPA) called on the commission council to "recon­
vene" the municipal survey commission, empowering it to "re­
mediate" the problems affecting the municipal government of 
New Orleans. At first the council (and the ODA patronage 
committee) ignored the requests of the TPA to eliminate 
"useless" jobs through the municipal government, scaling 
down the cost of government and, in the process, reducing 
taxes and the assessment rate. By the middle of February, 
with problems of the Behrman administration still readily 
apparent, the council could no longer ignore the demands of 
the TPA and the newspapers for an administrative survey.®
In February, J. Blanc Monroe, an executive official of
7New Orleans Item. August 8-18, November 10, 13, 29, 30, 
December 3, 28, 1920, January 7, 10, 20, 1921; New Orleans 
Daily States,. August 7-22, October 2, November 10, December 
2, 8, 1920, January 20, October 4, 1921.
®New Orleans Item, December 4, 1920, February 19, March 
2, April 24, 1921; New Orleans Daily States. December 16, 
1920, March 2, 1921.
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the TPA and the general counsel of the Orleans Parish School 
Board called on the city administration to "endorse" the 
concept of a municipal survey commission. According to 
Monroe, the city and the McShane administration would both 
benefit from an exhaustive and authoritative review and 
reform of the municipal government. The municipal govern­
ment of New Orleans, he told reporters, needed a complete 
restructuring and reordering of its priorities. The present 
system of government was inequitable and wasteful, penaliz­
ing businessmen, investors, and property holders with high 
taxes and insufficient services and supporting an army of 
needless workers and officials. Since the new administration 
was so inexperienced, he said, a systematic review of the 
municipal government could guide the commission council in 
its efforts to rid the city of Behrmanism and could, at the 
same time, recommend ways of restructuring the municipal 
government and making it economical and equitable.9
From the start, the McShane council was skeptical of 
the motivation of the TPA (the commission council and the 
TPA feuded constantly over assessment practices, paving ex­
penses, and the cost of government) and uncertain of the 
value of an unrestained administrative survey of the city 
government. But the TPA and its supporters in the press, 
principally the Item, assured the council that the sort of 
municipal survey they envisioned would not be politically
9 I b i d .
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motivated, but designed to promote effective, efficient man­
agement of municipal affairs. The "fundamental" concerns of 
any city, the Item advanced, were not politics and patron­
age, but public health, safety, commerce, education and the 
arts, and a whole assortment of other essential services. 
Modern municipal government, then, at least according to the 
TPA and the New Orleans Item, required the skilled manage­
ment of those services, and a municipal survey would vir­
tually assure the city of the sort of government and 
policies necessary to manage those concerns and services.3-0
Apparently, the constant pressure of the TPA and the 
Item convinced the commission council to pursue the idea of 
a municipal survey, but the council was unwilling to grant a 
municipal survey commission the sort of pleanary authority 
demanded by the TPA and the Item. Early in August, the coun­
cil took up the idea of a municipal survey. Commissioner of 
Public Finance Richard M. Murphy suggested limiting the sur­
vey commission to matters of taxation, assessment, and econ­
omy, leaving to the commission council concerns of a more 
"political" nature. Though economy was the watchword of the 
McShane administration, a majority of the council found no 
appreciable value in so limited a survey, preferring instead 
to expand the survey to all municipal departments, including 
the commission council and the independent boards and com­
missions serving the city and parish. But the commissioners,
3-°Ibid.
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fearful of losing control over their own government, refused 
to give the survey commission the authority to impose its 
recommendations on the commission council or the other 
"branches" of the municipal government. And the principal 
boards and commissions, the Sewerage and Water Board, the 
Public Belt Railroad Commission, the Orleans Parish School 
Board, and the Board of Liquidation City Debt, either de­
clined to participate in the survey or refused to abide by 
the recommendations of the municipal survey commission.xx
Despite its reservations and caveats, the commission 
council agreed to sponsor a "full and complete" survey of 
the municipal government by an independent, nonpartisan com­
mission of businessmen, assisted by recognized experts in 
the field of municipal administration. Eager to avoid any 
suspicion of bias or partisanship the city council, incred­
ibly, invited the moribund Dameron commission to serve as 
the municipal survey commission. After some initial hesita­
tion, the Dameron commission agreed to the conditions set by 
the commission council. The municipal survey commission im­
mediately hired a "professional" staff, led by "Colonel" 
James E. Edmonds, the former managing editor of the Times-
xxNew Orleans Item. August 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 16, 19, 20, 
September 15, 1921; New Orleans Daily Statesr August 9-10, 
September 7, 10, 15, 17, 1921. City Attorney Ivy G. Kitt- 
redge advised the commission council that it could not 
delegate the reserve powers of the city to the municipal 
survey commission, and, consequently, the recommendations of 
the commission were not binding on the council or any muni­
cipal department. Kittredge to McShane, August 31, 1921, 
vol.9, CAP. CA, NOPL.
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Picayune, to conduct the survey. Though the staft was ener­
getic, possessing "high principles and ideals" and broad ex­
perience in "practical politics," from the start it was evi­
dent that it lacked the competence to conduct a thorough and 
systematic analysis of the New Orleans municipal government. 
Late in September, then, James Edmonds recommended that the 
municipal survey commission and the commission council hire 
the New York Bureau of Municipal Research (BMR) to conduct 
the survey. Within a matter of days, the McShane administra­
tion contracted the BMR, appropriating $25,000 for the com­
pletion of the municipal survey.1-2
The Bureau of Municipal Research began its initial in­
quiries in September, completing the investigation in late 
November. Over the next month, the BMR collated the informa- 
tion it had gathered, issuing a detailed report and lenghty 
analysis to the Municipal Survey Commission at the every end 
of December. For the next several weeks, the MSC studied the 
report and recommendations of the BMR, releasing an explana­
tion of the BMR report and offering its own analysis of the
X2New Orleans Item. August 3-5, September 2, 25-27, 30, 
October 1-2, December 5, 14, 1921; New Orleans Daily States. 
August 5, October 1-2, December 5, 14, 1921; Municipal Sur­
vey Commission, Administrative Survey of the Government of 
the Citv of New Orleans. 8. Begun in 1906 by municipal re­
formers William H. Allen, Frederick Cleveland, and Henry
Bruere, the BMR advocated a scientific approach to 
municipal administration, though, according to historian 
Otis Pease, the BMR tempered its scientific reformism with 
"a saving sense of realism". Otis A. Pease, "Urban Reformers 
in the Progressive Era: A Reappraisal," Pacific Northwest 
Quarter- lv. 62 (April 1971), 54.
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conditions and problems of the municipal government and 
proposing several recommendations for the administrative and 
political reform of the City of New Orleans.13
The report of Bureau of Municipal Research was more and 
less than the Municipal Survey Commission expected and de­
sired. The BMR report, covering more than two hundred pages 
and countless organization charts and diagrams, was a sys­
tematic and detailed assessment of the structure, policies, 
and practices governing the municipal and parochial adminis­
trations of New Orleans. It was, as well, far too comprehen­
sive, overly technical, and, at times, virtually unreadable, 
making it difficult to digest, much less implement, all its 
recommendations. And, despite its much acclaimed political 
"realism," the BMR virtually ignored the political diffi­
culties and consequences of the reforms it proposed, com­
pelling the Municipal Survey Commission to reject many of 
the more significant proposals of the BMR as impractical and 
inappropriate for New Orleans.1*
In its investigation and report, the Bureau of Munici­
pal Research concentrated on three principal issues: the re­
structuring of the municipal government, reforming and
“ Municipal Survey Commission, Administrative Survey of 
the Government of the Citv of New Orleans. 6-9, 54-278; New 
Orleans Item, October 1, November 13, 23, December 21, 29, 
1921, January 15, 18, 1922; New Orleans Daily States. Decem­
ber 16, 1921, January 18, 1922.
“ Municipal Survey Commission, Administrative Survey of 
the Government of the Citv of New Orleans, 6-9.
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reorienting the financial and taxing policies of the city 
government, and the efficient redistribution of city ser­
vices. "The essentials of good government are easily 
stated," the report announced. "They are axiomatic; no one 
will debate them."
The first requisite is democracy. No political 
structure is sound that is not so constructed 
as to respond quickly and precisely to popular 
control. The second requisite is economy. Govern­
ment must not only respond to popular demands, 
but [also] must be carried on at the lowest cost 
consistent with the proper discharge of public 
functions and fair conditions of employment for 
those who serve the city. The third requisite is 
efficiency. This means that the work undertaken 
by the city government should be well done in 
accordance with the best standards of good work 
to be found in other cities and in private enter­
prises.
According to the Bureau of Municipal Research, the 
municipal government of New Orleans met none of the 
essential requisites for democratic, economical, and 
efficient government. The city government was unresponsive, 
profligate, and inefficient, and in need of thorough, com­
prehensive reorganization. "The type of city organization 
that is most desirable," the report intoned, "is the one 
that makes for simple, direct, responsible government." In 
contrast, the municipal government of New Orleans was overly 
complex, oblique, and irresponsible. "In fact, a more intri­
cate and unintelligible arrangement could hardly be de­
vised." There were, for example, sixty governmental offices,
XBIbid.. 58.
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departments, boards, commissions, and other agencies consti­
tuting the municipal government of New Orleans. The citizens 
of New Orleans elected forty-five officials, the governor 
appointed twenty-five more, and nearly thirty officials 
served as members of self-perpetuating boards. "In fact," 
the BMR concluded, "New Orleans has no semblance of a sys­
tematic and well-co-ordinated administrative organiza­
tion.1,18
The source of the city's discontent was, the BMR 
wrote, the politicized structure of the municipal govern­
ment. The Pavrot charter did not restructure or reorient 
the municipal government of New Orleans. Though the 1912 
charter enhanced the authority of the mayor and executive 
departments it created, it did not (as critics of the 
Behrman administrations alledged) concentrate complete 
municipal authority in the mayor and the council. Rather, 
like other commission council governments, the Pavrot char­
ter tended to diffuse power and obscure responsibility. The 
commission form adopted by New Orleans merely superimposed 
the commission form of government on the existing, "disor­
ganized collection" of special, independent boards and com­
missions, continuing the same "wasteful," politicized 
policies and practices of past administrations and per-
xaIbid.. 57-58.
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petuating machine politics.3-7
The rehabilitation of the municipal government of New 
Orleans, as seen by the BMR, demanded the centralization of 
municipal and parochial power in a single authority, elimi­
nating the independent boards and commissions and assigning 
their duties and responsibilities to expert administrators. 
Though the BMR considered the centralization of municipal 
authority essential to good government and to the develop­
ment of New Orleans as a progressive city, it also recog­
nized, but discounted, the entrenched, opposition to the 
concentration of political authority in the United States. 
With that realization in mind, the BMR recommended two 
approaches to reorganizing the municipal government in New 
Orleans.xa
Though sure to arouse controversy and opposition, the 
first proposal allowed the commission council to retain and
X7Ibid. According to the BMR, the board system of muni­
cipal government was "a clever means of escaping account­
ability and consequently criticism and blame" for public 
policy. The board system, the BMR report said, was devoid of
initiative, rewarded mediocrity, retarded public improve­
ments and development, and, above all, arrested the author­
ity of the commission council, preventing it from determin­
ing and controlling public policy. In essence, the BMR was 
correct, for boards and commissions like the Public Belt 
Railroad Commission and the Board of Liquidation City Debt, 
served the vested interests of the commerical and banking 
elite of the city. These boards, as we have seen, resisted 
the efforts of the Behrman administration to influence 
their conduct or eliminate their hold on public policy. For 
an historical account of the development of the independent 
commission system, see Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph. 
66-80.
XBIbid.. 60.
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expand its authority over the municipal government. The plan 
called for the commission council to abolish most of the in­
dependent commissions, turning over their duties to "compe­
tent" administrators directly responsible to the commission 
council. The BMR claimed that the plan promised a simple, 
direct, and immediate remedy for New Orleans's administra­
tive "paralysis". The plan, as portrayed by the BMR, may 
have simplified the "lines" of municipal authority, but in­
augurating such a plan would not be simple or, for that 
matter, likely. The plan proposed eliminating the elective 
Board of Assessors (something no governor, legislature, or 
constitutional convention had been willing or able to accom­
plish), replacing the assessors with a "bureau of assess­
ment," accountable only to the Commissioner of Public Fi­
nance and the commission council. In addition, the BMR's 
recommendation called for the Commissioner of Public Finance 
to take control of all future bond issues and the liquida­
tion of bonded indebtedness, relegating the Board of Liqui­
dation City Debt to retiring old debt and gradually ending 
the control of the Board— and the bankers who sat on it—  
over the financial and political development of the city.1"
These aspects condemned the proposal from the start, 
uniting Regulars and reformers, laborers, merchants, and
x"Ibid., 60-61. The plan also eliminated the boards of 
police and fire commissioners, and placed the Public Belt 
Railroad Commission and Sewerage and Water Board directly 
under the mayor. These boards would be abolished under the 
second plan.
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bankers against a plan that degraded popular participation 
in public affairs and proposed a fundamental realignment of 
power in New Orleans. It was unlikely that the civic and 
commercial elite of New Orleans, given its past opposition 
to the modest centralization of municipal power under the 
Behrman administration, would endorse so radical a change. 
Nevertheless, the BMR considered its first proposal a 
feasible, though wholly inadequate, response to the adminis­
trative needs of the city. "If the people of New Orleans 
desire a government that is simple in structure, that fixes 
definite responsibility for action, and that is capable of 
operating effectively and economically," the BMR report con­
tinued, "then sweeping changes must be made in the present 
organization"— changes that involved a complete revision of 
municipal government and politics.20
Efforts to return to a councilroanic system of govern­
ment (a plan endorsed by John Patrick Sullivan and the Daily 
States), the Bureau informed the Municipal Survey Commis­
sion, were regressive, and should be ignored. Instead, the 
BMR advocated the adoption of the Commission-Manager plan. 
"This form of city government has much to commend it. It is 
not only simple in structure and definitely locates adminis­
trative responsibility, but it has the added advantage over 
other forms of municipal government in that it enables the 
city to secure an experienced and trained chief administra­
2°Ibid.. 61.
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tor and to retain his services so long as he directs satis­
factorily the city's work."2X
The Commission-Manager plan concentrated most all muni­
cipal authority in a single, reputably nonpartisan, chief 
administrator, chosen by the commission council and serving 
no fixed term of office. The city manager was solely respon­
sible for the composition and performance of his administra­
tion, and, as the BMR report explained, "in the active man­
agement of the [city] he stands in the same relation to the 
commission council that a corporation head does to his 
board of directors". The success or failure of the commis- 
sion-manager plan, then, depended on the "good faith and 
vision" of the commission council in selecting the "best 
trained man available for the position and...giv{ing) him 
absolute freedom in administrative matters.82
But even for the so-called business progressives who 
constituted the Municipal Survey Commission or sat on the 
Hew Orleans commission council, the commission-manager pro­
posal required a naive act of faith and an almost prophetic 
vision. The BMR proposal called on the elective commission 
council to "relinquish all administrative powers and duties 
and become simply a legislative or policy determining body." 
The council would remain an elective body and would continue 
to determine the broad features of public policy, retaining
2XIbid.. 61-62.
22Ibid.
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direct control over civil service, the juvenile and city 
courts, and the Public Belt Railroad. But, apart from 
selecting the city manager, the council would have no other 
administrative or political authority.23
By contrast, under the second BMR proposal, the city 
manager would have the authority to "co-ordinate the activ­
ities of the city administration in any way he [saw] fit”. 
The city manager would have the freedom to consolidate ad­
ministrative departments, recruit experienced, competent 
subordinates, and determine the ultimate cost of essential 
city services. To guard against the establishment of an 
unelected political machine, the BMR proposed that the MSC 
and the commission council introduce a municipal civil ser­
vice system and that the city manager plan follow, as close­
ly as possible, the Bureau's specific recommendations.2•
The BMR recommended the creation of eight municipal de­
partments,29 consolidating the duties and services of the 
municipal, parochial, and state governments serving New 
Orleans. As with the first proposal, the BMR recommended the 
elimination of most of the independent commissions, includ­
ing the Board of Assessors, the Board of Liquidation, and 
the fire and police boards. Under the second set of recom­
23Ibid., 62-63.
2'•Ibid.. 63. The BMR report recommended that all public 
workers, with the exception of the city manager and the 
department heads, should be placed on civil service.
2SPublic Finance, Works, Safety, Welfare, Utilities, Law,
Drainage and Water Supply, and Parks and Recreation. Ibid.
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mendations, the BMR urged the abolition of the Sewerage 
and Water Board, the Recorder of Mortgages, the Registrar of 
Conveyances, and several other minor boards, and it sug­
gested that the city manager and the commission council con­
sider eliminating the Public Belt Railroad Commission and, 
if studies warranted, the Orleans Parish School Board.*®
The commission-manager proposal had few defenders, and 
the Municipal Survey Commission rejected the proposal as im­
practical and unwise. In a city as large as New Orleans, 
with diverse economic and political interests and concerns, 
a commission-manager plan was indeed an impractical and ill- 
considered proposal. It placed political and administrative 
authority in the hands of "outsiders" hired to determine and 
carry out public policy. It muffled, if not silenced, popu­
lar participation in the public affairs, relegating citizens 
to the level of consumers of public services and voters to 
the role of "stockholders". Above all, it placed government 
and politics beyond the control and influence of even the 
most active and interested citizens, allowing "experts" to 
determine the most fundamental public issues.*"7
*®Ibid.r 63-67. Though the BMR made no "positive" recom­
mendations concerning the School Board, it did argue that 
"so long as the schools remain(ed) under a separate govern­
ing body...there (could) never be (a) carefully co-ordinated 
budget plan covering all activities of the city government."
*'yIbid.. 12. The only defender the commission-manager 
plan had was the New Orleans Item. The Item reported that 
the commission-manager plan was not a "solid recommenda­
tion," but a simple summary of the latest developments in 
the "science" of municipal management.
Nevertheless, the Municipal Survey Commission consider­
ed the BMR study and report invaluable contributions to 
the rehabilitation o£ New Orleans politics and government, 
revealing several important facts about the character and 
business of the municipal government. When the McShane ad­
ministration assumed power in December, 1920, the MSC wrote 
in its report, municipal affairs were in "a state of practi­
cal paralysis and administrative collapse; without proper 
care for the present and without adequate plan for the fu­
ture". The causes for this administrative "collapse" were 
apparent to even the most casual observer, though remedying 
the collapse would be difficult, requiring a modification 
in the form of the municipal government and fundamental 
change in the content of city politics. The paralysis in 
government and politics stemmed from the politicalization of 
the "public service personnel" and the "confused and tangled 
governmental organization, which concealed responsibility, 
added to costs, limited economies, and impeded action while 
aiding politicalization of public service". The origin of 
these problems could be traced to the Pavrot commission 
council charter of 1912, which "superimposed...the old
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structure o£ the former politicalized ward-and-councilmanic 
form [of municipal government], without destruction of the 
gross evils existing in that form and without the Commission 
Council as such being given the necessary opportunity to 
function."a"
Finally, the BMR study revealed that the McShane admin­
istration, despite its considerable accomplishments (there 
were four the MSC report mentioned), remained a victim of 
the old politicized form of municipal government. In an 
effort to defeat the old regime, the ODA and its supporters 
employed the same sordid tactics and appealed to the same 
baser instincts that won elections for the Regular Demo­
crats. And, as a consequence, "the working personnel [of 
the municipal government], in considerable measure, [was] 
still too deeply concerned with factional and partisan 
politics".
These facts, "drawn naturally from the mass of data" 
assembled by the Bureau of Municipal Research, led the MSC 
to several general conclusions. First, in making its recom­
mendations, the MSC would ignore any consideration of fac­
tional advantage, local custom, or political convention. It 
would, as well, suggest only those reforms that were feasi­
ble and that the commission council could enact "in good
2<*Ibid.. 6-7.
2gIbid.r 7. The four noteable achievements of the McShane 
administration were placing city finances on a cash basis, 
repairing streets, establishing a system of maintaining city 
property, and making "necessary plans for the future".
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faith and without jeopardy to other public interests". 
Second, though it refused to endorse either of the "politi­
cal" recommendations made by the BMR, the Dameron commission 
recognized the need for the restructuring of municipal gov­
ernment and politics. The MSC proposed, then, the creation 
of two special advisory committees and the abolition of the 
civil service commission, replacing it with a Bureau of Em­
ployment and Personnel Supervision. The City Plan Commis­
sion, representing the commerical elite of New Orleans, 
would, with the help of experts and the approval of the city 
administration, develop a comprehensive city plan, designed 
to chart the city's civic and commerical future. The City 
Advisory Committee, consisting of one representative from 
the commission council and the principal independent boards 
and commissions, would bring order, continuity, and harmony 
to the administration of municipal affairs. As a division of 
city government directly responsible to the commission coun­
cil, the Bureau of Employment and Personnel Supervison would 
establish a civil service system for the city, separating 
policy making from administration and determining the em­
ployment policies and standards of performance for every 
municipal department. The MSC also proposed that all "rank- 
and-file" employees of the city and parochial governments be 
"barred from partisan and factional activities and the 
places these public servants fill be removed from the bar­
gain counter of political campaigns". With these reforms
539
in place, the municipal government of New Orleans could 
begin implementing the fiscal and administrative reforms 
recommended by the Bureau of Municipal Research.30
Though the McShane administration was anxious to reduce 
the cost of government, it was not prepared, or willing, for 
that matter, to restructure municipal government or relin­
quish political authority to a bureaucracy of experts or to 
a series of citizens advisory boards. Like previous adminis­
trations, the McShane commission council jealously guarded 
its prerogatives and powers, and was anxious to expand its 
authority into other areas of municipal administration. The 
McShane administration was content with the present system 
of municipal government, believing it served the specialized 
interests of the commerical and civic elite of New Orleans. 
The McShane commission council also wanted to control the 
municipal reform movement, structuring its policies to meet 
its own definitions and expectations of good government and 
assuring the continuation of business reform in New Orleans.
The reforms proposed by the BMR and advocated by the 
MSC promised, however, to strip the commission council— and 
a majority of the people of New Orleans— of effective poli­
tical and administrative authority, turning it over to 
experts and the privileged few. In one sense, then, the 
McShane administration, like the Behrman administration, re­
sisted (though not completely) the antidemocratic excesses
3°Ibid.r 7-12.
540
advocated by the BMR, the MSC, and John M. Parker. In an­
other sense, however, the McShane commission council, 
through its political alliances, policies, and accomplish­
ments, yielded to those excesses, paralyzing the municipal 
government and leading to its own administrative collapse.
In many ways, the Orleans Democratic Association was an 
organization of excesses, uniting the extremes of the anti- 
Behrman, anti-Regular movement in an unstable political 
coalition. At times, all that united these disparate politi­
cal factions was their commitment (indeed their obession) 
to removing the Behrman administration from power, replacing 
it with their own variety of municipal reform. But once the 
ODA defeated Behrman and the "Old" Regulars, the coarse 
fabric of the reform organization began to ravel, tearing 
apart the reform coalition. The first and most revealing 
snag developed over the issues of political patronage and 
civil service reform.
During the municipal campaign, the Parker administra­
tion lavished state patronage on the "disaffected" Regulars, 
hoping to attract their support for Andrew McShane and the 
other ODA candidates. The reformers consented to this "cor­
rupt bargain," believing it a necessary, though evil, expe­
dient. The patronage system was, after all, the epitome of 
ring rule, sustaining an unqualified, regressive administra-
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tion in office, adding unnecessarily to the cost of govern­
ment, and denying men of talent and intelligence the oppor­
tunity for public service. But there was, as well, virtue in 
necessity. Political patronage had helped defeat the "Old" 
Regulars (or at least the ODA believed it had) and could be 
used to sustain the ODA in office and further its conception 
of good government and progressive municipal reform. The 
continuation of the patronage system, if only on a temporary 
basis, also had an immediate benefit. It provided the 
McShane administration with experienced workers, allowing it 
to continue services without interruption and to pursue its 
political reforms, including civil service, without distrac­
tion. 3X
Accomplishing all this was, however, easier said than 
done. In several municipal and parochial departments, ODA 
officials "purged" dozens of experienced (RDO) workers, re­
placing them with men of unknown ability and little experi­
ence. And, to compound the issue, ODA leaders in the tradi­
tional Regular wards and precincts, themselves recent con­
verts to anti-Regular reform, awarded jobs almost exclusive­
ly to former Regular Democrats, bypassing the reform wing 
of the ODA coalition. The dispute over jobs was so intense 
and personal that it rent the ODA patronage committee in 
two and disrupted the efforts of the McShane administration
3XNew Orleans Item, November 25, December 10, 28, 29,
1920, September 3, November 1, 8, 1922; New Orleans Daily
States, November 28, December 5, 19, 23, 24, 28, 29, 1920.
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and the reformers within the ODA to enact a comprehensive 
municipal civil service law.32
At the state constitutional convention in the spring of 
1921, barely four months after the inauguration of the 
McShane administration, Charles I. Rosen, a charter member 
of the ODA and an inveterate opponent of ring rule, asked 
the convention to incorporate a series of detailed civil 
service provisions in the state constitution. The Rosen 
proposals applied only to New Orleans, superseding other 
municipal civil service laws and the civil service provi­
sions of the commission council charter. Rosen called for 
the creation of an independent, municipal civil service com­
mission, appointed by the governor (though funded by the 
municipal government) and authorized to write and implement 
the policies and regulations governing civil service employ­
ment for New Orleans. Under the Rosen proposals, all munici­
pal personnel, except elected officials, major appointive 
positions (City Attorney, City Treasurer, Clerk of Council), 
teachers, unskilled labor, and the personnel of the various 
independent boards and commissions, would be subject to the 
rules and regulation devised by the new civil service com­
mission. 33
32Ibid.
33New Orleans Daily States, March 15-18, 23, 1921.
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Though the civil service provisions won the support of 
the Committee on Parochial and Municipal Affairs, they did 
not have the support of Colonel Sullivan, Mayor McShane, or 
other ODA delegates. Nor did they have the support of former 
Mayor Behrman (Behrman was a delegate to the consitutional 
convention). Sullivan and the ODA patronage committee 
opposed the Rosen provisions because, as they argued, the 
proposals were too specific and did not belong in a modern 
state constituion. Sullivan favored broader, less detailed 
civil service provisions, granting the legislature the au­
thority to enact civil service legislation for New Orleans. 
And, as a way of placating Rosen and the ODA reformers, he 
and Governor Parker promised to enact the Rosen provisions 
at the next session of the legislature.*+
But Sullivan's reason was disingenuous and his prom­
ise false. Despite their limitations and partisanship, the 
Rosen proposals threatened Sullivan and his organization. In 
effect, the Rosen provisions set a limit on the number and 
sort of "nonexempt" positions and jobs, preventing Sullivan 
and the ODA from expanding their influence. In addition, the 
Rosen proposals placed municipal civil service under a state 
agency, mandated by the constitution, serving at the discre­
tion of the governor, authorized to adopt civil service 
policies and regulations free of "political" pressures, and
3'*New Orleans Item. April 27, 1921, September 13, Novem­
ber 8, 1922; New Orleans Daily States. April 27, 1921.
544
£unded by the municipal government. Hardly the ideal circum­
stances for an unreconstructed spoilsman like John Patrick 
Sullivan or a partisan reformer like John Milliken Parker. 
Sullivan and Parker convinced Rosen to retract his propo­
sals, promising to enact them or something like them in next 
session of the legislature. After "mature reflection," Rosen 
withdrew the provisions, but a municipal civil service bill 
was never introduced during John Parker's term, and civil 
service reform remained an elusive, though intensely de­
bated, reform for the next several years.33
The Municipal Survey Commission, too, blamed the 
"spoils system" for the administrative paralysis of the New 
Orleans municipal government. "From 1900 to 1920," the MSC 
wrote, "New Orleans was controlled, literally, by a soviet 
of municipal employees. Under this condition,...the public 
service in New Orleans had reached a point...of practically 
complete administrative collapse. Standards of public ser­
vice had become so lowered as to be nearly non-existent. It 
will be a generation before New Orleans ceases to pay, 
heavily, because street paving, repair, and maintenance, the
33Ibid.; Schott, "John M. Parker," 386; Kemp, ed., Martin 
Behrman of New Orleans. 320. Rosen acknowledged that the 
purpose of his proposals was to prevent the growth of a 
second political machine, one more powerful and corrput than 
the RDO. Mayor Behrman opposed the Rosen provisions because 
he opposed civil service, not because it threatened the 
political hegemony of the RDO, but because it hindered the 
formulation of public policy and lessened administrative 
control over workers. Behrman also opposed the provision 
giving a state agency control over municipal civil service.
See Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman of New Orleans. 295-301.
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construction and repair of public buildings, were not pro­
perly supervised or planned, because data essential to pro­
per planning and administration were not kept...[and] 
because the public, as a whole, was inert, and permitted 
it."3a
The MSC placed much of the blame for the "administra­
tive collapse" on the Behrman administration for establish­
ing and perpetuating the "soviet of municipal employees" The 
1900 civil service law and the 1912 commission council char­
ter provided "no effective system for the selection of fit 
employees," and the ambiguities and specific exemptions of 
those laws allowed for dismissals based on "political 
grounds". Though the MSC did not blame the ODA or the 
McShane administration for using the spoils system to remove 
the Regulars from power, the MSC cautioned the new organiza­
tion and administration against continuing the old system 
and contributing to the administrative paralysis of the 
municipal government. "The continuation of the [present 
civil service] operation and method, however, will consti­
tute a grave reflection upon the present administration. No 
new law is necessary for the present Commission council to 
install a proper system of government...New law may be 
necessary to protect a proper system against destruction in 
the future, but is not necessary for installation. Lack of
3BMunicipal Survey Commission, Administrative Survey of 
the Government of the City of New Orleans. 48.
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the law is no excuse for inaction. However, to forbid parti­
san or factional activity by employees [and abuse of the 
employment practices by the municipal government], a consti­
tutional amendment is necessary."37
The MSC, however, rejected the Rosen proposals as un­
justified and impractical intrusions on the administrative 
and political authority of the city, eroding the powers of 
the commission council without effecting real civil service 
reform. The Roen proposals denied the municipal government 
the authority to decide fundamental issues of public policy 
and to manage public programs. "The [public] policy [of the 
city], the plan adoption, the program-making, must be in the 
hands of elective public servants, answerable to the elec­
torate, aided and advised by a limited number of appointed 
deputies charged with the duty of seeing the agreed policy 
carried out." "For this reason, we are opposed to any legis­
lation which shall place in the hands of the State author­
37Ibid.. 48-49. The 1896 municipal charter created a 
civil service commission for New Orleans, placing many 
municipal employees (the number is uncertain) under civil 
service regulations. The civil service commission was, at 
least according to the reformers who enacted the law, in­
dependent of politics and the spoils system. Over the next 
several years, however, the Regular Democrats managed to 
alter the civil service regulations, eventually reorganizing 
the civil service commission and rewriting the civil service 
regulations. Nussbaum, "Progressive Politics in New 
Orleans," 76, 87-88, 92-96; Reynolds, Machine Politics in 
New Orleans. 58-61; Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman of New 
Orleans. 295-96, fn. 5. The BMR reported that there were 
8,000 government workers in New Orleans; 2,600 under the 
commission council and the rest divided among the state and 
parochial departments. Of those 8,000, 2,600 were under 
state and municipal civil service.
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ities as such or any Commission or agency of the State, as 
such, any division of authority over the employees of gov­
ernmental agencies properly subordinate to the municipal 
government of New Orleans." It was the duty and obligation 
of the commission council, then, to determine the fundamen­
tal civil service policies of New Orleans, depoliticizing 
municipal employment practices, recruiting and retaining 
competent employees, and protecting them and the administra­
tion of public affairs against political and personal fac­
tionalism. 30
The MSC urged the commission council to create a Bureau 
of Employment and Personnel Supervision, a reconstituted 
Civil Service Commission, answerable only to the commission 
council, and empowered to establish civil service regula­
tions and procedures that supplemented the employment and 
public policies of the commission council. The policies and 
procedures established by the council and implemented by the 
Bureau of Employment and Personnel Supervision should, the 
MSC recommended, apply to all divisions and departments 
under the political and administrative authority of the city 
and parish. The only exceptions would be the chief deputies 
and confidential clerks of all elective officials.33
3BIbid., 50 (first quotation), 15 (second quotation). 
3"Ibid.. 51-53.
The McShane administration and the ODA leadership 
ignored the civil service recommendations of the Municipal 
Survey Commission, refusing to relinquish their political 
"advantage”. Rather, the McShane council sought greater 
economy and accountability in municipal government by revis­
ing the financial, taxation, and assessment policies of the 
municipal government. The administration failed to reform 
the fiscal and assessment policies of the city, exacerbating 
the city’s financial condition and jeopardizing several es­
sential city services, like fire and police protection, 
water and drainage, paving, and education. That failure 
stemmed from a combination of personal and political intran­
sigence to change, inexperience and incompetence in the 
municipal government, and, perhaps most important, a height­
ened rural bias against New Orleans, in part the fault of 
John Parker and the anti-Regular reformers of New Orleans.
In its lenghty and exhaustive report on the financial 
condition and procedures of New Orleans, the Bureau of Muni­
cipal Research found the city’s financial condition deplor­
able and its financial administration cumbersome and ineffi­
cient, impeded by constitutional restrictions and uncoordin­
ated effort. The city operated under a rigid set of tax re­
strictions and limitations. The original purpose of those 
limitations and restrictions was to preserve the financial 
credit of the city. "That purpose," the BMR wrote, "was com­
mendable, but the means adopted was cumbersome and round-
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about" and impractical. Those limitations, the BMR pointed 
out, denied the people of New Orleans "the right, either by 
popular vote or through the acts of their duly elected rep­
resentatives, to pass on the amounts of their expenditures, 
and to some extent even on the purpose of their expenditure, 
without first obtaining the consent of the citizens of the 
entire state". And it was, as the BMR concluded, "an expedi­
ent of doubtful value". Still, the BMR recommended nothing 
more than a "revision of the involved provisions governing 
tax rates in such a manner as to give to cities a greater 
measure of home rule in their purely local affairs, without 
removing the safeguards now thrown about the security of in­
vestments in municipal bonds".*0
The local financial arrangement, itself imbedded in the 
state constitution, allowed political interest to determine 
the financial policies of the city. The determination and 
management of the city's debt, tax, and assessment policies 
were divided among three independent, and at times rival, 
public authorities, the Board of Liquidation City Debt 
(BLCD), the Board of Assessors, and the commission council. 
That sort of financial arrangement resulted in a duplication 
of effort, added immeasureably to the cost of government, 
and, understandably, contributed to the city's miserable 
financial condition. The city spent a disporportional amount 
of its taxing power and revenue on debt management, permit-
*°Ibid. . 144-45, 147.
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ted electoral politics to influence assessment policies and 
practices, and saddled the financial administration of the 
city with ineffective collection and record procedures. The 
BMR recommended, then, the elimination of the BLCD, the 
Board of Assessors, and the creation of a uniform system of 
debt and revenue management under a single municipal admin­
istrator . **■
The Municipal Survey Commission recommended the adop­
tion of several of the more technical and administrative 
reforms proposed by the BMR, but the MSC refused to endorse 
any of the principal political reforms. Though the BMR 
praised several of the policies of the BLCD, the Bureau 
called for the gradual elimination of the board, turning its 
duties over to the commission council. The MSC was "greatly 
impressed" by the BMR recommendations on debt management, 
and, though it could not "presume to pass judgment upon the 
details of...the various suggestions," it recommended that 
the commission council, BLCD, S&WB, and PBRRC study them 
with care. But nowhere in its report, however, did the MSC 
contemplate eliminating the Board of Liquidation or turning 
its duties over to the commission council.
The Municipal Survey Commission acknowledged, however, 
the "grave need" for a thorough revision of the assessment 
and revenue policies of the municipal government. The MSC
•*xIbid. r 72-74, 92-122.
•*aIbid.. 20.
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recommended the "standardization and equalization" of all 
real property within Orleans Parish, requiring the Board of 
Assessors to assess real property and improvements to real 
property separately and assigning a standard and uniform 
value to all property. The MSC did not recommend the aboli­
tion of the Board of Assessors, but urged the McShane admin­
istration to work with the present Board "in an earnest and 
sincere effort to accomplish the needed reforms.... If such 
co-operation fails, then the question of...abolishing the 
present system of seven separately elected assessors must 
necessarily become a vital issue.
The McShane administration disregarded all but of a few 
of the proposals of the Municipal Survey Commission, and its 
fiscal reform policy consisted of reducing the assessment 
rate from its wartime high of ninety percent to eighty-five 
percent of assessed value, imposing a new method of
'"3Ibid.. 17-21, 122-38. The BMR reported that the munici­
pal government of New Orleans taxed personal property at a 
higher rate of assessment than real property. "The low per 
capita assessed value of real estate in New Orleans, in com­
parison with those of other cities in its population group 
and of other cities in the same section of the country, 
would indicate...one of two things— either that New Orleans 
is a very poor city or that its real estate is very much un­
derassessed. The unusually high per capita assessment of 
personal property, on the other hand, eliminates the theory 
that it is a poor city." In 1921, the BMR reported, forty- 
four percent of New Orleans's revenues came from real estate 
taxes. The national average was fifty-two percent. New 
Orleans received thirty-one percent of its tax revenues from 
personal property tax, while the national average was only 
thirteen percent. But New Orleans was, and in many ways 
remains, a very poor city, purposely placing the tax burden 
on corporation wealth and commerical activities.
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budgeting and accounting (recommended by the BMR and MSC) on 
most municipal departments, and attempting to revise the 
assessment policies of the city along the lines recommended 
by the BMR and the MSC. Only the new budgetary provisions 
achieved any success. The reduction in the assessment rate 
jeopardized vital public services, compelling the McShane 
commission council to shift appropriations, curtail ser­
vices, and delay new projects. The commission council agreed 
that the city had to develop a comprehensive paving policy 
and enact a comprehensive zoning and planning ordinance. 
There was no agreement on the details of the plans or their 
financial and political costs. The administration also 
agreed that New Orleans needed to modernize and standardize 
its assessment policies (though the commission council was 
unwilling to place more of the tax burden on property hold­
ers), and it began working with the Board of Assessors on a 
plan to initiate the reforms urged by the BMR and the Muni­
cipal Survey Commission. These were assignments that would 
have taxed the capabilities and fortitude on any municipal 
government. They bankrupted the McShane administration.**
'•'•New Orleans Daily States, February 16, 1919, March 22- 
23, April 2, August 5, December 19, 1921; New Orleans Item. 
August 3, December 19, 1921, September 3, 1922. Though the 
assessment rate declined, the millage rate rose, giving the 
McShane administration an increase in revenues. Still, it 
was constantly struggling to fund services. One reason was 
the distribution of the revenues. Thirty six cents of every 
dollar went to the Board of Liquidation; only twenty-three 
cents went to the city alimony.
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Early in November, 1921, as the BMR completed its study 
into the administrative and financial condition of New 
Orleans, Commissioner of Public Finance Richard Murphy 
issued a preliminary report (probably gleaned from the BMR 
investigation) urging the commission council to install a 
new system of determining the assessed value of real proper­
ty in New Orleans. As Murphy explained, the "block and lot" 
method of assessment would equalize assessments, reduce 
taxes, generate needed additional revenues, and "depoliti- 
calize" and democratize the tax structure of New Orleans.
The BMR survey would confirm, he told the council, what 
every citizen already knew. The present system of assessment 
and taxation was regressive, inequitable, and politically 
motivated. It protected the interests of "favored" property 
owners (home owners), allowing them to evade taxation and 
shifting the tax burden to the commerical and professional 
classes. Adopting the plan would, as well, fulfill the ODA 
campaign promises, depoliticizing public affairs and estab­
lishing a permanent, progressive municipal government for 
New Orleans.*3
The Murphy plan was, however, inadequate. Despite the
*3New Orleans Item. November 19, 1921, March 15, 1922; 
Administrative Survey of the Government of the Citv of New 
Orleans, 73-74, 125-28, 137. Murphy argued that the "block 
and lot" method (critics labled it "block and tackle") would 
add between $100,000,000 and $150,000,000 to the assessment 
rolls, mostly from tax dodgers and the politically well- 
connected, augmenting the city treasury by nearly one mil­
lion dollars.
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justice of some of its provisions, the proposal did not 
favor the equalization of assessments, the depoliticization 
of assessment practices, or the establishment of permanent 
reform. The McShane commission council had no intention (and 
could not muster the political courage} of attempting to re­
vise the state constitution, deposing the elective Board of 
Assessors and replacing it with an appointed bureau of 
accountants, clerks, and assorted "experts'' in assessment 
procedures. The progressive reform ideology of the BMR may 
have urged a more efficient and an equitable rearrangement 
of the lines of public authority, but public sentiment de­
manded a democratic and, ironically, inequitable assessment 
of private property.
The problem of equalization of assessment, though, went 
beyond the question of removing the Orleans Parish Board of 
Assessors.""7 Nor was it simply a matter of convincing the 
citizens of New Orleans to equalize assessments or to shift
'""The commission council did not have the authority to 
assess real or personal property, though the council could 
review the decisions of the Board of Assessors. Even that 
review was severely restricted by state law and was "merely 
advisory" since only the board of Assessors and the Board of 
State Affairs (Equalization Board) could reduce assessments. 
Act 231 Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of 
Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1920: Ivy G. Kittredge to 
Richard M. Murphy, July 27, 1922, Assistant City Attorney 
Rene A. Viosca to George Thoele, Secretary to the Board of 
Equalization for Orleans Parish, September 10, 1923, vol.10, 
CAP. CA, NOPL.
'"‘'Orleans Parish had seven elected assessors, one each 
for the seven municipal districts of New Orleans. Each of 
the other sixty-three parishes had one elected assessor for 
the entire parish.
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the burden of taxation to other classifications of property 
and wealth. And, as the MSC survey revealed, it was not a 
partisan issue, with "machine" politicians aligned against 
change and the "progressive reformers" dedicated to economy, 
efficiency, and democracy.
As early as 1915, the Behrman administration, seeking 
financial and political independence from the state legis­
lature and the rural parishes that dominated it, demanded 
the equalization of assessment within Orleans Parish and 
throughout the state. In March of that year, the commission 
council arranged for the Bureau of Municipal Research to 
study the financial circumstances of the city, instructing 
the BMR to recommend ways for the city to equalize assess­
ments within the parish, increase municipal revenues, and 
establish a measure of financial independence from the state 
government.
In many ways, the 1915-1916 BMR report anticipated the 
municipal survey of 1921-1922. The BMR recommended replac­
*aAs Jon C. Teaford has pointed out, it would be a mis­
take to assume that the so-called machine politicians were 
incompetent, corrupt, and profligate with public revenues.
It would be a mistake, as well, to believe that the business 
reformers were competent, incorruptable, and conservative in 
the financial affairs of the city. "Tight money and high in­
terest rates," Teaford wrote, "may have been more decisive 
in determining whether sewers were built and waterworks 
expanded." See Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph. 283-84, 
"Finis for Tweed and Steffens: Rewriting the History of Ur­
ban Rule," Reviews in American History. 10 (December 1982), 
143, "New Life For An Old Subject: Investigating the Struc­
ture of Urban Rule," American Quarterly. 37 (Winter 1985), 
349, 351-52.
■•"New Orleans Item, March 5, 19, 1915.
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ing the Board of Assessors with a special assessment board 
appointed by the mayor and charged with the equalization of 
assessment throughout the parish. Under the new arrangement, 
the commission council would set assessment policies, stan­
dardizing the assessment rate, repealing exemptions on "pri­
vate" (Catholic parochial) schools, assessing real estate at 
rates comparable to personal property rates, and centraliz­
ing financial authority in the office of the Commissioner of 
Public Finance. The principal recommendation, however, con­
cerned the state assessment and taxing policies. The BMR 
recommended the abolition of the direct state tax on real 
and personal property, apportioning the tax revenues among 
the parishes in proportion to all revenues raised for local 
purposes.®0
The Behrman administration was thoroughly disappointed 
in the BMR recommendations. The administration had no inten­
tion of replacing the Board of Assessors (though Behrman 
would have gladly eliminated the Board of Liquidation) or 
repealing the exemptions for church property. And though it 
welcomed recommendations designed to enhance revenues and to 
alleviate the heavy state tax burden on the city, the BMR
®°New Orleans Item, March 5, 19, June 8, September 8, 
November 24, 1915, January 1, 11, April 30, 1916; New 
Orleans Daily States. January 6, 1916; New Orleans Times- 
Picavune. March 6, 1915, January 6, 1916; Ethel Hutson, "New 
Orleans Survey," National Municipal Review, 5 (July 1916), 
522-23; "Miss Hutson's Rejoinder," NMR. 5 (October 1916), 
705-06; Herbert R. Sands, "New Orleans Survey— A Reply,"
NMR. 5 (October 1916), 703-05.
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proposals would have placed a greater burden on real estate 
and would have increased the amount of taxes the city paid 
to the state, while decreasing taxes in rival parishes like 
Jefferson and St.Bernard. To increase personal property 
taxes while decreasing the taxes paid by New Orleans Railway 
and Light Company or the Cumberland Telephone Company was 
unacceptable to the Regular Democrats and to the voters of 
New Orleans. And, as Mayor Behrman and the commission coun­
cil recognized, equalization of assessment had to apply to 
all parishes. The BMR proposal for "equalized" assessment 
would penalize New Orleans, forcing Orleans property owners 
to pay more taxes, receiving fewer state services in re­
turn. The administration and the financial leaders of the 
city would never increase local taxes or equalize assessment 
policies until all parishes followed suit.*x
Despite these obstacles. Commissioner Murphy pressed
sxHutson, "New Orleans Survey," 523; "Miss Hutson's Re­
joinder," 705. Equalization of assessment remained an in­
tense issue throughout the Progressive Era in Louisiana. The 
Pleasant administration tried to resolve the issue, but was 
unsuccessful. The constituitonal convention of 1920 provided 
for uniformity of property tax assessment, but the Louisiana 
Tax Commission, the body charged with that task, failed to 
perform its duty. "Failure of the commission to supervise 
the assessors and to insure uniformity of property taxation, 
as required by law," writes the premier student of Louisiana 
constitutional history, "led to the rapid emergence of 
seventy autonomous sheikdoms in which each assessor was 
essentially free to value and assess property as he 
pleased." The emergence may have come sooner than this stu­
dent realized, but the causes he attributed to the failure 
are undeniably true. Carleton, "Elitism Sustained: The Loui­
siana Constitution of 1974," Tulane Law Review. 54 (April 
1980), 579-80.
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for the adoption of his plan. In haste and without any pub­
lic debate on the issue, Henry Umbach, the president of the 
Board of Assessors, Robert W. Riordan, chairman of the Loui­
siana Tax Commission, and the Board of Liquidation gave the 
plan their tenative approval. Acting on their advice (but 
without the approval of the City Attorney; Murphy referred 
the plan to the City Attorney as an afterthought), the com­
mission council agreed to accept Murphy's proposals as the 
basis for assessment reform and instructed the Commissioner 
of Public Finance to prepare the "appropriate" legislation 
for the adoption of the plan.32
At the legislative session in June, Murphy described 
for the General Assembly tbc disabilities and political 
evils of the current assessment policies, arguing that the 
city could no longer afford a regressive, politically biased 
tax and assessment system. In contrast, the "block and lot" 
system would reduce rates, increase revenues, and promote 
"greater democracy" in Hew Orleans. Though the plan was com­
plete and required no revision by the legislature, it needed 
the financial assistance of the state government. Commis­
sioner Murphy estimated the cost of installing the block and 
lot plan at $150,000, and he asked the legislature to con­
tribute $60,000 to help the city defray the cost. And though 
the House of Representatives passed the Murphy bill, the 
state Senate, obviously concerned with the excessive costs,
s2New Orleans Item. November 19, 1921, March 15, 1922.
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rejected the bill, effectively killing the plan.93
Despite the action of the state legislature and its own 
financial difficulties, the commission council ordered the 
adoption of the Murphy plan, commissioning Stoner, Gallagher 
and Gross, a Houston engineering firm, to implement the 
block and lot system. From the start, unexpected delays, 
petty bickerings, and growing doubts about the efficacy and 
equality of the block and lot system, impeded installation. 
Stoner, Gallagher and Gross took eight months to complete 
its survey, requiring the Board of Assessors to delay the 
assessment of property for several months and finally for­
cing the board to revert to the old method of establishing 
assessed value. The delays jeopardized city services and 
threatened the city's credit rating, irritating the citizens 
and creditors of New Orleans and rupturing the "tentative" 
consensus on the Murphy plan.9*
After the legislature rejected the Murphy plan, the 
Board of Assessors grew apprehensive about the block and lot 
system. In a formal statement, the Board of Assessors warned 
that "extreme care should be exercised in the adoption or 
installation of any [assessment] system in conflict with ex­
isting statutory provisions...”. Without the specific sanc­
tion and protection of state law, the city administration
"New Orleans Item, June 14, July 3, 19, September 13, 
October 4, 17, 1922; New Orleans Daily States. April 23,
June 21, 1923.
"New Orleans Item, January 10, May 13, 31, 1923; New 
Orleans Daily States. January 10, 11, May 15, 28, 1923.
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risked countless lawsuits and endless delays, threatening 
the repeal of assessment reform and the city with financial 
bankruptcy. Martin Behrman cautioned, as he had in the past, 
that the adoption of an equalized rate of assessment, unless 
applied uniformly within each parish and throughout the 
state, would jeopardize the interests of New Orleans, re­
quiring the city to pay a disproportional share of the state 
property tax and, in effect, subsidizing the other parishes 
and the state with its tax revenues. And, despite its 
claims, the Murphy plan did not equalize assessments or 
democratize the tax structure of New Orleans. The block and 
lot system placed a greater share of the assessment and tax 
burden on the small property owners, compelling them to pay 
an excessive share of the property tax of the city.**
Distrubed by the implications of the block and lot plan 
and disenchanted with the McShane administration, the Board 
of Assessors (every one a Regular Democrat) rejected the 
assessment figures calculated by Stone, Gallagher and Gross, 
referring to them as an "alien and incompetent assessment" 
based on an unproven and suspect system. The board ordered a 
reassessment of property values under the old method, in 
effect leaving the McShane administration with a deficit 
and compelling it to reallocate resources and to curtail
**New Orleans Item. September 3, 1922, February 18, May
13, 31, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. May 15, 28, 1923.
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city services.**
In December, 1920, at the inauguration of the McShane 
administration, the Association of Commerce sent a survey to 
one hundred business and professional executives, asking 
them to rank the city's essential "civic improvement" needs. 
Predictably, the civic and business leaders of New Orleans 
neglected the issues of public education, decent, affordable 
housing, "full employment” and a "living wage," public 
health, and child welfare. Rather, their chief interests and 
priorities concerned the commerical and physical improvement 
and development of the city. And, unquestionably, their 
principal concern was the adoption of a comprehensive paving 
and commerical transportation system, designed to enhance 
commerical and residental property values and to accelerate 
the pace and profit of commerical traffic in New Orleans. 
Regretably, adopting a comprehensive paving plan meant 
diverting precious financial and social resources from vital 
city services like fire and police protection (driving up 
the cost of business and residential insurance) and water, 
drainage, and sanitation. Nevertheless, the Association of 
Commerce and the reform press considered paving and a city 
plan among the primary concerns of the new administration.
And, despite reservations about depriving other essential
""New Orleans Item. May 13, 31, June 3, August 5, October
28, 30, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. May 15, June 7, Sep­
tember 21, 25, October 29, 1923.
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city services of money already appropriated to them, the 
McShane administration diverted money and energy to paving 
and zoning.
During the mayoral campaign, the ODA and the city press 
blamed the Behrman administration for the inexcusable condi­
tion of city streets, complaining that the street assessment 
policy of the administration penalized property owners, 
bloated cost, and prevented the development of a comprehen­
sive paving plan. According to the New Orleans Item, only 
twenty-seven percent of the streets in New Orleans were 
paved or surfaced, making New Orleans the "worst paved city 
in the country". Since 1915, the Item reported, when the 
commission council adopted a new paving and street assess­
ment ordinance, the city administration paved only thirty- 
nine miles of streets, leaving 470 miles of unimproved dirt 
roads in Orleans Parish. Nature was, to be sure, the princi­
pal enemy of New Orleans streets. The city was, after all, 
reclaimed from an immense and imposing cypress swamp that 
threatened the foundation of every home, building, and 
street in New Orleans. Much of the city remained undeveloped
S7New Orleans Daily States. June 17, September 29, Octo­
ber 4, 6, 29, December 4, 1920. The businessmen also in­
cluded the introduction of natural gas and the construction 
of more hotels as their principal concerns. Assessment 
reform and a comprehensive city plan were not among their 
priorities. For an informative account of the city planning 
movement in the urban South, see Blaine A. Brownell, "The 
Commerical-Civic Eilte and City Planning in Atlanta, Mem­
phis, and New Orleans in the 1920s," The Journal of Southern 
History. XLI (August 1975), 339-68.
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and did not require the immediate attention of the commis­
sion council. The war, too, contributed to the deplorable 
condition of city streets, making it difficult to obtain the 
financial, material, and human resources to maintain and ex­
pand the streets. But, the Item contended, these circum­
stances were not responsible for the condition of the city 
streets, and they did not excuse the Behrman administration 
from blame. Rather, responsibility for the streets lay with 
the present street paving and assessment ordinance and the 
failure of the city administration to anticipate and provide 
for the development of the city.*8
The Bureau of Municipal Research reiterated the same 
observations and criticisms in its report to the Municipal 
Survey Commission. The BMR, too, recommended revising the 
paving and street assessment laws and ordinances and estab­
lishing a "consistent" and comprehensive policy of paving 
and resurfacing streets. The BMR proposals, however, re­
quired property owners to pay an even greater share of the 
cost of paving and resurfacing and limited (in essence, 
denied) their choice of paving material. Despite these inno­
vations and additional resources, the BMR argued that "it 
would be impractical for the city to undertake a repaving 
program commensurate with (its] real needs". In essence,
""New Orleans Item, January 5, February 17, March 27, 
1919, January 7, 10, 13, 25, 26, 30, 1921, October 14, 1922, 
New Orleans Daily States, June 3, 22, July 26, August 6, 
1919, September 29, October 4, 6, 29, December 4, 1920, June 
14, 1922, February 2, 1923.
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under the existing paving laws and ordinances, the city 
could not afford to rebuild the city streets."
The BMR warned, however, that "the public should be 
under no illusion as to the reality of the need for paving.
It may be said without question that the economic loss ex­
perienced each year by the citizens of New Orleans in the 
form of cost of hauling and operating passenger automobiles 
over the streets as reflected in wear and tear on equipment, 
delays due to traffic congestions, breakdowns, etc. (sic), 
which result from the present deplorable conditions of these 
thoroughfares, is many times greater than the amount of 
money required to provide (a) suitable pavement surface."
"It is imperative," the BMR concluded, "that some definite 
policy be enunciated in the matter and a repaving program 
adopted." The municipal government, the BMR advised, should 
initiate a more comprehensive approach to paving, incorpo­
rating plans for resurfacing streets in preparation for 
eventual repaving and new paving construction that included 
paved and unimproved streets.®0
The Bureau proposed that the city resurface twenty 
miles of streets each year over the next ten years at a cost 
of $8.5 million dollars, roughly dividing the cost between 
the city and property holders. If the municipal government 
failed to initiate a resurfacing program, the BMR predicted,
g"Administrative Survey of the Government of City of New 
Orleans. 209, 211.
"Ibid., 211.
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eventually the deteriorating condition of the streets would 
compel the government to reconstruct those streets, squan­
dering precious resources and jeopardizing new construction 
projects. In addition, the BMR recommended that the commis­
sion council adopt a systematic and comprehensive paving 
program, permitting the city to pave 170 miles of new 
streets over the next fifteen years at a cost of forty-two 
million dollars, twenty-two for paving and twenty million 
for subsurface drainage. Furthermore, since new paving con­
struction increased property values and added "materially" 
to the convenience and the economy of residential and com­
merical life, then residential and commerical property 
owners ought to pay a large majority of the cost."3-
The Municipal Survey Commission, as expected, affirmed 
the paving recommendations of the BMR. "Preparing, financing 
and initiating a comprehensive programme of street improve­
ment," the MSC wrote, "will be the greatest single contri­
bution the present city administration can make to the econ­
omy, comfort and efficiency of living and working in New 
Orleans." And the MSC believed that a "consistent" and sys­
tematic paving program, if "thoughtfully devised and compre­
hensively applied," was the only alternative to "the far 
more costly continuance of the loose and aimless procedure 
of the past. The present city administration is being sum­
moned to plan and execute now things which should have been
glIbid.. 211-14.
566
planned and in execution long since. Delay and neglect in 
the past add(ed) to the difficulties and the cost now neces­
sary, but further delay can only further enhance those dif­
ficulties and those cost." With the assistance of the civic 
and commerical leadership of the city, the commission coun­
cil could devise a consistent and comprehensive paving 
policy and begin construction within two years. The "Compre­
hensive Street Improvement Programme" should include the in­
stallation of a "modern assessment" policy for real and per­
sonal property and a thorough revision of the zoning laws 
and ordinances. And, finally, the paving plan must compli­
ment and support the development of a comprehensive city 
plan, designed to direct and further the commercial and 
civic growth of New Orleans. Without such a systematic and 
comprehensive approach to city management. New Orleans would 
continue its perceptable, though reversible, decline among 
the nation's great cities.Ba
Regretably, from the perspective of the MSC and the 
commerical elect it represented, the "loose and aimless" 
practices of the past continued under the McShane adminis­
tration. Pressured by the civic and business leadership, the 
commission council responded first to the immediate need to 
maintain city streets, preserving existing property values 
and speeding commerical traffic in the "developed" portions 
of the city. Meeting this demand required reallocating the
BaIbid.. 32-33.
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city's meager revenues (the McShane administration lowered 
the assesment rate and decreased taxes), depriving citizens 
of certain city services, and incurring additional debt.*3 
The 1922 paving scheduled called for the city to pave 
or resurface thirty streets at a cost to the city of 
$560,000. But the city government appropriated only $125,000 
for street paving and major resurfacing projects. Rather 
than curtailing street projects, McShane administration con­
sidered "emergency" budget revisions to meet the demands of 
the Association of Commerce and the press for "good 
streets". The Association of Commerce proposed that the city 
administration retain the assessment rate at ninety percent 
(though the association urged a further increase in the 
homestead exemption, depriving the city of $320,000 in reve­
nue) and issue new "paving certificates" bearing higher in­
terest rates to attract investors. But the city council, an­
xious to fulfill its campaign promises to reduce taxes and 
"depoliticize" public affairs, wanted to dedicate budget 
savings to maintaining streets while it considered perma­
nent methods of funding the comprehensive paving plan. Com­
missioner of Public Utilities Maloney suggested diverting 
$400,000 from the franchise tax to fund paving, and Commis­
sioner of Public Safety Stanley Ray urged the council to 
ask the legislature for the authority to impose a special.
®3New Orleans Item, December 4, 14-18, 22, 1921, New Or­
leans Daily States. December 15, 16, 20, 21, 27, 1921.
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permanent two mill tax dedicated to municipal paving. An in­
crease in the millage rate would generate millions of 
dollars in recurring revenue, permitting the council to 
lower the assessment rate and reduce the tax burden on the 
average taxpayer.**
But the business and civic leadership were unwilling to 
wait for the legislature to convene and for the citizens of 
the state to vote New Orleans a special millage increase. 
Instead, they sought immediate relief and demanded that the 
people of New Orleans sacrifice some city services for the 
more essential and immediate need for paving. James Thomson, 
the publisher of the Item, favored using permanent revenues 
to fund the paving program, but he, like many civic and com­
merical leaders, opposed any increase in the millage rate. 
Rather, he recommended that the Orleans Parish School Board 
surrender two of its six and a half mills to the municipal 
government for paving. Thomson's proposal was, frankly, pre­
posterous, but was indicative of the fanatical dedication 
men like Thomson had for paving. Their persistence compelled 
the commission council to rededicate funds to paving and re­
surfacing projects. The McShane administration agreed to 
transfer funds from the fire and police departments, the 
free clinics operated by the New Orleans Board of Health, 
and salary increases for municipal workers to the Municipal
a«Ibid.
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Repair Plant and to the paving program.09
Still, by the end of the summer, 1922, the commerical 
and civic "elite" of New Orleans was clearly dissatisfied 
with the approach of the McShane administration to street 
maintenance and new street construction. The "pay-as-you-go" 
policy of the McShane commission council continued the 
same "loose and aimless" policy of the Behrman years. The 
city administration needed to ask the present and the future 
generations to share in the expense of removing New Orleans 
from the mud. New Orleans, the Item editorialized, is a 
"rich city, and an old center of accumulated wealth. It is 
absurb to say that it cannot raise the money for paving if 
its people make up their minds to come out of the mud". But 
the problem was never that simple. For, despite the amateur 
sociology and glib assurances of the Item. New Orleans was 
not a wealthy city, though there were pockets of wealth in 
the city, principally in the Garden District and the "Uni­
versity Section". These areas, however, were the centers of 
the anti-Regular reform movement that had demanded a reduc­
tion in assessment rates and property taxes. In addition, 
these sections of New Orleans were already paved (though 
in need of repair or resurfacing) and did not want to be 
assessed for new paving construction outside their own
" N e w  Orleans Item. February 2, 14, August 13, 1921, 
March 10-14, 26-31, July 17-28, August 1, 1922; New Or­
leans Daily States. August 9, 16, 1921, March 26, 27, 1922, 
February 7, 1923.
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areas or the downtown business district."®
Initiating a comprehensive paving and resurfacing plan, 
then, required a thorough restructuring of municipal assess­
ment and taxation policies and reorienting of city politics. 
And, given the legal and political obstacles standing before 
the McShane administration, it was understandable that the 
commission council approach the recommendations of the MSC 
and the Association of Commerce slowly and cautiously. In 
early February Mayor McShane called an "informal" meeting of 
the commission council to assess its "sentiment" on a paving 
and assessment plan he had developed. The plan called for 
dedicating either a new one mill tax to paving or dividing 
an existing mill between the commission council and the Sew­
erage and Water Board. In addition, the mayor proposed in­
creasing the debt limitation under the 1916 refunding act, 
permitting the commission council to fund the paving program 
immediately and recouping its expenses through the permanent 
paving assessment."7
The New Orleans Item and the Association of Commerce 
reacted bitterly to the McShane plan. It was inconceivable, 
the Item wrote, that after all the public discussion about 
the need for a comprehensive revision in the assessment and 
paving policies of the city, that Mayor McShane would offer 
a plan that promised to wreck the paving program before it
""Ibid.
®7New Orleans Item. February 3, 4, 6, March 18, 23, 1923
New Orleans Daily States. March 18, 1923.
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began and threatened the Sewerage and Water Board with 
financial ruin. The Association of Commerce, divided and un­
able to agree on a single plan, made two recommendations.
The initial plan authorized the S&WB to build the subsurface 
system and pave the streets. Property owners in the drainage 
and paving area would be assessed for the cost of the entire 
subsurface project and a prorated portion of the surface 
paving. The Sewerage and Water Board would fund subsurface 
construction by increasing water rates fifty percent for all 
customers. The commission council would meet the cost of 
street paving by issuing paving certificates underwritten by 
a special two mill increase. The second recommendation 
called for the creation of a "Special Independent Paving 
Commission" authorized to built new streets. The paving com­
mission, too, would fund new construction by "floating" 
paving certificates backed by a two mill increase in the tax 
rate.68
The Association of Commerce proposals were complex, ex­
pensive, inequitable, and undemocratic. Both plans required 
several constitutional and charter revisions, necessitating 
hours of costly legal research and political lobbying and 
distracting the council and the public from other, equally 
important issues. The association's plans were too costly 
from both a financial and a social aspect. It was unconscio­
s"New Orleans Daily States. January 3, March 12, 20,
April 19, November 29, 1923; New Orleans Item. March 20, 23,
April 19, 24, May 30, June 3, November 29, 1923.
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nable to raise rates on a necessity of life to fund a com­
prehensive paving plan. The plan discriminated against the 
unimproved areas of New Orleans, requiring them to pay for 
the entire cost of the subsurface construction and a higher 
price for street paving. Revenues from the general property 
tax, imposed on all property owners regardless of the loca­
tion and condition of their property, helped build the 
streets and subsurface drainage in those improved and ex­
clusive neighborhoods. On the other hand, property owners in 
the established residential areas and the central business 
district were virtually exempt from assisting in the devel­
opment of the unimproved areas of the city. Finally, even as 
the Item recognized, the creation of another special board 
ignored the recommendation of the BMR, undermining the demo­
cratic process and eroding the authority of the commission 
council.”
For the next several months the Association of Commerce 
and the McShane administration exchanged proposals. The 
businessmen opposed any increase in the millage rate, 
arguing instead that property owners in the drainage and 
paving areas should pay at least ninety-five percent of the 
total cost. The entire city, they contended, should not be 
compelled to pay for the improvements enjoyed by a small 
segment of the population. They proposed, however, a size-
8*New Orleans Item, March 29, April 10, July 30, November
29, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. March 30, July 4, 30,
August 2, November 29, 1923.
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able increase in debt limitation for public improvements, a 
fifty percent increase in the water rates charged by the 
Sewerage and Water Board, and an increase in the city 
gasoline tax— assessments imposed on other generations and 
other classes of citizens. The council insisted on a more 
modest increase in the debt limitation (twenty million as 
opposed to thirty-five million) and one mill for paving for 
the next ten years. The council believed that the associa­
tion plan was too costly and patently unfair, possibly 
jeopardizing the city's credit rating and penalizing the 
majority of the people.-70
The dispute continued into the summer, and neither the 
Association of Commerce nor the McShane administration would 
compromise. The state legislature refused to raise the mill- 
age rate, or authorize the S5WB to pave streets. The legis­
lature, however, raised the debt limitation for paving to a 
meager fifteen million dollars and dedicated one cent of the 
state gasoline tax to the municipal government for paving. 
Though Andrew McShane objected to the Bond-Theole paving 
law, other members of the municipal government and the 
president of the Association of Commerce applauded the leg­
islature, calling the new paving act "reasonable, construc-
7°New Orleans Item. November 23, December 12, 23, 1923, 
January 10, February 19, April 2, 29, May 17, 20, 21, 1924; 
New Orleans Daily States. November 23, December 19, 23,
1923; April 30, May 1, 9, 1924; Kittredge to McShane, Janu­
ary 28, 1924, vol.10, CAO, CA, NOPL.
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tive, and practical".-71-
In many ways, the Bond-Theole act was a reasonable and 
constructive solution to the paving problems of New Orleans. 
It increased the debt limitation for public improvements to 
$20,000,000, compelling all property owners to share in the 
expense of paving and allowing the McShane administration to 
expand its paving and resurfacing plans without relying ex­
clusively on "current" revenues. It placed greater finan­
cial obligations on those citizens who benefitted most from 
street improvements, the property owners in the paving areas 
and those citizens who used the city streets for private use 
or business. The Bond-Theole was a more judicious proposal 
than those offered by the Association of Commerce (though it 
could have benefitted from several of the recommendations of 
the McShane administration), which sought to displace the 
authority of the commission council and to shift much of the 
cost of paving to those citizens least able to meet those 
cost. And, it was, from the standpoint of Association of 
Commerce, more equitable than the bill offered by the 
McShane administration. That bill required all property 
owners to share in the expense of paving, though only a rel­
ative few citizens benefitted.
In other ways, however, the Bond-Theole act was more 
indicative of the failure of "business reformism" and the
71-New Orleans Item, June 25, July 1, 8, 1924. Senators 
Nat Bond (Martin Behrman's son-in-law-) and George Theole 
sponsored the 1924 paving law. Both were "Old" Regulars.
McShane administration. In effect, the Association of Com­
merce and the McShane administration represented the same 
economic and social interests. Yet they were incapable of 
consensus, principally because of the flaws and contradic­
tions embedded in the business reform movement. The civic 
and commerical leadership of New Orleans demanded a compre­
hensive rehabilitation of public affairs that, in effect, 
ensured their continued dominance, muffled popular politics, 
and assured the continuation of the "loose and aimless" 
policies of the past. The commercial elite demanded a new 
tax and assessment policy that placed a greater burden on 
public services. In addition, they demanded a massive 
"public" works program that reallocated vital financial and 
social resources and that, frankly, had few immediate social 
or political benefits.
The McShane administration, on the other hand, though 
anxious to undertake the reforms demanded by the civic and 
business elite, could not convince the business leadership 
to respect established democractic policies. Indeed, there 
was no effective reason why the business community should 
respect the efforts of the McShane commission council. Prom 
the start of the McShane administration, the business and 
civic elite presumed to govern in its name, imposing imprac­
tical and aimless reforms on the city council. For its part, 
the McShane commission seemed incapable of resisting the 
political pressures placed on it, resulting in a government
by ad hoc business committees and the continuation of the 
"loose and aimless" policies of the past— a past for which 
the civic and commercial elite and the McShane administra­
tion were now responsible.
Chapter Ten
The Barrone Street Blues
The McShane administration seemed poised and anxious to 
resolve the city's bitter and persistent differences with 
the New Orleans Railway and Light Company. And well it 
should. The Behrman administration seemed incapable (its 
critics said unwilling) of resolving the public utility pro­
blem. Instead, as critics charged, the Behrman administra­
tion, addicted to the old politics and overwhelmed by the 
welter of wartime events, fabricated a series of temporary 
accomdations that did little more than increase rates and 
fares. Perhaps no other issue, these same critics asserted, 
exposed the political and administrative bankruptcy of the 
old regime more or contributed so much to its defeat in 1920 
as the issue of the regulation and rehabilitation of the 
public service industry. And, these critics boasted, no 
other single issue would reveal more the fitness of the 
municipal reform movement to govern New Orleans than the re­
habilitation of New Orleans Railway and Light Company.x
The initial policies and actions of the McShane admin­
istration, however, displayed little of the fitness and 
readiness to govern that the leaders of the civic reform
xNew Orleans Daily States. December 26, 1920, February
16, 1921; New Orleans Item. December 8, 1920, Feburary 16,
March 25, 1925.
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reform movement expected. In February, 1921, one month 
before the expiration of the eight cent ordinance. Receiver 
John O'Keefe, Judge Rufus Foster, and the representatives of 
the major bond holders (the New York Trust Company and the 
Chase National Bank) called on the commission council. It 
was their hope, O'Keefe told the councilmen, to begin dis­
cussion with them for the "complete re-organization and re­
financing of the property [based] on the condition that a 
just and constant return on a fair valuation would be 
granted by the city authorities.2
The city administration, O'Keefe insisted, must "help" 
in the reorganization and rehabilitation of NORLC and NOGLC. 
Those two public service systems, he said, were overburdened 
and deteriorating, and could not, under present conditions, 
meet the public demands for more extensive service. If the 
two principal utility companies in the city were to furnish 
sufficient service now and in the future, then they must be 
allowed to reorganize and refinance themselves in such a 
manner that would preserve previous investments and encour­
age new investment. The only feasible and expedient way to
2New Orleans Daily States. February 16, 1921; New 
Orleans Item. February 16, 1921. The first action taken by 
the new administration was to sue NORLC for the recovery of 
delinquent taxes. The city claimed NORLC owed nearly 
$600,000 in back taxes for 1919 and 1920, and that the eight 
cent fare afforded the company the opportunity to meet its 
civic obligations. Eventually, the city and the receiver 
settled out of court. NORLC paid $332,000 in delinquent 
taxes. See New Orleans Daily States, January 13, 16, 22,
22, 24, March 15, 1921.
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safeguard old investment and to attract new money, O ’Keefe 
suggested, was to assure both a sufficient rate of return 
and a generous valuation. With these guarantees, which only 
the commission council could grant, the stockholders would 
be able to reorganize, rehabilitate, and expand the services 
of the companies.3
The council heard specific recommendations from O'Keefe 
as well. He called on the council to establish the valuation 
of the two companies at $55,000,000, guaranteeing them a 
rate of return of eight percent on current investment and 
eight percent on money contributing to the physical and 
financial rehabilitation of the companies. In addition, the 
receiver proposed that the commission council grant NORLC an 
indeterminate service at cost franchise (NOGLC had an exclu­
sive franchise with the city until 1925) that incorporated 
all operating cost, taxes, replacements, extensions, and the 
rate of return in the cost of service. The O'Keefe proposal 
"granted** the city the right of purchase and gave the com­
mission council authority over scheduling, routes, and 
general corporate expenses, exclusive of stock and bond 
issues.*
Despite the appeal and strengths of the service at cost 
plan, O'Keefe confessed, it could not effect the reorganiza­
tion and rehabilitation of the public service corporations
3New Orleans Item, November 24, 1920, January 21, Febru­
ary 16-17, 1921.
■•Ibid.
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without the consent and assistance of the the municipal 
government and the leading banks in New Orleans. The purpose 
of his presentation, he said, was to convince the commission 
council and the local bankers of the expediency of the 
service-at-cost plan and of the justice of his proposal for 
the rehabilitation of the public service industry.®
O'Keefe could do neither. Rudolph S. Hecht, the presi­
dent of the Hibernia National Bank and the chairman of the 
Bondholders Protection Committee, spoke for the bankers. He 
told O'Keefe that the local banks could not fund the 
rehabilitation of the companies under any circumstances or 
with any guarantees. The city banks simply did not possess 
the necessary capital to refinance NORLC, estimated at over 
twlve million dollars, five million alone in the first year. 
The commission council, too, was unwilling to endorse the 
receiver's recommendations. Commissioner of Public Utilities 
Paul H. Maloney, a tenacious Irish politician from the ex­
clusive Twelfth Ward and the only Regular Democrat on the 
commission council, questioned the wisdom and the justice of 
the service-at-cost plan. Directing his remarks to the 
representatives of the Chase National Bank (6. M. Dahl) and 
the New York Trust Company (M. N. Buckner), Maloney repeated 
the major criticisms of the service-at-cost plan. The plan 
was, he said, to be frank, a windfall for a distressed and 
suspect industry. The SAC plan, as suggested by company man-
3 I b i d .
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agement, required the municipal government and the consumers 
to underwrite and manage the entire cost of business, while 
the management of NORLC, without the conventional incentives 
for efficient and inexpensive service, received an assured 
income and a guaranteed profit. And, more to the point, 
Maloney objected to any suggestion that inflated the value 
of NORLC and offered to pay a return on stocks and bonds 
that never contributed to public service."
The two New York bankers told the Commissioner of Pub­
lic Utilities that they appreciated the administration's 
cautious, skeptical approach to the receiver's plan. Admit­
tedly, the service-at-cost plan was untested and required 
more precise definition and refinement. And, despite the 
practical necessity and justice of O'Keefe's plan, the city 
administration and the receiver seemed unequipped to resolve 
their differences. The bankers suggested that the commission 
council and the receiver submit their differences to a "dis­
interested and competent board of arbitration," possessing
"New Orleans Item, January 21, February 17, 19, 1921; 
New Orleans Daily States. February 16, 18, 1921. O'Keefe's 
proposals had several other well-placed critics, including 
Mayor McShane, Dr. V. K. Irion, Marshall Ballard, editor 
of the Item, and State Senator E. M. Stafford and attorney 
John J. McLoughlin, the two leaders of the anti-eight cent 
fare movement. There were, as well, less notable critics. 
For an example, see William Reese, secretary, Building 
Trades Union to CPU Paul H. Maloney, March 15, 1921 and 
Carpenters Union to CPU Maloney, April 18, 1921, Department 
of Public Utilities, Petitions and Correspondence vol.2,
CA, NOPL. For a generous, though inaccurate, description 
of Maloney's political abilities, see T. Harry Williams, 
Huev Long. 223-24.
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the authority and prestige to bind the administration and 
the company to its decisions. Judge Foster, perhaps sensing 
an opportunity to end the receivership, snapped at the idea. 
Since neither the receiver nor the council seemed capable of 
resolving their differences, he told reporters, then perhaps 
a conference of business and professional men could. With 
that thought in mind, Foster "invited" several leading busi­
nessmen and professionals to meet with him to select a board 
of arbitration.7
Incredibly, Judge Foster informed the conference that 
the commission council and the representatives of NORLC had 
conceded to them the authority to settle the public utili­
ties issue. The council had no intention, of course, of re­
linquishing its authority to the court or to another group 
of "special masters".® Nonetheless, Foster pursued the 
selection of a "citizens advisory commission," appointing 
forty business and professional men, with former NORLC
■'New Orleans Daily States, February 18, 22, 23, 25, 
1921; New Orleans Item. February 18, 22, 23, 25, 1921.
"Commissioner Maloney, emulating former Mayor Behrman 
and former City Attorney I. D. Moore, informed the confer­
ence that the commission council would not be bound by any 
recommendation made by the select committee. New Orleans 
Item. March 21, 1921.
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president Hugh McCloskey serving as chairman.9 Chairman 
McCloskey admonished the select committee to approach the 
investigation with circumspection and objectivity, careful 
to avoid any tincture of prejudice and partisanship. The 
"ultimate" solution, he said, lay with the ability of the 
committee to balance the interests of the public, of the 
employees of NORLC, and of its "legitimate investors". The 
public expected good service and strict financial account­
ability from NORLC, its employees wanted "living wages" and 
decent working conditions, and investors demanded security 
for their investments and a fair rate of return.10
Near the end of March, after several weeks of "full and
mature deliberations," the McCloskey committee issued two
reports. Writing for the majority of the select committee,
chairman Hugh McCloskey prefaced its recommendations with
words critical of management and public authority.
The commerical future of New Orleans [he wrote] is 
inseparably allied with the development of a modern 
public utility corporation which can furnish trans­
portation, power and light at reasonable cost to an 
ever-growing population. To be able to furnish such
"New Orleans Item, March 1, April 9, 1921; New Orleans 
Daily States. March 1, 1921. Committee member Sylvan Levy 
asked McCloskey to expand the committee's membership to in­
clude representatives from the city's "poorer people". But 
McCloskey denied the request, explaining that Foster called 
for a conference of businessmen and professional men. Leigh 
Carroll called on McCloskey to invite V. K. Irion, John J. 
McLoughlin, and B. M. Stafford to join the select committee. 
McCloskey denied them access, too, remarking, disingenously, 
that the conference should avoid any suspicion of partisan­
ship.
10New Orleans Item, March 1, 1921; New Orleans Daily
States, March 1, 1921.
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service it is absolutely essential that the company 
be put on a sound financial basis, and that the man­
agement should enjoy the confidence, respect, and good 
will of the people of New Orleans.
To accomplish those ends, the majority report recommended 
removing "managerial" control from the receiver and the 
board of directors, replacing them with a five-member board 
of trustees, comprised of local businessmen and authorized 
to determine company policy and to oversee its rehabilita­
tion. The board of trustees would select a general manager 
for the company whose duties would include its financial 
reorganization and, with the assistance of the board of 
trustees, the restoration of financial control and manage­
ment to the people of New Orleans.11 The majority report, 
however, was uncertain how the board of trustees and the 
general manager were to restore managerial control to the 
city, particularly since the local banks were incapable of 
financing the rehabilitation of the company.13
Nonetheless, the majority report made several specific 
recommendations for the financial reorganization and the 
physical rehabilitation of NORLC and NOGLC. Unfavorable 
financial conditions and a hostile political climate pre­
vented the receiver from raising the new capital needed to 
extend and improve services. As a result, property and ser­
vice deteriorated badly, undermining public confidence in
“ New Orleans Daily States. March 23-24, 30, 1921; New 
Orleans Item. March 23-24, 30, 1921; Reclassification of the 
Electric Plant, 56-58.
“ Ibid.
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in the ability and willingness of the company to deliver and 
maintain quality services. The company could not improve 
services, the report continued, until it obtained additional 
investment, and it could not obtain new investment until it 
secured present investment against an unfair and illegal re­
adjustment in its valuation. Nor could it regain the confi­
dence and good will of the public by protecting property no 
longer contributing to public service.13
The ownership and management of NORLC and NOGLC, the 
report continued, claimed that valuation rested somewhere 
between its historical or actual cost of $57 million and its 
cost of reproduction at $74 million. Though a valuation of 
$62 or $65 million would secure old money and attract new 
investment, NORLC could not generate sufficient revenue to 
support such an investment. By contrast, "extremists" on the 
other side of the issue insisted that the council base the 
valuation on current low market values. This approach, the 
committee wrote, was patently unfair and clearly unworkable 
and detrimental to the future of the company and the city.
A fairer adjustment, the committee concluded, lay between 
the two extremes. But, the report cautioned, the committee 
did not advocte "paying off securities on that basis, but 
only for the purposes of adjusting the company's capitaliza­
tion in such a way as to eliminate the necessity, or even 
the temptation, of paying dividends on securities which are
X3Ibid.
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not represented by actual values".14
Specifically, the report recommended a "fair technical" 
valuation of $44.7 million, eliminating more than thirty 
million dollars in stocks and bonds that did not contribute 
directly to public service. Eliminating nearly one-third of 
the outstanding stocks and bonds of the company was, the re­
port acknowledged, a difficult and deliberate process, best 
resolved by a reorganization committee of bondholders and 
only after the council adopted a workable rehabilitation 
plan. The McCloskey committee recommended, as well, a uni­
form rate of return of seven percent for old and new invest­
ment. And money raised for the financial and physical reha­
bilitation of the company would, with the consent and appro­
val of the commission council, become part of the "rate base 
valuation". The committee, however, rejected the service-at- 
cost plan proposed by Receiver O'Keefe, describing it as an 
unwise and improper grant of "unlimited power". Instead, the 
report proposed a "modified" service-at-cost plan, fixing 
the rate of return at seven percent and carfare at eight 
cents, and requiring the company to reduce fares if it earn­
ed more than seven percent. Finally, the report recommended 
the consolidation of all street railway franchises into a 
single indeterminate franchise, offered without competitive
x«Ibid.
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bidding to NORLC or its successor.xa
The "ultimate" solution to the utility question, of 
course, did not rest with Judge Foster's ad hoc committee of 
"nonpartisan" businessmen. Rather, it lay with the elected 
commission council and the representatives of the principal 
bondholders. Receiver O'Keefe reserved judgment until he 
consulted with Judge Foster and the major bondholders, but 
the commission council, speaking through Commissioner Paul 
Maloney and assistant City Attorney Michael Provosty, re­
fused to commit itself to the McCloskey recommendations. 
Provosty advised the council that it alone possessed the 
constitutional authority to establish rates and fares, the 
rate of return, and the valuation of the public utility com­
panies. Neither the court nor its hand-selected arbitration 
board, Provosty insisted, had such authority. At best the 
court could determine the "reasonableness" of fares, valua­
tion, and return. Commissioner Maloney grasped the sense and
xaIbid. Initially, a subcommittee on valuation recommend­
ed a valuation of $50 million, but the committee as a whole, 
as a gesture of good will to the people of New Orleans, re­
duced it to $44.7 million: $26 million for the streetcar 
system, $10,048 for the electrical division, and $8,652 for 
NOGLC. The majority report also suggested granting the coun­
cil the option to purchase NOGLC at its initial valuation, 
contending that there could be no permanent solution to the 
public utilities question until the city resolved the 
natural gas controversy and the "future status" of NOGLC.
The minority report, written by Leigh Carroll, Sylvan Levy, 
Walker Spencer, and Robley S. Sterns, argued that the major­
ity report placed the valuation and rate of return too high. 
The minority report proposed a valuation of $40 million, a 
six percent rate of return, an eight cent fare for 1921, and 
seven cent fare for 1922. The minority report also suggested 
that the council purchase NOGLC for $8,652.
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intent of Provosty's opinion. The McShane administration, he 
said, would negotiate strictly with the authorized represen­
tatives of the bondholders and would not permit, as had the 
Behrman administration, incidental issues like wages and 
fares to distract it from the principal issues of franchise 
reform, valuation, and rate of return. But, as Maloney 
revealed in calling for the repeal of the eight cent ordi­
nance, the regulation of rates and fares was anything but 
incidental to the reform and rehabilitation of the public 
service industry.xs
Early in January, Commissioner Maloney, with the aid of 
assistant City Attorney Rene Viosca, wrote a pointed letter 
to John O'Keefe, reminding the receiver that the eight cent 
fare expired at the end of March. The city administration, 
the commissioner wrote, eager to begin discussions on more 
substantive issues and to avoid an eleventh hour appeal from 
NORLC for an extension of the eight cent fare, invited the 
receiver and Judge Poster to begin meeting with the council. 
O'Keefe and Foster "consented" to a meeting, but they were 
unwilling to discuss, much less allow, a reduction in street 
railway fare. The eight cent fare was indispensable to the 
operation of the company, the said, and it would remain in 
effect indefinitely, irrespective of the intent of the eight 
cent ordinance or the will of the city council. With those
X8New Orleans Daily States, March 24, April 9, 13, 1921;
New Orleans Item. March 25, April 9, 13, 1921.
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remarks, the "conference" ended, and the council postponed 
consideration of the eight cent fare until April.3-7
At the end of March, with the expiration of the eight 
cent fare ordinance and the release of the McCloskey report, 
Commissioner Maloney introduced a series of proposals for a 
gradual reduction of the eight cent fare and the rehabilita­
tion of NORLC. An extension of the eight cent fare, he told 
his fellow councilmen, would be a serious mistake, allowing 
the receiver and the court to determine the cost of service 
and to set the terms for the rehabilitation of the company. 
Rather, as an expression of the council's authority and de­
termination and as an incentive to the receiver to begin 
negotiations in earnest, Maloney recommended a gradual re­
duction in carfare over the next two years. The proposal, as 
enacted by the commission council, set carfare at seven and 
a half cents, reducing it one-half cent every six months
17New Orleans Daily States, January 5, 13, 1921; New Or­
leans Item. January 5, 7, 12-14, 19, 1921. Public sentiment
on the eight cent fare issue was divided. The press and the 
McCloskey committee favored another "temporary" extension,
but other, less notable citizens favored repeal of the six 
and eight cent ordinances and the restoration of the five 
cent fare. For examples, see William A. Bell to Commissioner 
of Public Utilities, January 4, 1921, John J. McLoughlin and 
C. M. Stafford to Commissioner of Public Utilities, January
4, 1921, and William L. L. Shoemaker to Commissioner of Pub­
lic Utilities, April 19, 1921, Department of Public Utili­
ties, Petitions and Correspondence, vol.2, CA, NOPL.
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unti it reached its "normal" level of five cents.1®
Receiver O'Keefe denounced the ordinance, ridiculing it 
as dangerous and confiscatory and predicting that it would 
provoke another strike and end in the collapse of the 
public service industry in the city. But O'Keefe's remarks 
were trite and disingenuous, designed to disturb the public 
and to distract the council from the crucial issue of public 
authority over private utility interests. The scheduled re­
duction of fares was imperceptible, uncertain, and slow, 
and, more to the point, never intended to fix fares below 
the cost of operation (under the terms of the ordinance, the 
receiver and the court had to give their approval to the or­
dinance before it went into effect). The new ordinance was, 
as Maloney insisted, o.ily temporary, intended to initiate 
negotiations and to compel the receiver and the court to 
acknowledge the authority of the municipal government over 
the cost of service.19
The intention of the second set of proposals was to 
begin discussions with the bondholders leading to an accept­
able and permanent settlement and to establish the authority
iaNew Orleans Item. March 31, April 2-6, 1921; New Or­
leans Daily States. April 2-6, 1921; Ordinance 6148 CCSr CA, 
NOPL; O'Keefe v. The Citv of New Orleans 273 Federal Report­
er 561. The ordinance also required the receiver to dedicate 
any portion of the fare above six cents to wages and taxes.
19New Orleans Item. April 5, 6, 10, 1921; New Orleans 
Daily States, April 5, 6, 10, 1921; John D. O'Keefe to Com- 
missoner of Public Utilities, April 19, 1921; Leigh Carroll 
to Commissioner of Public Utilities, April 21, 1921, Depart­
ment of Public Utilities, Petitions and Correspondence 
vol.2, CA, NOPL.
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of the municipal government over the rehabilitation of New 
Orleans Railway and Light Company. Commissioner Maloney 
offered a series of "Fourteen Points" (the ordinance reduc­
ing carfare was one of those points), rejecting the princi­
pal financial recommendations of the McCloskey committee 
and, in effect, asserting the authority of the commission 
council over the rehabilitation of the company. Specifical­
ly, Maloney recommended setting valuation at $35 million, 
allowing the company to earn a rate of return of five per­
cent on its "actual" investment and seven to seven and a 
half percent on money invested in the physical rehabilita­
tion of the company. In addition. Commissioner Maloney pro­
posed granting the commission council the authority to 
approve all new stock and bond issues, regulate the distri­
bution of "undivided" profits, inspect financial accounts, 
and assess taxes on the basis of gross earnings rather than 
net revenues.30
Understandably, the representatives of the bondholders 
were displeased by Maloney*s recommendations, especially, 
they remarked, in light of their recent concessions to the 
council. The day before Maloney released his proposals, the
zoNew Orleans Item, March 29, 31, April 2-5, 1921; New 
Orleans Daily States. April 2-5, 1921. Maloney's plan also 
required the management of NORLC or its successor to estab­
lish a "sinking fund" for repairs, replacements, and exten­
sions and a uniform track system. Furthermore, like the 
McCloskey committee, Maloney demanded that the manager of 
NORLC be a New Orleans man and independent of corporate man­
agement .
bankers met with the commission council, Rudolph S. Hecht, 
and McCloskey committee members Hugh and Bernard McCloskey 
and Arthur D. Parker. The bankers argued that the valuation 
and rate of return recommended by the McCloskey committee 
were patently unjust and unrealistic. The bankers complained 
that those recommendations nullified all the common and much 
of the preferred stock in NORLC, penalizing legitimate in­
vestors at the expense of consumers and labor and making 
it impossible to attract new investors. Similarly, any rate 
of return below eight percent was, in essence, confiscatory, 
denying a just profit to established investment and, ulti­
mately, inviting a more expensive and incomplete rehabilita­
tion. Nonetheless, despite their overwhelming dissatisfac­
tion with the proposals, the bondholders were willing to 
accept a valuation of $44.7 million and a constant rate of 
return of eight percent, provided the council acknowledged 
the continuing need and justice of the eight cent fare. 
Otherwise, the company could no longer continue operating 
and the bondholders could not undertake the rehabilitation 
of the company.21
Despite the "concessions" offered by the bondholders 
(they simply agreed to accept the recommendations of the 
McCloskey committee, with minor variations, as the basis for 
future discussions with the commission council), the council
2XNew Orleans Item, April 8, 9, 1921; New Orleans Daily
States. April 8, 9, 1921.
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passed the seven cent ordinance and began consideration o£ 
Commissioner Maloney's other recommendations.** But the or­
dinance, rejected by the receiver and the court, never went 
into effect. And the council, preoccupied with the implica­
tions of a suit filed against it by Receiver O'Keefe and 
uncertain about several features of the Maloney plan, enter­
tained other proposals.23
The receiver's petition, filed in federal district 
court and heard by Judge Henry D. Clayton (at the council's 
insistance, Foster recused himself), asked the court to pre­
vent the council from lowering streetcar fares and from in­
terfering with the collection of the eight cent fare. The 
receiver argued that any fare below eight cents was confis­
catory, depriving the company of just compensation and deny­
ing it equal protection under the law. And, more important­
ly, the receiver contended that the commission council, as 
the regulatory authority of the city, could not fix rates 
and fares by ordinance or franchise. The council's authority 
over rates and fares was strictly regulatory, subject to the
22New Orleans Item, April 8, 9, 11, 1921; New Orleans 
Daily States. April 8, 9, 11, 1921; Ordinance 6148 CCS. CA, 
NOPL.
230'Keefe to Commissioner of Public Utilities, April 19, 
1921, Department of Public Utilities, Petitions and Corre­
spondence, vol.2, CA, NOPL; O'Keefe v. Citv of New Orleans 
273 Federal Reporter 560; New Orleans Item. April 12, 13, 
1921; New Orleans Daily States. April 13, 1921; Fairclough, 
"Public Utilities," 54-55.
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reqirements of service and the demands of the market.24
The city attorney argued that the suit was deceitful, 
willfully misleading the court to the facts of the matter 
and disguising the intentions of the receiver. The manage­
ment of NORLC wanted the court to believe that the commis­
sion council, acting as a regulatory agency and responding 
to the demands of service, granted it fare increases in 
1918 and 1920. In fact, NORLC never approached the council 
seeking a "readjustment" in rates and fares. Rather, NORLC 
asked for temporary relief from the extraordinary financial 
conditions resulting from the war and readjustment. The com­
mission council, acting under its contractual authority, 
altered the franchise contract in 1918 and 1920, granting 
temporary, emergency relief to NORLC. The passing of the 
wartime and readjustment emergencies (repaying the War 
Finance Corporation loan in late 19202S and averting a 
second strike), however, ended the need for the emergency 
rates and fares. And, rather than reducing utility rates too 
fast, precipitating another crisis, the council provided for 
a modest and deliberate reduction until it could determine
24Q,Keefe v. Citv of New Orleans 273 FR 561-62; New 
Orleans Daily States. April 16-19, 1921; New Orleans Item. 
April 16-19, 1921.
23NORLC took more than two years and three compromises 
to repay its WFC loan. See, for example, "Minutes of Meet­
ings," January 6-19, February 2, 20, 27, July 28-29, August 
5, 13, 19, October 31, December 18, 29, 1919, December 29, 
1920, January 3, 1921, vols. 3, 4, 5, 8, Records of the War 
Finance Corporation. Record Group 154; WFC to Monte Lemann, 
October 21, 1919, vol.5, ibid.
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reasonable and acceptable rates and fares.38
But the management of NORLC, the City Attorney argued, 
did not seek a reasonable adjustment of rates and fares from 
the city council. Nor did management want the municipal 
government to set the conditions for the rehabilitation of 
the company. Rather, management wanted to determine the cost 
of service, the rate of return, and the valuation, exclusive 
of the commission council, and it appealed to the federal 
court to free it from municipal control and regulation.37
Though the Maloney ordinance was a dead letter. Judge 
Clayton believed that the issues raised in the receiver's 
petition were important and required sober consideration and 
response. The judge acknowledged that the municipal govern­
ment had the authority to set rates and fares, but he ruled 
that the commission council exceeded its authority in fixing 
fares under the Maloney ordinance. It was apparent. Judge 
Clayton wrote, that the eight cent fare was vital to the 
operation of NORLC and that any fare less than eight cents 
was, in essence, confiscatory, depriving NORLC of the equal 
protection of the law. And, though the commission council 
had the authority to grant franchises and contract for ser­
vices, it could not, under the Louisiana constitution, per­
manently fix rates and fares by contract, franchise, or
380'Keffe v. City of New Orleans 273 FR 561-62; New Or­
leans Daily States. April 16-17, 19, 1921; New Orleans Item. 
April 16-19, 1921.
37IMi.
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ordinance.28
The ruling was not, however, a defeat for the city. Nor 
did it permit NORLC to determine exclusively the cost of 
service, the conditions of rehabilitation, or escape public 
regulation. Indeed, the ruling reaffirmed the position of 
the city council and the Louisiana State Supreme Court that 
the municipal government possessed exclusive authority over 
the public utilities industry in New Orleans, including the 
right to contract for services and to "regulate" rates and 
fares.29 (The authority of the municipal government was 
limited, however, restrained by the reasonable exercise of 
its inherent powers.) In short, it did not limit the city's 
authority to granting franchises and letting contracts, as 
Commissioner Maloney and the City Attorney feared initially, 
but recognized its right to determine rates, valuation, and 
rate of return. And, perhaps most importantly, it accorded 
the McShane administration the opportunity of abandoning an 
inexpedient and suspect policy (that, characteristically, it 
delayed in taking), forcing the council to resume discus-
2aO'Keefe v. City of New Orleans 273 FR 560, 562-67; 
State v. City of New Orleans 91 Southern Reporter 533 
(1922), 535-36; City of New Orleans v. O'Keefe 280 FR 92 
(1922), 94; Ivy G. Kittredge to Maloney August 8, 1921, 
Kittredge to Maloney, January 8, 1922, Kittredge to McShane, 
April 1, 1922, vol.9, CAP. CA, NOPL; Provosty to Maloney,
May 8, 1924, vol. 10, ibid,; New Orleans Daily States, April 
17, 22, 1921; New Orleans Item, April 22, 1921.
**Black v. City of New Orleans 82 Southern Reporter 81; 
State v. City of New Orleans 91 SR. 533; Moore to Glenny, 
August 8, 1918, Waldo to Moore, August 24, 1918, vol. 8,
CAP. CA, NOPL; Provosty to Maloney, May 8, 1924, vol.10, 
ibid.
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sions with NORLC.30
Late in May, 1921, the commission council began a 
series of public discussions with C. C. Chappelle, an agent 
of Chase National Bank and the Security Holders Committee of 
NORLC, a junior securities association. Chappelle told the 
council that the issue of rates and fares was incidental to 
rehabilitation of the company. The principal issue, he said, 
was reestablishing the financial integrity of the company, 
sustaining current investment and attracting new money with 
a reasonable valuation and an assured rate of return. Only 
then could the new company assure sufficient service to the 
city. Surely, he said, the council understood that a unrea­
sonably low valuation and rate of return hampered the reor­
ganization of the company and threatened the city with eco­
nomic collapse. Earlier recommendations by Ballard and E. E. 
Lafaye were, like Commissioner Maloney's recent attempt, 
outmoded and unrealistic, based on theories and practices 
rejected by most experts and the courts. Rather than risk a 
protracted and futile court battle, Chappelle said, the 
council should compromise with the bondholders, accepting 
their offer for a valuation of $44.7 million and a rate of
3°New Orleans Daily States. June 22, 23, 26, August 30,
31, September 1, 1921; New Orleans Item. June 23-26, August
30, 31, September 1, 1921.
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return of eight percent for old and new investments.31
The council was unimpressed with Chappelle's presenta­
tion and was unwilling to accept the recommendations of the 
bondholders. Commissioner Maloney categorized Chappelle's 
proposals as "propaganda," promoting the interests of bank­
ers and speculators, exonerating NORLC of mismanagement and 
justifying its exorbitant claims, and, in the process, dis­
crediting the municipal government of New Orleans. Predic­
tions of the financial collapse and economic ruin were "non­
sense," Maloney told Receiver O'Keefe, and were designed to 
intimidate the council and to dictate its decision. From the 
start, Maloney continued, the management of NORLC challenged 
the authority of the municipal government, questioning its 
competence and motivation and seeking to abridge its power. 
Taking sanctuary in the federal courts, management attempted 
to fix rates and to set the conditions for the rehabilita­
tion of the company. The company complained that it could 
not improve services, though it received a sixty percent in­
crease in rates and fares and paid dividends on certain 
bonds. And, most importantly, management refused to negoti­
ate in good faith, withholding essential financial informa­
tion from the council and preventing it from making a fair
31C. C. Chappelle, The Assured Service Plan An Open 
Letter to the People of New Orleans Concerning Their Public 
Utility Problem (np 1921), 10-16, CA, NOPL; New Orleans 
Item. May 19-27, June 3, 9-14, 27, 28, 1921; New Orleans 
Daily States. May 19-27, June 4, 6, 11-14, 28, 1921.
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and accurate evaluation of the worth and earning capacity 
of New Orleans Railway and Light Company.32
But Maloney did not confine his anger to the management 
of NORLC. He confessed that the McShane administration was, 
in part, responsible for the public service crisis in New 
Orleans. The council seemed incapable of consensus or 
action, and he pleaded with it to take "some concerted and 
definitive action," recommending that it employ a staff of 
utility experts to advise and direct the council on public 
utility matters. Though the Maloney's proposal (and critique 
of the McShane administration) received some support in the 
newspapers, the council majority saw it as another waste of 
time and money. Instead, the council instructed Commissioner 
of Public Finance Richard M. Murphy to review all previous 
proposals and to find a workable and acceptable plan for the 
rehabilitation of NORLC.33
A week later, after consulting with Commissioners Wil­
bert Black and Stanley Ray and attorneys John Patrick Sulli­
van and Charles I. Rosen (but not Maloney or Mayor McShane), 
Commissioner Murphy released his findings. The latest pro­
posal of the Commissioner of Public Utilities, Murphy wrote, 
would complicate the utilities issue, adding another layer 
of bureaucracy and expense to city government, producing the
32New Orleans Daily States. May 19, 22, 27, June 11-12,
14, 1921; New Orleans Item. May 19, 22, 27, June 11-12, 14,
1921.
33Ibid.
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same conclusions as previous studies, and diminishing the 
changes for "concerted and definitive action". The council 
already possessed sufficient legislative authority and exe­
cutive ability to develop and enforce a comprehensive plan 
for the reorganization and operation of NORLC. And, he 
wrote, after years of constant study and debate, the council 
had ample information to offer an "intelligent and just" 
plan for the rehabilitation of NORLC— one that offered com­
promise and promised a reasonable solution to the crisis.34
Commissioner Murphy modeled his plan on the recommenda­
tions of the McCloskey committee, Chappelle, and Commission­
er Maloney. "I have come to the conclusion," Murphy wrote, 
"that any appeal to the investors would be useless without 
recognition of the valuation of $44,700,000 proposed by the 
Citizens Advisory Committee of Forty (McCloskey committee) 
and accepted as a compromise valuation by the representa­
tives of the security holders of New Orleans Railway and 
Light Company." In arriving at its assessment, the McCloskey 
committee merely averaged the valuations determined by 
Ballard, General Goethals, Frank Coleman, and the Special 
Masters. The commission council, Murphy acknowledged, would 
take the same approach. "It would be forced, by its sense of 
fairness, to accept the average of all expert valuations
34Reclassification of the Electric Plant. 63, New Orleans
Daily States. June 21-24, 26; New Orleans Item. June 21-23,
26, 1921.
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honestly made."33
Fairness, so to speak, also required the commission 
council to reconsider its position on the rate of return.
A single, unqualified rate of return, Murphy suggested, had 
few financial and political advantages, and he urged the 
commission council to grant NORLC separate rates of return 
for old and new investment. His plan, phased in over the 
next three years, allowed for a gradual increase in the 
rate of return for old money, yielding eight percent in the 
final year. Depending on market conditions, new money, allo­
cated for the financial and physical rehabilitation of the 
company, could earn between nine and ten percent, satisfying 
the demands of investors and hastening the complete rehabil­
itation of the company.33
Satisfying the demands of investors alone, as Commis­
sioner Murphy understood, would not hasten the complete 
rehabilitation of NORLC. Rehabilitation was, after all, a 
political question, concerned as much with public authority 
and accountability as private investment. Though financial 
control remained in the hands of private investors. Commis­
sioner Murphy proposed that the commission council and local 
businessmen "manage" the rehabilitation and operation of the
33Ibid.
3"Ibid. The plan allowed NORLC to earn 5.7% in 1921, 
6.14% in 1922, and 8% in 1921, and granted the company a 
fare of seven cents and $1.30 mcf for artifical gas. Under 
the terms of the plan, management had to reinvest twenty- 
five percent of its profit in the company.
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company. Under his plan, he said, the financial and physical 
rehabilitation of the company would be temperate and well- 
ordered, allowing the company, under the direction of a new 
president and board of directors, to invest $5 million in 
its first year of operation and $2 million in each of the 
next five years. The commission council would select four 
members of the board of directors, and the president and 
three quarters of the board had to be Mew Orleanians. The 
council also would have the authority to approve the sale of 
new stocks and bonds, and had the option to purchase the 
company at its original valuation of $44.7 million. 3‘r
Predictably, public sentiment and the commission coun­
cil divided over the Murphy plan. James McLoughlin and C. M. 
Stafford urged the commission council to discontinue its 
discussions with the bondholders, advising it to exhaust its 
legal remedies before submitting to a negotiated settlement. 
William Railey, a businessman and anti-vice crusader, con­
sidered the plan "unworkable," complaining that it ignored 
the crucial issue of bringing efficient, economical natural 
gas service to the city. George Terriberry, one of the three 
Special Masters, wanted the right of purchase provision re­
moved from the plan. "It will do much harm," he predicted, 
"because it will always encourage some visionary to urge 
municipal ownership in the future— which, if adopted, would
3,7Ibid.
603
end in disaster."3"
Business and civic associations, like the Association 
of Commerce, the Board of Trade, the Young Men's Business 
Club, and the Housewives' League of New Orleans, were more 
optimistic. They believed the plan reasonable and workable, 
and they encouraged the council to continue negotiations.
The Item, too, believed the plan had "great value," offering 
several intelligent and innovative recommendations. Yet, the 
Item cautioned, there remained too many troubling and unre­
solved issues to recommend the immediate and complete adop­
tion of the plan. The valuation and rates of return set by 
Commissioner Murphy were "too high" and the safeguards too 
feeble to assure the efficient, economic rehabilitation of 
the company.3*
The Daily States and Mayor McShane argued that the plan 
was "politically motivated," fashioned without regard for 
the concerns of ordinary citizens, designed to further the 
interests of the principal stockholders, and to avoid the 
regimen of public rehabilitation and regulation of NORLC.
The Daily States complained that the McShane administration 
seemed in capable of consensus on the public service issue,
3aMcLoughlin and Stafford to Commissioner of Public Util­
ities, June 21, 1921, Sixteen Petitoners to Commissioner of 
Public Utilities, June 28, 1921, Department of Public Util­
ities, Petitions and Correspondence, vol.2, CA, NOPL; New 
Orleans Daily States. June 22-24, August 19, 1921; New 
Orleans Item. June 22-24, 1921.
3"New Orleans Item, June 22-24, August 6, 26, 1921; New 
Orleans Daily States. June 22-24, 1921.
and that it allowed its internal political differences to 
influence public policy. The Murphy plan only accentuated 
the rift within the commission council, and the States 
urged the mayor and the council to reconvene the McCloskey 
committee and direct it to devise a comprehensive plan for 
the reorganization and operation of NORLC. In a lengthy and 
petulent press release, Mayor McShane condemned the plan, 
accusing commissioners Murphy, Black, and Ray of misplaced 
loyalty and political expediency. The Murphy plan, the mayor 
wrote, ignored the essential recommendations of prominent, 
local citizens, including a respected member of the commmis- 
sion council. Instead, the council majority offered a "modi­
fied" version of a plan introduced by the bondholders, re­
quiring the commission council to protect worthless invest­
ment and to guarantee profit to a delapidated public service 
corporation. •*°
Though the commission council rejected McShane's as­
sessment and recommendations (he called for a valuation of 
$35 million and a rate of return of 6.25%, with rehabilita­
tion funded from "excess" profits) as "fundamentally wrong," 
it nonetheless postponed consideration of the Murphy plan 
and, once again, sought expert advise on the rehabilitation 
of NORLC. Toward the end of July, after several weeks of 
pointless discussion, the council commissioned Frederick W.
*°New Orleans Daily States, June 24-27, August 24, Octo­
ber 28, 1921.
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Ballard to "reappraise" NORLC and to advise the council on 
the rehabilitation of the company. The following month 
Ballard met with the council in executive session, defending 
earlier valuations and justifying the necessity for a more 
expensive rehabilitation of NORLC.‘•1
The valuations conducted before 1919, Ballard told the 
commission council, were, at that time, accurate and com­
plete assessments of the actual investment and earning power 
of NORLC. Those investigations, however, operated under cer­
tain assumptions and practices that based valuation on orig­
inal investment and discounted the cost of reproducing the 
service under present conditions. Since then the public 
utilities industry had abandoned those assumptions, convinc­
ing the state legislatures and the courts to adopt more 
acceptable ways of gauging the valuation of public utility 
properties. Adopting the principles determined by the indus­
try and the courts, Ballard placed the valuation of NORLC 
at $44.7 million, adding another $5.8 million for the 
intrinsic value of the franchises and the cost of 
"promotion". '•*
■•XF. W. Ballard, Valuation and Report on the Properties 
of New Orleans Railway and Light Company to the Honorable 
Mayor and Commission Council of the Citv of New Orleans. 
Louisiana. August 10. 1921. hereafter cited as Valuation and 
Report. 1-13, CA, NOPL; Reclassification of the Electric 
Plant. 64-66; New Orleans Daily States. August 14-17, 1921; 
New Orleans Item. August 15-18, 1921.
*aIbid.
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The council, Ballard advised, could assure the city of 
a reasonable and complete rehabilitation of NORLC by doing 
four things. First, the council had to abandon the idea of 
establishing valuation, profit, and rates and fares by muni­
cipal ordinance. If the council persisted in this attempt, 
the federal court would take control of the rehabilitation 
process, locking out the council and setting the cost of re­
organization higher than the compromise figure of $44.7 mil­
lion. Second, the council had to guarantee old and new in­
vestment a sufficient and identical rate of return. The 
court would never permit a rate of return below eight per­
cent, and the bondholders would not undertake the financial 
reorganization of the company without an adequate return on 
previous investment. Third, the commission council must 
agree to a thorough and, undoubtedly, expensive rehabilita­
tion of the company. The entire system was "overloaded," 
Ballard claimed, and "cannot meet the demands [for service! 
without increased investments for additional capacity". The 
company needed $23 million over the next five years. If the 
council allowed NORLC to attract this sort of investment, 
then it could "assure reliable and satisfactory service" to 
the city. Finally, despite its untested character, the coun­
cil had to grant NORLC an indeterminate, cost-of-service 
franchise. This sort of franchise, despite the reservations 
of Mayor McShane, benefitted the city as much, if not more, 
than the company. It maintained the legal and political
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integrity of the city, recognizing the authority of the 
council to "contract" for public service and to "regulate," 
now and in the future, its cost and satisfying the principal 
objections of the federal court.43
As expected, the council majority voted to accept the 
Ballard valuation and report as the basis for negotiations 
with the bondholders of NORLC. Hayor McShane and Commission­
er Maloney, however, voted no, but for different reasons. 
Mayor McShane, increasingly isolated from the council and 
without influence in his own administration, considered the 
valuation too expensive and the cost-of-service plan a 
betrayal of city authority over the public service industry. 
Though he voted no. Commissioner Maloney was more amenable 
to compromise. He was convinced, he said, that the city 
administration had to abandon the policy of seeking to fix 
rates and fares and set the terms of rehabilitation through 
binding contract or franchise. The courts and the industry 
were adamant in their opposition to that policy, and, if 
the council pursued that policy, ulitmately it would lose 
authority over rehabilitation and regulation of NORLC. 
Despite this realization, Maloney remained uncertain about 
the character and extent of the city's authority over NORLC. 
He urged the council, then, to delay consideration of the 
Ballard report until the City Attorney clarified the city's
■*3Ballard, Valuation and Report. 11-12, 14, 16-20; New
Orleans Daily States. August 14-17, 1921; New Orleans Item.
August 15-18, 1921.
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legal status.*4
But Commissioner Murphy, speaking for the majority, 
disagreed, arguing that the opinion of the City Attorney was 
immaterial. The issues before the council, he said, were not 
matters of law but of public policy. As a rate-making body, 
Murphy contended, the authority of the council included the 
authority to determine valuation and rate of return, set the 
standards of service, and approve the sale of stocks and 
bonds. These issues were integral parts of the council's 
rate-making and contractual authority. In short, then, the 
council could continue its negotiations with NORLC seeking a 
permanent settlement without jeopardizing its position as a 
rate-making body.43
Apparently, despite its initial approval, the commis­
sion council shared Commissioner Maloney's misgivings about 
the Ballard valuation and report. The Commissioner of Public 
Utilities acknowledged the necessity of accepting the valua­
tion recommended by Ballard and the bondholders. But he, 
like so many others, questioned the legitimacy of the
44New Orleans Daily States. August 14-21, 1921; New Or­
leans Item. August 15-21, 26, 1921.
43New Orleans Daily States. August 19, 1921; New Orleans 
Item. August 19, 1921. In 1922, on the eve of the rehabili­
tation settlement, City Attorney Ivy G. Kittredge affirmed 
Commissioner Murphy's position. In his opinion, Kittredge 
argued that the commission council was both a contractual 
and rate-making body, and, though circumscribed by law, the 
rehabilitation of NORLC was a matter of public policy. See 
Provosty to Maloney, March 2, 1921, vol.8, Kittredge to 
Maloney, august 18, 1921, vol.9, Kittredge to McShane, March 
29, 1922, vol.10, CAP. CA, NOPL.
demands for single rate of return for present and future 
investment and for a service-at-cost plan regulating the 
cost and quality of service. The financial reorganization of 
the company and its eventual rehabilitation, Maloney told 
the council, hinged on meeting the "reasonable" expectations 
of the bondholders for a secure investment and an assured 
rate of return. Since no established method had yet confirm­
ed the valuation favored by the commission, it had no choice 
but to accept the figure recommended by Ballard and the 
bondholders. The rate of return proposed by Ballard and the 
bondholders, however, was unacceptable, and Maloney proposed 
offering present investment a return of seven and a half 
percent, one and a half percent returned to the company for 
replacements and repairs and six percent to the investors. 
The rate of return for new investment, used in the financial 
and physical renovation of the company, would be set at 
current market values.'*"
Despite the objections of Mayor McShane to certain sec­
tions of the plan (he agreed to accept the valuation of 
$44.7, but wanted the rate of return fixed at six and one 
quarter percent), the commission council adopted the Maloney
••"New Orleans Daily States. August 30-31, September 1, 
1921; New Orleans Item. August 30-31, 1921, September 1,
1921. The regulatory provisions of the second Maloney plan 
paralleled those recommended earlier by the McCloskey com­
mittee and Commissioner Murphy. In addition, plan called for 
a seven cent fare and $1.30 mcf for artificial gas for the 
first six months of the settlement; the council would then 
reassess rates and fares after determining the rate of 
return earned by the new company.
plan. Though at first hestitant and skeptical, the bondhold­
ers agreed to the plan in principle (though they would not 
consent to any particular feature), and began negotiations 
for the financial reorganization of the company. The negoti­
ations lasted until March, eventually reducing the valuation 
of NORLC to $44.7 million and allowing the city council and 
the City Attorney the time to draft the "settlement" ordin­
ance. Late in March, 1922, Commissioner Maloney introduced 
the settlement ordinance. The bondholders reacted angrily 
to the ordinance, accusing the municipal administration of 
"radically" altering the initial plan, compelling them to 
reinvest one and a half percent of the rate of return on the 
physical and financial rehabilitation. Eventually, after 
the intercession of Rudolph Hecht and a compromise allowing 
the company to sell stock to cover the cost of replacement 
and repair, the bondholders accepted the plan. And near the 
end of April, the council enacted the "settlement" ordinance 
into law. In mid-June, the major bondholders formed a new 
utilities corporation, New Orleans Public Service, Incorpo­
rated (NOPSI), and in August NOPSI acquired the holdings of 
New Orleans Railway and Light Company. Finally, in September 
the council granted NOPSI indeterminate franchises, permit­
ting the "new" company to operate the three major public 
utilities in the city.*'7
47New Orleans Daily States, March 29-30, April 2-3, 4-10, 
1921; New Orleans Item. March 22, 31, April 2-3, 4-10, 1921; 
Fairclough, "Public Utilties," 55.
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Despite the intense, almost visceral, partisanship that 
characterized the rehabiliatation of NORLC, there was, 
surprisingly, little vocal opposition to the settlement 
ordinance. Equally surprising, given the importance of the 
public utilities issue in the history of the city, there has 
been little notable scholarly interest in the settlement.
And that interest is, at best, only passing and incomplete, 
content with seeing rehabilitation as politics as usual in 
New Orleans. In his article on the public utilities issue 
in New Orleans, Adam Fairclough, an able and accomplished 
scholar, argued that the rehabilitation of NORLC did not 
strengthen or improve public regulation. In fact, as he sug­
gested, rehabilitation weakened public authority over the 
public service industry. In practice, Fairclough wrote, the 
conditions of rehabilitation "did not add up to effective 
regulation". A politicized municipal government retained 
complete authority over the regulation of public utilities, 
and the vague and insufficient terms and provisions of the 
settlement ordinances (there were four in all, a rehabilita­
tion ordinance and three indeterminate franchise ordinances 
for the separate utility departments) allowed NOPSI to "cir­
cumvent too rigorous regulation". "Utility companies like 
NOPSI gladly accepted a weak form of public regulation in 
exchange for the advantages that went with perpetual fran­
chises, and welcomed it as infinitely preferable to munici-
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pal ownership."*B
But Fairclough's interpretation leaves much to be 
desired, resting on a cursory review of the settlement or­
dinances and neglecting the lengthy debate that determined 
rehabilitation. The settlement ordinances were, in fact, a 
considerable improvement over the welter of franchises and 
ordinances that characterized public regulation prior to 
1922. Apart from fixing the valuation ($44.7 million) and 
rate of return (seven and a half percent for old money and 
between eight and nine percent for new investment), the re­
habilitation ordinance recognized the exclusive authority 
of the city government over municipal public services. And 
it also recognized the municipal government as both a rate- 
making and contractual body, capable of adjusting rates and 
fares to meet the demands of service and to fix the condi­
tions for the rehabilitation of NORLC.•*
Those demands and conditions were essential to the 
rehabilitation of NORLC and the regulation of NOPSI. The 
indeterminate franchise ordinances codified existing public 
utilities ordinances, binding NOPSI to "faithful and prompt 
compliance" with every condition of the settlement and 
allowing the municipal government to compel service and to
“•"Adam Fairclough, "The Public Utilities Industry in New 
Orleans: A Study in Capital, Labor and Government, 1894- 
1929, " 55-56; New Orleans Daily States. April 4-10, 1922;
New Orleans Item. April 4-10, 1921.
•^Ordinances 6822, 7067-69, CCS. CA, NOPL; New Orleans 
Daily States. April 4-10, 1922; New Orleans Item. April 
4-10, 1922; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 55-56.
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develop a comprehensive public service policy.30 The condi­
tions of the rehabilitation or settlement ordinance were 
even more significant. Two-thirds of the board of directors 
of NOPSI had to be residents of New Orleans and, upon assum­
ing office, the president of NOPSI had to reside in New 
Orleans, restoring, at least in name, some managerial con­
trol to the city. The ordinance also required NOPSI to 
create a "sinking" fund of $300,000 each year from either 
the earnings of bonds and preferred stock or the sale of 
stock used for "improvements and betterments" in the company 
and the retirement of debt.31 Dividends accrued by common 
stock issued by NOPSI had to be reinvested in the company 
until dividends amounted to forty percent of the value of 
the stock. The sale of all stocks and bonds increasing the 
valuation of NOPSI had to have the approval of the commis­
3°Fairclough argued that the phrase "faithful and prompt 
compliance" did not accord the city the "firm legal basis 
for revoking the indeterminate franchises." But he missed 
the point. As the public service authority for the city, the 
city council— and not the franchises— would determine what 
constituted "faithful and prompt compliance". Furthermore, 
there was no need to specify the means of revoking the fran­
chise. Under the terms of the agreement, the council had the 
authority to purchase NOPSI or any one of the three utility 
departments. Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 56.
31Initially, the settlement ordinance required the bond­
holders to return a specific percentage of the seven and a 
half percent rate of return to repairs and replacement and 
to debt retirement. The council relented in its demands when 
the bondholders, at the insistence of Rudolph Hecht, agreed 
to seven and a half percent rate of return. Though not as 
exacting as the original proposal, the compromise assured 
that some portion of revenues would be returned to the city 
in the form of improvements and services. New Orleans Item. 
April 4, 1922; New Orleans Daily States. April 4, 1922.
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sion council. In essence, then, the council and the bond­
holders set the terms and cost of rehabilitation, requiring 
the bondholders and the city to pay representative portions 
of the financial and physical rehabilitation of NORLC-NOPSI. 
And finally, the municipal government had the "perpetual" 
option to buy one or all of the public utilities at their 
original valuation (plus or minus additions and deprecia­
tions). Despite Fairclough's contention that the city did 
not possess the will or the money to buy NOPSI, the munici­
palization provisions strenghtened the regulatory authority 
of the municipal government. For, like the other provisions 
of the settlement ordinances, it gave the city an authority 
over public services it never had before.
The rehabilitation of the public utilities industry 
achieved much. It improved the quality of service, reducing 
costs slightly and compelling NOPSI to renovate and modern-
szOrdinance 6822 CCS, CA, NOPL; W. Catesby Jones, assis­
tant City Attorney, to Maloney, October 27, 1924, vol.10,
CAP. CA, NOPL; New Orleans Daily States. April 4-10, Sep­
tember 24, 1922, March 20, 1923; New Orleans Item. April 
4-10, 1922, March 19-20, April 17, 1923; Fairclough, "Pub­
lic Utilities," 56. The terms of the settlement ordinances 
were, as Fairclough suggested, vague and imprecise, and 
were, from time to time, a source of confusion and disagree­
ment. For the next several years, the council and NOPSI hag­
gled over the rate of return, earnings, and the sale of 
securities. In each instance, however, the council and the 
company came to a mutual understanding without resorting to 
the courts or delaying the rehabilitation of the company.
See, for example, Kittredge to Maloney, June 26, 1926 (rate 
of return), W. Catesby Jones to Maloney, September 25, Octo­
ber 27, 1924, Kittredge to Maloney, November 5, 1924 (sale 
of new stock), vol.10, CAP. CA, NOPL.
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ize street railway and electric power services (the company 
prevented the introduction of cheaper, more efficient natu­
ral gas until 1928s3). The rehabilitation settlement elimi­
nated excessive, unproductive investment, preventing it from 
devouring revenues and emasculating services. It publized 
and limited the rate of profit, tying it to efficient, eco­
nomical management. It regulated rates and fares, allowing 
the commission council to determine the cost of service. It 
controlled investment, regulating the rate base and deter­
mining the scope of rehabilitation. It reinvested profit in 
services, restoring some of the wealth taken from the city 
by the public service industry. And it provided for the 
municipalization of public services, giving the city council 
the legal and political power to enforce public regulation.
There were, to be sure, provisions of the settlement 
ordinances that apparently permitted NOPSI to manipulate or 
to avoid public regulation. And, then too, the rehabilita­
tion agreements seemingly required the commission council to 
protect (some students may argue promote) the interests of 
the public service corporation, overlooking its speculative
S3For a brief and able account of the natural gas contro­
versy, see Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 57-61. Though 
Fairclough argued that the city council showed no interest 
in the natural gas issue until Huey Long applied his unique 
brand of political pressure, there is sufficient and con­
vincing evidence that the municipal government under mayors 
Behrman, McShane, and Arthur O'Keefe (no relation to John 
O'Keefe) actively sought to bring natural gas to New 
Orleans. I am working on an article that will, I hope, sub­
stantiate my claim.
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and exploitive character. But the purpose of the rehabili­
tation ordinances was regulation, specifically municipal 
regulation, and regulation, as we have seen, served both 
private and public interests. It should not be surprising, 
then, that the settlement agreements contained specific pro­
visions favoring either the corporation or the city."
Rehabilitation, then, transcended the financial reor­
ganization and physical renovation of NORLC. Rehabilitation 
and regulation were not, as the New Orleans Item at first 
believed, matters of simple business. They were, rather, 
as the Behrman administration asserted from the beginning, 
fundamental political questions, demanding a political re­
sponse and solution. As a political response, rehabilitation 
ratified the public utilities policy initiated by the 
Behrman administration in 1912, recognizing and strengthen­
ing the exclusive authority of the municipal government over 
the affairs of the public service industry."
Rehabilitation also revealed much of the character of 
New Orleans politics in the progressive era. In one sense, 
the politics of rehabilitation, like much of municipal poli­
tics in general, did not concern political patronage or
"Thomas K. McCraw, "Regulation in America: A Review 
Article," Business History Review. 49 (Summer 1975), 159-83.
"After the Louisiana Supreme Court nullified the Nix act 
in 1919, there were several other attempts to place NORLC 
under state regulatory authority, but each attempt failed.
See New Orleans Item. May 7, June 3, 12, 30, July 6, 1920, 
January 21, 1921.
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shallow personal advantage. Rather, many of the issues of 
rehabilitation transcended partisan and social lines, per­
mitting a variety of concerns and interests, private as well 
as public, parochial as well as catholic, to fashion public 
policy. Rehablitation was, nonetheless, a thoroughly polit­
icized issue, allowing those same private, partisan, and 
social interests to frustrate municipal reform and to 
exhaust and defeat the McShane administration in 1925.
Chapter Eleven
A Last Hurrah
Late in the spring, 1922, after enduring nearly two 
years of continuous and bitter disagreement with the McShane 
administration and its supporters in the Orleans Democratic 
Association, John Patrick Sullivan resigned as chairman. 
Sullivan offered no explanation for his sudden departure, 
but the Hew Orleans press did. In essence, they explained, 
despite Sullivan's acknowledged "genius for practical lead­
ership," he was unable to transform the ODA into a competent 
and accomplished municipal administration. The reasons for 
Sullivan's failure were apparent, though only through hind­
sight. The ODA was a volatile mixture of traditional anti- 
Regular reformers and businessmen committed to political 
and economic independence and progressive reform and dis­
satisfied professional politicians concerned only with fur­
thering their own parochial interests. The anti-Regular 
businessmen were, as a rule, the Item and the Daily States 
agreed, political amateurs, dogmatic and uncompromising in 
their beliefs and unaccustomed to building coalitions and 
reaching census. The professional politicians of the ODA 
were unconcerned with the "public interest," and they chaf­
fed under the impolitic policies and practices of a munici­
pal government run for the exclusive benefit of the social
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and commerical elite of the city. In brief, Sullivan and the 
ODA reformers could win an occasional election, but they 
could not govern.3-
In one sense, the failings of the McShane administra­
tion were due to the personal limitations and political mis­
apprehensions of the mayor and the social and commerical 
element that "supported" him. By his own account, McShane 
was no politician and he possessed few, if any, proven po­
litical skills and attributes. He was, by all accounts, a 
quarrelsome, peevish, and suspicious man, quick to anger, 
quicker to condemn, and incapable of compromise and forgive­
ness. The normal patterns of city politics and municipal ad­
ministration, with their constant demands for temperance and 
compromise, irritated and nearly incapacitated him. He seem­
ed to take acception to every suggestion, balk at every de­
tail, subscribe to the lone unpopular or impractical solu­
tion, and question the motives of those who opposed him.
These irritations, both large and small, cost him countless 
days at the office and, more importantly, the confidence and 
trust of friends, the commission council, and the citizens 
of Mew Orleans. His lack of effectiveness and his growing
xNew Orleans Item. May 11-13, 1922; New Orleans Daily 
States. May 11, 1922. Later, the Item shifted more of the 
responsibility to Sullivan, complaining that had Sullivan 
been less concerned with "backroom dickering," he and the 
ODA could have been "a tremendous power for good in New 
Orleans". See New Orleans Item. September 3, 1922, January
5, 1925. See also, Reynolds, Machine Politics in New 
Orleans. 214-15.
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sense of isolation only aggravated his suspicions and pre­
judices about politics and government, which, of course, 
only lessened his effectiveness and increased his sense of 
isolation even further.2
In another sense, as the Item and the Daily States 
suggested, the failures of the McShane adminstration stemmed 
from the incompatability of professional politicians and 
municipal reformers. By definition, the municipal reform 
movement (as conceived by John Parker and the other members 
of the commerical and social elite of New Orleans), disdain­
ed, at least in theory, organized politics, claiming that 
political organization compromised independence and imperil­
ed private rights. These men were, in part, contemptuous, 
perhaps fearful, of public authority, demanding the concen­
tration of public authority in their own hands and opposing 
the expansion of public authority in areas hostle to their 
interests. They reduced politics and municipal administra­
tion to the narrowest and most inappropriate of definitions, 
likening them to the modern business corporation and rele­
gating citizens to the status of stockholders.3
The professional politicians of the ODA, too, shared 
responsibility for the failures of the McShane administra­
tion. Unlike many of the Behrman Regulars, the Sullivan or
2New Orleans Item. January 14, February 18, 24, March 6,
May 7, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. February 24, March 6,
1923.
3Ibid.
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"New" Regulars did not embrace the municipal reform move­
ment. Rather, they seemed concerned only with political 
patronage and its rewards, ignoring for the most part issues 
like tax and assessment reform, paving, the rehabilitation 
of New Orleans Railway and Light Company, and city planning. 
The only exceptions were their opposition to civil service 
reform and their desire to return to the councilmanic form 
of government.* The McShane administration was unable to 
ovecome the social and ideological differences between the 
commerical and civic reformers and the Sullivan Regulars.
And, more to the point, it was not able to curb the exces­
sive demands of either faction, spliting the reform coali­
tion and paralyzing the municipal government.9
It did not take long for John Patrick Sullivan to re­
gain his composure or reorganize his following. Near the end 
of the summmer, Sullivan announced the formation of another 
political organization, the New Regulars, composed of compe­
tent "young, sturdy, and strong men and women who subscribed 
to rule of no one m^n, but to the rule by Democrats for 
Democrats". The New Regulars, Sullivan professed, was no 
mere reform organization, "here today, gone tomorrow," but 
a permanent and enlightened political organization, mindful
*Ibid.
9New Orleans Item, January 5-10, 15, July 28, 29, August
4, 10, October 17, 25, 1921, May 1, June 20, July 27-30, 
August 8, 22, 25, 31, 1922, January 13, February 25, 1926;
New Orleans Daily States. January 5-10, 15-21, 23, February
6, 14, 18, 22, 1921, June 27, 1927.
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of the rewards of public service (patronage), but more con­
cerned with the effective and economical management of the 
municipal government,® In fact, however, as the Daily States 
recognized, the New Regulars were anything but new, combin­
ing the disconsolate remnant of professional politicians 
from the ODA and the inexperienced and brash faction of 
Sixth and Seventh Ward Democrats loyal to Francis and Gus 
Williams.'7
Neither were the New Regulars particularly enlightened 
nor altogether permanent. The New Orleans press claimed that 
Sullivan and the New Regulars attracted and represented an 
unsavory, "vicious" class of citizens. The press associated 
the New Regulars with race horse gambling, bootlegging, 
prostitution, and New Orleans Railway and Light Company and 
later New Orleans Public Service. The claim was not totally 
unwarranted. During his professional life as an attorney and
"New Orleans Daily States. August 10-14, 16, 20, 23, 25, 
1922; New Orleans Item. August 10-14, 16, 20-25, 1922.
7The principal leaders of the New Regulars were Edward 
Haggerty (First Ward), John J. O'Neil (Second Ward), George 
Williams, no relation to Francis and Gus, (Third Ward), John 
Bacon (Fourth Ward), Ural McMillan (Fifth Ward), Henrico 
Desmare (Sixth Ward), John W. Bagert (Seventh Ward), Joseph 
O'Hara (Tenth Ward), and Ivy G. Kittredge (Thirteenth Ward). 
New Orleans Item, July 22, 23, August 10-14, 1922, September
13, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. August 10-14, 30, Sep­
tember 11, 1922, September 13, 1923.
The term "Old Regulars" was not used until 1922, when 
John Sullivan formed the "New" Regulars. Initially, the ex­
pression Old Regulars referred only to the Behrman Regulars 
and not to the entire organization, but over the course of 
New Orleans politics the term became associated with the 
Regular Democratic Organization. See New Orleans Item. May
14, 1920, July 15, 1922, January 18, 19, 27, February 20, 
1924.
lobbyist, John Sullivan represented several "vicious" 
economic interests, including the New Orleans Fair Grounds, 
the New Orleans Brewers and Distillers Assocation, and, of 
course, New Orleans Railway and Light Company. It was un­
fair and inaccurate, though, to describe the entire organi­
zation as corrupt and vicious, for there were men of integ­
rity and intelligence, like Michael McKay and Ivy Kittredge 
in the New Regular organization."
But the presence of men like McKay and Kittredge did 
not necessarily ensure the political permanance and success 
of the New Regulars. The success and permanance of the New 
Regulars depended principally on their ability to win elec­
tions and to convince the voters that they were capable of 
enlightened and effective government. Under John Sullivan, 
the New Regulars came close to winning control of the muni­
cipal government in 1925 and being a force in state govern­
ment. But close was never good enough.
In September, 1922, Martin Behrman, in poor health and 
acting on advise from his doctor, family, and friends, 
resigned as chairman of the Regular Democratic Organization 
Though Behrman planned to remain active in the RDO and in 
municipal and state affairs, he told the RDO caucus that he 
would never again seek public office in New Orleans. Though
"New Orleans Item January 10, 13, 16, 28, 1925; New
Orleans Times-Picavune. January 10, 1925.
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Behrman's health may have been a deciding factor in his 
decision to retire from active politics, it was not the sole 
reason. After 1916, when Behrman won an uncontested and 
nearly unprecedented third term, the RDO began to unravel, 
factionalized along social, political, and ideological 
lines. Though factionalism was certainly common in New Or­
leans politics, even among the so-called machine politi­
cians, it had never prevented the RDO from winning elec­
tions or controlling the municipal government.
All that changed with 1916. The RDO and the Behrman 
administration seemed incapable of answering the city's 
needs or resolving its pressing problems. City finances were 
in disarray, tax and assessment policies were inequitable 
and, according to the reformers, "politicized," services 
were deteriorating, and the city was held hostage by the 
public utilities company and its employees. Discontent with 
the municipal government undermined confidence in the RDO's 
and Behrman's ability to govern, culminating in their defeat 
in 1920. After 1920, Behrman was unable to heal the riffs 
within the RDO, and rather than see it lose another munici­
pal election under his leadership, he resigned, turning over 
the RDO to Paul H. Maloney and a different generation of 
Regulars. Behrman's retirement, however, like his confidence 
in Paul Maloney and the "new” generation of Regulars, lasted 
only a short time, cut short by the exigencies of politics
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and the desire for vindication.*
At the end of August, 1924, Martin H. Manion, a life­
long Regular and the leader of the Fourteenth Ward, resign­
ed his office and announced his unwillingness to remain in 
an organization concerned more with the municipal elections 
and less with municipal service.10 Chairman Maloney expres­
sed surprise and consternation at Manion's decision and ex­
planation, but he accepted the resignation without hesita­
tion and called on the RDO precinct leaders in the Four­
teenth Ward to select a new leader. Ordinarily, selecting a 
replacement for Martin Manion would have had no special im­
plication for municipal politics. But these were not ordi­
nary times or circumstances. The Fourteenth Ward was one of 
the two "silk stocking" wards (the Twelfth Ward, Maloney's 
home, was the other), containing several stately and wealthy 
neighborhods. As a rule, its voters were among the economic, 
social, and civic leaders of the city. And these leaders 
were, almost to a man, unremitting opponents of the Regular
®New Orleans Item, February 26, March 5, 16, 18, 19, 22, 
23, July 15, 25, 27, August 25, September 17, 21, October 3- 
5, 20, 21, 1922; New Orleans Daily States,. March 25-27, June 
4, July 12, 13, 16, 23-26, 31, September 9, October 4, 5,
1922. Behrman may have hastened his decision because of the 
failure of his candidates to win the special and regular 
elections for the Public Service Commission. Behrman backed 
two nondescript candidates against Francis Williams, while 
Paul Maloney endorsed Williams. Williams won both elections.
x°Manion, of course, was one of the more progressive 
"Old" Regulars. During his political career in the Louisiana 
House of Representatives, Manion sponsored or supported 
several important "progressive" measures, including utility 
regulation and woman suffrage.
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Democratic Organization. In the municipal elections of 1908, 
1912, and 1920, with a clear choice between a reform candi­
date and Martin Behrman the residents of the Fourteenth Ward 
voted in overwhelming numbers against Behrman and the RDO.
In a municipal election with no recognizable reform candi­
date, the vote in the Fourteenth Ward could be decisive, 
especially to the "Regular" candidate opposing Martin 
Behrman. It was crucial, then, for any anti-Behrman candi­
date be organized and well-represented in the Fourteenth 
Ward.
The Regular Democrats of the Fourteenth Ward were, as 
well, thoroughly divided, reflecting, in effect, the larger 
schism within the RDO. There were three principal factions 
competing for control of the ward and demanding representa­
tion on the caucus. One faction, led by William Anthony 
Bisso, the owner of a tugbqat and salvage company, repre­
sented the "river" precincts along the Mississippi River. 
These precincts, like their counterparts in the "lake" pre­
cincts, were working-class neighborhoods and generally pro- 
Regular and pro-Behrman. But in 1920, these precincts dis­
serted the incumbent mayor, casting a majority and decisive 
vote for Andrew McShane. The "lake" precincts in the rear of 
the ward were led by John P. O'Leary, a supporter of former 
mayor Behrman and president of the Jefferson Construction 
Company. Though less visible in municipal politics than 
either the "river" or "uptown" areas, the rear precincts
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cast more votes in the mayoral election of 1920 than any 
other section— votes that helped elect Andrew HcShane. The 
third faction, centered in the "uptown" precincts adjacent 
to Loyola, Newcomb, and Tulane universities, opposed Bisso 
and O'Leary (and Behrman), endorsing Richard Webster Leche 
(and Maloney), a "prominent" young attorney for ward 
leader.xx
Eventually, after considerable political manuevering, 
a majority of the precinct leaders settled on O'Leary (Bisso 
withdrew from the contest earlier), giving former mayor 
Behrman an additional vote in the caucus and ruining 
Maloney's chances of winning the RDO nomination for mayor. 
For obvious reasons, the Maloney Regulars in the Fourteenth 
Ward contested the selection of O'Leary, in effect, compel­
ling the RDO caucus to settle the dispute. Twelve members of 
the caucus favored seating O'Leary, but Maloney and his 
following on the caucus argued for a "democratic solution," 
calling for a "preference primary" to decide the true leader 
of the Fourteenth Ward. Behrman and the majority of the 
caucus rejected Maloney's petition as "impractical," but 
voted to resolve the issue at a later time. That time was 
the next day.12
lxNew Orleans Item, September 11-13, 23, 1924; New 
Orleans Daily States. September 14, 1924; New Orleans Times- 
Picayune, November 13, 1924.
X2New Orleans Item. September 20, 23, October 30, Novem­
ber 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 1924; New Orleans Daily States, No­
vember 1, 2, 6, 13, 14, 20, 1924.
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The caucus reconvened the following day, anxious to 
choose a new leader for the Fourteenth Ward and to move on 
to more substantial matters. Martin Behrman moved that the 
caucus accept John O'Leary as the leader of the Fourteenth 
Ward Regulars. And eleven of the sixteen ward leaders voted 
to seat O'Leary. But five caucus members, Edward Egan 
(Second Ward), Albert J. Leggert (Seventh Ward), John Nun- 
nemacher (Ninth Ward), R. J. Gregory (Twelfth Ward), and 
C. S. Barnes (Thirteenth), refused to vote, but simply re­
mained silent during the roll call vote on the O'Leary con­
firmation. Once the caucus acknowledged O'Leary as the 
leader of the Fourteenth Ward, the five ward leaders 
announced their intention of supporting Paul Maloney, refus­
ing to discuss any other candidate for mayor. When Behrman 
ruled them out of order, Paul Maloney resigned as chairman 
of the RDO caucus and announced his candidacy for mayor.13 
"My friends," Maloney told reporters, referring to his five 
supporters on the caucus, "have gone so far and have been so 
persistent in their support of me as a candidate for mayor, 
that I feel honor bound to continue my candidacy. There
X3New Orleans Item. November 13, 15, 1924; New Orleans 
Daily States. November 15, 1924; New Orleans Times-Picavune. 
November 13, 15, 1924. Maloney had been a candidate for 
mayor since 1923, receiving enthusiastic support from the 
women of the Twelefth Ward and, for a time, from Martin 
Behrman. Behrman's enthusiasm ended when Maloney began 
acquiring influence in the RDO caucus and when Maloney 
began courting the support of John Sullivan, Robert Ewing, 
and Huey Pierce Long. See New Orleans Item, passim, 1923.
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seems no turning back now. I entertain the kindest feelings 
towards the [Regular] organization. Many of my warmest and 
best friends are enrolled in its membership.1*1*
For the moment, Maloney remained a member of the RDO 
and the leader of the Twelfth Ward, hoping, perhaps, that 
the Regulars might still offer him their nomination. He 
hoped in vain. The Regulars made no such concession. And 
when the Regulars selected Thomas Killeen, the former presi­
dent of the Choctaw Club, the Registrar of Voters for 
Orleans Parish, and an intimate of Martin Behrman, to re­
place him as chairman, Maloney conceded the Regular nomina­
tion, announcing as an "independent" candidate for mayor. 
Maloney's "independent" candidacy troubled the Regular Demo­
crats. Though for the moment without significant organized 
support, Maloney was an accomplished executive and public 
servant, and, with the proper support and guidance, could be 
a formidable candidate. He was the only Regular to survive 
the election of 1920, and he served with distinction as Com­
missioner of Public Utilities, arranging the rehabilitation 
of NORLC and challenging the monopoly of the Cumberland 
Telephone Company. And, as Maloney displayed in 1920, he 
could attract support from both Regular and independent 
voters. Clearly, Maloney's departure weakened the RDO and 
his candidacy threatened the plans of the Regulars to regain
x*New Orleans Daily States, November 16, 1924; New
Orleans Times-Picavune. November 16, 1924.
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control of the municipal government.1®
Unwilling to nominate Maloney or to concede the elec­
tion to John Sullivan and his New Regulars, the RDO caucus 
approached Maloney with a "compromise". If Maloney agreed to 
step aside, so too would Mayor Behrman (though not an 
"active" candidate, Behrman was the overwhelming choice of 
the "Old" Regulars who dominated the caucus), freeing the 
way for a compromise candidate and assuring victory for the 
Regulars in the municipal elections. Should Maloney withdraw 
from the mayoral campaign, the Regulars assured him a place 
on their commission council ticket, rewarding him with the 
position of Commissioner of Public Finance and vice-Mayor.3-® 
Maloney rejected the compromise. The Regulars, he con­
tended, conceded nothing, but gained every advantage. Every 
one of the compromise candidates mentioned by the Regulars 
was either a friend or a protege of Martin Behrman,3-7 in 
effect conceding the election to the former mayor and allow­
ing him to govern indirectly through a mayor and a commis­
sion council chosen not for their ability but for their 
loyalty and subservience to Martin Behrman and his "Old"
“ New Orleans Item, January 25, 1921, November 16, 17, 
1924; New Orleans Daily States. November 16, 17, December
15, 1925, January 8, 12, 1925.
“ New Orleans Item. November 22, 26, December 2, 1924; 
New Orleans Daily States, November 16-20, 22-24, 1924; New 
Orleans Times-Picavune. November 23, 24, 1924.
“ Ibid. The candidates mentioned most often were former 
Commissioner of Public Property Edward E. Lafaye, Civil 
District Court Judge William H. Byrnes, banker Charles 
Theard, State Senator John C. Davey, and Robert Riordan, 
the chairman of the Louisiana Tax Commission.
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Regulars. Maloney, on the other hand, supporters argued, 
conceded everything and gained nothing. The Regulars asked 
him to delay his ambitions, and those of the voters, to 
serve in an administration dominated by his political ad­
versaries and in a position that promised few personal and 
political rewards and that asked him to further the ambi­
tions of other men, in particular Martin Behrman and the 
"Old" Regulars.18
t
If Maloney remained independent of Martin Behrman and 
the Regulars, these same "friends" asserted, he would become 
a more legitimate and attractive candidate, particularly to 
the "independent" voters in the Uptown sections of the city 
and to the New Regulars of John Patrick Sullivan. For these 
voters and politicians, the principal issue of the campaign 
was the final defeat of "Behrmanism" and the continuation 
and fufillment of the reforms begun in 1920. In their view, 
Martin Behrman and his Regulars represented a failed public 
policy, dependent on high taxes, unprincipled assessment 
practices, profligate, reckless finances, needless city 
services, and undue interference with private business and 
personal interests. An independent candidate that stood 
against the return of Behrmanism and had the unqualified 
support of the civic and commerical leadership of the city 
and the New Regulars would force the "Old" Regulars to 
nominate Martin Behrman, whose health and political past
iaIbid.
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made him an unattractive and vulnerable candidate. And, as 
the election of 1920 demonstrated, Martin Behrman and the 
Regulars could not defeat an independent candidate blessed 
with the support of civic reformers and practical politi­
cians .xs
But this was not 1920. Though an attractive and legiti­
mate candidate, to be sure, Maloney hardly qualified as an 
independent anti-Regular candidate. He was, after all, until 
his recent conversion, an unrepentant Regular Democrat. As a 
member of the Regular Democratic Organization, Maloney 
served first as a state legislator, then as the leader of 
the Twelfth Ward, Commissioner of Public Utilities, and, 
since 1922, when Martin Behrman "retired" from active muni­
cipal politics, chairman of the RDO caucus. Beginning in 
1922, Maloney cultivated more power within the organization, 
and openly sought its nomination for mayor. During his ten­
ure on the commission council, Maloney pressed for more ex­
acting regulation of public utilities, fashioning a rehabil­
itation settlement and ordinance favorable to both sides and 
more reminiscent of the sort of solution favored by the RDO 
than the Orleans Democratic Association. And, with his col­
leagues on the commission council, Maloney opposed many of 
the recommendations of the Municipal Survey Commission and 
the City Planning and Zoning Commission, irritating the 
civic and commerical leaders of the city. Paul Maloney,
“ I b i d .
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then, would never have the unqualified support of the civic 
and social elite of New Orleans.
Though many "Old" Regulars believed that John Sullivan 
arranged and directed Maloney's independent candidacy, the 
Commissioner of Public Utilties did not have the undivided 
confidence of the New Regular organization. Maloney's apos­
tasy from the RDO was more a matter of convenience than con­
viction, and his following in the RDO was, for the most
part, limited to a handful of supporters and confined to the
Uptown wards. Despite his elevated position within the RDO 
caucus, Maloney did not have the confidence of former mayor 
Behrman or the majority of other the ward leaders. In early 
1923, six months after announcing his retirement, Martin 
Behrman began reasserting his command over the RDO and its
ward leaders, forcing Maloney farther into the background
and eventually replacing him altogether as the acknowledged 
leader of the Regular Democratic Organization. Mayor Behrman 
and his "Old" Regulars endorsed state, parochial, and muni­
cipal candidates, conducted their campaigns, and dispensed 
all patronage. By the end of 1924, Behrman had regained com­
plete dominance of the RDO caucus, denying Maloney the priv­
ilege of naming Richard Leche the leader of the Fourteenth 
Ward and, in effect, forcing Maloney to resign as chairman 
of the RDO caucus. In addition, the bulk of Commissioner 
Maloney's support came from the same sort of voters already 
committed to anti-Behrman municipal reform. In brief, then.
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Paul Maloney could not command the respect of his own orga­
nization and, apparently, could contribute little to the 
new.20
Finally, the political circumstances were different in 
1924 and 1925.2X Martin Behrman and the Regular Democrats 
were no longer in power and responsible for the economic, 
social, and political problems of the city. The people and 
the press blamed the ODA, John Sullivan, and the McShane 
administration for the collapse of municipal services, for 
high utility bills, for unpaved streets, and for the parti­
san and personal incompetence of the municipal government. 
Despite the demands for personal competence and political 
experienced in municipal affairs, many Regulars and reform­
ers, were not yet convinced that the return of these
2°New Orleans Item, October 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, November 12, 
13, December 20, 23, 24, 1924; New Orleans Daily States. 
October 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 19, December 23, 1924. Several mem­
bers of the "Old" Regulars joined the Maloney campaign. Many 
of them, however, had opposed Behrman in 1920, returning to 
the RDO only after the collapse of the ODA and then "desert­
ing" the Regulars for Maloney and Sullivan. For example,
"Old" Regulars Henry Desmare, a leader of the Sixth Ward 
and a former member of the ODA, left the RDO for Maloney.
So too did Richard Leche, Ural McMillian, and Maurice 
DePass. The majority of Maloney supporters, however, came 
from the civic and commerical establishment and from the 
McShane administration.
21The state constitution of 1921 lengthened McShaneTs 
term by five months, scheduling the municipal elections for 
February, 1925. Thereafter, the municipal elections would 
take place during even numbered years. The stated purpose of 
the provision was to prevent the municipal elections from 
influencing the state campaign. In reality, it was a com­
promise between Governor Parker, who wanted to limit the 
mayor of New Orleans to one term, and John Sullivan, who 
wanted to the New Orleans vote to influence state elec­
tions .
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personal and civic virtues meant the return of Martin 
Behrman.22
Martin Behrman never doubted that the RDO would return 
to power and that with the right leadership and support the 
Regulars could restore integrity to the municipal government 
and city politics. Like many "public men," Martin Behrman 
recognized that the McShane administration and those it 
represented were responsible for the paralysis of municipal 
affairs. From his standpoint, the principal failure of the 
McShane administration was its inability to provide sustain­
ed, disciplined leadership. No one person or political or­
ganization spoke for the administration or could discipline 
its disparate factions. After four years of so-called reform 
government, it was apparent to Martin Behrman and to many 
others, that only the Regular Democratic Organization could 
discipline the municipal government of New Orleans, restor­
ing order and purpose to public affairs.23
22New Orleans Item. April 16, June 17, 18, 1924; New 
Orleans Times-Picavune. June 17, 1924; New Orleans Daily 
States. November 30, December 1, 1924.
23New Orleans Item. November 22, 26, 27, 1924, January 6, 
1925; New Orleans Daily States. January 26, November 16, 
December 26, 1924; New Orleans Times-Picavuner November 20,
26, 27, 1924. For Martin Behrman, the McShane administration 
failed principally because "amateur" politicians and "silk 
stocking" reformers formed its leadership. Unlike the re­
formers, professional politicians adhered to a code of 
strict professional standards, and operated under constant 
public review. By contrast, the amateur politician and "silk 
stocking" reformer operated by private standards, creating 
an "invisible" government of private privilege.
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There was legitimate concern, however, that Behrman's 
health and his political reputation might prevent him from 
taking a direct and active part in the restoration. Behrman 
shared these concerns, stating on several occasions, partic­
ularly after he resumed leadership over the RDO caucus, that 
he was physically unable and spirtually unwilling to cam­
paign for office. There was, as well, speculation that the 
"Behrman era" had past, that the former mayor represented an 
older generation and an outdated politics. Some members of 
the RDO caucus, those who eventually left with Maloney, 
argued that Behrman should step aside for younger, more 
capable and appealing candidates. Mayor Behrman was not un­
aware of these concerns, and, to an extent, he agreed with 
them. As late as November, 1924, Behrman reiterated his un­
willingness to run for office, instead urging the RDO caucus 
to nominate a younger, more vigorous candidate, some one 
like Edward E. Lafaye or Robert Riordan.24
But Lafaye and Riordan declined the nomination, com­
pelling the "Old" Regulars and Martin Behrman to reconsider 
his nomination. The supporters of Martin Behrman were con­
vinced that, despite questions about his health and politi­
cal record, Behrman could defeat Paul Maloney and govern the 
city. By the beginning of December, Martin Behrman, too, was 
convinced that he could win the mayoral election and recon-
24New Orleans Item, November 12, December 1, 2, 1924; New
Orleans Daily States. November 26-29, December 3, 5, 1924.
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struct municipal government and politics. Early in December, 
the RDO caucus, complete with the five ward leaders support­
ing Maloney, met to select the Regular nominee for mayor.
The caucus adopted a resolution binding all ward and pre­
cinct leaders to support the Regular nominees for mayor and 
the commission council, prompting the supporters of Paul 
Maloney to leave the meeting and the RDO. With the Maloney 
supporters deserting the RDO, the caucus nominated Martin 
Behrman for a fifth and last term as mayor.29
Though Martin Behrman and Paul Maloney were confident 
of election, some men were disturbed by the prospect of the 
return of the RDO to power or the continuation of municipal 
misrule under John Patrick Sullivan. Other men were con­
vinced that they could influence, if not determine, the 
outcome of the election, themselves governing the city 
through political alliances and building coalitions for 
future municipal and state campaigns. Those men, Andrew 
McShane, Francis and Gus Williams, and Huey Pierce Long, 
would be disappointed by the results of the municipal 
elections. Their convictions and political maneuverings 
would influence, though not determine, the course of the 
municipal campaign.
29New Orleans Item, December 3, 4, 6-10, 1924; New 
Orleans Daily Statesr December 5-10, 1924; New Orleans 
Times-Picavune. November 15, 16, 19, 26, 29, December 2, 
6-10, 1924.
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At the beginning of 1924, an exhausted and disillusion­
ed Andrew McShane declared that he would not seek another 
term as mayor. McShane's tenure as mayor had soured him on 
municipal politics and government. McShane was, as he said, 
no politician, and was unwilling, perhaps incapable, of bow­
ing to either professional politicians or self-interested 
businessmen. McShane saw himself as a disinterested, public- 
minded citizen, drafted by the people and alone charged with 
representing their wishes. He found himself mired in patron­
age disputes, legislative compromise, and economic and 
political conflict with the people who elected him. Disillu­
sioned by politics, he lost favor and influence in his own 
administration, standing idlely and helplessly while his ad- 
administration collapsed from internal division and con­
flict. "I have had more hell since I was elected mayor," he 
said, "then in all the rest of my life before." Under no 
circumstance, would he seek reelection or participate in the 
municipal campaigns. By the end of the year, McShane had 
changed his mind, disturbed more by the prospect of Martin 
Behrman or Paul Maloney serving as mayor than with being 
condemned to four more years of personal and political 
hell.2"
Initially, Andrew McShane hoped to endorse the nominee 
of the Regular Democratic Organization. Apparently, McShane
28New Orleans Item, February 8, November 20, 1924; New
Orleans Daily States. February 8, 10, 11, November 20, 1924.
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recognized that Martin Behrman and the "Old" Regulars would 
never nominate Paul Maloney for mayor. Instead, like many 
other "independent" citizens, McShane believed, perhaps 
hoped, that the RDO would nominate some one like Edward E. 
Lafaye or City Engineer John Klorer. For McShane and other 
civic reformers, these men offered a legitimate and thought­
ful alternative to a true civic reform candidate. But polit­
ical circumstances changed during the year. Maloney did not 
honor the wishes of the RDO caucus, but instead left the 
organization, declaring himself an "independent" candidate 
for mayor and allying with John Patrick Sullivan and, later, 
Huey Pierce Long. "I will not stand by idle," McShane told 
reporters, referring to Maloney's alliance with Sullivan, 
"while the ideals and objectives for which I have fought and 
striven during my administration are disregarded and thrown 
side."2"7
Though not yet a declared candidate, McShane declared 
his campaign against the corrupt alliance of Paul Maloney 
and John Sullivan. For Andrew McShane, the candidacy of Paul 
Maloney and his subsequent alliance with John Sullivan was 
both politically troubling and personally distasteful, a 
bitter reminder of his failed administration and the failure 
of municipal reform politics to effectively govern the city. 
From McShane's vantage, the alliance between Maloney and
2-7New Orleans Daily States. November 20, 1924; New
Orleans Item, November 20, 1924.
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Sullivan strengthened the special interests and partisan 
concerns that had since 1921 combined to dilute and then 
paralyze the municipal reform movement. Sullivan was the 
consumate spoils politician, unconcerned with political 
ethics and social responsibility. He sabotaged the civil 
service reforms promised by the ODA and viewed public policy 
as an oppotunity to expand his reservoir of political 
patronage. Maloney represented the corrupt alliance between 
politics and corporate interest, using the authority of the 
municipal government to protect and further the financial 
interest of companies like NORLC-NOPSI. For McShane, Maloney 
and Sullivan were responsible for the failure of his admin­
istration and the degredation of municipal affairs in New 
Orleans.2a
But so too were Martin Behrman and the Regular Democra­
tic Organization. They were more concerned with political 
advantage than economic and social progress, content to ally 
with any political or economic interest that promised their 
continued political success. When the RDO nominated Behrman, 
McShane decided to seek reelection, contending that his own 
candidacy gave the people of New Orleans a valid alternative 
between two generations of machine politicians.2®
McShane*s candidacy (it became official at the end of 
the year) clearly threatened Paul Maloney. Maloney had hoped
2°New Orleans Times-Picavune. November 21, December 12,
1924; New Orleans Daily States. December 5, 1924.
2®Ibid.
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to attract the independent anti-Behrman voter, who, along 
with the New Regular voter, would give him a majority in the 
municipal elections. McShane's candidacy forced Maloney into 
ern open alliance with Sullivan's New Regulars, jeopardizing 
the independent vote and exposing his relationship with Huey 
Long.30 Reaction to McShane's candidacy among the friends of 
Paul Maloney and the opponents of Martin Behrman was immedi­
ate and critical. The Daily Satesr the principal newspaper 
supporter of Maloney, Sullivan, and Long, called the McShane 
candidacy "pathetic," denouncing the incumbent reform mayor 
as a "tool" of Martin Behrman. Other critics, like the 
Times-Picayune, did not doubt McShane's integrity, but they 
did question his judgment. The Times-Picavune acknowledged 
the sincerity of McShane's candidacy, reminding voters that 
the McShane administration gave the city a period of "repair 
and recuperation" from the excessess of "Behrmanism". But 
the Picayune also pointed out the failures of the McShane 
administration, contending that those failures made "Behr­
manism" an attractive, though false, alternative to munici­
pal reform under*the "independent" candidacy of Paul 
Maloney. Any vote for McShane, the Times-Picavune and the 
Daily States predicted (though incorrectly), spoiled the 
chances of Maloney and promised the return of Martin Behrman 
and the Regular Democratic Organization. To the contrary, as
3°New Orleans Item, November 21, 22, December 26-30,
1924; New Orleans Daily States. December 14, 1924.
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we shall see, a vote for Andrew McShane was an anti-Regular 
vote, cast in protest against both Behrman and Maloney.3X
The principal threat to the Maloney-Sullivan coalition 
came from Francis and Gus Williams and their "Independent" 
Regular Organization. Initially, the Williamses joined John 
Sullivan, hoping that their affiliation with the New Regular 
organization would serve their political asperations. It 
soon became apparent to the Williamses that the New Regulars 
served only the ambitions of John Sullivan and those he 
chose to favor. In the summer of 1923, Francis and Gus left 
the New Regulars, forming their own political organization, 
the "Independent" Regulars. The Williams brothers promised 
to rid municipal affairs of "boss rule" and to end the 
corrupt alliance between the municipal government and alien 
corporations like New Orleans Public Service and the Cumber­
land Telephone Company.32
The Williamses were not only independent, but also 
ambitious and impatient. Not content with their present
3XNew Orleans Times-Picavuner December 29, 31, 1924, Jan­
uary 16, 17, February 16, 1925; New Orleans Item. January 
16, 17, 1925. McShane had little organized support, and what 
little he had was virtualy nonexistent. A group of support­
ers calling itself the "Mohawk Democratic Club" endorsed 
McShane and his "municipal ticket". Needless to say, the 
Mohawk Democratic Club commanded few votes, and the McShane 
ticket consisted of four candidates for the commission coun­
cil.
32New Orleans Item, June 6-10, 29, July 4, 1923; New 
Orleans Daily States, June 6-10, July 4, 1923; Williams,
Huey Long. 167-68. The "Independent" Regulars attracted few 
supporters, though several acknowledged professional politi­
cians joined. Among them were Richard A. Dowling, Thomas I. 
O'Connor, and John St.Paul.
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positions and standing in municipal affairs, they decided to 
challenge both the "Old" and the New Regulars in the munici­
pal election of 1925. Early in November, 1924, before either 
faction had settled on its candidate, Francis Williams 
announced for mayor. The Times-Picavune commented the next 
day on Williams's candidacy. The Picayune saw great promise 
in Francis Williams. He was, it remarked, a forceful and 
energetic politician, but at times ill-tempered and impul­
sive. Though one day he may become an excellent mayor, at 
this time he did not have the temperment or maturity to 
govern the city.33
But the public and Maloney and Sullivan thought other­
wise. Late in October, before Williams announced, the Item 
conducted a "strawvote" election, sending sample ballots to 
its subscribers and asking them to express their preference 
from among the major candidates for mayor. The names of four 
candidates, Maloney, Behrman, Arthur J. O'Keefe (the Regular 
leader of the Tenth Ward and the former City Treasurer), and 
Francis Williams, appeared on the "ballot". The "voting" was 
very close; fewer than sixty votes separated Behrman from 
Maloney. Francis Williams was a close third. Though
33New Orleans Times-Picavune. November 12, 1924; 
Williams, Huey Long. 167-68. Francis Williams was a loud and 
tempetious man, prone to coarse actions and language. He 
was, however, also deeply committed to the interest of or­
ganized labor (he was the attorney for the Carmen's union in
the 1920s) and to the lower classes of New Orleans. From
every indication, he was a sincere, though personally ambi­
tious, "urban progressive".
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obviously unscientific and biased, the poll revealed that 
neither Behrman nor Maloney was the clear choice of the 
city's "voters". And the strawvote showed as well that a 
third candidate like Francis Williams could influence the 
outcome of the election.*+
Francis Williams was more of a threat to Paul Maloney 
than to Martin Behrman. Despite their personal and political 
differences, Williams and Maloney shared the same constitu­
encies. Williams, like Maloney, appealed to the anti-Regular 
reformers and anti-Behrman Regulars that elected McShane in 
1920. Williams's strength was concentrated in the Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth wards, areas of the city 
crucial to Maloney's candidacy. Williams was, as well, as 
Public Service Commissioner, in an authoritative position to 
criticize the NORLC rehabilitation settlement fashioned by 
Commissioner of Public Utilities Paul Maloney. And Williams 
had a personal dislike for John Sullivan and Huey Long, 
the two principal supporters of the Maloney canpaign.3*
But Williams's political and personal appeal did not 
detract from his considerable political liabilities. His 
affiliation with the carmen's union and his early associa­
tion with Huey Long soured many businessmen, and his politi­
cal "independence" irked Martin Behrman and John Sullivan.
As a result, his organized political support was limited and
3,*New Orleans Item. November 18-21, 24, 30, December 11,
1924.
39Ibid.; Williams, Huey Long. 167-68.
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few people considered him a "serious" candidate (there were 
rumors that Williams was a Behrman "dummy candidate"). These 
liabilities surfaced almost immediately. Within weeks of an­
nouncing his candidacy, Francis Williams sought an "accomo­
dation" with both the "Old" and New Regulars. Williams ap­
proached the "Old" Regulars first, hoping either for its en­
dorsement for mayor or for a spot on the commission council 
ticket. Aware of Williams's shortcomings, the "Old" Regulars 
dismissed his candidacy, offering him neither position nor 
encouragement.3B
Maloney and the New Regulars offered the Williamses 
some encouragement, but little else. Eoprly in December, 
Maloney's followers met with Francis Williams, trying to 
convince him that his candidacy jeopardized Maloney's 
opportunity of defeating Behrman and the "Old" Regulars. 
These followers "promised" Francis a place on Maloney's com­
mission council ticket and agreed to endorse Gus for Recor­
der of Mortgages, a position he held currently.3‘/ The 
Williams brothers waited several weeks before making their 
decisions. Late in December, Francis withdrew from the 
mayoral campaign, "accepting" the endorsement of the Inde­
pendent Regulars for the commission council. But by that
3BGus Williams complained that the demands of the Behrman 
Regulars were so demeaning that they compromised his "self- 
respect". New Orleans Item. December 9, 17-19, 1924, January 
5, 1925; New Orleans Times-Picayune. December 4, 1924; New 
Orleans Daily States. December 3, 4, 14, 1924.
37Ibid.
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time, Sullivan, Maloney, and Huey Long had concluded that 
Williams was more valuable (and less threatening) to their 
coalition as Public Service Commissioner, and they insisted 
that Francis withdraw completely from the municipal cam­
paign . 3“
The Williamses hesitated, unwilling to bow to Maloney 
and Sullivan. But they did bend, or at least appeared to, to 
Huey Long. According to newspaper reports, Long "convinced" 
Williams to withdraw, arguing that the common enemy was 
Martin Behrman and the "Old" Regulars. Long also persuaded 
Williams, after several "heated" sessions, to endorse Paul 
Maloney for mayor. Though Huey Long later became a very per­
suasive politician, it seems farfetched that he convinced 
Francis Williams to withdraw from the municipal elections. 
Long had virtually no following in New Orleans, receiving 
only 12,000 votes in the city in the 1924 gubernatorial 
election. It seems more likely that Francis Williams, with 
more experience in municipal affairs than Long, sensed that 
there was no support for his candidacy and that he had no 
other choice but to withdraw and endorse Paul Maloney. With 
Williams out of the race, however, Maloney could concentrate 
on selecting his commission council ticket and defeating
3°New Orleans Daily States, December 15-17, 20, 21,
1924; New Orleans Item. December 16-18, 20, 1924-
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Martin Behrman.3®
Maloney's selections for the commission council, two 
anti-Behrman Regulars, a member of the commerical establish­
ment, and a New Regular office holder from the McShane ad­
ministration, spoke of his political accomodation and his 
electoral needs. Charles H. Hendricks and Paul B. Habans, 
the two anti-Behrman Regulars would, Maloney assumed, appeal 
to those Regulars weary of Behrman*s domination of the RDO. 
Hendricks, a former state Representative and Senator from 
Behrman*s home ward, had lost favor with the former mayor 
and had been gerrymandered from his job in 1921 to make room 
for John C. Davey, a protege of Behrman. Paul Habans was a 
former school teacher and administrator, and, at one time, a 
protege of Martin Behrman. When the "Old" Regulars gained 
control of the Orleans Parish Democratic Central Committee 
in 1924, Behrman chose Habans as its chairman. Not only did 
Habans hold an important position in the RDO, he also came 
from the Seventh Ward, a section of the city below Canal 
Street essential to Maloney's hopes for election. Ben C.
Brown was among the commerical elite of New Orleans. Born 
and educated in Canada, Brown came to the United States in
3SThe New Orleans press overreacted to Huey Long's intru­
sion in the municipal election, claiming that a vote for 
Maloney was a vote for Huey Long. The patterns of municipal 
politics were set long before Huey Long became an active 
player in the municipal election, and, as the election 
returns indicate. Long's presence in the municipal campaign 
had no impact on the outcome. For an account of the 1924- 
1925 election that gives Long more credit than he is due, 
see Williams, Huey Long. 73, 81, 84, 162, 212, 213, 382.
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the 1890s, settling at first in St.Louis before moving to 
New Orleans. In 1905 Brown established a dairy and ice cream 
company, and, with business success, came social and civic 
acceptance.1-0
As impressive and significant as those selections were 
to Paul Maloney, none was more important than the endorse­
ment of John D. Klorer. Klorer was a noted civil engineer 
and served five years as City Engineer during the McShane 
administration. Klorer had a reputation as an efficient 
and apolitical public servant, acquiring that reputation as 
one of the administration's principal negotiators during the 
NORLC rehabilitation controversy. Klorer had been mentioned 
frequently as a possible mayoral candidate, but he was never 
a serious candidate. He was, though, a serious candidate for 
the commission council, running as an independent. Maloney 
tried to convince Klorer to accept a place on his ticket, 
hoping to appeal to the civic and social refomers who ad­
mired the City Engineer, but Klorer declined. Instead, 
Maloney, like Behrman, endorsed Klorer, virtually assuring 
his election to the commission council. The Maloney press 
pronounced the municipal ticket (Maloney endorsed the New 
Regulars candidates for parochial offices), the best in 
years, proclaiming it the "people's" ticket, and predicting
-°New Orleans Item, April 18, November 21, 1913, April 7, 
1914, December 17, 1924; New Orleans Daily States. December 
17, 1924, January 4, 16, 1925; New Orleans Times-Picavune. 
November 19, December 26, 1924, January 6, 1925.
a complete victory in the municipal primary in February.'•x
Defeating Martin Behrman and the "Old" Regulars, as 
Maloney and Sullivan surely understood, encompassed more 
than selecting an appealing, though conventional, municipal 
ticket. For Paul Maloney to win the municipal election, he 
had to disassociate himself from the numerous and painful 
failures of the McShane administration. In addition, he had 
to assure his disparate fallowing that his administration 
would not be either a restoration of "Behrmanism" or the 
continuation of municipal misrule under John Sullivan. The 
Maloney platform, then, reflected those concerns. Maloney 
promised a true, "business-like" administration, a more 
equitable assessment and tax policy, stricter regulation of 
NOPSI, cheap natural gas for the city, better schools and 
teacher pay, a reasonable, though comprehensive, zoning and 
planning ordinance, including provisions for residential 
segregation.
Though the platform contained an impressive list of 
capital improvements and municipal reforms, supporters of 
Martin Behrman lacerated it, calling it a litany of empty 
generalities, platitudes, and false promises. The Item 
acknowledged that it contained several planks pledging Com­
missioner Maloney to municipal reform and to vital social
4XBew Orleans Item, December 23, 1924; New Orleans Daily 
States. December 23, 24, 1924; New Orleans Times-Picayune. 
December 24, 1924.
42New Orleans Item, January 4, 9, 21, 22, 25, 1925; New 
Orleans Daily States. January 16, 17, 22, 1925.
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and civic improvements. But these promises, the Item remind­
ed its readers, were the same ones offered by the ODA in 
1920. But those promises, the Item asserted, went unfulfill­
ed principally because the same men who supported Paul 
Maloney either "reneged" on them or were never truly commit­
ted to them.'*3
Mayor Behrman agreed. In the opening speech of his cam­
paign, Behrman stressed the administrative and political 
failures of the past four years. Behrman did not attribute 
these failures to the citizens of New Orleans (a reference 
to the sort of campaign rhetoric used by civic reformers 
like John Parker and Andrew McShane) or even to Mayor 
McShane, but to the men now supporting Paul Maloney. These 
men, the former mayor said, for their own selfish political 
purposes, blocked the reforms promised by the ODA in 1920, 
retarding the economic and social development of the city 
and fracturing its political cohesion. The essential purpose 
of his campaign and administration, he said, was to restore 
political and social harmony to municipal affairs, assuring
'•3New Orleans Item, January 9, 1925. The New Regular 
politicians were not the only men to support Maloney. He 
received endorsements from Commissioners Stanley Ray and 
Wilbert Black, Esmond Phelps, Charles I. Rosen, and Hugh 
and Bernard McCloskey.
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the return of economic and civic development.**
Like Paul Maloney, Martin Behrman sought first to bring 
harmony to his political faction. Behrman began reconciling 
the disparate Regular factions in the early 1920s, welcoming 
back into the ranks of the RDO those men who had deserted 
the Regulars in 1920. He intensified his efforts after 1922, 
hoping that his retirement would speed reconcilation, but a 
complete reunification was, frankly, not possible, forcing 
Behrman out of retirement and compelling him to seek another 
term as mayor.48 Behrman, much like Maloney, chose his muni­
cipal ticket to reflect the politicial and electoral needs 
of the "Old" Regulars. Behrman selected one stalwart "Old" 
Regular, a businessman, and an attorney for the commission 
council ticket. Behrman, like Maloney, also endorsed John 
Klorer, the independent candidate for the commission coun-
■•■•New Orleans Item, December 5, 1924, January 5, 6, 9, 
February 1, 1925; New Orleans Times-Picavune. December 12, 
1924, January 9-12, 18, 29, 30, 1925. Critics of the Behrman 
candidacy charged that the McShane administration accom­
plished more than any previous Behrman administration, and 
that any failure on the part of the McShane municipal gov­
ernment to resolve the economic problems of the city stemmed 
from sixteen years of stagnation under Martin Behrman.
“•"Martin Behrman was, without question, an ambitious 
politician and wanted to vindicate his loss to McShane in 
1920. But he was, as well, a devoted "party man," seeking 
above all else the restoration of the RDO to power. The list 
of returning Regular Democrats is too long to cite here, but 
it was considerable and was a determining factor in the 
municipal elections. Returning Regulars included Harold W. 
Newman, Edward Comiskey, Fred Earhart, Joachim O. "Bathtub 
Joe" Fernandez, and Maurice Picheloup. Reconciliation was, 
of course, never complete. Several "Old" Regulars left 
Behrman to ioin Maloney and Sullivan. The most noteable 
desertions were Ural McMillian, Martin Manion, and Michael 
James McKay.
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cil. The "Old" Regular candidate was Arthur J. O'Keefe, a 
tea and coffee merchant and leader of the Irish and German 
Tenth Ward, the home ward of Robert Ewing, the publisher of 
the Daily States and the most noteable supporter of Paul 
Maloney, John Sullivan, and Huey Long. The businessman was 
William T. Hall, president of Hall Coffee and Sugar Company 
and the Panama Rice Milling Company and a resident of the 
spacious and politically important Ninth Ward. The final 
candidate was Joseph Sinai, a successful civil attorney and 
the law partner of Judge James Henrigues.
The anti-Behrman Daily States ridiculed the ticket as 
"pitifully weak and handicapped," a calculated, though 
transparent, attempt by the Behrman Regulars to hide behind 
a mask of social and professional respectability. None of 
the men selected by th2 "Old" Regular caucus, with the 
exception of John Klorer, the newspaper reported, possessed 
the sort of independent character or necessary experience to 
resist the political demands of Martin Behrman and the "Old" 
Regulars and to govern the city effectively and well. Admit­
tedly, the Behrman commission council ticket, not unlike the 
Maloney ticket, lacked practical political and governmental 
experience, but the same sort of criticism applied to every
46New Orleans Item, November 7, 1911, June 23, 1912, 
December 11, 15, 16, 28, 1924, January 12, February 21,
1925; New Orleans Times-Picavune. December 24, 27, 28, 1924; 
Melvin G. Holli and Peter d'A. Jones, eds., Biographical 
Directory of American Mayors, 1820-1980. (Greenwood Press, 
1981), 273-74.
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commission council since 1912. The Regular Democractic Or­
ganization, like the Good Government League and the Orleans 
Democractic Association, chose prominent business and pro­
fessional men for the commission council, relying on organi­
zation and the appeal of the municipal reform movement, 
rather than on personality and professional occupation, to 
attract voters. The Behrman administration never viewed 
political independence as an impediment to public service 
(the careers of Martin Manion, Harold Newman, Edward Lafaye, 
and John Klorer were examples of that view). It demanded, 
however, and to some degree achieved, a coordinated expres­
sion of public policy— something the McShane administration 
rarely, if ever, accomplished.*7
As in past elections, however, voters concentrated 
their attention on the principal candidates for mayor and 
their platforms. Two of the three major newspapers of New 
Orleans, the Times-Picayune and the Daily States endorsed 
Paul Maloney, but the Item, for years a relentless and, at 
times, merciless, critic of Martin Behrman and the RDO, 
supported the former mayor and his ticket. The Picayune and 
the States argued that the election of Martin Behrman meant
‘•"’'New Orleans Daily States. December 29, 1924; New 
Orleans Item. December 3, 1924, January 16, 1925. The "Old" 
Regulars "fielded" a complete municipal ticket, as well.
The principal candidates were Henry Mooney for District 
Attorney, Richard Meredeth for Criminal Sheriff, Maurice 
Hartson for Civil Sheriff, and C. P. Taylor, Victor 
Mauberret, Fred Schmidt, James Malloy, Henry Umbach, A. R. 
Norbusch, and James Humphreys for the Board of Assessors.
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the return of "politicized" public administration and the 
continuation of the economic and social paralysis first felt 
during the last years of the war under the Behrman adminis­
tration and lasting throughout the entire McShane adminis­
tration. *" The New Orleans Item believed differently. The 
Item contended that neither Paul Maloney nor Andrew McShane 
had the qualifications or disposition to reconcile the dis­
crete political and social interests of the city. McShane 
was a man of determination and principle, but he was also 
willful and unbending, unwilling to compromise ideals to 
save his principles. By contrast, the Item editorialized, 
Paul Maloney was so ambitious for office that he would sac­
rifice his principles for political gain.*3
Martin Behrman, however, the Item continued, possessed 
all the personal attributes and practical experience to rec­
tify the social and economic problems of the city and to re­
store integrity to municipal and political affairs. Behrman 
was personally and politically honest, the Item said, never 
profiting from his position as mayor and never willing to 
compromise his principles for political advancement. Behrman 
was, as well, no mediocre ward politician, but an accom­
plished public servant, ever "receptive to progressive 
suggestion [and] sympathetic [to] constructive thought".
*BNew Orleans Times-Picayune and New Orleans Daily 
States, any edition beginning in January 1925 and continuing 
into early February, 1925.
*3New Orleans Item. January 1, 5, 9, 26, 1925, February 
2, 1925.
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And, most importantly, Martin Behrman reformed the Regular 
Democractic Organization, expelling the corrupt and vicious 
element of "ringsters" and realigning the RDO with the 
forces of economic and social progress in New Orleans.90
The endorsement of the Item was sincere,91 but its 
reasons require clarification. There was no question that 
Martin Behrman was honest and capable and that his conduct 
as the leader of the Regular Democratic Organization and as 
mayor was exemplary, setting the standards for the organiza­
tion and the municipal government. But though Behrman was a 
devoted public administrator, he was not without personal 
and political ambition, intent on advancing the legitimate 
political interests of the RDO and the public policy inter­
ests of the municipal government. Those concerns and inten-
9°New Orleans Item, September 3, 1922, January 5, 22, 
February 26, 1925. In many ways, the Behrman coalition did 
not differ from Maloney's. The "Old" Regulars contained pro­
fessional politicians, businessmen, current and former 
office holders, and "new men," like Thomas Semmes Walmsley, 
who sought a career in politics. Principally, however, the 
majority of Behrman supporters came from the "common class” 
of citizens who participated in politics as part of their 
civic responsibility and personal advancement.
91The opponents of Martin Behrman accused him of "buying" 
the endorsement of the New Orleans Item. In 1924, Genevieve 
Clark Thomson, the wife of James Thomson, publisher of the 
Item, ran for the unexpired term of Congressman H. Garland 
Dupre. Behrman endorsed Mrs. Thomson. Though she lost the 
election, Behrman "earned" the thanks and support of the 
Thomsons and the New Orleans Item. When the newspaper en­
dorsed Behrman in 1924-1925, critics claimed that Thomson 
was repaying an old campaign debt, a claim Thomson denied. 
Thomson claimed that the Item endorsed Behrman because of 
his sincere, though sudden, "conversion" to the principles 
of modern, prgressive reform and because a Maloney-Sullivan 
administration was a menace to prgress and reform in the 
city. New Orleans Item, February 1, 1925.
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tions expressed by Mayor Behrman and his administration 
often clashed with the interests of some Regular Democrats, 
as in the case of Storyville,32 and the civic-commerical 
elite, as in the case of the Public Belt Railroad Commis­
sion, the regulation of public utilities under the Manion 
and Nix bills, and the rehabilitation of New Orleans Railway 
and Light Company. In brief, though Behrman was open to pro­
gressive thought and suggestion and sought to "realign" the 
RDO with the interests of municipal reform, the Item and the 
civic and commerical elite of New Orleans opposed the sort 
of municipal reform advocated by the Behrman administration. 
Only later, after four years of municipal rule under Andrew 
McShane and the ODA, did the Item admit its mistake and ac­
knowledge its support of municipal rule under Martin Behrman 
and the RDO.
Convincing the Item alone, of course, would not win the 
municipal election. Behrman had to assure the commerical and 
civic leaders of New Orleans that he could overcome the 
political divisions within the city and restore its economic 
fortunes. Behrman also had to convince the public that his
32In October 1917, Mayor Behrman, only after the United 
States Navy threatened to remove the Algiers (Behrman's home 
ward) Naval Station, ordered the repeal of the Storyville 
ordinance and the dismantling of the "red-light district". 
The action of the Behrman administration went against the 
interests of Regular Democrats like Thomas Anderson, Victor 
Mauberret, and Robert Maestri and the brewers and distillers 
who had vast financial investments in the district. For a 
fuller account on the history of Storyville, see Terrence W. 
Fitzmorris, "'The Basin Street Blues': Storyville, 1897- 
1917," paper in the possesion of the author.
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administration would restore essential city services to the 
benefit of all citizens. Behrman's platform and campaign re­
flected those concerns. Soon after the New Year, Behrman 
released his platform.93
On one level, the platform clearly addressed the inter­
ests and needs of the commerical and civic establishment. It 
promised an extensive (and, frankly, necessary) public works 
program aimed at ending the geographic and commerical isola­
tion of New Orleans, rebuilding its decaying transportation 
system, and providing for greater commerical and residential 
development. The Behrman platform called for the municipal 
government, in partnership with several independent state 
and parochial commissions, to build bridges across the 
Mississippi River (a project that predated the war) and Lake 
Pontchartrain, connecting the city by rail and highway with 
the "outside" world. The former mayor pledged his adminis­
tration to a comprehensive paving plan and a comprehensive 
zoning and planning ordinance, though Behrman stopped far 
short of endorsing the Favrot City Planning Commission. And 
the platform promised to end the chronic housing shortage in 
New Orleans by reclaiming a large section of Lake Pontchar­
train for commerical, residential, and recreational develop­
ment. Behrman endorsed the NORLC-NOPSI rehabilitation 
ordinance, however, promising to improve services, reduce
S3New Orleans Item. January 3-6, 1925; New Orleans Daily
States. January 4, 1925.
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rates ("whenever possible"), and enforce strictly all provi­
sions. Finally, Behrman pledged to work closely and on 
friendly terms with the various business and professional 
organizations of the city, promising to include more of them 
in municipal affairs.*■*
But Martin Behrman and the "Old" Regulars had no inten­
tion of relinquishing control of the municipal government to 
the so-called commerical and civic leadership that had for 
years blocked municipal reform and demoralized the municipal 
government. In a statement that accompanied the platform, 
Behrman spoke directly to that issue. "I believe," he said, 
"that our people want an administration with party obliga­
tions and party responsibilities; for it is only through 
party government with party responsibilities that true pro­
gress has been made in government." For Martin Behrman and 
the Regular Democratic Organization, then, good government 
was popular and representative and "true progress" was the 
effective expression of the popular will. The McShane admin­
istration and the commerical and political factions it rep­
resented could never establish good government or initiate 
"true progress" because they were never truly popular and 
their policies were never really expressions of the popular 
will.03
s,,New Orleans Itemr January 4, 6, 1925.
BBNew Orleans Item, January 3-6, 1925; New Orleans Times-
Picayune, January 15, 1925.
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Those failures— and, of course, those of the Behrman 
administrations— were expressed best in the issues raised 
during the municipal campaign. The Behrman campaign empha­
sized the failure, indeed the unwillingness and inability, 
of the Maloney-Sullivan "administration" to initiate the 
reforms promised during the 1920 municipal campaign or to 
adopt the recommendations of its own municipal survey 
commission. The Maloney-Sullivan coalition, in short, mis­
represented itself. It was, in fact, unconcerned with muni­
cipal reform and good government. It first crippled, then 
destroyed, efforts to enact a comprehensive civil service 
system for city government, and it used the immense re­
sources of the state, parochial, and municipal governments 
to construct a second, less enlightened political organiza­
tion, dedicated exclusively to political spoils and patron­
age. Without regard for the safety, health, and general wel­
fare of the citizens of New Orleans, Maloney and Sullivan 
reduced taxes, misappropriating money to special interests 
projects like a "comprehensive" paving plan and curtailing 
essential services like police and fire protection. At every 
instance, it bent to the pressures of special commercial in­
terests, allowing them to determine the assessment and tax 
policy of the municipal government and giving them excessive 
influence over the physical and commerical development of 
the city (the "Old" Regulars ignored the efforts of the 
McShane administration to curb demands of the Favrot City
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Planning Commission).1**1
Mayor Behrman and the "Old" Regulars did not challenge 
Maloney and Sullivan on the NORLC-NOPSI rehabilitation or­
dinance. Rehabilitation was, after all, a problem the 
McShane administration inherited from Martin Behrman and the 
settlement plan owed much to the policies of the Behrman ad­
ministration. t>'7 But Andrew McShane had no qualms about 
attacking Maloney, the commission council (Ray and Black en­
dorsed Maloney and the New Regular municipal ticket), and 
Sullivan on the rehabilitation settlement ordinance. Mayor 
McShane argued that the financial and corporate management 
of NORLC-NOPSI were solely responsible for the intolerable 
physical and financial condition of the public service in­
dustry in New Orleans and they, along with the present com­
mission council, were responsible for the costly rehabili­
tation settlement. McShane complained that the commission
9®New Orleans Item, November 21, December 1, 14, 21,
1924, January 4 through February 5, 1925; New Orleans Daily 
StatesP December 14, 1924, January 3 through February 5,
1925.
9'7The Behrman campaign depicted Maloney and his prin­
cipal supporters as the "determined enemies of labor," 
contending that the NORLC-NOPSI settlement ignored the 
just demands of organized labor. The charge had some justi­
fication. Several Maloney supporters, Sullivan, Parker, 
District Attorney candidate Hugh Wilkinson, had anti-labor 
reputations. But the Behrman administration, though clearly 
on the side of labor during the war and the 1920 strike, did 
not make the interest of labor an integral part of its ef­
forts to rehabilitate NORLC. Seeking a fair settlement for 
stockholders and consumers was, however, hardly an act 
inherently unfriendly to labor. During the 1925 campaign, 
Martin Behrman received endorsements from the major labor 
unions in the city. New Orleans Item, December 14, 21, 1924, 
January 9, 11, 20, 24, 1925.
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council, particularly Commissioner of Public Utilities Paul 
Maloney, bent to the financial and political influence of 
New Orleans Railway and Light Company, arriving at a settle­
ment that favored a mismanaged, bankrupt company and burden­
ing the taxpayers and citizens of New Orleans with exorbi­
tant rates and inadequate service.sa
The response of Paul Maloney and the New Regulars to 
the accusations of the "Old" Regulars and Andrew McShane was 
simple and direct. The ODA commission council inherited six­
teen years of incompetent and "politicized" municipal rule 
from the Behrman administration. No municipal government, 
even one dedicated to progressive municipal reform, could in 
one term cure the administrative and political paralysis of 
Behrman misrule. The ODA commission council was dedicated to 
municipal reform, but it did not govern under ideal condi­
tions. And, though the commission council acted effectively 
and prudently on most issues, Mayor McShane and a remnant of 
unreconstructed politicians blocked or distorted some 
aspects of the municipal reform movement in New Orleans."
The two "conspicuous failures" of the ODA commission 
council, the New Regulars admitted, were civil service re­
form and the revision of tax and assessment policy. Though
"New Orleans Item, November 21, December 1, 1924, 
January 18, 25, 28, 30, 1925; New Orleans Daily States. 
January 22, February 16, 1925.
"New Orleans Item. January 6, 16, 17, 19, February 1, 
16, 1925; New Orleans Daily Statesr January 8, 13, 23, 24, 
1925.
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the RDO and Behrman administration did not introduce the 
"spoils system" to New Orleans, the Maloney campaign argued, 
they perfected it, contributing directly to the administra­
tive and political collapse of the municipal government in 
1920. In the years since the defeat of Martin Behrman in 
1920, the ODA attempted without success to initiate an ef­
fective and permanent civil service system in New Orleans. 
The failure of the ODA, the New Regulars argued, resulted 
from sincere differences within the association about the 
merit and form of civil service legislation and from the 
concerted opposition of the "Old" Regulars to civil service 
reform proposed by the ODA. And the revision of the assess­
ment and tax policies of New Orleans had only been delayed, 
blocked by a Board of Assessors controlled by the "Old" 
Regulars .•**
In other areas, the Maloney campaign argued, the ODA 
administration provided the services and enacted the reforms 
it promised. It reduced taxes and cut needless expenses, 
freeing revenues for more appropriate services. It initiated
coAt the summer session of the Louisiana General Assem­
bly, John Sullivan introduced a civil service bill creating 
a permanent civil service board for the Board of Commissio- 
ers for the Port of New Orleans. The special civil service 
board, comprised exclusively of businessmen, would govern 
the public employees of the Dock Board. The "Old" Regulars 
in the legislature opposed the bill, claiming that Sullivan 
sought to create a permanent class of New Regular supporters 
and, at the same time, realign his faction with the business 
community. The bill failed, allowing Sullivan to claim that 
the "Old" Regulars blocked civil service reform for New 
Orleans. New Orleans Item. June 15, 18 19, 1924; New Orleans 
Daily States, June 19, 1924.
budget and administrative reforms allowing the municipal 
government to operate more efficiently. The ODA commission 
council revised the state and municipal laws concerning 
paving, permitting the municipal government to inaugurate a 
comprehensive paving plan (the New Regulars conveniently 
forgot that the "Old" Regulars enacted the Bond-Theole pav­
ing law). And, despite years of acrid disagreement between 
the Behrman administration and New Orleans Railway and Light 
Company and the unreasonable behavior of Mayor McShane, Com­
missioner Maloney and the ODA commission council brought 
about the prudent and expedient rehabilitation of NORLC. The 
recommendations proposed by Mayor McShane were unacceptable 
to the financial managers of NORLC and would not further the 
public rehabilitation of the company. Nor was there any in­
dication from Mayor Behrman that he opposed the Maloney re­
habilitation settlement or that he would enforce its provi­
sions. A McShane administration, then, threatened to disrupt 
the financial arrangements of the rehabilitation agreement 
and a Behrman administration promised once again the inef­
fective, politicized regulation of the public service indus­
try in New Orleans. McShane was incapable of governing and 
Behrman incapable of reform, only the New Regulars were 
capable of both.*3-
I6 6 4
In the last days of the municipal campaign (offically 
it lasted five weeks), Maloney and Behrman supporters in­
tensified their campaigning, conducting countless rallies 
and, as custom demanded, predicting the outcome of the muni­
cipal elections. Each campaign, of course, predicted a com­
plete victory for its candidate and a thorough, though jus­
tified, defeat for the opposition. Those endorsing Paul 
Maloney claimed that he would win fifteen of the seventeen 
wards, electing his entire commission council ticket and 
most of the parochial ticket. In a similar fashion, the 
"Old" Regulars saw Martin Behrman winning eleven or twelve 
wards, defeating Maloney by "a handsome total majority" and 
carrying the entire RDO ticket to power. Both sides dis­
counted the possibility of a second primary, arguing that 
the McShane candidacy came too late to have any significant 
effect on the election."*
The New Orleans press, with the exception of the Daily 
States, thought differently. The Item and the Times-Picayune 
predicted a close election, with only a few thousand votes 
separating Behrman and Maloney. They predicted McShane to 
finish a distant third, but expected his vote to have a sig­
nificant effect on the outcome of the mayoral election, 
forcing the two leading candidates into a second primary.
®*New Orleans Item. January 21, 25, 31, February 1, 2, 
1925; New Orleans Daily States. January 10, 23, 25, 29, 
February 1, 1925; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 
217-23.
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The two newspapers were convinced that the majority of 
citizens voting for McShane would come from the same class 
of independent voters who elected him in 1920. For Paul 
Maloney to win the mayoral campaign, then, the McShane vote 
would have to be small, somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 
votes, an indication that the Commissioner of Public Utili­
ties had succeeded in attracting the "unbossed" Democratic 
voter. On the other hand, if the McShane total exceeded 
6,000 votes then Maloney had failed to win the independent 
voters of New Orleans, and Martin Behrman would be the next 
mayor of New Orleans.03
As the election officials began tabulating the results, 
it became apparent that a second primary would be necessary 
to determine the next mayor. What was not so apparent, how­
ever, was what effect the McShane candidacy had had on the 
first primary and, more to the point, what effect his vote 
would have on the second primary. Appearances, of course, 
can be deceiving.
Martin Behrman received 35,837 votes, forty-eight 
percent of the vote, winning majorities in nine wards and 
pluralities in two.04 Paul Maloney garnered 33,771 votes, or 
forty-six percent of the vote. Maloney received majorities
"3New Orleans Item, January 25, 31, February 2, 3, 12, 
1925; New Orleans Times-Picavune. February 3, 5, 1925; 
Reynolds, Machine Politics, 217-23.
S4Behrman won majorities in the First, Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fifteenth wards 
and pluralities in the Third (Sullivan's ward) and Seven­
teenth wards. New Orleans Times-Picavune. February 5, 1925.
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in only five wards and a plurality in one.*9 McShane won no 
wards or precincts, receiving only 4,654 votes.** Despite 
the ambiguous character of the election returns, the New 
Regulars argued that the majority of McShane voters would 
support Maloney in the second primary, making him the next 
mayor of New Orleans. Behrman and the "Old" Regulars dis­
agreed with that assessment, claiming that the McShane vote 
was an anti-Maloney and anti-Sullivan vote. Mayor McShane 
agreed with the "Old" Regulars. "As a matter of fact," he 
told reporters, "I got many more votes that Mr. Behrman 
would have got [sic] than I got from Mr. Maloney." The "Old" 
Regulars, too, predicted victory in the second primary.*7 
There is some question, though, whether the McShane 
vote hurt, or favored either candidate. It seems, rather, 
that the McShane candidacy represented the unreconstructed 
anti-Regular voter opposed to both Maloney and Behrman. His 
candidacy did not siphon votes from either Behrman or 
Maloney. By his own admission, McShane's candidacy was not 
an endorsement of Martin Behrman or the "Old" Regulars. At 
first, McShane entered the campaign because of his opposi­
tion to a Maloney-Sullivan administration. He was willing to
*9Maloney received majorities in the Sixth, Twelfth, 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth wards and a plurality 
in the Seventh ward. New Orleans Times-Picavune. February 5,
1925.
""Ibid.
*7New Orleans Times-Picayune. February 5, 6, 1925; New
Orleans Daily States. February 5, 6, 1925; Reynolds, Machine 
Politics in New Orleans. 217-23; Williams, Huev Long. 224-25.
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endorse the "Old" Regular candidate only if the Regulars 
nominated an independent civic leader like Edward Lafaye 
or John Klorer. When the RDO nominated Martin Behrman, 
however, McShane announced his own candidacy, in effect 
running as the independent reform candidate against two 
established machine politicians representing factions of 
the same sordid political organization.
An assessment of the McShane vote does not support the 
contention of contemporaries or historians that it divided 
the anti-Behrman vote, preventing Paul Maloney from winning 
a first primary victory. Admittedly, McShane*s vote came 
principally from those wards and precincts he won in the 
1920 mayoral election. In those ten wards (the Third, Sixth,
h i
Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
Sixteenth, and Seventeenth wards), McShane received 3,249 
votes, nearly seventy percent of his total vote. But in the 
traditional anti-Regular wards (the Eleventh, Twelfth, 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth), Mayor 
McShane received 1,965 votes, only forty-two percent of his 
vote. McShane received 2,169 votes, fifty-seven percent of 
his vote, in the wards carried by Martin Behrman, but only 
1,572 votes, or thirty-four percent, in the Maloney wards. 
And, in the wards where Behrman and Maloney received plural­
ities, McShane garnered nearly one thousand votes. Clearly, 
then, the McShane vote did not represent so much an anti- 
Behrman vote as an anti-Regular vote that did not bother to
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discriminate between Maloney and Behrman.■■
In the days following the primary, several prominent 
businessmen announced their opposition to a second primary, 
calling on Paul Maloney to withdraw his candidacy. In their 
view, a second primary would be divisive and unnecessary, 
resulting ultimately in the election of Martin Behrman. The
sense of the voters, they argued, was with the Behrman Regu­
lars, and no amount of campaigning could change the voters' 
minds. Despite the size and distribution of the McShane 
vote, they believed that Paul Maloney could not defeat 
Martin Behrman. The former mayor received more than 25,000 
votes in the eleven wards he and the "Old" Regulars command­
ed, and more than 10,000 votes in the so-called Maloney 
wards. In contrast, the Maloney vote was concentrated in the 
wards above Canal Street or controlled by professional poli­
ticians like Sullivan and Francis and Gus Williams. Behrman 
and the "Old" Regulars could only add to their totals in a 
second primary, while Maloney would be fortunate to retain 
the vote he received in the first primary.
The businessmen also pointed out that the Behrman Regu­
lars controlled the municipal and parochial governments of 
New Orleans. The RDO elected three of its candidates to the 
commission council (Behrman would be the fourth), controlled 
the District Attorney's Office, the Board of Assessors, six
""Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans. 217-23; 
Williams, Huev Long. 224-25.
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parochial offices (the New Regulars elected six parish 
officers, all of them incumbents), fifteen of the seventeen 
state Representatives, five of the seven state Senators, and 
fifteen of the seventeen members of the Democratic Central 
Committee for Orleans Parish. The businessmen conceded that 
the election had been close, but the decision of the voters 
was clear and they saw no legitimate reason to question the 
will of the people.89
At the end of the week, the New Regular leadership and 
the executive committee of the Maloney campaign met to con­
sider their plans for a second primary. But during the con­
ference, it became apparent that Maloney could not defeat 
Behrman in a second primary. Overwhelmed with debt and de­
sertions, the New Regulars advised Maloney to withdraw from 
the second primary. Unable to raise more money or to prevent 
further erosion of his support, Paul Maloney withdrew from 
the campaign, conceding the election to Behrman.70
With the campaign and election over, Martin Behrman 
urged the citizens of New Orleans to place their partisan 
considerations behind them, concentrating their efforts 
instead on building a political system dedicated to public 
service. Too often in the past, he said, public service was 
"sacrificed to political expediency". New Orleans could no 
longer live in the past. It had to deal with its present
" N e w  Orleans Item, February 5-10, 1925. The state and
party officials were elected in January, 1924.
7°New Orleans Item. February 5-7, 1925.
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problems and plan for the future. "Political conditions have 
changed," he said in an interview after the municipal 
campaign. "Organizations such as ours no longer hold their 
grip on the public by the old influences. Old agencies that 
held men in line have disappeared, and today public offici­
als are elected to office upon the record of their accom­
plishments. If we are to remain in power, we can only do so 
by giving the people what they pay for and that I propose to 
do during this administration." "My greatest aim," he con­
tinued elsewhere, "will be to give New Orleans an adminis­
tration which will work for the advancement of the city's 
coromerical and industrial interests as well as its social 
welfare, and to put an end to the public discord which has 
retarded our development." And, though politics must always 
determine public policy, he concluded, it must never again 
impede "civic progress".73-
Early in May, Martin Behrman again took the oath of 
office as mayor of New Orleans. In his brief remarks before 
a modest crowd of supporters and civic officials, the "new" 
mayor reminded his audience how little the needs of the city 
had changed in the past twenty years. In 1925, as in 1904, 
the city demanded an extensive array of public and social 
services, all essential to the public and private welfare of 
its citizens. Today, as yesterday, he continued, the citi­
7iNew Orleans Item, March 1, 4, 19, April 23, 1925, Janu­
ary 12, 1926; New Orleans Daily States. April 23, 1925.
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zens of New Orleans demanded a healthy physical and commeri- 
cal environment, modern transportation systems, an expanded 
water, sewerage, and drainage system, better police and fire 
protection, more and better health facilities, ample, cheap 
gas and electric service, affordable, decent housing, super­
ior public education, and, most important of all, an effi­
cient and honest municipal government.72
Though the demands for essential city services had not 
changed, Behrman said, the ability of the municipal govern­
ment to address and resolve those issues had changed for the 
better and for the worse. The commission council system and 
the other divisions of the municipal government were, for 
the most part, reliable and effective instruments of the 
public will, and did not require any fundamental revision.
Over the past eight years, however, the municipal government 
of New Orleans allowed private and partisan interests to 
erode its authority and distort its fundamental purpose. The 
Regular Democratic Organization, the mayor said, would re­
store discipline to the municipal administration, giving it 
structure and purpose and allowing it to more clearly define 
public needs and to achieve the public good.73
When the commission council met for the first time, 
it adopted a series of resolutions imposing a rigorous par­
tisan and administrative discipline on all municipal depart­
72New Orleans Item. May 4, 5, 1925.
73Ibid.
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ments serving under it. From the outset, the Behrman admin­
istration sought to exert greater authority over the munici­
pal and parochial governments, reclaiming the initiative 
over public policy from the independent boards and commis­
sions controlled by an commerical-civic elite that had crip­
pled earlier administrations and demoralized the municipal 
reform movement.7*
The Behrman adminstration sought, as well, to eliminate 
the influence of John Sullivan over public administration 
and public policy, removing "unqualified" appointees and 
severing ties with those interests favored by Sullivan. The 
resolutions also sought to bring order and purpose to the 
municipal administration and public policy by revising the 
budgetary commitments of the McShane administration. The new 
budget reflected the commitments of the Behrman administra­
tion to essential city services, rather than to those bene- 
fitting a special class of citizens and interests. The 
Behrman budget called for more money for police and fire 
protection, schools and teachers, expansion of the sewerage 
and water system, and better health care.7*
The budget also provided for a planned and manageable 
city plan, coordinating the priorities of businesses and 
neighborhoods. As such, the new administration pledged 
greater support for the City Planning and Zoning Commission,
7*New Orleans Item. March through September, 1925.
7BIbid.
the Sewerage and Water Board, and the Department of Public 
Property. In addition, Behrman promised to complete the Lake 
Pontchartrain seawall, opening up a vast tract of land for 
residential and commercial development. He also called for 
a bridge across the Mississippi River, permitting the Public 
Belt Railroad Commission and the port authority to facili­
tate and expand the flow of commerce. Finally, the 1926 bud­
get called on the mayor and the council to find the proper 
balance between services and revenues, preventing partisan­
ship from impeding civic progress.7®
Martin Behrman would never fulfill those commitments to 
municipal reform. Early in January, 1926, after weeks of 
confinement at home, he died.77
76Ibid.
77New Orleans Item, October 3, 1925, January 2, 3, 12, 
1926; New Orleans Daily States, January 3, 12, 1926.
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